Moving back into the Orbit? ­ Russia′s influence in Central Asia

Author: Christian Ganske

Table of Contents

Introduction
1 Filters for the projection of Russia′s power in Central Asia
1.1 Russia′s domestic politics and its policy towards Central Asia
1.2 The process of state- and nation-building in Central Asia
1.3 The engagement of other states in Central Asia
2 Outcomes
2.1 Russia′s influence in the field of security and defence
2.2 Russia′s cultural influence
2.3 Russia′s influence on the Central Asian economies
3 Moving back into the Russian orbit? ­Russia′s influence in Central Asia in the mid-term future
Bibliography

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Introduction

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the relationship between the new states of Central Asia1 and Russia has been characterized by a great deal of dependence of the former on the latter. Reluctantly approving the dissolution of the Soviet Union and, thus, having gained de jure sovereignty from Moscow, the leaders of these countries have been facing the highly challenging task of state-building and of the consolidation of their nations.2 New state identities had to be defined that emphasize the difference from the other former Soviet republics. This process involved the setting up of a self-assertive policy towards their immediate neighbours, but also towards Russia. Moreover, the new Central Asian states looked for new allies beyond the territory of the former Soviet Union.3

While Russia′s influence on these weak new states remained substantial, in terms of economic relations and security, there seems to be a consensus among experts on the region that this influence has been gradually decreasing throughout the 1990s and even more so with the emergence of the US as a dominant player in the region in the aftermath of 9/11.4 Less research has been done on the question whether this trend is likely to continue in the short- and mid-term future taking into consideration attempts by President Vladimir Putin to strengthen Russia′s role in the region since summer 2002.5 This paper seeks to close that gap in the existing research body by an analysis of the factors conditioning Russia′s influence in Central Asia.

Before I present my main claim, let me outline an important theoretical consideration which my claim builds on. I start by assuming that Russia′s power6--before it can materialize as influence in distinct policy outcomes on the political-military, cultural and economic fields--has to go through certain "filters".7 Thus, these filters can be understood as the intervening variables in the causal relationship between Russia′s power (independent

^{1 The new Central Asian states are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
2 Shirin Akiner, 1998, Social and Political Reorganisation in Central Asia: Transition from Pre-Colonial to Post-Colonial Society, in: Touraj Atabaki, John O′Kane (eds.), 1998, Post-Soviet Central Asia, London: Tauris, pp. 1-34.
3 Anthony Hyman, 1993, `Moving out of Moscow′s Orbit: The Outlook for Central Asia,′ International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 2, pp. 288-304.
4 Anthony Hyman, ibidem. More recently: Martha Brill Olcott, 2003, `Taking Stock of Central Asia,′ Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 3-17.
5 Recent articles that address this issue are: Roy Allison, 2004, `Strategic reassertion in Russia′s Central Asia policy,′ International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 277-293; Peter Rutland, 2003, `Russia′s Response to U.S. Regional Influence,′ NBR Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 27-50; Paul Kubicek, 2004, `Russian Energy Policy in the Caspian Basin,′ World Affairs, Vol. 166, No. 4, pp. 207-217.
6 I use the notion of power in the sense of Karl W. Deutsch′s definition. He understands power as "facilities to put a decision into effect against possible external resistance, or in any case, to put it into effect in such a manner as to make some appreciable difference to the ensemble of outcomes in the environment that would have occurred anyway." Karl W. Deutsch, 1966, The Nerves of Government. Models of Political Communication and Control, New York: Free Press, p. 110.}

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variable) and Russia′s influence on the Central Asian states (dependent variable). I divide these filters into three categories: first, Russia′s domestic process of policy formulation towards Central Asia; second, the process of state and nation-building within the region; and third, the impact of policies pursued by other influential players in the region, above all the U.S., but also China, Turkey and Iran.8 In order to make a fair assessment of the impact Putin′s "strategic reassertion" might have on Russia′s influence in Central Asia, a close inspection of these filters will be essential.

My main argument in this paper is that Putin′s policy of a strategic reassertion has the biggest impact on the first filter (formulation of Russia′s policy towards Central Asia) that leads to the reinvigoration of Russia′s Central Asia policy. The structures of the second and third filters are far less effected by this policy change, but they provide levers Russia can use to exert its influence in the region. It is only after the first filter has been changed by Putin that Russia is now in a position to make more effective use of the levers provided by the second and third filter.

The paper is structured as follows: in the first section, the conditions shaping the filters will be more precisely outlined, giving also consideration to changes that have occurred under Putin. In section two, the impact and interplay of the filters on fields such as security, culture and economic relations will be analyzed. Further, it will be scrutinized how Putin′s strategic reassertion has altered this interplay. The final section looks what possible implications my argument has for the prediction of Russia′s influence in Central Asia in the short- and mid-term future and develops possible scenarios.

1 Filters for the projection of Russia′s power in Central Asia

In this section I outline the conditions shaping the filters for the projection of Russia′s power in Central Asia (intervening variables). These are, first, Russia′s domestic politics and the resulting policy towards Central Asia; second, the process of state- and nation-building in Central Asia; and, third, the engagement of external players other than Russia.

1.1 Russia′s domestic politics and its policy towards Central Asia

The first filter concerns the nature of the political system in post-Soviet Russia and its impact on the policy Russia pursued towards the Central Asian countries. After 1991 Russia has been

^{7 I am grateful to Flemming Splidsboel Hansen to have directed my attention to this theoretical consideration.
8 I do not claim that these categories are independent from each other.}

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