Moving back into the Orbit? ­ Russia′s influence in Central Asia

Author: Christian Ganske

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Table of Contents

Introduction

1

Filters for the projection of Russia′s power in Central Asia

1.1

Russia′s domestic politics and its policy towards Central Asia

1.2

The process of state- and nation-building in Central Asia

1.3

The engagement of other states in Central Asia

2

Outcomes

2.1

Russia′s influence in the field of security and defence

2.2

Russia′s cultural influence

2.3

Russia′s influence on the Central Asian economies

3

Moving back into the Russian orbit? ­Russia′s influence in Central Asia in the mid-

term future

Bibliography

2

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Introduction

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the relationship between the new states of Central

Asia1 and Russia has been characterized by a great deal of dependence of the former on the

latter. Reluctantly approving the dissolution of the Soviet Union and, thus, having gained

de

jure

sovereignty from Moscow, the leaders of these countries have been facing the highly

challenging task of state-building and of the consolidation of their nations.2 New state

identities had to be defined that emphasize the difference from the other former Soviet

republics. This process involved the setting up of a self-assertive policy towards their

immediate neighbours, but also towards Russia. Moreover, the new Central Asian states

looked for new allies beyond the territory of the former Soviet Union.3

While Russia′s influence on these weak new states remained substantial, in terms of

economic relations and security, there seems to be a consensus among experts on the region

that this influence has been gradually decreasing throughout the 1990s and even more so with

the emergence of the US as a dominant player in the region in the aftermath of 9/11.4 Less

research has been done on the question whether this trend is likely to continue in the short-

and mid-term future taking into consideration attempts by President Vladimir Putin to

strengthen Russia′s role in the region since summer 2002.5 This paper seeks to close that gap

in the existing research body by an analysis of the factors conditioning Russia′s influence in

Central Asia.

Before I present my main claim, let me outline an important theoretical consideration

which my claim builds on. I start by assuming that Russia′s power6--before it can materialize

as influence in distinct policy outcomes on the political-military, cultural and economic

fields--has to go through certain "filters".7 Thus, these filters can be understood as the

intervening variables in the causal relationship between Russia′s power (independent

1 The new Central Asian states are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.

2 Shirin Akiner, 1998, Social and Political Reorganisation in Central Asia: Transition from Pre-Colonial to Post-

Colonial Society, in: Touraj Atabaki, John O′Kane (eds.), 1998,

Post-Soviet Central Asia

, London: Tauris, pp. 1-

34.

3 Anthony Hyman, 1993, `Moving out of Moscow′s Orbit: The Outlook for Central Asia,′

International Affairs

,

Vol. 69, No. 2, pp. 288-304.

4 Anthony Hyman,

ibidem

. More recently: Martha Brill Olcott, 2003, `Taking Stock of Central Asia,′

Journal of
International Affairs

, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 3-17.

5 Recent articles that address this issue are: Roy Allison, 2004, `Strategic reassertion in Russia′s Central Asia

policy,′

International Affairs

, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 277-293; Peter Rutland, 2003, `Russia′s Response to U.S.

Regional Influence,′

NBR Analysis

, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 27-50; Paul Kubicek, 2004, `Russian Energy Policy in

the Caspian Basin,′

World Affairs

, Vol. 166, No. 4, pp. 207-217.

6 I use the notion of power in the sense of Karl W. Deutsch′s definition. He understands power as "facilities to

put a decision into effect against possible external resistance, or in any case, to put it into effect in such a manner

as to make some appreciable difference to the ensemble of outcomes in the environment that would have

occurred anyway." Karl W. Deutsch, 1966,

The Nerves of Government. Models of Political Communication and
Control

, New York: Free Press, p. 110.

3

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variable) and Russia′s influence on the Central Asian states (dependent variable). I divide

these filters into three categories: first, Russia′s domestic process of policy formulation

towards Central Asia; second, the process of state and nation-building within the region; and

third, the impact of policies pursued by other influential players in the region, above all the

U.S., but also China, Turkey and Iran.8 In order to make a fair assessment of the impact

Putin′s "strategic reassertion" might have on Russia′s influence in Central Asia, a close

inspection of these filters will be essential.

My main argument in this paper is that Putin′s policy of a strategic reassertion has the

biggest impact on the first filter (formulation of Russia′s policy towards Central Asia) that

leads to the reinvigoration of Russia′s Central Asia policy. The structures of the second and

third filters are far less effected by this policy change, but they provide levers Russia can use

to exert its influence in the region. It is only after the first filter has been changed by Putin

that Russia is now in a position to make more effective use of the levers provided by the

second and third filter.

The paper is structured as follows: in the first section, the conditions shaping the filters

will be more precisely outlined, giving also consideration to changes that have occurred under

Putin. In section two, the impact and interplay of the filters on fields such as security, culture

and economic relations will be analyzed. Further, it will be scrutinized how Putin′s strategic

reassertion has altered this interplay. The final section looks what possible implications my

argument has for the prediction of Russia′s influence in Central Asia in the short- and mid-

term future and develops possible scenarios.

1

Filters for the projection of Russia′s power in Central Asia

In this section I outline the conditions shaping the filters for the projection of Russia′s power

in Central Asia (intervening variables). These are, first, Russia′s domestic politics and the

resulting policy towards Central Asia; second, the process of state- and nation-building in

Central Asia; and, third, the engagement of external players other than Russia.

1.1

Russia′s domestic politics and its policy towards Central Asia

The first filter concerns the nature of the political system in post-Soviet Russia and its impact

on the policy Russia pursued towards the Central Asian countries. After 1991 Russia has been

7 I am grateful to Flemming Splidsboel Hansen to have directed my attention to this theoretical consideration.

8 I do not claim that these categories are independent from each other.

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