Product Safety in the Chinese Automotive Industry

Seminararbeit der Veranstaltung "Business Ethics in China" an der Universität Zürich


Seminararbeit, 2010
44 Seiten, Note: 1,0

Leseprobe

Content

1. Introduction

2. The automotive industry and China
2.1. Facts and figures
2.2. China - A new hope
2.2.1. Chinese manufacturers
2.2.2. European manufacturers in China

3. European-Chinese automotive cooperations
3.1. Influence of European car manufacturers on the Chinese industry
3.2. European-Chinese automotive cooperations: BMW and Brilliance

4. Product safety in the automotive industry
4.1. European safety standards and legislations
4.2. Importance of crash safety for customer satisfaction
4.3. The Brilliance BS4 and BS6 crash test debacles

5. Ethical discussion
5.1. Summary and outlook of the Chinese automotive industry
5.2. European-Chinese automotive cooperations and business ethics
5.3. Importance of automotive safety in China
5.4. A potential solution: Transnational safety lab
5.5. What makes the automotive industry different?

Citations

List of figures

Figure 1: Car sales of light vehicles from 1990 to 2010

Figure 2: Mercedes CLK and BYD S8

Figure 3: Key Issues for the Auto Industry Under the WTO Agreement

Figure 4: Kano model

Figure 5: Jiangling Landwind crash test

Figure 6: Brilliance BS6 crash test

Abstract

The paper will discuss the phenomenon of European car manufacturers operating outstandingly successful in China without losing their know-how and competitive advantages to Chinese firms, despite being forced to do business in China in joint ventures with Chinese partners. The focus of the thesis will lie on product safety concerns of Chinese cars as well as the existence of European-Chinese joint ventures within the automotive industry in China, especially the coop- eration of BMW and Brilliance. Next to the examination of reasons why European manufac- turers were able to keep their knowledge in creating better and particularly safer cars than their Chinese counterparts, the author will discuss the question if and how European carmakers should and could help their Chinese business partners to build safer cars from an ethical point of view

The author finds the existence of economic reasons which for European manufacturers speak against helping Chinese firms to make their cars safer, namely that due to a loss of know-how European firms could support potential future competitors within their home markets. Additionally, the author suggests that part of the problem is caused by the low public awareness for the importance of crash safety in the Chinese population due to the still low traffic density. Ultimately, the author proposes the foundation of a transnational, non-profit and independent safety lab by European manufacturers and suppliers, which not only could reduce costs in R&D for car safety technology, but could also offer consulting and R&D services in safety technology for carmakers of developing countries

The findings within the paper show, that there exist three main reasons why the European automotive industry unlike other industries can operate so successful in China without losing their knowhow. First, as the example of product safety illustrates, European car firms are very successful in influencing European legislation, namely the approval process of new cars, and therefore building feasible barriers to entry. Secondly, European carmakers effectively limit the knowledge-transfer within the joint ventures to the production and manufacturing of new cars, and are not investing in a know-how transfer on the R&D and marketing level. The third rea- son is that the business model of European car manufacturers is not solely relying on imitable technological advantages, but mainly on the emotional differentiation of their products, which obviously rests heavily on tacit knowledge within European firms that can not be observed or learnt by reengineering or just copying

1. Introduction

When we talk about the current economic crisis, we tend to forget that while it was mainly caused by the financial sector, the economic downturn has also brutally affected other industries, like for example the tourism industry (Handelsblatt, 2009b), the airline industry and, amongst a lot of others, especially the automotive industry, which becomes very obvious if we have a closer look at what happened in countries that do have a strong economic focus on the automotive industry within the last two years.

One of the worldwide biggest companies in the automotive industry, GM, had to report busi- ness failure in 2009 and had to be saved from insolvency by the US government (Welt, 2009; Piper, 2009). As a consequence of that, the German subsidiary of GM, Opel, was reported to be sold to the Canadian-Austrian Magna-Styr Group after months of negotiations. However, in the last minute, GM decided to stay with Opel and now has to refund the 1.5 billion Euros of bridge financing (Spiegel, 2009). After original plans of closing GM’s Swedish subsidiary company Saab, it was sold to the Dutch sports car manufacturer Spyker in 2010 (Spiegel, 2010). Volvo, Ford’s Swedish subsidiary, was sold to the Chinese Geely Group in 2010 (Auto, Motor & Sport, 2010d). Chrysler, the other US company with massive financial issues, con- tracted a strategic alliance with the Italian Fiat Group to get access to know-how and technol- ogy for vehicles in the small and mini car segments (NZZ, 2009b), after facing a 53% decline in sales in Dezember 2008 (Süddeutsche, 2009). And the three main German premium manu- facturers Audi, BMW and Mercedes faced declines in sales in 2009 of up to 28% compared to the previous year (Auto, Motor & Sport, 2009f).

However, the recent downfall of the automotive industry is not entirely caused by the current financial crisis. The automotive markets of Europe, the USA and Japan have turned to buyers’ markets many years ago and are considered saturated. Long before the current economic and financial crisis the demand for automobiles, not only in these markets, started to decline. Despite the brutal cut-throat competition that thus started and the separation of the industry in premium and mass production manufacturers, a lot of players in the market still built up excess capacities (see for example Diez, 2001, p. 29ff.; Ludvigsen, 1995, p. 17; Ebel, Hofer & AlSibai, 2003, p. 3; Imhof, 2008; Hamprecht & Ostmann, 2008). It becomes clear that structural weaknesses were there long before the last economic crisis.

Of course, the automotive industry is not simply waiting for its complete breakdown. There are indeed some trends which can be observed in the whole industry: The trend for smaller cars (see for example Delekat, 2008; Imhof, 2008; Köth, 2008), the trend for multimedia and con- nected devices for in-car entertainment systems (see for example Whitfield, 2004; Bloch, 2009; Szych, 2008), downsizing and turbo- or supercharging in engine technology (see for example Grünweg, 2007; Auto Motor & Sport, 2008a; 2008b; 2008c), efficient and clean new- technology powertrains like hybrids (see for example Hamprecht & Ostmann, 2008) as well as China as the growth market of the future - which finally brings us to the focus of this paper.

The importance of China for the automotive industry derives from two sides. First of all, China with its huge population and enormous economic growth is the most important growth market for the whole automotive industry and especially for manufacturers who face saturated home markets. Secondly, Chinese manufacturers not only are tough competitors in the Chinese mar- ket itself, but also play an increasingly more important role in the industry as a whole. These observations pose two important questions. First, facing the enormous success of par- ticularly European premium brands operating in China, one could wonder how European car manufacturers were able to produce and sell their cars in China without loosing their know- how of how to make “good” cars in a country where almost every other industrial product is copied and then successfully sold in- and outside of China. Secondly, the big product safety scandals of Chinese manufacturers in the past - think of Baxter or Mattel (see Santoro, 2009, p. 50) - have made customers, experts, competitors and governments critical and mistrustful about Chinese products and manufacturers in general. The automotive industry had its own case from this perspective: The terrifying crash test results of the BS6 and BS4, both of which models from the Chinese manufacturer Brilliance, which like a lot of Chinese manufacturers is engaged in a joint venture with an European company, in this case BMW. The aim of this paper therefore is to work out how (a) European manufacturers are able to limit the knowledge-transfer to their Chinese business partners, if (b) the currently inferior product safety of Chinese cars should concern European manufacturers and - if yes - why it should concern them and how they should and could react to this issue.

The final question the author wants to answer within this paper is why and how European car manufacturers should and can help the Chinese car industry to overcome product safety issues from a business ethical point of view. To foreclose some findings, the obvious answer to this question - which is that for European manufacturers the inferior product safety of Chinese cars is helpful because it helps them to differentiate their own products from the cheaper Chinese alternatives in the home and Chinese market - has to be discussed more differentiated, with potential externalities as well as future competitive and strategic developments in mind.

2. The automotive industry and China

2.1. Facts and figures

Since its invention by Carl Benz in 1886, the car has gathered a rather great amount of attention and has become one of the most important technological products of them all - along with its industry. There are over 100 different brands competing worldwide, producing 73’152’696 cars in 2007, 70’520’493 in 2008 (-3.7%) and 60’986’985 in 2009 (-13.5%) (Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers [OICA], 2010). About 8.8 million people globally work directly for the automotive industry and generate approximately 15% of the global GDP (Dannenberg & Kleinhans, 2004, p. 88).

Figure 1: Car sales of light vehicles from 1990 to 2010

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, AutoData, found on Markt-Daten, 2010

How hard the financial crisis hit the automotive industry can easily be identified by having a closer look at some numbers and indicators: Whereas the German automotive industry alone earned 330 billion Euros in 2008, revenues broke down to approximately 263 billion Euros in 2009 (-20.5%) (Verband der Automobilindustrie [VDA], 2010). The globally biggest car mar- ket, America, was hit even harder by the economic events taking place in 2008 and 2009, with Chrysler, Ford and GM reporting declines in sales of 30% compared to the previous year (Süddeutsche, 2009). The massive overall decline of sales in the American market can be seen in figure 1.

2.2. China - A new hope

Facing the enormous challenges explained in chapter 2.1., the whole automotive industry is currently searching for the “holy grale”, which are unsaturated growth markets in which mar- ket shares can be gained easier than on the traditional, saturated markets. China, it seems, is the market the whole industry is currently concentrating on, which can be seen by the enormous efforts of all manufacturers for the Peking Autoshow 2010 (see Baumann, 2010). Whereas the traditionally vital car shows, for example Geneva, Detroit or Tokyo, are facing decreasing at- tendance and manufacturers even starting to cancel their participation on these auto shows, 2100 manufacturers from 16 different countries are attending the Peking Autoshow (Focus, 2010b; Grundhoff, 2010). Remarkable is that especially premium brands are starting to heavily penetrate the Chinese market on the Peking Autoshow with the promotion of concept cars and special editions of their current cars, which will be exclusively sold in China1.

The reason the Peking Autoshow has become such an important event for the whole industry is that in the last couple of years China has become the most important growth market for the automotive industry. Whilst all other global key car markets still struggle to recover from the economic crisis, China faced 10 million registrations of new cars in 2009 and therefore re- placed the United States as the biggest car market (Grundhoff, 2010; Himmelbauer, 2010). During the first three months of 2010, China also experienced a 77.5% increase in sales com- pared to the previous year, with an expected number of new-car- registrations of 17 million vehicles for 2010 (Focus, 2010b; Auto Motor & Sport, 2010b). Experts forecast that by 2015 China will definitely replace Japan, America and all major car markets in Europe as the biggest automotive market in the world (Grundhoff, 2010). Finally, China has also become the biggest car manufacturing country, with 13.7 million cars built in 2009 (Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers [OICA], 2010). The basis for the extensive growth of the Chinese market are governmental buying incentives, namely tax benefits (see for example Auto Motor & Sport, 2009e), economic stimulus packages, increasing demand in smaller cities and the rising wealth in the Chinese population (NZZ, 2010a). Compared to the relation of 500 cars per 1000 habi- tants in Germany for example, China shows a huge potential with just 21 cars per 1000 habi- tants (Hamprecht, 2010c).

BMW (Bähnisch, 2010a) and Mercedes (Kriebel, 2010) for example are presenting long-wheelbase versions of their upper-class limousines which will be produced and sold in China, Bentley (Bähnisch, 2010c) and Lamborghini (Bähnisch, 2010e) showcasing special (colour) editions of their current cars, Volkswagen introducing the world-premiere of the facelift of its luxury model Phaeton (Grundhoff, 2010) and BMW, Mercedes and Ford putting eye-catching concept cars on stage (Bähnisch, 2010d; Wittich, 2010a). Even more extreme are the efforts of Chinese manufacturers which are exhibiting close to 100 world premiers (Grundhoff, 2010).

2.2.1. Chinese manufacturers

As much as the Peking Autoshow 2010 shows the importance of the Chinese automotive market, it also displays one of the major issues European manufacturers are facing when it comes to their Chinese counterparts: Shameless Plagiarism (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Mercedes CLK and BYD S8

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Source: Wittich, 2010b

It is above all the exterior design that is copied by Chinese firms (see Autobild, 2010a; Wittich, 2010b; Baumann, 2008b). Whilst this is not so much a problem for export markets, because the enforcement of (intellectual) property rights and copy rights in Europe is rather strong (see Baumann, 2008b; Auto Motor & Sport, 2006b), but a serious issue in the Chinese market, be- cause the optical similarities of the infringing rip-offs to the originals not only put European manufacturers under pressure to innovate quicker, but also could lead to biased brand percep- tions of the original brands because of potential quality and safety issues of the optical very similar copies. The underlying problems are that copies in general are not considered worse than the originals in the Chinese culture: “Some observers see inadequate intellectual property protection as being rooted in an intellectual history which helped the perfect imitation of an- cient arts and styles in high regard and viewed new creations with suspicion” (Ganea & Pattloch, 2005, p. xi; see also Alford, 1995, p. 9ff.). Also, Chinese firms tend to face a signifi- cantly shorter time-to-market (see Kaufmann et al., 2005, p. 185) and incentives to copy, be- cause whereas copies normally are stopped from being sold in Europe, the Chinese home mar- ket for these copiers is still large enough to make it financially profitable to infringe on Euro- pean copy rights (see for example Yu, 2000; New York Times, 2009; Gu, 2009; Zheng, 1997). The Chinese car manufacturing industry itself is traditionally very fragmented, which can be explained by its history (see Süddeutsche, 2010; Harwit, 1994; Hofer, Schmutzler & Ebel, 2004, p. 155). Since 1950, the China tried to establish a strong domestic automotive industry but failed to do so because of the insufficient technological know-how and the lacking domes- tic demand, which meant that manufacturers were not able to produce on an economically effi- cient level (Hofer, Schmutzler & Ebel, 2004, p. 144) and therefore were not able to exploit economies of scale. After opening the Chinese market in the 1980’s, foreign manufacturers faced huge import tariffs, narrow import licences and import restrictions, which is the reason they were forced to engage in joint ventures with Chinese manufacturers. This made the situa- tion for the domestic manufacturers even worse: Out of the 120 manufacturers operating in China in 1998, just 13 produced 92% of all produced vehicles (Hofer, Schmutzler & Ebel, 2004, p. 148). China’s participation in the WTO forced the government to further relax import tariffs, which lead to a further opening of the market and an even more increasing pressure on small manufacturers. Today, the biggest Chinese manufacturers - Chang´an, BYD, Great Wall and Brilliance - face a market share of roughly 35% (see Rose, 2010). Whereas the Chinese industry still is technologically dragging behind in the production of internal combustion en- gines, Chinese manufacturers play a leading role in the development and of battery powered drivetrain systems and therefore could be an important partner in the future (Schrieber, 2010; Focus, 2010b; Auto Motor & Sport, 2010e; Dohr & Hamprecht, 2010).

Moreover, Chinese manufacturers have started to acquire European brands to gather techno- logical know-how. Examples are Geely that acquired Volvo in 2010 (Süddeutsche, 2010; Auto Motor & Sport, 2010d), BAIC that acquired parts of Saab in 2009 (Autobild, 2010b) and wanted to buy Opel in 2009 (Auto Motor & Sport, 2009d), SAIC2 that bought Rover in 2004 (Auto Motor & Sport, 2004c) or FAW3 that wanted to buy Bertone in 2008 (Baumann, 2008a). Next to the incentive of acquiring knowledge, the motivation of buying former European manufacturers and/or suppliers could be the long-term plan of Chinese firms to start production in Europe (Baumann, 2008a).

2.2.2. European manufacturers in China

For foreign automotive manufacturers, there are only two ways of selling cars in China: Accepting the enormously high import taxes (260% in 1980, see Harwit, 2001), narrow import licences as well as import restrictions and sell cars at extremely high prices, or start joint ventures with Chinese manufacturers to produce their cars locally in China.

Since the opening of the Chinese (automotive) market in the 1980s, the Chinese government “encouraged” foreign manufacturers to arrange in joint ventures with domestic firms to help the industry gathering technological and economic knowledge in producing cars (Hofer, Schmutzler & Ebel, 2004, p. 146). Although trade barriers eroded with time, joint ventures were - and still are - the only way for foreign car manufacturers to by-pass the high import taxes. However, the attractiveness of such joint ventures faced some limitations:

“Vehicle manufacturers could not own a majority stake in a manufacturing plant - Volkswagen’s venture took the limit of 50 per cent foreign ownership. Manufacturers also had incentives and pressures to source parts from Chinese suppliers, with a 40 per cent local-content rate bestowing reduced parts import duties of some 30 per cent on the foreign partner. The Chinese also kept control of distribution networks for the jointly-produced automobiles.” (Harwit, 2001, p. 656)

It was China’s participation in the WTO in 2001 which finally showed significant improvements in the competitive situation for foreign manufacturers (see figure 3).

Figure 3: Key issues for the auto industry under the WTO agreement

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Source: Harwit, 2001, p. 663

Facing these developments, there can be identified some clear winners and losers. Whereas the American Motor Corporation’s joint venture Beijing Jeep “never found a mass market for its high-platform vehicles” and Peugeot withdrawing from its joint venture in southern China in 1997 (with Honda filling the gap), “Volkswagen’s Shanghai plant was by the far the winner under the regime, as it produced cars that could function as taxis, vehicles for government offi- cials and transport for the newly emerging business elite” (Harwit, 20001, p. 657).

With trade barriers still intact (see for example Hamprecht, 2010c; Auto Motor & Sport, 2006d), but further eroding (see for example Hoffbauer, 2009), and next to Japanese and Ko- rean manufacturers (particularly Toyota, Honda, Mazda and Hyundai, see for example Harwit, 2001, p. 666ff.; Autobild, 2002), German manufacturers today seem to be the players within the Chinese market which benefit the most from it. Nearly every fifth sold car in China in 2009 (Focus, 2010b; Auto Motor & Sport, 2010b) and 80% of all sold premium vehicles were German (Hamprecht, 2010c). Brands like Porsche and Audi already consider China as their key market (Hamprecht, 2007; 2010d; Auto Motor & Sport, 2009b).

An important observation is that manufacturers which invested early in joint ventures in China now seem to be the most successful (which from the author’s standpoint could be an indication for the importance of Guanxi): Next to Shanghai General Motors, Bejing Hyundai (Himmel- bauer, 2010) and Audi, which already started operating in China 21 years ago (NZZ, 2009a), it is mainly the Volkswagen Group China with its two joint ventures Shanghai Volkswagen and FAW-Volkswagen (see Kaufmanm et al., 2005, p. 87). In 1984, VW4 signed a 45-year joint venture with SAIC (Engel, 2009). Thanks to additional structural conditions such as the loca- tion of the manufacturing industry (see Harwit, 20001), the joint venture between VW and SAIC rose to the most successful with a current market share of roughly 15% (Focus, 2010b) and a 60% increase in sales within the first quarter of 2010 (Auto Motor & Sport, 2010e). With the expected entry of the French PSA group (Auto Motor & Sport, 2010c), the author supposes that China will play a leading role for the European industry of the future. Facing a further opening of the Chinese market, it will be interesting to observe if the concept of joint ventures will be as successful in the future as it was in the past. Especially Toyota is playing a leading role in hedging the benefits from producing cars locally in China (low costs of labour and do- mestic parts) and importing them and profit from the advantages from the Japanese home mar- ket (high efficiency and quality) (Harwit, 2001, p. 665f.; see also Auto Motor & Sport, 2003).

3. European-Chinese automotive cooperations

3.1. Influence of European car manufacturers on the Chinese industry

Since a complete list and discussion of all possible and actual influencing factors of European car manufacturers on the Chinese automotive industry would go beyond the scope of this the- sis, the author will focus on the most popular and mostly discussed themes. One important and very critical aspect how the European car industry is affecting China’s is with the expected and hoped technology and knowledge transfer through the above described joint ventures. This aspect of course is critical, because the efforts of the Chinese state to estab- lish a modern and competitive industry in its own country, to meet its own economical, envi- Volkswagen ronmental and safety goals and to quickly reduce the technological and knowledge-based backlog of the domestic industry (see Engel, 2009) heavily depend on how and to which extent this technology and know-how transfer actually takes place.

How important these cooperations between foreign and Chinese manufacturers are shows the example of Renault. In 2009, the Chinese government stopped sales of some of Renault’s models because questionable safety concerns by the so-called General Administration of Qualitiy Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ). The real reason behind these inci- dents was that Renault is not participating in any joint venture up to date and the Chinese gov- ernment noticeably wants to force Renault into such a cooperation (see Engel, 2009).

To measure the success of these efforts, we have to consider them from two different sides. On the one hand, powerful European manufacturers, especially premium brands, which produce their own cars within joint ventures in China, simply can not afford to compromise the product quality of their cars produced in China (see Jacobs, 2004). If we consider cars from Chinese manufacturers on the other hand, even if these firms cooperate in joint ventures with foreign companies, it seems that the Chinese automotive industry still is dragging far behind when it comes to product quality (see for example Bild, 2009; Focus, 2010a; Welt, 2008).

It seems that by now, the hoped for technology and knowledge-transfers are not taking place. Further evidence for this proposition can be drawn from the example of the former Daimler Chrysler group, which stopped long-lasting negotiations with the Chinese firm FAW, because FAW wanted to embrace more than just the production into the planned joint venture (Hofer, Schmutzler & Ebel, 2004, p. 154). It becomes obvious, that foreign manufacturers fear to lose know-how to their Chinese partners, which could very quickly become very serious competi- tors (see Lange, 2004). Furthermore, there are some Chinese manufacturers that engage in joint ventures with several foreign carmakers. Brilliance, BMW’s business partner in China, for example also has plans to work with Toyota in the future (Handelsblatt, 2009a). European manufactures thus not only face a possible knowledge-transfer to Chinese firms, but more im- portantly to their other direct competitors from Europe, Japan or America.

Joint ventures, in other words, are just used by European manufacturers to cheaply produce their own cars in China. For now, the influence of foreign, particularly European manufacturers on the Chinese automotive industry is limited to technological improvements in processing and manufacturing. Remember: Starting from 200’000 cars produced in 1980 and 1.6 million cars in 1998 (Hofer, Schmutzler & Ebel, 2004, p. 145 & 148), the Chinese car manufacturing in- dustry was able to become the market leader with 13.7 million produced vehicles in 2009 (Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers [OICA], 2010).

There are however some efforts to invest into a knowledge-transfer to China. An observable trend for example is, that together with European manufacturers a lot of European suppliers of the automotive industry are focussing on the Chinese market and are building plants, subsidiar- ies as well as local offices in China (Auto Motor & Sport, 2004a; 2005; 2006a; 2009c). With- out having a detailed insight of the networks and relationships within the local industry in China, the author strongly assumes that because of the intense competition (see for example Auto Motor & Sport, 2008d) there actually is a distinctive knowledge-transfer taking place between the European manufacturers, European suppliers and Chinese manufacturers as well as Chinese suppliers, which of course learn from their European counterparts and competitors and will adapt quickly to meet the demands of the European-Chinese partnerships.

Furthermore, there are especially the departments of exterior design and engine technology which are influenced by the European car industry (see for example Auto Motor & Sport, 2004b; Car Body Design, 2010; Kort, 2006; Horenburg, 2007; Jungmann, 2005). Additionally, examples like Volkswagen’s investments in research in traffic safety (Auto Motor & Sport, 2007c) as well as Toyota’s R&D joint venture with FAW (Auto Motor & Sport, 2006c) show that in the long run, no automotive manufacturer which plans to establish itself in China can afford not to concentrate its R&D efforts to the Chinese market. Because after all, Chinese customers have specific demands which differ from the claims by European, Japanese or American consumers, and since Chinese manufacturers simply have more experience and knowledge in dealing with these demands.

3.2. European-Chinese automotive cooperations: BMW and Brilliance

As mentioned in chapter 2.2.1., foreign manufacturers only are allowed to produce cars in China if they arrange in up to a maximum of two joint ventures with Chinese producers (with a maximum share of 50% per joint venture by the European firms). It is therefore no wonder that almost every big player in the automotive industry today is operating in such joint ventures (for a list of all joint ventures existing in 2007, see Auto Motor & Sport, 2007b). To provide a better understanding for how such joint ventures are established and currently look like, the author will present one of these cooperations between European and Chinese manufacturers with the example of BMW and Brilliance.

[...]

Ende der Leseprobe aus 44 Seiten

Details

Titel
Product Safety in the Chinese Automotive Industry
Untertitel
Seminararbeit der Veranstaltung "Business Ethics in China" an der Universität Zürich
Hochschule
Universität Zürich  (Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre - Lehrstühl für Organisation und Management)
Veranstaltung
Business Ethics in China
Note
1,0
Autor
Jahr
2010
Seiten
44
Katalognummer
V199301
ISBN (eBook)
9783656257363
ISBN (Buch)
9783656258001
Dateigröße
1113 KB
Sprache
Deutsch
Schlagworte
China, Chinese, Automotive, Automotive Industry, Automobilindustrie, Produktsicherheit, Product Safety, Ethics, Ethik, Unternehmensethik, BMW, Brilliance, Brillance, Audi, Mercedes, EURO NCAP, Crashtest, Copy
Arbeit zitieren
Andreas Schwarzinger (Autor), 2010, Product Safety in the Chinese Automotive Industry, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/199301

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