The Legitimacy of the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Sudan (AMIS)


Hausarbeit, 2015
12 Seiten

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2
Table of Contents
Introduction ... 3
Chapter I Beetham's model of legitimacy ... 5
Chapter II. 1 Conformity to rules ... 6
Chapter II. 2 Justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs ... 7
Chapter II. 3 Expressed Consent ... 8
Conclusion ... 9
Bibliography ... 11

3
Introduction
Peacekeeping is an important part of global politics. Furthermore, it can be called an
essentially contested concept. Additionally, many people relate the word peacekeeping
automatically with the Blue Helmets of the UN. However, the UN is not the only international
organization which conducted peacekeeping missions. The African Union (AU) deployed
peacekeeping missions in Sudan, Somalia and Burundi.
1
A key norm in international law
expresses that sovereign states should not intervene in national matters of other sovereign
states. Nevertheless, there are omissions concerning this "non-intervention principle,"
2
which
are laid down under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
3
In contrast, the convention of the
African Union is more specific and states that the African Union has the permission to
intervene in the Member States in the cases of "war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity."
4
Therefore, it is of special interest to examine the legitimacy of the first African
Union peacekeeping mission, namely in Sudan. The aim of this paper is to examine the
legitimacy of the African Union peacekeeping mission in Sudan (AMIS). In order to judge the
legitimacy of the AMIS, Beetham's model of legitimacy will be used. This leads to the
research question, which will be answered throughout this paper, namely: "Can the African
Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur (AMIS) be considered legitimate, according to
Beetham's model of legitimacy?"
This paper begins by providing background information about the African Union and the
causes of the civil war in Sudan, which erupted in 2003.
5
It will then go on to present the
theoretical framework, namely Beetham's model of legitimacy. Thirdly, Beetham's model of
legitimacy will be applied to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Finally, a
conclusion is drawn and the question whether the AMIS can be considered legitimate
according to Beetham's model is answered.
1
Richard Kamidza, Karanja Mbugua and Venashri Pillay, "AMIS: African Mission in Sudan (Darfur)," Conflict
Trends, no. 4 (2005): 46,52.
2
Anél Ferreira-Snyman, "Intervention with specific reference to the relationship between the United Nations
Security Council and the African Union," Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 43,
no.2 (Jul 2010): 141.
3
Ibid.
4
Tim Murithi,"The African Union's evolving role in peace operations:the African Union Mission in Burundi,
the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia." African Security Review 17,
no.1 (2008): 76, accessed April 18, 2016.
5
Roba Sharamo, "The African Union's Peacekeeping Experience in Darfur, Sudan," Conflict trends, no.3
(2006): 51.

4
The African Union (AU) is an international organization and a key instrument in African
politics. It was launched in 2002 in Durban, South Africa. In addition, the African Union has
54 African Member States; with Morocco being the only African state which is not a member
of the African Union. Its main goals are the support economic development, the upholding
democracy, and the deployment of peacekeeping missions.
6
Importantly, the African Union is the successor of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
The Organization of African Unity was established in 1963 in Addis Ababa. Back then, 32
African states signed the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. Accordingly, the OAU
and the AU differ from each other in their legal powers. The Charter of the Organization of
African Unity was subscribed to the belief that intervention in an African member state is
only legitimate if the head of government agreed to it, in order to uphold the sovereignty of
the African states. This "norm of non-intervention"
7
changed with the adoption of the African
Constitutive Act.
8
The African Constitution Act was signed in Lomé, Togo and replaced the
Charter of the Organization of African Unity in 2000.
9
Consequently, the African Constitutive
Act gives the African Union the right to intervene in the Member States in cases of "war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity."
10
The AMIS was established in 2004 and operated till 2006. In 2006, it was transformed into a
joint mission between the UN and the African Union, namely the
African Union - United
Nations Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID).
11
Therefore, this paper will only focus on the time
period between 2004 and 2006, where only the African Union operated a peacekeeping
mission Sudan. Comparatively, this paper examines whether the African Union peacekeeping
6
Mammo Muchie, Phindile Lukhele-Olorunju and Oghenerobor Akpor, ed., The African Union Ten Years After
Solving African Problems with Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance (South Africa: Africa Institute of
South Africa, 2013), 9.
7
Tim Murithi, "The African Union's evolving role in peace operations:the African Union Mission in Burundi,
the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia," African Security Review 17,
no.1 (2008): 72.
8
OAU Charter, Article II.(2),
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-sl-oau_charter_1963_0.pdf, accessed May 9, 2016.
9
Tim Murithi, "The African Union's evolving role in peace operations:the African Union Mission in Burundi,
the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia," African Security Review 17,
no.1 (2008): 75.
10
African Union, "Constitutive Act of the African Union," Article 4 (h),
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf, accessed May 9, 2016.
11
D. Mickler, "UNAMID: A hybrid solution to a human security problem in Darfur?," Conflict, Security and
Development 13, no. 5 (2013): 498.

5
mission in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS) was legitimate, according to Beetham's model of
legitimacy.
The Darfur area in Sudan has a long history of ethnic conflict between the peripatetic Arab
population and the mainly farming black population.
12
In 2003 the struggle between two rebel
groups, namely the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) and the Government of Sudan (GoS) began.
13
The Government of Sudan
consists mainly of the Arab minority in Sudan. In contrast to the government, the two rebel
groups are made up of the ethnically African population. Likewise, the SLM/A and the JEM
started fighting against the Government of Sudan (GoS). As a result of the attacks from the
rebel groups, the GoS equipped and supported the Janjaweed militia, which was fighting for
the government. Consequently, a war erupted between these groups.
14
Chapter
I
Beetham's
model
of
legitimacy
Beetham describes in his book "The Legitimation of Power," three conditions which are
essential in order to call power legitimate. "Conformity to rules" is the first condition in
Beetham's model, this condition implies that the power was acquired in accordance with
already existing rules. Importantly, if the first condition is not given, the power is illegitimate.
The second condition is the "justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs." This implies
that the existing rules have to be supported by the influential and the less influential.
Furthermore, the power has to come from a lawful source of power and it has to be performed
in line with the rules. In addition, the justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs depends
on the cultural context. However, if the second condition is not given, power is not
automatically illegitimate, it can be more seen as a "weakness."
15
For the reason that the
influential and less influential never form a homogenous group. Although, there has to be a
minimum of shared beliefs, in order for power to legitimate. Lastly, the third condition is the
12
Roba Sharamo, "The African Union's Peacekeeping Experience in Darfur, Sudan," Conflict trends, no.3
(2006): 51.
13
Paul D. Williams, "Military Responses to Mass Killing: Sudan," International Peacekeeping 13, no.2 (2006):
169.
14
F. Grandesso, F. Sanderson, J. Kruijt, T. Koene, V. Brown, "Mortality and Malnutrition Among Populations
Living in South Darfur, Sudan: Results of 3 Surveys," JAMA 293, no.12 (September 2004): 1490.
15
David, Beetham, The Legitimation of Power:
Issues in political theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), 17.

6
"legitimation through expressed consent."
16
Consent can be expressed at different levels,
namely the state level, the international level and at the level of private actors. For instance,
demonstrations are an expression of consent. Correspondingly, power is not legitimate when
there is no consent.
17
Chapter II. 1
Conformity to rules
The first part of the second chapter will examine the legal grounds on which the African
peacekeeping mission was instituted. Secondly, it will be examined whether the establishment
of the AMIS was conforming to the existing rules. In fact, the African Union confirmed that
war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed by the Government of Sudan and
the Janjaweed militia, even though it refused from calling it a genocide.
18
19
By May 2004, the
sum of people being "affected by war" in Sudan accounted to one million.
20
The term
"affected by war," is defined by the UN, as people who have been murdered, raped or
dislocated, as a consequence of war.
21
The African Mission in Darfur (AMIS) was established
in June 2004, following a ceasefire agreement, signed in May 2004. The ceasefire agreement
was signed between the GoS, the JEM and the SLM/A. This ceasefire agreement clearly
stated that "on the basis of consensus,"
22
all the participating parties agreed to the
establishment of the AMIS.
23
Moreover, the tasks of the AMIS, outlined in the ceasefire
agreement were "to monitor, verify, investigate and report on violations"
24
and to "ensure the
16
Ibid. 15.
17
Ibid. 16.
18
Roba Sharamo, "The African Union's Peacekeeping Experience in Darfur, Sudan," Conflict trends, no.3
(2006): 51.
19
Richard Kamidza, Karanja Mbugua and Venashri Pillay, "AMIS: African Mission in Sudan (Darfur),"
Conflict Trends, no. 4 (2005): 52.
20
Paul D. Williams, "Military Responses to Mass Killing: Sudan," International Peacekeeping 13, no.2 (2006):
175.
21
UK House of Commons International Development Committee, "Darfur, Sudan: The Responsibility to
Protect," no.5 (March 2005): 5, accessed May, 13, 2016,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmintdev/67/67i.pdf.
22
"Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission
and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur," Art.1, accessed May, 12, 2016,
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_040528_Agreement%20on%20the%20Modalities%2
0for%20the%20Establishment%20of%20the%20Ceasefire%20Commission%20in%20Darfur.pdf.
23
Ibid.
24
C. Appiah-Mensah, "AU's Critical Assignment in Darfur," African Security Review 14, no.2 (2005): 8.

7
protection and the safety of the observers."
25
Accordingly, the clear defined responsibilities of
the AMIS reaffirm the AMIS purpose of being an "observer mission," Therefore, the AMIS
was not a military mission, with armed forces in order to protect civilians.
26
Consequently, the
AMIS can be called conform to existing rules. Firstly, the convention of the African Union
allows interventions in the Member States in certain instances.
27
Secondly, the Government of
Sudan and the two involved rebel groups approved the formation of AMIS. Consequently, the
first condition of Beetham's model of legitimacy, the conformity to already existing rules in
the case of the AMIS, is given.
Chapter II. 2
Justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs
The second condition, according to Beetham's model, in order to call power legitimate, is the
justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs. In the first part of this paper, the African
peacekeeping mission in Sudan and its accordance with existing rules were examined. The
second part of the second chapter examines the justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs
of the AMIS.
In contrast to the first condition, the second condition is more ambiguous, for the reason that
the justifiability of rules in terms of shared belief is different at different levels. For instance,
at the level of the African Union, the justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs can be
explained through two different perspectives. On the one hand, the mere fact that all the
Member States to the African Union agreed upon the African Constitutive Act shows the
justifiability of the right to intervene in a Member State in terms of shared beliefs. Therefore,
it also shows the belief in the rightfulness of intervention in a Member State. On the other
hand, the African Union is often called a "head of states club"
28
and consequently acting in
the interest of the people who are at the top and not according to what their population
believes to be right. In the case of Sudan, the justifiability of rules in terms of shared belief
25
Richard Kamidza, Karanja Mbugua and Pillay Venashri, "AMIS: African Mission in Sudan (Darfur),"
Conflict Trends, no. 4 (2005): 52.
26
Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission
and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur," Art.6, accessed May, 12, 2016,
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_040528_Agreement%20on%20the%20Modalities%2
0for%20the%20Establishment%20of%20the%20Ceasefire%20Commission%20in%20Darfur.pdf.
27
African Union, "Constitutive Act of the African Union," Article 4 (h),
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf, accessed May 9, 2016.
28
Gabriel Amvane, "Intervention pursuant to article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union without
United Nations Security Council authorization," African Human Rights Law Journal 15, no.2 (2015): 298.

8
can be looked at different levels as well, namely the different parties involved in the civil war
in Sudan. Firstly, the Government of Sudan will be examined, secondly the SLM/A and the
JEM. Likewise, all three parties signed the ceasefire agreement in May 2004, in which they
agreed on the establishment of the AMIS. Therefore, it can be said that the three groups
shared the belief that the peacekeeping mission was justifiable in terms of existing rules. The
existing rules are in this case the right of the African Union to intervene in the Member States
in cases of "war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity."
29
Consequently, the GoS, the
JEM and the SLM/A shared the belief that the peacekeeping mission was justifiable in terms
of shared beliefs. Unfortunately, sources about the public opinion of the population are
limited. Nevertheless, some international organizations conducted interviews in refugee
camps in Sudan and neighbouring Chad. With Amnesty International being one of them. The
interviews showed that the majority of the refugees in these camps were disappointment about
the AMIS, due to the fact that the AMIS' task was simply to monitor the ceasefire agreement
and that it did not actively protect civilians.
30
Consequently, there was not a universal
justifiability of the AMIS In terms of shared beliefs. Nevertheless, this does not make the
AMIS automatically illegitimate, according to Beetham's second condition. For the reason,
that opinion is never homogenous. In this case, it can be called a flaw of the second condition
but this not enough to call the AMIS illegitimate. Conclusively, there is to say that the
justifiability of the rules in terms shared beliefs, on which the AMIS was based, is given to
the largest extent.
Chapter II. 3
Expressed Consent
The third condition in Beetham's model of legitimacy for power to be legitimate is expressed
consent. The Macmillan dictionary defines consent as "the approval for something."
31
This
approval has to be made public in order to fulfill Beetham's third condition of legitimacy. On
the one hand, the African Union peacekeeping mission acquired consent from the Sudanese
government in Khartoum, as mentioned in the ceasefire agreement from 2004.
32
Additionally,
the African Union was also approved by the rebel groups JEM and SLM/A. Furthermore, the
29
African Union, "Constitutive Act of the African Union," Article 4 (h),
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf, accessed May 9, 2016.
30
Amnesty International, "Sudan: Human rights situation deteriorating in Darfur five months after peace
agreement," (October 2006): 1-2.
31
Macmillan English Dictionary, 1st ed., s.v "consent."
32
Paul D. Williams, "Military Responses to Mass Killing: Sudan," International Peacekeeping 13, no.2 (2006):
178.

9
AMIS was publicly supported by the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary-General, the
EU, NATO and the Arab League.
33
On the other hand the AMIS was criticized by the United
States, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for not intervening in a harsher way
and not using force in order to protect civilians.
34
For instance, a quote from an Amnesty
International representative expressing that the AMIS is "abandoning the people in Darfur,"
35
clearly shows the disapproval of the AMIS being only an observer mission and not actively
intervening in Sudan. In addition, there has been criticism from refugees, saying that the
AMIS has failed to protect civilians. Nevertheless, the interviews are not representative for
the whole of Sudan's population. Furthermore, the interviewed did not criticized the presence
of the AMIS but the AMIS not intervening in a harsher way. Nevertheless, there is a lack of
articulated consent from the population. According to Beetham, no expressed consent can not
brand the AMIS as legitimate. Consequently, this difference in expressed consent about the
AMIS shows that there was no universal articulated consent. However, there was expressed
consent to a significant degree.
Conclusion
This research paper set out to determine whether the African Union Mission in Darfur, Sudan
can be called legitimate, according to Beetham's model of legitimacy. Beetham presents three
conditions of legitimacy which have been applied to the AMIS. The three conditions in order
to call power legitimate, namely the conformity to rules, the justifiability of rules in terms of
shared beliefs and expressed consent have been discussed in the case of the African Union
peacekeeping mission in Sudan. The first condition, the conformity to rules applies to the
AMIS. Therefore, the first condition in the case of AMIS is fulfilled. Secondly, the AMIS
does not totally satisfy the second condition, the justifiability of rules in terms of shared
beliefs. Nevertheless, this flaw in the justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs does not
make the AMIS illegitimate. It can be called a limitation, on the grounds of the diversity of
the population and the parties involved in the conflict. Lastly, the third condition was
accomplished by the largest extent. On the one hand, there was a lot of consent and support
from the international community. This consent from important, international players can be
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.

10
seen as an emblematic support of the AMIS. On the other hand, the AMIS was criticized for
being only an observer mission and not actively protecting civilians. This criticism came from
people affected by the war living in Sudan and International Organizations, such as Amnesty
International. According to these findings, it can be said that the AMIS cannot be called
entirely legitimate. Due to the fact, that an obvious limitation of this paper is the lack of
sources concerning the expressed consent and the justifiability of the AMIS in terms of shared
beliefs from the population in Sudan. Nevertheless, the AMIS can be called legitimate to the
largest extent. For the reason, that the African mission in Sudan meets most Beetham's
criteria in order to be called legitimate. Consequently, it is to say that the AMIS can be called
legitimate to the largest extent.

11
Bibliography
1.
African Union. "Constitutive Act of the African Union." Article 4 (h),
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf. Accessed May 9,
2016.
2.
"Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the
Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur." Accessed
May, 12, 2016,
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_040528_Agreement%20on
%20the%20Modalities%20for%20the%20Establishment%20of%20the%20Ceasefire
%20Commission%20in%20Darfur.pdf.
3.
Amnesty International. "Sudan: Human rights situation deteriorating in Darfur five
months after peace agreement." (October 2006): 1-2.
4.
Amvane, Gabriel. "Intervention pursuant to article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the
African Union without United Nations Security Council authorization." African
Human Rights Law Journal 15, no.2 (2015): 282-298.
5.
Appiah-Mensah, C. "AU's Critical Assignment in Darfur." African Security Review
14, no.2 (2005): 7-21.
6.
Beetham, David. The Legitimation of Power: Issues in political theory. Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1991.
7.
Ferreira-Snyman, Anél. "Intervention with specific reference to the relationship
between the United Nations Security Council and the African Union." Comparative
and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 43, no.2 (Jul 2010): 139-172.
8.
Grandesso F, Sanderson F, Kruijt J, Koene T, Brown V. "Mortality and Malnutrition
Among Populations Living in South Darfur, Sudan: Results of 3 Surveys." JAMA 293,
no.12 (September 2004): 1490-1494.

12
9.
Kamidza Richard, Mbugua Karanja and Pillay Venashri. "AMIS: African Mission in
Sudan (Darfur)." Conflict Trends, no. 4 (2005): 52-53.
10.
Macmillan English Dictionary, 1st ed.
11.
Mickler D. "UNAMID: A hybrid solution to a human security problem in Darfur.?"
Conflict, Security and Development 13, no. 5 (2013): 487-511.
12.
Muchie, Mammo, Lukhele-Olorunju, Phindile and Akpor, Oghenerobor, ed. The
African Union Ten Years After Solving African Problems with Pan-Africanism and the
African Renaissance. South Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2013.
13.
Murithi, Tim. "The African Union's evolving role in peace operations:the African
Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union
Mission in Somalia." African Security Review 17, no.1 (2008): 69-82. Accessed April
18, 2016.
14.
OAU Charter.Article II,(2).
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-sl-
oau_charter_1963_0.pdf. Accessed May 9, 2016.
15.
Sharamo, Roba. "The African Union's Peacekeeping Experience in Darfur, Sudan."
Conflict trends, no.3 (2006): 50-55.
16.
UK House of Commons International Development Committee. "Darfur, Sudan: The
Responsibility to Protect." No.5 (March 2005): 3-92. Accessed May, 13, 2016,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmintdev/67/67i.pdf.
17.
Williams, Paul D. "Military Responses to Mass Killing: Sudan." International
Peacekeeping 13, no.2 (2006): 168-183.
12 von 12 Seiten

Details

Titel
The Legitimacy of the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Sudan (AMIS)
Hochschule
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Autor
Jahr
2015
Seiten
12
Katalognummer
V335165
ISBN (Buch)
9783668279018
Dateigröße
564 KB
Sprache
Deutsch
Reihe
Aus der Reihe: e-fellows.net stipendiaten-wissen
Schlagworte
legitimacy, african, union, peacekeeping, mission, sudan, amis
Arbeit zitieren
Fabiola Mallach (Autor), 2015, The Legitimacy of the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Sudan (AMIS), München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/335165

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