

Niklas Manhart

The Sub-National Politics of Punjab

Case Study

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1. Introduction

The Indian state of Punjab¹ is mentioned mostly for the secessionist activities of its Sikh majority, the assassination of Indira Gandhi marking their inglorious peak in 1984. But despite strong Sikh nationalism, Punjab's sub-political system is comparatively weak. While the region is well off in comparison to other Indian states, a number of political and economic problems persist. By looking at Punjab's political history and the evolution of Indian federalism, I assess the degree to which these problems can be attributed to flaws in the federal design. In my view, they result from three factors: deliberate constitutional arrangements, especially regarding revenues, over-complexity and underdevelopment of local politics, and the political implications of Punjab's Sikh heritage.

Finally, some suggestions regarding restructuring of Punjab's ramified system of local government are presented. However, an overhaul of Punjab's sub-national politics seems more than unlikely.

2. The Sub-National Politics of Punjab

Table 1 - Basic Figures	
Area	50,362 sq. km
Area under forest	3055 sq. km
Latitude	29° 30' N to 32° 32' N
Longitude	73° 55' E to 76° 50' E
Population(2001)	24,358,999
Population Density	484 per sq. km
Male population	12,985,045
Female population	11,373,954
Sex Ratio	876
Literacy rate	69.70%
Per Capita Income	Rs 19,500
Capital	Chandigarh
Largest City	Ludhiana
No. of Inhabited Villages	12278
Religion	Hindus (34.46%), Sikhs(62.95)
Languages spoken	Punjabi, Hindi, English and Urdu
Urbanization Ratio	29.55%

Source: Punjab Online, 2009.

2.1 General Information

Before looking at the political system in detail, it is useful to review Punjab's geographic, demographic and economic conditions. The state covers an area of 50,362 square kilometres (Table 1). Located in the north-western part of the subcontinent, Punjab shares its capital, Chandigarh, with another state, Haryana (Appendix: Map 1). Its official

¹ Not to be confused with the adjacent, equally named region in Pakistan.

Table 2: Nationwide Religious Distribution

Religion	Population	% to total population
<i>Hindus</i>	827,578,868	80.5%
<i>Muslims</i>	138,188,240	13.4%
<i>Christians</i>	24,080,016	2.3%
<i>Sikhs</i>	19,215,730	1.9%
<i>Buddhists</i>	7,955,207	0.8%
<i>Jains</i>	4,225,053	0.4%
<i>Other religions</i>	6,639,626	0.6%
<i>Religion not stated</i>	n.a.	0.1%
<i>Total</i>	1,028,610,328	100%

Source: Bhattacharyya, 2005: 4.

and principal spoken language is Punjabi.

In terms of religion, Hindus are a minority. More than 60 percent of the population are Sikhs (Encyclopaedia Britannica, “EB“, 2008), although they constitute only 1,9 percent of the national

population (Table 2). According to a 2001 census, the population of the state is 24,4 million (Table 1). That is an increase of 4 mn in comparison to 1991.

Despite concerted efforts by the regional government to curb birth rates, the yearly rate of growth is still only 1,82 percent. This, however, is not the major cause of concern in demography of the Punjab state. Female foeticide and infanticide has led to a disproportionate female to male ratio of 87,6 to 100 (Government of Punjab, “GP”, 2009).

Punjab’s geography is perfect for agriculture (EB, 2008, see also: Appendix: Map 3). Physiographically, the state can be divided into three parts: the Shiwalik Hills in the northeast, rising up to 3,000 feet high, the undulating foothill zone farther south and the flat tract with fertile alluvial soils, covering the majority of the state’s area. Punjab has an inland subtropical location with a continental climate which is semi-arid to sub humid – Summers are hot and Winters fairly cold with high rainfall, especially in the monsoon season from July to September.

These rich conditions make Punjab the wealthiest Indian state

Table 3 - Punjab Population	
<i>Total Population</i>	243.59
<i>Rural Population (in Lakh)</i>	160.96
<i>Urban Population (in Lakh)</i>	82.63
<i>Density (Per Sq. Km.)</i>	484
<i>Total Population</i>	243.59

(1 Lakh = 100 000)

Source: GP, 2009.

(Table 4, see also Appendix: Map 4). Covering less than 2 percent of its area, the region produces more than 10 percent of India’s foodstuff, including half of the national rice stock and more wheat than all other states combined (EB, 2008).

This is mainly attributed to the “Green Revolution”, a series of agricultural reforms in the 1960s. As a result of Punjab’s prosperous farming, 70 percent of the population still lead a rural life, whereas 30 percent live in its fast growing urban areas (Table 3).

However, the structural composition is changing. The agricultural (proper) sector has declined from 26,27 percent to 22,15 percent between 2000 and 2005 (GP, 2008), whereas the second and third sector’s share has grown steadily, mainly due to increases in transport, communication and banking. Nevertheless, unemployment remains a serious concern. As of 2005, 463.000 job seekers were registered (GP, 2008). The main employers are the cotton and silk as well as the metal and machinery industries. A good infrastructure has emerged with 75 percent of the state covered by roads.

The economy has shown a high growth rate of 6,29 percent in 2003-2004 (GP, 2008). Per capita income at current prices has shown an increase of 7,32 percent between 2004 and 2005 only. As Table 4 shows, Punjab ranks high in all economic and infrastructural nationwide comparisons. With 1,52 percent of the national population it creates 3,92 percent of India’s Net State Domestic Product (Appendix: Table 7). There are, however, a number of economic problems in the region. Punjab is highly indebted, thereby representing an anomaly among the Indian states. Despite its high Domestic Product, the region has very high revenue and fiscal deficits (Rao, 2002: 10). The favourable economic indicators must also be taken with caution, as they do not differentiate between the Punjab’ various social strata (Telford, 1992: 976).

Table 4 - Punjab vis-à-vis India	Punjab's average	All- India average	Rank in the country
<i>Per capita income (Rs)</i>	19,5	6,929	First
<i>Daily factory employment per 1000 population</i>	17.0	10.0	First
<i>Per capita bank deposits (Rs)</i>	4,565	2,362	First
<i>Per Capita Bank Credit (Rs)</i>	2,201	1,57	Second
<i>TV Coverage (%) area</i>	99.00	58.02	First
<i>Rural Electrification (per cent)</i>	100	83.9	First
<i>Employment in the organised sector to total population(%)</i>	63	84	First
<i>Villages connected with roads (per cent)</i>	98.8	40.7	Second

Source: GP, 2009.

Rural farmers in particular are facing serious deficit problems. Industrial development is also meagre as Pakistan inherited Punjab's core industrial region in 1947. Even the agroindustry is underdeveloped. While Punjab owns 23,9 percent of India's tractors, its capacity for tractor production is only 8 percent (ibid., 980).

2.2 Political History

Punjab's current situation cannot be explained without looking back at its troubled political history, which was characterized by adverse conditions from its very beginning. Upon being freed from British rule in 1947, Punjab was split between India and Pakistan (EB, 2008). Sikh agitation for a Punjabi-speaking state put pressure on the national Indian government until on 1 November 1966 the then Punjab state was divided on the basis of language, not community, into the Sikh-majority state of Punjab and into the state of Haryana which comprised most of the Hindi-speaking people. However, Sikh demands were not satisfied by this. In the 1970s, the government adopted a policy of deliberate neglect, or "constructive inaction", hoping that the secessionist movement would burn out (Hardgrave Jr., 1983: 1173). Instead, demands for independence were fuelled by central manipulation of Punjabi politics in the 1980s (Tillin, 2007: 64). Militant Sikh groups campaigned for an autonomous Sikh homeland ('Khalistan') with terroristic means. The conflict escalated in 1984, when many Sikh fighters were killed by the Indian army. In retaliation for this so-called "Operation Blue Star", Prime Minister Indira Ghandi was killed by her Sikh bodyguards. Since then, attempts to negotiate settlements with Sikh rebels have failed repeatedly and a violent political climate persists, although the conflict is considered to be overcome today (Zingel, 2004: 4). While the movement has lost ideological coherence and moral purpose (Telford, 1992: 986), it remains a looming threat, particularly in the poorer parts of Punjab.

2.3 Debates on Indian Federalism

The political system of Punjab must be assessed against the backdrop of its wider federal framework. But practical considerations are not the only motivation for an analysis of Indian federalism. The issue is interesting for a number of reasons. It is “unique in nature and tailored according to the specific needs of the country” (Pathak, 2009). India’s federal construction is regarded with worldwide interest because of its size, diversity, and levels of poverty (Tillin, 2007: 46) – in particular by other countries with ethnic variety, such as Canada or Spain. Over one billion people live in India’s 28 states and 7 Union Territories (Bhattacharyya, 2005: 4).

2.3.1 India’s Federal Design

Two processes dominated the creation of India’s federal organization in 1950: “devolution of authority to the provincial governments on the one hand and the integration of the acceding states on the other” (Teng, 1990). However, the power dynamic between regions and central government was not equal. Power laid firmly in the hands of the Constituent Assembly. Its members were not representatives of the states as was the case in Philadelphia in 1787. The mode of making the federation was clearly top-down rather than bottom-up (Bhattacharyya, 2005: 14). As the states failed to form constitutional assemblies of their own, their individual constitutions were drawn out by the national Assembly. The final agreement somehow recognized their political identity, but at the same time consolidated them into India’s political personality. The Indian Constitution considered the provinces to be administrative units of a unitary structure of power (Teng, 1990).

Different explanations are given for the moderate role the provinces were granted. India presented a “highly intricate complex of numerous sub-national identities, which could not be identified with any political boundaries or administrative limits” (Teng, 1990). In 1947, 216 princely states and territories had to be integrated into the Indian state in addition to the former British colonies (Rao and Singh, 2004: 6). Second, “Federalism with a strong centre

was inevitable as the framers of the Indian Constitution were aware that there were economic disparities as several areas of India were economically as well as industrially far behind in comparison to others” (Pathak, 2009). While India can therefore be regarded as a federation with strong unitary features, the exact nature of its federal design remains debated.

2.3.2 Unitary or Federal?

According to Pathak, the framers of the Indian Constitution incorporated certain unique features in an attempt to avoid difficulties faced by other federal units like the US or Canada. The right of the central government to intervene in the state affairs in particular has elicited questions as to the nature of Indian federalism. Some commentators regard India as quasi-federal for the fact that its constitution describes it as a “Union of states” (Article 1). Opposed to this, some see it to be unitary as the Indian Constitution does not allow the states to make their own constitutions. Also, the most important legislative competences lie exclusively with the centre. Regarding concurrent competences, the parliament enjoys an overriding authority over the state legislatures (Pathak, 2009). India therefore lends itself for neither of the ideal types to describe territorial relations in a nation-state. It has been suggested to appreciate the uniqueness of India’s federal arrangement. Stepan (in: Tillin, 2007: 58) describes India’s “special type” of federation as a “holding together” (where power has been devolved from a formally fundamentally unitary state) and demos-enabling model, as opposed to a US-style “coming-together”, demos-constraining model. This notion is significant for the issue of Punjab nationalism. It explains the provisions granted by the centre in 1966 to redesign the region’s boundaries not as a shift in power toward the periphery, but rather as a means of bringing Punjab closer to the centre by accommodating its linguistic and cultural diversity and therefore calming its secessionist impetus. In a way, Indian federalism serves as a “political equilibrium” (Bhattacharyya, 2005: 2).

2.3.3 Asymmetric or Symmetric?

Another debate has emerged as to whether Indian federalism can be regarded as “asymmetric“, which is understood to mean “federalism based on unequal powers and relationships in political, administrative and fiscal arrangements spheres between the units constituting a federation in both vertical (between Center and states) and horizontal (among the states) senses” (Rao and Singh, 2004: 2). Although the Indian Constitution places great emphasis on the equal treatment of the sub-national units, a special status was accorded to the Muslim state of Jammu and Kashmir. Article 370 enshrined its separate political identity. However, Tillin argues that this “asymmetric appearance” does not constitute subordination of Sikh to Muslim interests, even though the interests of the former were never catered for to the same degree. Kashmir’s status “did not stem from a recognition that its ethnic or religious distinctiveness constituted a basis for a higher degree of self-government than other Indian states” (Tillin, 2007: 47). In her view, Article 370 was only a temporary expediency, put in place for practical reasons. She concludes that asymmetry is not an important feature of India’s federal design, and has therefore neither been used in the 1960s territorial rearrangement, where no coherent “ethnic” or “cultural” federal sub-units were created, nor in the resolution of the Sikh separatist movement in the 1980s. A return to “normal”, electoral politics was employed instead of a recognition of Punjab’s special status.

Despite this absence of *de jure* asymmetry, there can be *de facto* differences in the treatment of states by the centre. According to Rao and Singh, “special arrangements instituted to meet short term political expediency or administrative discretion can cause secular degradation of intergovernmental institutions” (2004: 5). Such a mechanism is the rescheduling and writing-off of regional indebtedness by national Finance Commissions. Allegedly, this has been the case with Punjab in 2004, when the central government has written off of Punjab’s loans, “without referring the issue to any body on a discretionary basis” (Rao and Singh, 2004: 24). The official reason advanced for this was the costs of the battle on insurgency which needed

to be compensated. However, Rao and Singh suggest that this measure was an informal accommodation of Punjab demands.

2.3.4 Devolutional Tendencies

Despite the Union-centred nature of its Constitution, India is not exempt from calls for devolution. Bringing the decisions closer to the people, it is widely argued, should lead to a better delivery of public goods. According to Chhibber, devolution in India has taken three forms (2004: 340). First, the formerly socialist central government has reduced its role in the economic life of the nation, as its survival often depends upon its ability to form coalitions with state-level political parties. Second, the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments (1992-93) were passed with the express purpose of transferring some authority to local governments. Third, civil society allegedly has made the government more responsive to local needs and fostered democratic development.

The 1993 amendments in particular must be seen as a momentous devolutional achievement. They gave local bodies constitutional rank for the first time (Zingel, 2004: 3). Also, they set up a large number of State Financial Commissions for the division of funds between state and local governments and the decentralized provision of public services. Its implications are presented next.

2.4 Centre-Periphery Relations

The previous section has shown that India's federalism is, with some exceptions, centrist in its nature. How this affects the relations between the Indian Union and its peripheries is discussed next with regard to the constitutional provisions. Special attention is paid to financial regulations, as they determine the dynamics of federal power.

2.4.1 Between Centre and State

The Indian Constitution specifies the relations with the states in great detail. Separate legislative, executive and judicial arms of government are constituted at centre and state level.

Constitutional supremacy is vested in the central government over the federating units within the limits of national parliamentary sovereignty. Administrative competence is also primarily given to New Delhi. The supremacy of the centre is exemplified by Article 3 of the Indian Constitution which authorizes the parliament with to constitute new states by “separating territories from the existing ones, alter their boundaries, and change their names” (Rao and Singh, 2004: 3).

Legislative Competences

The respective legislative competences are listed in the seventh schedule to the Indian Constitution (Constitution of India, 2004). Article 246 of the Indian Constitution specifies 97 legislative matters which are exclusive to the centre in the so-called *Union List*, ranging from defence and security to all infrastructural, financial or legal competences of nationwide relevance. The *State List* comprises 66 items. They include police, welfare and health, regional infrastructure and, most importantly for Punjab, agriculture. With its 47 entries, the *Concurrent List* contains mostly cross-state matters, such as the transfer of prisoners and property, migration, forests, education, and so on. The states’ legislative powers are constrained by Article 356 of the Constitution which allows the President of India to dismiss state parliaments. As the central government is at the same time primarily in charge of providing funds to the state, Zingel calls this centre-periphery relation a “perfect combination of stick and carrot” (2004: 3).

Financial Competences

In terms of financing, the centre is exclusively responsible for functions related to money supply, external borrowing, international relations, and those having significant scale economies (Rao, 2002: 4). Concurrent functions involve cross-state benefits and matters with developmental potential, such as energy, education and welfare. Only functions with state-wide implications are assigned to the states. Most taxes are collected by the centre. The states are only allowed to raise taxes on land revenue, on agricultural incomes and wealth, on

registration fees as well as on goods and transports. With regard to debt, the states are in theory allowed to borrow autonomously (Rao, 2002: 5). However, when in debt, a state has to obtain permission by the centre. Thus, central institutions, such as the Ministry of Finance or India's Reserve Bank, in fact determine states' borrowing. In addition, states' finances are under review every five years by a Finance Commission which is appointed by the President of India. This can lead to the abovementioned informal preferential treatment of certain states.

2.4.2 Between Centre and Local Level

In contrast to centre-state relations, there is little provision for local government in the Indian Constitution (Zingel, 2004: 3). Article 12 defines 'the state' as to include national and state legislature as well as "all local and other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India", "local authorities" meaning a variety of different authorities. Otherwise, local government is left to the states. In accordance with item 5 of the *State List* laid down in Article 246, the state is responsible for "local government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal corporations, improvement trusts, district boards, mining settlement authorities and other local authorities for the purpose of local self-government or village administration".

In the 1980s, PM Indira Gandhi centralized regional politics further in order to maintain control: "Local issues and conflicts were recast as national ones requiring direct central intervention" (Chima, 1994: 853). This had a significant impact on Punjab. Local alliance-building, inter-party factional manoeuvring and grass-root politics all declined. Access to power and office was now regulated from New Delhi (ibid.), which sparked animosity toward the centre as wealthy and middle-class Punjabis aspired to more than the central government would allow (ibid., 856).

The relations between centre and local bodies only changed to a certain degree with the 1992 constitutional amendments, which "specified roles and responsibilities of rural and urban local government" (Rao, 2002: 5). However, two of the most important assignments,

revenue and expenditure assignments, are concurrent with the states' responsibilities. Devolution of revenue sources therefore still depends on the willingness of the state government to allocate revenues to the local level which otherwise has limited own sources of revenue.

In her assessment of the impact of these reforms (in: Zingel, 2004: 5), Indira Rajaraman finds that, comparing the years 1990-91 and 1997-98, local bodies' incomes doubled in the period of seven years. However, she argues, this figure is less impressive considering the total income of the local bodies. The total revenue of Rs 7 bn is only 0,2 percent of the Rs 4.000 bn government revenue (central and state). She concludes that "without a defined fiscal domain, *panchayats* (= local governmental bodies, NM) will remain [...] mere expenditure agencies rather than units of self government" (ibid.). It appears that, despite the 1993 reforms, Indian local bodies have yet to go a long way before becoming financially self-sufficient. In Germany, for instance, 15 percent of public money is raised by local bodies (ibid., 7).

2.5. Nature of the Sub-National Political System

Punjab's problems cannot be explained with constitutional provisions only. They are exacerbated by its sub-national political system, the nature of which is explored in the following section. First, Punjab's institutional framework is presented with respect to its multifaceted tiers of government. Second, the influence of its Sikh heritage is assessed.

2.5.1 Institutional Framework

State Level

At state level, Punjab's governmental framework mirrors the rest of India's regions. Executive power lies with the governor. Being the constitutional head of the administration, he is directly appointed by the President of India for a term of five years. Zingel considers the governor as "hangover of the *raj*", who represents the president and – given the fact that the office of President of India is more a ceremonial one – the central government (2004: 3). The governor is aided by a Council of Ministers with a chief minister that he personally appoints

(Government of India, “GI”, 2008). The Council is accountable to the unicameral Legislative Assembly (*Vidhan Sabha*, or “House of the People”, GP, 2008). Its members, called MLAs, wield considerable influence over policy-making and implementation, in particular because they are members of District Level Planning and Grievance Committees set up by the government in each district (GP, 2008). The legislative is directly elected from territorial constituencies in the state. Judiciary power is vested in the High Court, located in Chandigarh – appeals to its decisions are directed to the Supreme Court of India (EB, 2008). The administration is headed by a chief secretary. His assistants, the secretaries, are in turn assisted by heads of department most of which maintain branch offices at district level (GI, 2008).

District Level

Punjab is divided into four revenue divisions and 20 districts (Table 5). They range from 500 000 to 3 mn inhabitants each (Appendix: Table 8). These second tiers of sub-national government are headed by district magistrates (GI, 2008). The magistrates are responsible for coordinating the work of all government departments, revenue collection and maintenance of law and order as well as controlling and supervising all departmental heads. Their power is not derived so much from formal authority, but rather from the confidence the state government reposes them, which gives them great informal authority (ibid.).

Local Level

The local level of government is a complicated one. Two separate administrative branches run below the district level (Table 6). For revenue purposes, each district is divided into sub-divisions and *tehsils*. Administrative functions are vested in Municipal

Table 5: Administrative Structure


<i>Divisions</i>	4
<i>Districts</i>	20
<i>Sub-Division</i>	76
<i>Tehsils</i>	77
<i>Sub-Tehsils</i>	141
<i>Blocks</i>	12278
<i>Towns (census 2001)</i>	143
<i>Cities (census 2001)</i>	14

Source: GP, 2009.

Corporations, Municipalities and City Councils. Its main source of revenue is octroi and its administrative competences are conservancy, local health laws, and approving building plans

in its local jurisdiction. For development administration, the basic unit is the block (GP, 2008). The district of Muktsar, for instance, is divided into three tehsils, four sub-tehsils and 234 villages on the one hand and four Municipal Councils and four blocks on the other hand (GI, 2008). But overall, unlike other Indian states, local government is not highly developed in Punjab (GP, 2008). This is a relict of British dominion, as there was little interference by the colonial power below district level (Zingel, 2004: 3). Today, most power still lies with local village chiefs. They, as do the magistrates on district levels, cultivate an informal style of administration which by definition does not lend itself for effective and transparent governance.

Table 6: Municipal Setup



Source: GI, 2009.

To sum up: Local government in Punjab relies on informal agreements rather than efficient institutional channels. It is over-complex and underdeveloped.

2.5.2 Sikh Politics

No account of Punjabi politics is complete without assessing the implications of its large Sikh community. Chima describes the emergence of a unique system of politics which he calls “Sikh politics”, to mean a “loosely defined yet highly institutionalized political system” (1994: 847). This system is defined by “internal competition and factionalism”, “a tendency to rebel against state authority and emphasize the separateness of the Sikh community” and “interrelation of politics and religion” (ibid.). In his view, the Sikh society is very competitive and therefore elite-driven, which has aided the mobilization of protest during the 1980s troubles. Chima argues that national political elites underestimated the erosion of “Indian” identity in Punjab (ibid., 860). Instead, there was a countertendency of reinforcing the Sikh identity. The recurrent centralizing dynamics lead to state-society tension, as central intervention was regarded as a destructive process. He concludes that future agreements with Punjab must take this background into account.

3. Conclusion

Reiterating the previous findings, it can be maintained that Punjab’s sub-national political system faces three major problems. First of all, the demands of the Sikh community have not been taken into account to a significant degree. For the sake of holding together the myriad of different nations and tribes it comprises, the Indian Union has always adopted a strong stance towards centrifugal tendencies by its provinces. In order to achieve lasting stability and tranquillity, India must take Sikh claims into consideration. In order to appease the Sikh community, the Indian government should keep its interventions into state affairs to a minimum. Otherwise the threat of internal conflicts remains ever present.

That is directly related to the second factor, namely India's propensity towards centrist policies despite the federalist nature of its constitution. This strategy of 'stick and carrot' has, some commentators argue, fostered Punjabi animosity toward New Delhi. However, recent developments show that the centre is starting to accommodate Punjab's needs informally by writing off loans. In my view, centre-state relations would benefit if such mechanisms would be institutionally internalized. A fundamental reform of the financial relations between New Delhi and Punjab could improve the allocation of funds within the state, thereby addressing regional imbalances between rural and urban areas more effectively. As long as the distribution of funds remains constrained by the Union, sorely needed structural developments will remain a distant prospect.

In any case it remains highly unlikely that the central government would allow further power to be transferred to the provinces. Given Punjab's wealth and success, there is little sympathy for Sikh claims.

In terms of local administration, Punjab is far from representing a model of effective governance. Its multiple, even parallel layers of administration certainly do not serve democratic transparency. The fact that Punjab must share its capital with another state is certainly of no help, either. But it would be presumptuous to apply western standards of governance to a country like India, with its short history as a free nation and long list of problems. Nevertheless, it might be fruitful to reduce the tiers of government, increase the democratic accountability of decisions and, most importantly, provide local bodies with own sources of revenue. While the 1992 reforms marked a promising step, they have not accomplished enough. Especially rural areas still suffer from disproportionate allocation of funding.

All these considerations must, however, be put into the unique Indian perspective. It turns out that devolution is met with little enthusiasm by the population. Chhibber et al. found that most Indian citizens still rely on the state to provide public goods (2004: 342). An

astonishingly high share of over 90 percent of the interviewed people held the government responsible for dealing with the issues deemed the most significant (ibid., 346). In contrast, state government is predominantly blamed for problems. But attributing the underdevelopment of sub-national governance in Punjab to this dissatisfaction would be mistaking cause for effect. Rather, it must be accepted that popular opinion not always follows academic views, the importance of an efficient sub-national political system in Punjab being not exception.

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
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
Appendix

Map 1: India – Political Map




Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/bilder/map_of_india50.jpg

Map 2: Punjab – District Map




Source: <http://www.ncmrwf.gov.in/t254-model/t254-district/punjab-district-map.gif>

Map 3: Photograph



Source: Google Earth, 2009.

Map 4: Nationwide Comparison of Per Capita Income



Source: <http://india.gov.in/maps/percapita.php>

Table 7: Comparison of Indian states

	Area (Sq. Km)	Population (in '000)	Density of Pop	NSDP 1999-00 Rs. Million	Per capita NSDP (1999-00)	Percentage of Total Area	Percentage of Total population	Percentage of Total NSDP
High Income States	601800	194065	322.5	4065770	22461	18.31	18.90	28.74
Gujarat	196000	50597	258.1	896060	18685	5.96	4.93	6.33
Goa	3800	1344	353.7	58620	44613	0.12	0.13	0.41
Haryana	44000	21083	479.2	424880	21551	1.34	2.05	3.00
Maharashtra	308000	96752	314.1	2131510	22604	9.37	9.42	15.07
Punjab	50000	24289	485.8	554700	23254	1.52	2.37	3.92
Middle Income States	725000	302633	417.4	4867930	17635	22.05	29.47	34.41
Andhra Pradesh	275000	75728	275.4	1117530	14878	8.36	7.37	7.90
Karnataka	192000	52734	274.7	862980	16654	5.84	5.13	6.10
Kerala	39000	31839	816.4	569260	17709	1.19	3.10	4.02
Tamil Nadu	130000	62111	477.8	1143090	18623	3.95	6.05	8.08
West Bengal	89000	80221	901.4	1175070	14874	2.71	7.81	8.31
Madhya Pradesh	308000	60385	196.1	677780	11626	9.37	5.88	4.79
Orissa	156000	36707	235.3	311950	8733	4.75	3.57	2.21
Rajasthan	342000	56473	165.1	710200	13046	10.40	5.50	5.02
Uttaranchal	53500	8480	158.5	na	Na	1.60	0.83	0.00
Uttar Pradesh	241000	166053	689.0	1493520	9323	7.33	16.17	10.56
General Category States	2736100	955380	349.2	12955990	14605	81.89	93.02	91.59
Special Category States	594000	63662	107.2	63930	10695	17.78	6.20	4.52
Arunachal Pradesh	84000	1091	13.0	14270	13352	2.56	0.11	0.10
Assam	78000	26638	341.5	2533300	9720	2.37	2.59	1.79
Himachal Pradesh	56000	6077	108.5	106570	17786	1.70	0.59	0.75
Jammu & Kashmir	222000	10070	45.4	121820	12373	6.75	0.98	0.86
Manipur	22000	2389	108.6	28580	12721	0.67	0.23	0.20
Meghalaya	23000	2306	100.3	29040	12063	0.70	0.22	0.21
Mizoram	21000	891	42.4	12880	14909	0.64	0.09	0.09
Nagaland	17000	1989	117.0	23300	12594	0.52	0.19	0.16
Sikkim	7000	540	77.1	7580	14751	0.21	0.05	0.05
Tripura	10500	3191	303.9	41930	13195	0.32	0.31	0.30
Uttaranchal	53500	8480	158.5	na	na	1.60	0.83	na
All States	3276600	1010562	308.4	13595290	14359	99.67	98.40	96.11
Uts	10974	16453	1499.3	549870	31211	0.33	1.60	3.89
Total	3287574	1027015	312.4	14145160	13778	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source:

Rao and Singh, 2004: 12

Table 8: Punjab's Districts

Sr. No.	District	Area in 000' sq. km	2001 Census Population	Headquarters
1	Amritsar	5,094	3,096,077	Amritsar
2	Bathinda	3,382	1,183,295	Bathinda
3	Faridkot	1,469	550,892	Faridkot
4	Fatehgarh Sahib	1,180	538,041	Fatehgarh Sahib
5	Ferozepur	5,300	1,746,107	Ferozepur
6	Gurdaspur	3,569	2,104,011	Gurdaspur
7	Hoshiarpur	3,364	1,480,736	Hoshiarpur
8	Jalandhar	2,634	1,962,700	Jalandhar
9	Kapurthala	1,633	754,521	Kapurthala
10	Ludhiana	3,767	3,032,831	Ludhiana
11	Mansa	2,169	688,758	Mansa
12	Moga	2,216	894,854	Moga
13	Muktsar	2,615	777,493	Muktsar
14	Nawanshahr	1,266	587,468	Nawanshehar
15	Patiala	3,627	1,844,934	Patiala
16	Rupnagar	2,056	1,116,108	Rupnagar
17	Sangrur	5,021	2,000,173	Sangrur
18	Mohali*	1,098	698,317	Mohali
19	Tarn Taran*	2,449	939,057	Tarn Taran
20	Barnala*	1,410	526,931	Barnala

* The source does not state what the asterisk means.

Source: <http://india.gov.in/knowindia/districts/andhra1.php?stateid=PB>

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