As a realization from Gerner (1991, p. 42) of the near destruction of the Jewish people of Europe spread, the Zionist movement in the U.S., the country that now contained the largest Jewish community in the world, gained a tremendous support. It was inconceivable to most U.S. citizens regardless of their religious beliefs, that they could fail to support Jewish aspirations for a safe place where Jews could never again be senselessly slaughtered. In the process, the reality of Palestine and its indigenous people was ignored.
Though Howley (1975, p. 3) contested that the events that caused the exodus of the Palestine Arabs did not begin in 1948 or for that matter with the Balfour Declaration in 1917. They began much earlier in the history of the conflict between the Christian West and the Muslim East. This is “a struggle that cannot be fully understood or appreciated unless one grasps the problem as it originated in the Ottoman Empire.” By British declaration of intent to create a “Jewish National Home in Palestine,” David Ben-Gurion reads out the proclamation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948. In Ostle (1991, p. 24) literature, he said that a guy by the named of Leonard Stein, authoritative historian of Zionism, argued that the real purpose of the Zionist movement was to detach Palestine from its people and form a very effective guard for the Suez Canal thus turning it into a Jewish State.
While the Arabs in the Middle East are busy for their nationalistic activities, According to Hurewitz (1975, p. 19), the Egyptians, which is under the British Wartime Policy, have ascended to demand the restoration of their independence. When the war in Europe ended, Sa’d Zaghlul, whom Lord Cromer had praised as an industrious, intelligent, and capable leader in 1906, gave British high commissioner a statement tantamount to a demand for independence. Within a few days, Egypt was in revolt against British. The national nature of the reaction illustrated the fact that Egyptians, for many different reasons, wanted independence and respect from the British. Contrary to British assertions, what seemed dearest to most British officials despite exceptions like Wingate was the honor of the British Empire. Although the British rapidly squelched the uprising, its magnitude and nature was not entirely lost on officials in Cairo and London. British commission realized that the Egyptians who had suffered from wartime inflation, family separation, hardship, indenture, and death had not received due award. With the acknowledgement of Zaghlul as the man with whom the British would have to negotiate Egypt’s future, he was brought into talks with other freedom fighters.
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In the end, Egypt won a nominal independence not by negotiation but by a unilateral declaration of the British high commissioner on 28 February 1922. The terms of independence drew upon the treaty about which Zaghlul had equivocated. Britain reserved to its own government four points: the defense of Egypt, protection of communications, protection of foreign and minority interests, and the administration of the Sudan. But Egypt remained under the thumb of the British for over thirty years.
In the great Persia which is a different story according to the written accounts of Imamuddin (1968). After the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 divided Iran into rival spheres of influence and a neutral zone, the Qajar boy-shah Ahmad (1909-24) fell under the domination of Bakhtiari chiefs. He began to repress nationalists whose leadership soon fled the country or were executed. Berkoff (1994, p. 36) said that there is a foreign intrigue, mainly among Germans, Russians, and the British, resulted in a secret treaty between Germany and the Qajar government. The Germans promised support for Persian independence if the Persians would assist Germany in the war. More accommodating Persian leaders succumbed to british pressure and signed a treaty on 9 August 1919. This gave Britain rights similar to those enjoyed in Egypt and Iraq – rights objectionable to populations in all places. In the treaty Britain gained control over the administration, economy, communications, and defense of Iran. However, the decision left Iran still facing a soviet threat. Although the Bolshevik government had denounced all Russian-Persian treaties as imperialist, it used abrogation as an excuse to pursue into Iran the opposition forces of General Denikin during the Russian Civil War. It was in this context that the Bolsheviks tried to affirm the independence of a Soviet republic set up in northern Persia. After the League of Nations (which Iran joined) failed to take action, the Persians opened negotiations with the Soviet Union On 29 February 1921, the Bolsheviks renounced former czarist treaties and policies, except those relating to fisheries in the Caspian Sea. Iran’s debts were cancelled, but to send troops in case of a threat to Iranian independence. Iran agreed to retain concessions given up by the Russians, thereby assuring the Soviet government that Iran intended to remain sovereign.
Ironically Long and Reich (1980, p. 124-126), stated that as the Persian negotiators were concluding these negotiations in Moscow, a Russian-trained Persian Cossack, Reza Khan, carried out a successful coup d’etat intended to abolish the Qajar monarchy and replace it with a republic. Reza Khan appointed the influential Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabataba’i his prime minister, but eventually he himself took this position. At that point in 1923, he sent the Qajar
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shah Ahmad on a long vacation to Europe. Reza’s plans for the republic were proceeding well until the Turkish parliament took a radical step of abolishing the Caliphate. The Persian ulama reacted by insisting on the unacceptability of republican government. Still determined to rid Iran of the Qajars, Reza agreed to the change of plans only on condition that he himself be recognized as shah. In 1925, the Persians Majlis voted out the Qajar dynasty and replaced it with that of the Pahlavis, in whose male line the succession would reside. The thirty-four year history of Pahlavi Iran began.
In the holy land of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is a rather subtle yet salient to the historical emergence for the leaders of the Islamic faith. Esposito (1987, p. 10) argued that with official British backing for both the Hashimites of the Hujaz and the Saudis of Najd during the war, it was no surprise that the two rivals fought each other for control of Arabia once the war was over. By leading the Arab revolt Husayn thought he had won the promise of an independent, united Arab state. In October 1916, he publicly proclaimed himself king, thereby further enraging the Saudis. Fully confident of the allied commitment, Husayn received a rude shock when Britain, France, and their allies proceeded with the partition of the Middle East, including lands promised to him. Taking seriously Britain’s award of the Khurma oasis, though it was held by Abd al-Aziz ibn Sa’ud, Husayn sent Abd Allah with an army to seize it. But Abd al-Aziz so thoroughly defeated the Hashimite force at Turaba that Abd Allah was fortunate to escape. The two cities in the Utayba Highlands of eastern Hijaz controlled the caravan routes from Najd to Makka. This incident in 1919 was but a preview of the struggle ahead.
With the installation of Abd Allah in Transjordan in 1920 and that of Faysal in Iraq in 1921, and with the continued presence of the Hashmites in the Hijaz, the Saudis began to feel surrounded. In Marx (1968), he exposed the reasons, first, they sent a force into southwest Arabia to defend the interests of the Idris family in Asir. In November 1921, Abd Al-Aziz also defeated the Rashidi emirate at Ha’il in the Jabal Shammar area of northern Arabia. He assured their future quiescence by bringing their key leaders to his own court in Riyadh. After these successes, Ibn Saud negotiated two neutral zones with the British in north Arabia, one on the frontier of Iraq and the other on the border with Kuwait. These zones would allow for mutual grazing or water rights. The Shaykhdom of Kuwayt lost some two thirds of its previous sphere of authority, but Shayk Ahmad of Kuwayt nevertheless agreed. The agreement of November 1922 establishing the protocol of Uqayr, signified recognition by the
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Citation du texte:
Researcher Nassef Adiong, 2008, The Historical Emergence of the Main Forms of Actors in the Middle East and North Africa region , Munich, Editeur GRIN GmbH (SARL)
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