1.1 Structure and Goals of this Thesis
1.2 The Area of Focus and the Structure
1.3 Survey of Existing Literature
2 An Introduction to Evangelical Protestantism
2.1 Evangelical Denominations
2.1.2 ‘Classical’ or Neo-Evangelicalism
2.1.3 Pentecostalism and Charismatics
2.1.5 Analysis of the Socio-Demographic Details of Evangelicals
3 Evangelicals and Politics
3.1 Religious Reasons for Political Abstinence
3.2 The 1920s – Sporadic Activism, Followed by Retreat
3.3 The Fundamentalist Comeback of the 1950s
3.3.2 Further Organizations of the 1950s
3.4 The Height of Liberalism and its Consequences for Evangelicals
3.5 The New Right’s Formation
3.6 The Creation of the New Christian Right
3.6.1 Targeting Conservative Evangelicals
4 The First Generation of Organizations
4.1 The Moral Majority
4.2 Other Organizations of the 1980s
4.2.1 Religious Roundtable
4.2.2 Christian Voice
4.2.3 American Coalition for Traditional Values
4.4 Summary: The Christian Right of the 1980s
4.5 The First Wave’s Downfall
5 Pat Robertson – Bringing Charismatics and Pentecostals into Politics
5.1 Pat Robertson’s Presidential Campaign
5.2 Conclusion - The Campaign’s Impact
6 The Second Generation – The Christian Right in the 1990s
6.1 Christian Coalition
6.1.1 Ralph Reed
6.1.2 The launching of Christian Coalition
6.1.3 Membership and its Structure
6.1.4 Funding & Finances
6.1.5 The Christian Coalition and the GOP
6.1.6 Christ ian Coalition’s conflict with the FEC a nd the IRS
6.2 Focus on the Family
6.3 Family Research Council
6.4 Concerned Women for America
6.4.1 Strategy – Pioneering in Juridical Action
6.4.2 Structure and Organization
6.5 Eagle Forum
7 The Second Generation’s Strategies
7.1 A Transformation of Strategy
7.2 Focusing on legal action
7.3 Juridical Organizations of the Christian Right
7.3.1 American Center for Law and Justice
7.3.2 Rutherford Institute
8 Strategies & Issues
8.2 Foreign Policy
9 The Development of Evangelical Party Affiliation
9.1 From Democrat to Republican
9.2 Infiltrating the GOP
9.2.1 Gaining Control at the Local Level
9.2.2 Conflicts between established Republicans and Christian Right Newcomers
9.2.3 Premises for Evangelical Involvement
10.1 What they really want: the ultimate goals of the Christian Right
10.2 Has the Christian Right been successful so far?
10.3 Looking Ahead – A Personal Forecast
11 Works Cited
11.1 Primary Sources
11.1.1 Publications of the Christian Right
11.2 Secondary Sources
11.2.1 Monographies and Collected Editions
11.2.2 Newspaper Articles
11.2.3 Articles from Periodicals
11.2.4 Unpublished Articles
11.2.5 Miscellaneous Internet-based Sources
11.2.6 E-Mail Correspondence
List of Illustrations illustration not visible in this excerpt
Figure 1: White Evangelical Religious Traditions
Figure 2: The Christian Coalition’s Membership and Budget
Map l: The Christian Right’s Influence in Republican State Parties
This thesis will address the political movement of the Christian Right (see chapter 3.6 on why this term is most apt), one of the most controversial movements in the American political system. Clyde Wilcox fittingly summarized the amplitude of views about the Christian Right:
“At their most extreme, these divergent views of the Christian Right paint a picture of stalwart Christians battling satanic forces for the soul of America or of neo-Nazi storm troopers rounding up homosexuals or roasting marshmallows in the flames from the books they have culled from the public library.”1
Its critics have accused it of trying to establish a theocracy in the United States,2 of trying to strip homosexuals of their civil rights,3 and called it fascist,4 to name but a few allegations.5 Leaders of the Christian Right, on the other hand, have harshly attacked those they made out as advocates of “secular humanism”,6 have accused them of anti-Christian bigotry,7 and have repeatedly employed extreme rhetoric when addressing their (political) adversaries.8 Within about twenty-five years, the movement developed from almost complete political abstinence into a highly organized political force.
The subject is appealing for research for several reasons: firstly, it is a good example of how vivid and influential religion and religiously motivated political action still are, in spite of the secularization theory widely adhered to in the respective period of time. It is also still current, as there has been some fluctuation in terms of activity and degree of organization, but so far the Christian Right has not ceased to exist.
For examples of anti-homosexual rhetoric, see also: Diamond, Sara. Not by Politics Alone: The Enduring Influence of the Christian Right. New York, London: The Guilford Press, 1998. 156-172.
1.1 Structure and Goals of this Thesis
The goal of the thesis is to explore the emergence of the movement, to portrait the developments that brought theologically conservative Protestants (Evangelicals) – from isolation and retreat into a subculture – to active and organized political involvement. Due to the topic’s complexity and the indispensable, rather extensive introduction to Evangelicalism, a focus has to be set: instead of developing a complete survey of the movement, its origins and its time of prosperity will be explored in detail, including particularly descriptions of the organizations. This means that the Christian Right’s activity in the current decade will not be analyzed as thoroughly, for two reasons. Firstly, George W. Bush’s presidency, and his administration’s connections and relations to the Christian Right, offer more additional material than what could be included here. Secondly, the research available so far for the period from 2000 on offers not nearly as much sources and comprehensive works as there are available for the previous decades (as explained in the survey of existing literature). Therefore, references to those years will only be made selectively, as far as appropriate and possible. The central questions to be answered are linked to the controversy surrounding the movement: (1) Has the Christian Right been trying to accomplish what its critics fear, a theocracy, and a Christian nation in which there would be no place for dissenters?
(2) Is the Christian Right a legitimate movement operating within the frame of the political system, or is it set out to ultimately change that system?
Resulting from those questions is the evaluation of the Christian Right’s performance so far (regardless of what can be concluded to answer the above questions):
(3) Which of its goals have been achieved, what balance can be drawn?
1.2 The Area of Focus and the Structure
The key to understanding the individual and collective motivation of Christian Right activists is their faith, as well as the characteristics of the various subgroups of Evangelicalism. Therefore, chapter two will provide an introduction to American Evangelicalism: its development, theological basis, and various currents will be treated. Chapter three will then deal with the Evangelicals’ way into politics, from the first involvement in the l920s, via the retreat from the public, political abstinence, and the sporadic engagement in the 1950s, until the emergence of the New Christian Right at the end of the 1970s. The thesis will be focused on the developments of the late 1970s through the end of the 1990s, as this period covers the formation of the movement and its organization, and the most important events that triggered it. In order to describe and explain the activity of the various groups and actors, a detailed survey of the main organizations, their activity, strategy, membership, and performance will be provided (chapter four). Following that, the transition from the first wave of Christian Right activity to the second one will be described in chapter five, including the presidential campaign of Pat Robertson in between. The second half of the main part in chapter 6 will deal with the organizations and activities of the 1990s, it will also address the important differences between the first and second generation of organizations. Subsequently, the newly adapted strategies and approaches the Christian Right employed in the second decade of its existence will be examined, including the increasingly intense connection with the Republican Party, and the juridical strategy (chapters seven and eight). Finally, a conclusion will be drawn in chapter nine to summarize the Christian Right’s activism, to answer the questions brought up in the introduction, and to evaluate the influence, successes, and failures the Christian Right has had so far.
1.3 Survey of Existing Literature
Works on Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism are numerous, both specialized theological and sociological studies (Marsden 2006, Dayton/Johnston 1998, Hochgeschwender 2007, Smith 2000, Hunter 1983, Pieh 1998), and briefer introductions in works concerned primarily with Evangelicalism as a political phenomenon (Wilcox 1992; 1996, Brocker 2004, Bruce 2000) exist. The latter works (generally those by political scientists) usually also include studies about socio-demographic details of Evangelicals.
As far as this work’s main part, the emergence of the Christian Right, its triggers, structure, and political activity are concerned, the existing literature provides a variety of studies, both specialized and more general. Broad studies about the Christian Right include Brocker 2004, Wilcox 1992; 1996, Brown 2002, Bruce 1990; 1995, Green/Guth/Smidt/Kellstedt 1996, Watson 1997, Oldfield 1997, and Liebman/Wuthnow 1983. More specialized works (e.g. about single organizations or aspects of the topic) are numerous. A great deal of attention has been devoted to Evangelicals in election studies (focusing on religion as an influence), and in studies concerned with the Christian Right’s campaign activities, as Brocker has noted.9
As already mentioned above, the majority of available literature (especially the comprehensive studies about the Christian Right) focuses on the time before 2000, there seems to be no newer study dealing with the developments in the Christian Right during the last years. A reference handbook containing short articles on a wide variety of issues related to political involvement of conservative Christians provides some newer research (Utter/True 2004).
2. An Introduction to Evangelical Protestantism
This chapter will try to shed light on the phenomenon of Evangelicalism in order to provide a basis for an understanding of this part of Protestantism. The approach taken here will first provide the theological definition of Evangelicalism, as well as a brief survey of its historical development, and finally an introduction into the main branches of Evangelicalism. Defining Evangelicalism is by no means an easy task; the existing literature holds a multitude of different approaches and explanations,10 making it difficult to find a uniform definition. Donald Dayton argues “that the category ‘evangelical’ has lost whatever usefulness it once might have had”,11 due to the equivocality of the term and the misunderstandings that might arise from it; Weber12 and Smith13 hold similar views. Despite these problems of definition, the term will be used here, in the sense of Evangelicalism as “an extended family”14 of subgroups, which will be introduced in the following (at least those relevant to the topic).
Evangelicalism predominantly is a Protestant phenomenon (although evangelical Catholics and even Jews exist),15 and it is important to note that the term here will be used to refer to all those denominational and non-denominational branches of Protestantism that have developed out of mainstream Protestantism in the course of the Second Great Awakening (ca. 1800- 1840,16 the first one had taken place around 174017 ).18 Evangelicalism first and foremost describes nothing more than a Christian piety in line with the Gospel’s authority, but the term’s meaning has shifted somewhat and now refers to the series of awakenings (from within mainline Protestantism, which refers to established denominations, like Presbyterianism, Methodism, Baptism, and others),19 in the course of which a personal relationship with Jesus Christ and the acceptance of Christ as a messianic Redeemer were emphasized.20 The experience of accepting Jesus Christ as Redeemer is one collective characteristic shared by all (white) Evangelicals, it is commonly known as “being born again” (although not all evangelical churches use this term, which might make this criterion too narrow).21 Basically, these criteria (following Hunter)22 can be used to identify Evangelicals:
1. Accepting the Bible as inerrant and the word of God
2. The belief in Jesus Christ’s divinity
3. The Belief that Jesus Christ’s life, death, and resurrection make redemption of the soul possible
Even at this basic point, various definitions of what Evangelicals are defined by can be found in literature, a similar characterization (which is slightly different form Hunter’s) consisting of four points can be found elsewhere,23 which gives an idea of how difficult it is to find a uniform definition. In the following, an important aspect (which would have consequences concerning the Evangelicals’ relation to politics) of Evangelicalism will be explored: millennialism. A great majority of evangelical preachers of the eighteenth and nineteenth century adhered to postmillennialism and believed that the second coming of Christ was imminent (derived from the Revelation to John, 20, 1-15).24 The opposite of postmillennialism is premillennianism, to which only one evangelical denomination of the early nineteenth century adhered, the Millerites. The difference between both interpretations is that
“For the postmillennialists, Christ would come after the millennium, a thousand-year period of perfect peace and tranquility. In contrast, the premillennialists believed that Christ would return prior to the millennium and defeat the Antichrist in a major battle.”25
While premillennialists believe in a literal interpretation of the Revelation to John (which reads that Christ will return to earth in an act of mercy, and establish the millennium – as described above – without requiring human engagement),26 postmillennialists emphasize the necessity of becoming involved in order to facilitate the return of Christ, through improving the world and establishing the millennium themselves.27 This meant that only postmillennialists would see any sense in trying to improve the world’s situation, as premillennialists would not see much sense in trying to improve a world bound to be ended by the Second Coming shortly; premillenianism led to a certain other-worldliness and isolationism, disencouraging its adherents from any sort of social movement.28 Besides these differences, both interpretations did have much in common prior to the American Civil War.29 From the 1870s on, premillenianism spread and became more accepted among Evangelicals, and eventually provided the basis for dispensational premillenianism, a doctrine opposed to the theological liberalism among Evangelicals in the post-Civil-War period of time.30 Dispensational premillennianism, in short, is based on an interpretation of a prophecy in Daniel 9, 24-27, (see Marsden for details)31 assumes that history is split into seven separate periods of time, dispensations, of which the sixth has been reached so far; the doctrine was based on John Nelson Darby’s views, and then institutionalized by C.I. Scofield.32 Christ’s return, and thus the beginning of the millennium, was seen as Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 2. immediate.33 Darby also introduced the highly controversial concept of pre-tribulational rapture: Christ would come to remove his saints from earth before the seven years of tribulation, and then return with them after that period to establish the millennium on earth.34 This doctrine was to be re-interpreted by some leading evangelists in the last third of the twentieth century, since it obstructed their attempts to mobilize Evangelicals into political action; others, like Pat Robertson, believed in the concept of a post-tribulational rapture, after which Christ’s followers would remain on earth during the time of tribulation, possibly actively participating in fighting the Antichrist – thus, the concept encouraged political engagement.35
Due to the limited extent of this thesis, this brief introduction into the details and developments of Evangelicalism during the nineteenth and early twentieth century will have to suffice, see Dayton/Johnston, Hochgeschwender, and Marsden for far more detailed surveys of American Protestantism and Evangelicalism.
2.1 Evangelical Denominations
The first large evangelical group to be introduced here is that of Fundamentalism, which developed from 1910 on, out of a theological dispute among Presbyterians: the central synod of Presbyterians in the Northern States established five authoritative dogmas for all their members.36 While three of those merely repeated what was already contained in the Apostles’ Creed, the remaining two – absolute inerrancy of Scripture, directly originating from God, and the establishment of the historicity of the depiction of Biblical miracles as facts of belief - were key factors for the upcoming controversy. In the following years, conservative theologians of the Princeton Theological Seminary published a series of writings called “The Fundamentals: A Testimony of Truth”, which provided the name of the newly developed movement; it was opposed to religious liberalism, Catholicism, Mormonism, and to other religions that it saw as deviations.37 Fundamentalism comprised groups from different Protestant denominations, it was, and always remained, a rather loosely connected movement that did not become organized in through a central institution.38 The criteria introduced to identify Evangelicals in general do also apply to Fundamentalists; Brocker names five points39 largely congruent with those given by Hunter. Beginning with the 1930s, Fundamentalism spread to the South and Midwest, constituting the common image of the Bible Belt, dominated by this version of conservative Protestantism, despite the fact that there has always been a majority of Protestants who cannot be apportioned to Fundamentalism.40
2.1.2 ‘Classical’ or N eo-Evangelicalism
Fundamentalism did not substitute Evangelicalism as such, it is merely a radical version of Evangelicalism, but the “classical” version of Evangelicalism continued to exist. It was labeled neo-Evangelicalism in 1942, in order to avoid a mix-up with Fundamentalism, which was now often equated with Evangelicalism.41 The split between Fundamentalists and neo- Evangelicals was most visible in the creation of two organizations, the National Organization of Evangelicals (NAE), which was open to a variety of denominations and Evangelical groups; it did adhere to the core principles of Fundamentalism, but it did not demand a strict separationism, e.g. from Pentecostals (a further subgroup, see below).42 In contrast, the American Council of Christian Churches (ACCC) was purely fundamentalist, much smaller than the NAE, and opposed to Pentecostalism.43 Nevertheless, Fundamentalists and neo- Evangelicals are far less different than the sharp separationism might imply, both are closely related subgroups of the same broad movement, sharing most of their doctrines – although neo-Evangelicals accept a broader array of doctrines, e.g. variations of millennialism, while Fundamentalists are somewhat more conservative – but differing in their attitude towards other subgroups of Evangelicalism.44 Neo-Evangelicals agree with Fundamentalists about the Bible’s inerrancy, but they do not insist on its verbatim truth.45
2.1.3 Pentecostalism and Charismatics
Pentecostalism as a movement originated around 1900 near Topeka (KS), although it is possible that it originated six years later in an African-American mission in Los Angeles instead. Hochgeschwender gives the Apostolic Faith Gospel Mission in Los Angeles as the Pentecostal movement’s origin, its preacher was a follower of Charles Parham, who had contributed to the movement’s emergence in about l900.46 The most distinctive features of Pentecostalism are its belief in the gifts of the Holy Spirit, mainly glossolalia (speaking in tongues), and healing by faith.47 Nevertheless, the adherence to glossolalia alone cannot serve as a criterion to identify Pentecostals, as it had already existed among Mormons and Shakers - denominations that do not have much else in common with Pentecostalism – in the nineteenth century.48 As far as theological doctrine is concerned, Pentecostals share much of what Fundamentalists adhere to, e.g. the Bible’s inerrancy, and the belief that personal salvation is needed.49 But unlike Fundamentalists, Pentecostals emphasize the role of the Holy Spirit in experiencing God’s will (the movement’s name is derived from the day of Pentecost, when the outpouring of the Holy Spirit enabled Christ’s disciples to speak in tongues)50 while the former group relies entirely on the study of Scripture. The concept of premillennial dispensationalism was rejected by Pentecostals, since it did not contain the possibility of miracles;51 “classical” Protestant doctrine argued that the possibility of wonders ended with the apostolic era.52 The acceptance of doctrine and tenets was one-sided: Fundamentalists (as well as others) at least rejected Pentecostalism and its practices, especially the belief in glossolalia.53 Open hostility was common, expressed both by prominent evangelists of the earlier days, such as Reuben Archer Torrey, who went to such extremes as to call Pentecostals “the last vomit of Satan”,54 and fundamentalist leaders of the late twentieth century, such as Jerry Falwell; it took until the 1980s for Fundamentalists to take a more lenient stance toward Pentecostalism.55
A movement very closely connected with Pentecostalism is that of the Charismatics, which emerged in the 1950s, out of the Pentecostal movement; it shares its doctrine and also emphasizes a personal religious experience.56 The difference between the two is that Charismatics stay within their original denominations and churches (which extends this branch of Evangelicalism to Catholicism, in the form of the movement for charismatic renewal within the Catholic Church), while Pentecostals form independent churches and denominations; Pentecostalism is based on local structures.57 Altogether, 29 million Americans identified themselves as Charismatics in 1980, 19 million thereof belonged to Catholic or Protestant churches.58 As of 2007, Pentecostalism was the fastest growing denomination in the U.S.59
The purpose of this brief introduction of the diverse branches of Evangelicalism is to provide the basis necessary to understand the circumstances of their political engagement during the twentieth century, it is therefore admissible to use “evangelical” from here on as a trans- denominational term embracing all denominations and movements to which the characteristics listed above fit. All of the following can be (but of course do not necessarily have to be) included into the category “evangelical”, giving an idea of its transcending nature: “Baptists, Methodists Presbyterians, Lutherans, Pentecostals, Charismatics, Independents, Anabaptists, Restorationists, Congregationalists, Holiness Christians, even Episcopalians”.60 It is necessary to keep in mind that there are different approaches concerning the identification of Evangelicals employed by researchers who conducted studies including detailed accounts of the constituency. Three main operational approaches exist: (1) identification through the denomination a person belongs to, (2) identification through doctrine and religious practice, and (3) self-identification; each one of those has certain deficits, e.g. different meanings of certain terms among respondents asked how they would identify their own religious identity (see also Smith’s view of the problem61 ).62 Since this thesis draws on many different works, it is inevitable that the single sources might have employed different methods for identifying Evangelicals, leading to a certain inconsistency. However, this is permissible, as the thesis’ focus lies elsewhere.
2.1.5 Analysis of the Socio-Demographic Details of Evangelicals
This chapter will anticipate the contents of the main part, the (largely chronologic) description of Evangelical involvement in politics, as it seems more convenient to explore the social and demographic details of Evangelicals as a group in American society at this point, in order to be able to revert to it for addressing details later on. A detailed historical approach will not be necessary (nor would it be possible within acceptable limits), as it will suffice to provide data for the period of time mostly relevant: the 1980s and 1990s.
First, the proportions the subgroups introduced above make up within all Evangelicals are of interest.
Figure 1 63 illustration not visible in this excerpt
Note that the percentage of Charismatics is higher than the 9% given here, as those belonging to non-Protestant denominations are not included.64 All in all, white Evangelicals constituted about 25% of the total population in the U.S. (1996),65 Smith gives a percentage of 29% (2000),66 but apparently included Afro-Americans, making it impossible to determine if there has been an increase from these two numbers alone. As African-Americans have never been a substantial part of those Evangelicals mobilized into political action by the Christian Right,67 they will not be included here. What is of interest here is an overview about the socio- demographic data concerning Evangelicals, in comparison to that of other denominations; furthermore, it is important to find out whether or not they generally differ (from other denominations) in their political views.
Based on the results drawn from the data of the 1988 American National Election Studies (ANES),68 Evangelicals predominantly come from rural areas (49%, compared to only 25% of non-evangelical whites) in the South (68% vs. 20%) and Midwest (17% vs. 31%), the age distribution of Evangelicals compared to non-Evangelicals shows only a small discrepancy. As far as education and income are concerned, Evangelicals have both a lesser degree of education (31% did not graduate high school, and 34% have at least some college education, compared to 16% and 50%) and a lower income, 35% of Evangelicals have a lower income than $15,000 p.a., and only 8% have more than $50,000 p.a., compared to 26% and 19% for non-Evangelicals; both groups have about the same percentage of blue-collar employees, but Evangelicals are somewhat more likely to identify themselves as working-class. There are also more women and housewives among Evangelicals. When it comes to religion, Evangelicals attend church more often than others, pray significantly more often (81% pray daily, compared to 44% of non-evangelical respondents), and 70% (vs. 22%) find religion very important. The data of the 1992 ANES confirms these results, although variations occur and some items are different.69 Evangelicals prove to be considerably more conservative as others as far as socio-moral issues are concerned, especially on abortion, civil rights of homosexuals, and the role of women in society. It is important to notice that the degree of conservatism on these issues increased when the definition of “evangelical” was set more narrow (in terms of doctrine, denominational affiliation, and religious practice), while the number of Evangelicals included in this more narrow raster decreased.70
3. Evangelicals and Politics
3.1 Religious Reasons for Political Abstinence
It is rather difficult to find a single point of time or incident which marked the beginning of the political involvement of Evangelicals, and it is necessary to focus on recent developments in order to be able to examine them properly within the limits of this thesis. Therefore, the main time of interest starts with the end of the 1960s and the dawn of the 1970s, as this time marks the beginning of what Wilcox labeled “the third coming of the fundamentalist right”.71
In the following introduction, an overview of the previous decades, from the early 20th century on, will be given, since an understanding of the Evangelicals’ relation to politics prior to the 1970s is necessary to explain the distinctiveness of their increasing involvement with politics.
3.2 The 1920s – Sporadic Activism, Followed by Retreat
Prohibition and the teaching of evolution in public schools were two issues important enough to spark the Fundamentalists’ involvement (Pentecostals did not become involved until much later in the twentieth century) in politics, although it is not clear why it was the evolution issue that led to an opposition of this sort.72 Tarek Mitri finds an explanation in the fact that pious parents could not accept that their children were taught a theory incompatible with their belief, the conflict between evolutionists and Fundamentalists became a political one.73 Fundamentalists launched several organizations to reach their goal, such as the Bible Crusaders of America or the Defenders of the Christian Faith, to name but two.74
The fight against the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools culminated in the Scopes Trial, in which the teacher Thomas Scopes was convicted of breaking a Tennessee state law prohibiting the teaching of anything in contradiction to what the bible contained on creation. The trial is remarkable for “its interpretation as a conflict of social and intellectual values”75 and for the fact that it was stage-managed and inspired by an ACLU announcement promising support to those willing to dispute the Tennessee law. It turned out to be a disaster for Fundamentalists despite the fact that Scopes was convicted, since the defense’s lawyer, Clarence Darrow, an agnostic, managed to humiliate the prosecutor William Jennings Bryan, Fundamentalist and former presidential candidate for the Democratic Party.76 Michael Hochgeschwender, in contrast, does not describe the Scopes trial as a heavy defeat for Fundamentalists, since the defense itself sought Scopes’ conviction to be able to create precedence, but their plan failed, Tennessee v. Scopes never became what the ACLU had wanted.77 Alcoholic beverages were made illegal and prohibition thus enacted, but this did not, as Bruce briefly describes, change society in the way Fundamentalists had endorsed, it rather led to the thriving of organized crime, demand for alcohol did not decrease as hoped for.78
A period of retreat followed after these political campaigns, the Fundamentalists did not enjoy wide public support for their views and thus withdrew from larger political action, concentrating on “institution-building and soul-saving”.79
Another explanation for their retreat lies in the fact that the doctrinal presupposition of premillennianism, the millennium, had not arrived (again), while the third awakening had supposed it would arrive soon, its failure to do so had taken a part of the movement’s impetus80. This was also due to the change in society: the decline of the world economic crisis – which corresponded to the premillennialists’ point of view and therefore was no incentive to become politically active81 – led to a decline of the new morality of consumerism and a reflection on values which Fundamentalism had sought to restore. Besides, liberal Protestantism, the Fundamentalists’ main adversary on the theological level, vanished as well, which eased the cultural conflict between the two, so Fundamentalism (and Evangelicalism) partly became moot.82
3.3 The Fundamentalist Comeback of the 1950s
Evangelicals had not been active in politics for almost three decades83, but they returned to the political stage after World War II, in the 1950s. This chapter will explore why conservative Christians became actively involved in politics again, since their point of view had been to see “politics […] as an ultimately futile endeavor”84 during their retreat from the 1930s on.85 A brief digression into the political and socio-cultural circumstances of those years during which a new evangelical engagement in politics began is necessary in order to be able to explain the multifarious factors which influenced both society as such and, in turn, the conservative forces aiming to alter it. Firstly, the political situation during the 1950s will be examined; secondly, the changes of relevance to the topic called forth by the thriving socio-cultural liberalization of the 1960s and early 1970s86 will be described.
The emergence of a single foe image sparked another wave of organized political involvement by the Christian Right: the rise of the Soviet Union as the U.S.’s main rival, and the following rising “fear of domestic communist influence”.87 Furthermore, the Korean War had influenced American society in the same way, anticommunist sentiments were amplified, the Chinese and the Russians were adopted as new foe images.88 Prosecution of Soviet spies was only a part of what expanded into a system of controlling suspected communist attitudes of federal employees, artists, and intellectuals; this culminated in Senator Joseph McCarthy’s radical anticommunism.89 On a broader scale, McCarthyism had been the manifestation of the attempt to allow as little discrepancy from the political and cultural norms of the middle- class;90 an attempt which stood diametrically against the slow but steady decline of social conformity and the resulting alteration of norms and values.91 Anticommunism, however, had been a part of the Fundamentalist’s agenda since the end of the 1920s, and remained so throughout the following decades, it was not adopted as recently as the beginning of the 1950s.92 An example of this earlier anticommunism is the split between Fundamentalists and the newer movement called neo-Evangelicalism (see chapter 2.1.2): in 1941, the American Council of Christian Churches (ACCC) had been established by Fundamentalists, its leader was a fervent anticommunist. The more moderate organization, the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), whose members had the same religious set of beliefs as the Fundamentalists it tried to distinguish itself from, did not support the Fundamentalists’ separatism, the NAE was willing to cooperate with other denominations and refrained from the ACCC’s stern anticommunism.93
3.3.2 Further Organizations of the 1950s
There were some organizations devoted to anticommunism, which had emerged out of the ACCC’s leadership, examples are the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade, and the Church League of America.94 Their agenda was only somewhat broader than that of the earlier organizations of the 1920s, it now included opposition against Medicare and sex education, but all elements expanding their agenda still were embedded in their core concern, the battle against communism.95 The Christian Rights engagement did not find a greater audience, and the groups vanished after Senator McCarty’s downfall and the defeat of Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential campaign, but the development of infrastructure, such as Bible colleges, continued.96 Thus, the situation was similar to that of the 1920s: anticommunism in the extreme form (including the belief in a conspiracy)97 the Christian Right had adopted was no longer fashionable, and a retreat into continuing a less public engagement followed, only for different reasons than before.
3.4 The Height of Liberalism and its Consequences for Evangelicals
During the 1960s and 1970s, the United States experienced an era of a vast socio- cultural liberalization throughout many aspects of society, driven to a large part by legal actions brought in before the Supreme Court by liberal organizations. This subsequently led to an increasingly different interpretation of the Bill of Rights: it was more and more interpreted in a way that emphasized an individualistic understanding of freedom and therefore lessened the influence of Christian concepts of morality on federal law.98 Naturally, the latter consequence could not be in the interest of evangelical Protestants. Moreover, the separation of church and state contained in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States99 was now enforced and interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States as the Jeffersonian wall of separation, which meant that prayer, as well as Bible reading in public schools, and the placement of sacral items in public spaces were declared unconstitutional.100 As recent as in the l950s, the expansion of the Pledge of Allegiance by the words “[one nation] under god” and the creation of the nation’s motto, “In God We Trust”101, had taken place, of course these new decisions made by the Supreme Court were greatly at odds with the former handling of references to God. This (as well as other changes yet to be addressed) startled conservative Protestants, as they could not understand how this could have happened in the country founded by Puritan settlers and as a Christian Nation.102 A Supreme Court decision of far-reaching impact not only for conservative Christians was that of Roe v. Wade (1973), in which the Court held that “State criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that except from criminality only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and other interests involved violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy.”103
This liberalization of abortion was most likely the issue of the greatest importance to conservative Protestants, as it seemed fundamentally morally wrong to them and would also ultimately contribute to the demise of the conservative image of the family.104 The same of course applies to conservative opposition against the Civil Rights Movement: the effort to promote equal rights and opportunities for women, as well the protection against discrimination based on sex (Civil Rights Act of 1964), and the slowly increasing toleration of homosexual partnerships were equally inacceptable. 105 For a more detailed description of the events and alterations of theses decades, see Brocker (2004).
However, these changes did not yet bring great numbers of organized conservative Protestants into politics right away: the first reaction was a retraction into their church communities, and evangelical denominational schools and colleges, in order to avoid the advancing liberalization.106 Consequently, racial segregation, and the exclusion of “un- Christian” contents in school curricula could be upheld by citing religious beliefs as legitimization, at least somewhat longer. But as the tax-exempt status of colleges and schools became endangered when racial segregation was ended (starting with Brown v. Ferguson, which ended segregation in public schools), isolation from society became increasingly impossible.107 Eventually, first involvements of conservative Christians in politics occurred, on local and state levels: protests against a textbook used in schools in Kanawha County (WV), a homosexual rights referendum in Dade County (FL), and similar local initiatives (some of which expanded to a national engagement later).108
Jimmy Carter’s campaign for President in l976 showed that Evangelicals could indeed become politically active in greater numbers, and in a more organized way than before.109 Moreover, a theological development had taken place between 1965 and 1976: the Fundamentalist’s and Evangelicals’ tendency to isolate themselves from the “earthly” world had been overcome; and Carter’s presidency had consequences as well, as it broke the taboo of becoming involved with politics sustainably (since Carter himself was an Evangelical, born-again Christian).110 The next chapters will deal with the emergence of a well-organized, long-term involvement of conservative Protestants in United States politics.
3.5 The New Right’s Formation
The New Right (NR) emerged out of Goldwater’s failed presidential campaign of l964, the more conservative parts, to be more exact.111 Three names are generally considered the main founders of the movement: Richard Vigurie, who established a “direct mail empire” out of the campaign; Howard Phillips, another Goldwater-activist; and Paul Weyrich, who helped found several think tanks and other organizations.112 Others active in the creation of the NR include Terry Dolan, Senator Jesse Helms, and Reed Larson.113 The NR must not be seen as a movement incorporated into the Republican Party, according to Duane Oldfield, it by far was no part of it and rather kept its distance from “the establishment” and “country club Republicans”, its self-image was rather “blue collar” than “blue blood”.114 Its demeanor, aptly, was populist, fierce, opposed to the status quo, and tended to be anti- intellectual.115 As far as the NR’s strategy and agenda are concerned, it focused on establishing a broad network for direct mailing (a technique many of the NR’s leaders had mastered),116 work in political action committees, and lobbying; its agenda did not consist of a well-planned platform, campaigns were conducted to oppose (it seems as if the NR much rather opposed issues instead of promoting their own issues, which would be consistent with its populist demeanor) single issues, such as the SALT and Panama Canal treaties, abortion rights, and feminism.117
The last remaining point is to explain what distinguishes the New Right from the Old Right, and also the common grounds they share. According to Paul Weyrich, “The New Right differs from the Old in its political origins, its philosophical/political motivations, its strategic/tactical operations, and its self-conscious goals. The New Right shares with the old a common adherence to general conservative principles; it differs, however, in articulation of those principles, and in the emphasis given them in respective politics.”118
The cardinal difference between New and Old Right is the Old Right’s tendency to ultimately see their endeavor as futile, their outlook on the future was thoroughly negative, with little intention to act in order to accomplish any long-term goals, summed up by another statement by Weyrich: “They had resigned themselves to the inevitable defeat of their principles”.119
Another important difference is the NR’s approach to dealing with the media: Weyrich emphasizes how a complete about-turn had taken place, the NR no longer avoided the media, but understood how to use the media for getting coverage, and, even more importantly, establish a cooperative relationship.120
3.6 The Creation of the New Christian Right
First of all, it is necessary to discuss which term is most useful for describing the movement aiming to mobilize Christians in general (and Fundamentalists and Evangelicals specifically) for achieving certain political goals.121 While no single term is solely valid (in fact, several terms are used throughout literature, often intertwined), some terms are more apt to describe the phenomenon than others. The one mostly used in literature nowadays is (New) Christian Right, which will therefore be used here as well, since it is the most fitting term. The best argument for using it is that of Jerome Himmelstein, who places the New Christian Right in “the context of a broader conservative political movement that calls itself the ‘New Right’”122, as described above. For reasons of convenience, the term will later be changed to Christian Right (i.e. when moving past the first generation). Other suggested terms include Religious Right, which seems useful since it would include conservative Jews, but it is misleading, since the movement is mostly composed of Christians.123 The term Old Christian Right would then be applied to the religiously motivated set of groups and activists which existed prior to this point. In the following, the creation of the New Christian Right out of the secular New Right, will be discussed.
3.6.1 Targeting Conservative Evangelicals
The New Right’s leaders recognized the potential of a nearly un-mobilized constituency featuring a socially conservative set of values (as shown above) by the mid to late 1970s: evangelical Christians.124 For several reasons, this constituency was predestined to be targeted by a movement such as the NR, especially at a period of time during which Evangelicals started to become more active than ever, as suggested by both Time Magazine and Newsweek, who named l976 the “year of the evangelical”;125 the fact that a majority of Evangelicals had voted for the Democrat Carter was negligible in the light of their conservative attitudes.126 Besides the fact that their conservative attitudes were resembled by those issues the NR had started to address, Evangelicals made up about 20% of the U.S. population,127 a considerable block of (present and future) voters. Furthermore, they already had built up a network of institutions, such as church communities, schools, colleges, television networks, which would only have to be used for spreading political messages, instead of only serving to maintain religious values.128 The networks established by televangelists were especially interesting, as a very large audience could be reached on a regular basis; by the beginning of the 1980s, about three quarters of all radio- and television shows featuring religious content were created by conservative Protestants.129
These prospective resources were doubtlessly promising, but it took quite a bit of persuasive work from the leading figures of the NR, who started approaching televangelists and those Evangelicals already actively involved in politics, such as Ed McAteer (whose work will be described in the next chapter) at the end of the 1970s.130 Despite the fact that some prominent religious entrepreneurs (such as Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell) had already moved away from the strictly apolitical attitude so common among Evangelicals, they were reluctant to commit to the NR’s cause and to establishing their own political organizations, since the whole creation of the “evangelical subculture”131 had been an attempt to keep out of the world of politics and its corruption;132 they were also concerned that upset followers might decrease contributions.133 Interestingly, none of the most important activists of the NR were Evangelicals or even Protestants: Vigurie and Phyllis Schlafly (see chapter 6.5) were Roman Catholics, Weyrich an Eastern Rite Catholic, and Phillips a Jew; nevertheless, their role in the political mobilization of conservative Protestants has been of crucial importance.134 In 1979, Weyrich initiated a study, asking the followers of those evangelical leaders the NR tried to persuade whether or not they would approve of political involvement of their ministers – the results were positive, which persuaded them to agree to the NR’s proposals:
“[…] Falwell said ‘O.K., I’m serious. Let’s do it.’ And Robertson started taking an interest and James Robison started taking an interest and Charles Stanley started to take an interest and James Kennedy started to take an interest and on and on… Some of them went formal—i.e., the Moral Majority—others stayed with their ministries but got into these [political] topics which they were unwilling to address before.”135
According to Brocker, this marked the New Christian Right’s hour of birth.136 The leaders of the NR introduced the Evangelicals to the world of politics, before the new movement became more and more independent and founded (relying on the know-how of the NR’s leaders) their own organizations, and eventually the New Christian Right grew larger than the New Right itself.137 The most important pioneering organizations, which constitute the first generation of the New Christian Right, and were launched at the brink of the 1980s, will be described below.
4. The First Generation of Organizations
4.1 The Moral Majority
The Moral Majority is one of the first organizations (and potentially the most important)138 of nation-wide importance founded within the New Christian Right. It was founded in June 1979 (although Wilcox names 1978 as the date of foundation)139 by the leaders of the New Right, such as Paul Weyrich (who supposedly also named it,140 although Brocker states that it is not quite clear who came up with the name),141 and Howard Phillips. Furthermore, those fundamentalist preachers and televangelists willing to enter politics joined them, in this case Jerry Falwell (who became the organization’s first chairman), as well as Timothy LaHaye, D. James Kennedy, and others.142
It is difficult to say how many members the Moral Majority had acquired within the first years, as the numbers range from “several hundred thousand to several million”143 ; the Moral Majority itself speaks of “l00,000 evangelical pastors, conservative Cath-olic priests and orthodox rabbis”144 and “seven million families”145 by 1980; these numbers are likely to be incorrect, as Wilcox reported that the Moral Majority spoke of 20.000 members in the Ohio state chapter, while its address list included no more than 285 names.146 An advantage of the Moral Majority was the fact that its founders could rely on Jerry Falwell’s community, the Baptist Bible Fellowship, to form an organization and to acquire pastors willing to act as leaders, both on state and lower levels. The problem that arose is that those pastors “were a generally intolerant lot”,147 which meant that working with other evangelical denominations or even Catholics was almost impossible. Due to this fact, that a lot of their state chapters neither survived very long, nor did they accomplish much.148
This leads on to the next point of interest: what did the Moral Majority hope to accomplish, what did its agenda look like? Falwell himself had a clear idea of what needed to be accomplished: “[Moral Majority was founded as] a nonpartisan political organization to promote morality in public life and to combat legislation that favored the legalization of immorality”.149 More specifically, this meant that the Moral Majority had been brought into being to restore what they considered the values and principles the nation had been founded on, and which they saw under attack by “[…] many amoral and secular humanists and other liberals”150 ; the core points of their agenda were later refined to four categories: pro-life, pro- traditional family, pro-morality, and pro-American. This was broad enough to address all those willing to support the Moral Majority’s cause, but few supporters could be won outside the fundamentalist circles in which the movement had originated.151 The movement concentrated on lobbying Congress and the administration, trying to influence the Republican Party’s agenda after their taste, all by conventional means such as ad campaigns, mass rallies, and voter mobilization.152
During the first term of Ronald Reagan, the Moral Majority reached the peak of its success: more than $11 million had been spent on lobbying, and successes could be marked up, since some of the NCR’s issues were put on Congress’s agenda and decided in their favor. But the main issues were not adopted as hoped for. Moreover, successes also meant that there was less need for more lobbying, and the defeats the movement had suffered resulted in negative publicity.153 Additionally, problems in fundraising arose after Reagan’s reelection in l984: firstly, Reagan’s campaign and reelection suggested that most of what conservative Christians wanted had been accomplished, so there was little need to donate more money; secondly, scandals around televangelists, such as Jim Bakker (who was convicted of fraud and went to prison), led to a declining confidence in the Christian Right’s political activists.154
These factors contributed to the Moral Majority’s downfall over the latter half of the 1980s155, which culminated in Jerry Falwell’s decision to step down as President, it only took another year-and-a-half before the Moral Majority factually stopped existing156, since it had reached its goals, as Fallwell said: “The purpose of the Moral Majority was to activate the religious right. Our mission has been accomplished […]”.157
However, miscellaneous studies of polls (Gallup) and data from the American National Election Studies conducted throughout the 1980s have shown that support for Moral Majority steadily declined over the years, resulting in what Matthew Moen brought to the point: “The more people knew about Moral Majority, the less they liked it”.158
Despite those ratings, the substantial impact the organization had on the political landscape during its zenith cannot be denied.
4.2 Other Organizations of the 1980s
There were three other organizations of major importance which were active throughout the 1980s, plus an umbrella organization, which can be counted as a fourth one: the National Christian Action Coalition, the Religious Roundtable, Christian Voice, and the American Coalition for Traditional Values.159
1 Wilcox, Clyde. Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. 95.
2 Boston, Robert. The Most Dangerous Man in America?: Pat Robertson and the Rise of the Christian Coalition. Amherst (NY): Prometheus Books, 1996. 161.
3 Wilcox, Clyde. Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 93.
4 Brocker, Manfred. Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung: Die christliche Rechte im politischen System der USA. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 2004. 13.
5 Compare Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 13-14.
6 Falwell apologizes to gays, feminists, lesbians. Ed. CNN.com. 2001. 30 Mar. 2008. <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/14/Falwell.apology/>.
7 Boston 161.
8 "Robertson Letter Attacks Feminists". New York Times. 26.8.1992. 30 Mar. 2008.
9 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 32.
10 See for instance Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung; Dayton/Johnston; Hochgeschwender; and Smith, American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving.
11 Dayton, Donald W. "Some Doubts about the Usefulness of the Category "Evangelical"". The Variety of American Evangelicalism. Eds. Donald W. Dayton, and Robert K. Johnston. Eugene (OR), Pasadena: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1997. 245–251. 245.
12 Weber, Timothy P. "Premillenialism and the Branches of Evangelicalism". The Variety of American Evangelicalism. Ed. Donald W. Dayton, and Robert K. Johnston. Eugene (OR), Pasadena: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1997. 5–21. 13.
13 Smith, Christian. Christian America?: What Evangelicals Really Want. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 15.
14 Johnston, Robert K. "American Evangelicalism: An Extended Family". The Variety of American Evangelicalism. Eds. Donald W. Dayton, and Robert K. Johnston. Eugene (OR), Pasadena: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1997. 252–269. 252.
15 Hunter, James Davison. American Evangelicalism: Conservative Religion and the Quandary of Modernity. New Brunswick (NJ): Rutgers University Press, 1983. 139-140.
16 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 38.
17 Hochgeschwender 86.
18 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 38; Hochgeschwender 23-24.
19 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 61.
20 Hochgeschwender 23.
21 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 45; and Wilcox, Go d ’s Warrio rs 43.
22 Hunter 7.
23 Kellstedt, Lyman A., et al. "The Puzzle of Evangelical Protestantism: Core, Periphery, and Political Behavior". Religion and the Culture Wars: Dispatches from the Front. Eds. John C. Green, James L. Guth, Corwin E. Smidt, and Lyman A. Kellstedt. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996. 240-266. 244.
24 Hochgeschwender 96.
25 Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 2.
26 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 58, footnote 45; and Hochgeschwender 96-97.
27 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 58, footnote 45; and Hochgeschwender 97.
28 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 58, footnote 45; 59; and Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 2.
29 Marsden, George M. Fundamentalism and American Culture. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 51.
30 Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture 51.
31 Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture 51; 58.
32 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 58, footnote 46; Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture 51-55;
33 Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 2.
34 Weber 9-10.
35 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 60, footnote 49.
36 Hochgeschwender 145.
37 Hochgeschwender 146-148.
38 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 62-63.
39 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 62.
40 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 62.
41 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 64.
42 Marsden, George M. "Fundamentalism and American Evangelicalism". The Variety of American Evangelicalism. Ed. Donald W. Dayton, and Robert K. Johnston. Eugene (OR), Pasadena: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1997. 22–35. 29.
43 Marsden, George M. "Fundamentalism and American Evangelicalism", 29.
44 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 64-65; and Marsden, "Fundamentalism and American Evangelicalism" 32-33.
45 Wilcox, Clyde, and Carin Larson. "In den Schützengräben: Amerikanische Evangelikale und der "Kulturkampf". God Bless America: Politik und Religion in den USA. Ed. Manfred Brocker. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005.89-108. 91.
46 Dayton, Donald W. "The Limits of Evangelicalism: The Pentecostal Tradition". The Variety of American Evangelicalism. Ed. Donald W. Dayton, and Robert K. Johnston. Eugene (OR), Pasadena: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1997. 36–56. 37; and Hochgeschwender 237.
47 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 65; Hochgeschwender 238; Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 143.
48 Dayton, "The Limits of Evangelicalism: The Pentecostal Tradition" 39.
49 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 65; Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 143.
50 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 28.
51 Hochgeschwender 238.
52 Dayton, "The Limits of Evangelicalism: The Pentecostal Tradition" 44.
53 Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 144.
54 Cited in Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 29.
55 Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 144-145; Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 29.
56 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 66; Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 143-144.
57 Hochgeschwender 26; 232.
58 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 66-67.
59 Hochgeschwender 232.
60 Smith, Christian. American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving. Emerson, Michael, et al. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998. 87.
61 Smith, Christian. Christian America?: What Evangelicals Really Want. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 15- 18.
62 Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 42-45.
63 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 47.
64 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 47.
65 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 46.
66 Smith, Christian America?: What Evangelicals Really Want 16-17.
67 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 61-62, footnote 50; Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth- Century America 41; see also the portrait of Christian Coalition in chapter 6.
68 Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 46-47.
69 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 47-49.
70 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 68-72.
71 Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 10.
72 Wilcox, Go d ’s Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America. 2.
73 Mitri, Tarek. In Gottes Namen? Religion und Politik in den USA. Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag Otto Lembeck, 2005. 41-42.
74 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 11, footnote 1.
75 Linder, Douglas O. “State v. John Scopes ("The Monkey Trial").” University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. N.d. 30 Mar. 2008. <http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/scopes/evolut.htm>.
76 Bruce, Steve. Fundamentalism. Cambridge (UK): Polity, 2000. 69.; Pieh, Eleonore. Fight like David - Run like Lincoln: Die politischen Einwirkungen des protestantischen Fundamentalismus in den USA. Münster: LIT Verlag, 1998. 72. and Linder, Douglas O.
77 Hochgeschwender 160-163.
78 Bruce, Fundamentalism 69-70.
79 Bruce, Fundamentalism 69-70; and Mitri 43-44.
80 Hochgeschwender 163.
81 Pieh 73.
82 Hochgeschwender 163-164.
83 The exact length of time varies according to the point of time at which a new engagement is seen, Oldfield (1996, P.35) names about 30 years, Pieh (1998, P. 73) names the 1950s; others, such as Bruce (2000, P. 70), see the 1970s as the beginning of a new, organized involvement; as well as Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung (2004, P. 47), who speaks of a marginal degree of politicization before the 1970s.
84 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 34.
85 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 33-34.
86 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 42.
87 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 34.
88 Heideking, Jürgen, and Christof Mauch. Geschichte der USA. 5. ergänzte Auflage mit CD-ROM. Tübingen: Narr Francke Attempto Verlag, 2007. 303.
89 Heideking/Mauch 303-304.
90 Heideking/Mauch 304.
91 Heideking/Mauch 304.
92 Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 9.
93 Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 8; and Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 34.
94 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 34.
95 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 34-35.
96 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 35.
97 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 34.
98 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 42.
99 The respective part of the First Amendment reads as follows: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; […]”. The Bill of Rights: A Transcription. Washington, D.C.: The National Archives and Records Administration. N.d. 30 Mar. 2008. <http://www.archives.gov/national-archives-experience/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html>.
100 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 42.
101 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 42.
102 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 45.
103 ROE V. WADE, 410 U. S. 113 (1973). Ed. Justia.com Beta US Supreme Court Center. N.d. 12. Feb. 2008. <http://supreme.justia.com/us/410/113/index.html>.
104 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 45.
105 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 45.
106 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 46.
107 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 46-47.
108 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 46-47; and Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 35-36.
109 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 46.
110 Pieh 74.
111 Oldfield, Duane Murray. The Right and the Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996. 96.
112 Oldfield 96
113 Oldfield 96.
114 Oldfield 96-97. See also Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 49.
115 Oldfield 96-97.
116 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 49, footnote 24.
117 Oldfield 97.
118 Weyrich, Paul M. "Blue Collar or Blue Blood?: The New Right Compared with The Old Right". The New Christian Right: Political and Social Issues. Ed. Melvin I. Urofsky, and Martha May. New York, London: Garland Publishing, 1996. 136-150.138.
119 Weyrich 142.
120 Weyrich 143-145.
121 Pieh 74.
122 Himmelstein, Jerome L. "The New Right". The New Christian Right: Mobilization and Legitimation. Ed. Robert C. Liebman, and Robert Wuthnow. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine Publishing Company, 1983. 13-30. 13.
123 Pieh 74.
124 Oldfield 97.
125 Oldfield 87.
126 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 50.
127 Oldfield 97.
128 Oldfield 97.
129 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 51.
130 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 51-52.
131 Oldfield 98.
132 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 52; and Oldfield 98.
133 Oldfield 101.
134 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 53; and Oldfield 100.
135 Cited in: Oldfield 101.
136 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 53.
137 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 53; and Oldfield 101-102.
138 Moen, Matthew C. The Transformation of the Christian Right. Tuscaloosa (AL): University of Alabama Press, 1992. 20.
139 Wilcox, God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America 12.
140 Moen 21.
141 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 75.
142 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 53; 75.
143 Moen 21.
144 Moral Majority Timeline. Ed. The Moral Majority Coalition. N.d. 30 Mar. 2008. <http://www.moralmajority.us/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5&Itemid=29>.
145 Moral Majority Timeline.
146 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 78.
147 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 37.
148 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 37.
149 Cited in: Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 76.
150 Cited in: Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 79.
151 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 80.
152 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 80.
153 Moen 21.
154 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 37-38.
155 Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics 38
156 Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 82.
157 Moen 22.
158 Moen 22-23.
159 Moen 16-17; and Brocker, Protest - Anpassung - Etablierung 86.
- Quote paper
- Nils Schnelle (Author), 2008, The Christian Right in the United States - Origin, Structure, and Political Activism, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/121005