List of Illustrations
List of Tables
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Chapter 1 Al–Qaeda Messaging America
Chapter 2 Mungiki and the Second Liberation
Mungiki in a Historical Context
From Mungiki to Mungiki sm
Mungiki being Mungiki
Chapter 3 SLDF in Pursuit of Land Reforms
Chapter 4 Al–Shabab and Fighting Terror with Errors
Westgate Shopping Mall Attack | 21–24 Sep 2013
Mpeketoni Attacks | 15 and 17 Jun 2014
Mandera Attacks | 22 Nov and 02 Dec 2014
Garissa University College Attack | 2 Apr 2015
Chapter 5 State Terrorism: Fighting Terror with Terror
Chapter 6 Flawed Military and Defense Policies
The Jubaland Initiative
Military Invasion of Somalia | 16 – 22 Oct 2011
Military Occupation of Somalia | 2 Jun 2012 – ?!
The Great Wall of Kenya
Chapter 7 What Data tells us about Terrorism
Terrorism Trends and Incidences
Casualties and Consequences of Terrorism
Perpetrators of Terrorism
Terror Attacks and Targets
Chapter 8 Moving Forward
National Security Strategy
Violent Extremism and the TJRC Report
Cross Functional Teams
Case Management System
Appendix A Top 20 Most Fragile States, 2005–16
Appendix B Westgate Mall Attack Time Stamp
Appendix C Garissa University Attack Time Stamp
Appendix D Kenya’s Human Rights Obligations
Appendix E Terror Correlations among Selected States
Appendix F TJRC Recommendations
List of Illustrations
Figure 3.1 Mt. Elgon region and administrative wards
Figure 4.1 States and regions of Somalia as of Dec 2015
Figure 4.2 Al–Shabab Hotspots, 2005–2015
Figure 4.3 Al–Shabab Hotspots in Kenya as of Dec 2015
Figure 5.1 A Jubilee of Torture in Post Independent Kenya
Figure 6.1 Contestations over offshore oil blocks
Figure 7.1 Global and Regional Terror Trends, 1970–2015
Figure 7.2 Terror Attacks by Counties
Figure 7.3 Consequences of Terrorism in Kenya, 1975–2015
Figure 7.4 Groups Targeted by Terrorist in Kenya, 1975–2015
Figure 7.5 Terror Hotspots in and around Kenya
List of Tables
Table 5.1 Refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya, 31 Jul 2016
Table 7.1 Terrorism in some Sub–Saharan States, 1970–2015
Table 7.2 Crimes by the Most Notorious Terrorists, 1975–2015
Table 7.3 Countries most Affected by Terrorism, 2000–2014
James Wallunya whose idea it was that I should research and write on the subject matter. ‘ Awacho ero kamano ’ for this and everything else. My good friend Luke Baraza, a scholar in international relations studies, for his insight in security matters. George Munene, who pushed me to see this book project through. You will have to pay extra to have your brother’s signature on your personal copy. Mama Chebet, who serves with Kenya’s security organs, organs that I believe can do better, thank you for being the inspiring big sister who holds everything together. George would be lost without you! Martha, for the support and many hours you spent reviewing this work. Thank you for pointing out those glaring grammatical and spelling blunders that Spellchecker, and I, could not see.
Kenyans tend to protest and vent out their frustrations online. So for a series of weeks, beginning 23 Jul 2015, an irate citizenry took to their social media accounts, rallied behind the #SomeoneTellCNN hashtag, and went on to troll Cable News Network (CNN) which, when covering a story on Barack Hussein Obama II’s famed homecoming, had referred to their country as a “terror hotbed”. Led by U. Kenyatta’s press team and the Cabinet Secretary (CS) for the MOICNG, Maj Gen Joseph Kasaine Ole Nkaissery, Kenyans spent days, mostly on Facebook and Twitter, relentlessly demanding for an apology, from the network, which never came, at least not until mid–Aug 2015.
Reacting to this “misrepresentation of the country’s status”, the Kenyan Tourism Board (KTB) suspended all running narrative adverts and above–the–line TV campaigns that it had planned to launch with the network. It was the threat of losing such a lucrative deal that prompted CNN’s Executive Vice President (VP) and Managing Director, Tony Maddox to fly all the way to Nairobi in order to offer his personal (not the network’s) apology for the inadvertent defamation, if at all it was one in the first place. Claiming ample awareness in global terror trends and extremist affairs, Maddox went the extra mile: he personally exonerated Kenya from such an undeserved and ill–conceived label. I cannot claim to speak for the 40 plus million Kenyans but personally, I fail to see exactly where Time Warner Inc’s CNN offered an official apology for the #TerrorHotbed insult, I repeat, if it was one to begin with. I do not refute the fact that there was some symbolic attempt of at least seeming like thinking of issuing one but candidly speaking, deeply remorseful, be they arbitrary or otherwise, speeches issued by iconic figureheads, do not necessarily represent an institution’s sealed and signed official position on any subject matter. In simpler terms, Maddox said, “ok, I, personally, being a key CNN representative, I am really, really sorry that some naive subordinates, who never have to wrestle with the realities of Wall Street and global stock index prices; share market tanks, spikes; boardroom politics; and our insatiable shareholders, thought it was cool to, you know, maybe rightly report, or not, that Kenya was a nation facing multiple threats of terrorism, especially at a time when Obama was planning to fly into the country. And just so you know, despite the fact that three months earlier, 150 people, most of them students were massacred at Garissa University College, I highly doubt that CNN feels that Kenya is a # terrorhotbed. That is assuming CNN, being the colossal corporation that it is, feels anything”
Furthermore, when an aggrieved citizenry demands for a prompt public apology then is not one issued four weeks later just too late an apology? And just how sincere would such an apology be considering the fact that Maddox was someone who gets paid specifically to safeguard his network’s revenue streams, streams that would soon run dry unless someone seemed remorseful? Why choose to fly and yet decline to issue an official apology on CNN’s TV and its social media networks? I believe tweeting is cheaper and easier than flying, right? Plus, having clarified that he was no expert on matters terrorism, what expertise did Maddox have to declare Kenya not a #TerrorHotbed ? Better still, what authority, or right (journalism is a profession, not a right per se), did CNN have to brand Kenya a #TerrorHotbed in the first place? Are not these groveling actions mockeries in the least, mere public relation stunts that should be disregarded and simply left at that, or should we esteem them as meaning something, whatever thing that may be? If Maddox set off intending to pacify an upset mass of tweeter troopers, he succeeded, and spectacularly at that. Not only did he manage to quell things down, without CNN really apologizing, he also managed to somehow dupe the irrational jingoists into believing that their country was the safest and most secure, terror free to say the least. But to others, Maddox’s mockery of an apology raised more questions (and zero reassurances) on Kenya’s (security) status. Being one of these others, I set out to establish whether Kenya was indeed a #TerrorHotbed, or not, and if it was, what made it one.
Terrorism is a serious threat to the progression and sustainability of modern civilized society. But what is it? The word terror comes from the Latin word terrere meaning to frighten. In this essay, terror implies a general sense of great or extreme fear. Terrorism is the deliberate act of instilling terror in a society with the aim of achieving certain political, religious, ideological or any other goals. A terrorist is both a perpetrator and/or an advocate of terrorism, be it an individual or institution. That being so, certain basic actualities can be deduced from the rudimentary definitions adopted. First, even though the term terrorist gained considerable popularity during the French Revolution (1789–1799) – when it was used to describe the acts committed by Maximilien Robespierre and the Jacobins during the Reign of Terror or simply The Terror (6 Sep 1793–28 Jul 1794) – the phenomenon of instilling terror when waging war against a relatively superior and well established force is not new. Take the case of Hannibal Barca (183–181 BC) who, at least according to the American military historian Theodore Ayrault Dodge:
…was unquestionably one of the world's greatest soldiers. His strategic intuitions had as yet been equaled by no one but Alexander. It was he who taught Rome the art of war, and this so crisply that his teachings were perpetuated, and not, like Alexander's, lost to the world of that day. He knew and showed the Romans that mere fighting is not all there is of war. He may with propriety be called the father of strategy.
Dodge goes on to note that owing to their limited knowledge, and hence reliance on strategy in Hannibal's era, the Romans, like many other societies, largely relied on brute force and crude battle–tactics to thwart their foes into submission. However, this one man, leading a comparatively smaller Carthaginian army, so terrified the Romans to the point of him becoming a symbol of fear, anxiety, terror and calamity in ancient to modern Latin society. Hannibal largely owed his successes to his reliance on military strategy, described by Dodge as “nothing but the highest military expression of the art of deceit.” It was not until the Romans began relying heavily on strategy that they also came to appreciate what it could accomplish against force.
Second, terrorism is a tactic of war (not war itself) that is often employed by entities that Craig and George would describe, in their book Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time, as amoralists. Responding to the age old question, does the end justify the means, the amoralists will say ‘yes’; perfectionists will say ‘hell no’; and the nonperfectionists, flip–flopping in between, will settle for a ‘yes and no’ response. Amoralists are open to adopting and employing any tactic to their cause provided that the means chosen are effective in achieving the intended objective. Perfectionists abhor the usurpation of morals ethics regardless of how noble or grandiose the promised results might be. Nonperfectionists are guided by situational rather that absolute ethical standards in pursuit of their interests. Nonperfectionists, in my perspective, are worse than amoralists. While one will always know where the latter stand, the former, ever strutting around with malleable morals are something similar to sociopaths, who, having mastered the grey arts, distort contexts to conform them to their versions of reality.
That having been established, public perception, international statutes, and human rights movements, among other factors, compel modern democratic civilizations to exercise a significant level of restraint when handling both domestic and foreign threats. But the same cannot be said of totalitarian regimes, fascist movements, or the so called terrorist organizations. For example, take Osama bin Laden’s perspective on modern warfare. His was cast in the conviction that:
In today’s wars, there are no morals, and it is clear that mankind has descended to the lowest degree of decadence and oppression. They steal our wealth, our resources and our oil. They kill and murder our brothers. They compromise our honor and our dignity, and dare we utter a single word of protest against the injustice, we are called terrorists. This is compounded injustice.
From this statement, one would quickly take Osama for an amoralist, given to doing whatever it takes to get that which belongs to him while squaring things with Western despots. But at the same time, the same sentiments cast into doubt the general assumption that contemporary democratic Republics are not predisposed to adopting violence while in pursuit of their nationals’ interests. Osama’s logic is that of them being worse than us: we have to do this to them as a matter of self–preservation while they are committed to exploiting and oppressing us, for their amusement. If this is indeed the reality of things, which it is, then how is civilized society any better and why do we even have the United Nations (UN)? According to Osama:
The United Nations’ insistence to convict the victims and support the aggressors constitutes a serious precedence which shows the extent of injustice that has been allowed to take root in this land.
But what Osama, like many others, fail to appreciate is the history behind the formation of the UN. You see, the United Nations Charter, the document which finally established the UN in late–1945, was built on the Declaration by United Nations, signed first, on 31 Dec 1941, by the Four Policemen (US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, UK Prime Minister (PM) Winston Leonard Spencer–Churchill, China’s leader Chiang Kai–shek, and USSR’s Ambassador to the US Maxim Maximovich Litvinov). It was not until the following day that the other twenty–two State representatives, converging in Washington, also appended their signatures on the document. These signatories pledged to commit their military and economic resources and corporate in order to ensure victory over members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents. The Tripartite Pact, establishing the Axis Powers, was signed on 27 Sep 1940, in Berlin, by Germany's Führer Adolf Hitler, Japan’s PM Hideki Tōjō, and Italy’s PM Benito Amilcare Andrea Mussolini. Now, signatories to the UN Declaration “subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the” the Atlantic Charter: a rejoinder to the Tripartite Pact originally consented to, on 14 Aug 1941, by only two heads of States: Roosevelt and Churchill.
As history goes, Hitlerism was eventually vanquished and when this became a reality, two things happened. One, the UN was formed because nations were not ready for another World War, then. Hence:
Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world…
I say not ready because it has never been about why nations go to war, it has always been about when. Wars are inevitable and man will forever find an excuse to indulge himself in one.
Make no mistake, it was upon this very rock that the UN was set and continues to rest upon. But remember, all this was originally a US/UK affair, and then everyone else came in and so continues to be rega as a guest, regardless of whether they have a permanent seat at the high table or are one among the many spectators speculating from the terraces; and being so, no one, terrorists included, has that much leeway to feel slighted when they come to the realize that UN policies, priorities, and agenda, are determined and driven by two nations. Consequently, though the UN has now grown into a complex global bureaucracy capable of serving humanity through several programmes, the fact remains that it cannot deter the US and UK from pursuing their interests, no? This will be made apparent when we take a look at the invasion of Iraq.
Two, terrorism replaced Hitlerism. However, it was not until after 9/11 that terrorism became a prominent aspect of contemporary discussions. This does not mean that terrorism did not exist or was insignificant before 11 Sep 2001, but rather, when suspected Al–Qaeda operatives hijacked planes and crashed these on US soil, the UN immediately moved terrorism from one among several of its ‘other issues of global concern’ status to ‘the issue’ at the center of global everything. I repeat, prior to 9/11, terrorism was there, everywhere, with Al–Qaeda being responsible for at least 3 bombings in Kenya alone, the deadliest being the 1998 US Embassy bombings. Unfortunately, as we will see, these attacks, deadly as they were, rarely attracted any global traction. But after 9/11, terrorism boomed into something more than a universal security concern; it now influences nearly every known aspect of human society. Its catastrophic effects have so far been so severe to the extent that the mere mentioning of the word invokes powerful human emotions like deep fear and hatred.
Terrifying or not, some, like Smyth et al., regard terrorism as “a growth industry” based on the fact that, being a major cultural phenomenon, it continues to inspire several literary works, motion pictures, media pieces, and the like. In fact, what many people know about terrorism is mainly based on what they see in cinemas. Thomas Riegler, in his paper Through the Lenses of Hollywood: depictions of Terrorism in American Movies, established this mass cultural representation to be both a good and a bad thing. Good because, exaggerated and deformed as they may be, these movies provide insight into the socio–cultural and economic contexts from which terrorism originates; the prevailing mass fears, fantasies, and projections about terrorism; and the status quo at that time, reproducing hegemonic ideas promoted by politicians, the media, or experts. Though originally and mainly intended for entertainment, films on terrorism capture and expresses certain horrific dimensions viewers must be prepared (at least psychologically) to confront in real life.
However, “in Hollywood movies terrorism is essentialised – that is, often presented as de–politicized and merely pathological or criminal.” In other words, aiming to thrill and excite, they widely miss the true reality of things, by miles. For example, take the 2013 action thriller Olympus Has Fallen. Here, hundreds of highly trained and heavily armed North Korean terrorists led by Kang Yeonsak (Rick Yune) overrun the White House. They capture and stream the execution of South Korean PM Lee Tae–Woo (Keong Sim) who had come to meet with US President Benjamin Asher (Aaron Eckhart). Asher, his Vice President Charlie Rodriguez (Phil Austin), Secretary of Defense Ruth McMillan (Melissa Leo), and several staff members are taken as hostages. Kang then demands the withdrawal of US forces from the Korean Peninsula. He also seeks to detonate America’s nuclear weapons, in America. But one man, a former Army Ranger, now disgraced Secret Service agent, Mike Banning (Gerard Butler), who conveniently happened to be around, barges in with a couple of knives, a hand gun, and some grenades; and somehow manages to rescue the president’s son, Connor Asher (Finley Jacobsen) plus the US president; hence saving the day plus the free world. Raking in more than USD 160 million against a USD 70 million production budget, the film was a huge success to say the least. Its 2016 sequel London Has Fallen, with an even more complicated and thrilling plot earned USD 205.8 million against a USD 60 million production budget. I write this while eagerly waiting for the third sequel, Angel Has Fallen, to be released somewhere in 2018. But for now, I will spare you the details on how Jack Bauer (Kiefer Sutherland) managed to survive through nine seasons of 24.
I have no issue with a heart racing a couple of paces above average, courtesy of an elated adrenal medulla, but as Riegler pointed out, the illusion that comes with these depictions is misleading. There is no such thing as a one man show or a quick simple fix to terrorism. The problem is highly complicated and it calls for solutions that see beyond the naive dichotomy of good and evil, as depicted on screens. Furthermore, the common commando approach adopted in thwarting terror threats serves to legitimize extra–legal approaches while denouncing compromise and negotiations deemed as signs of weakness. For instance, take the “America does not negotiate with terrorists” refrain chanted in every terrorism movie. Many would swear that this was indeed the true US policy when it comes to handling terrorism. However, in reality, if history is anything to go by, this is not the case: many governments, America included, have in the past and today continue to negotiate with terrorists. But misinformation from oversimplification, exaggeration and falsification of truths is not the only downside associated with mass media, these also challenge; provoke; and embolden terrorists to strive for higher gory heights. Terrorists, like movie stars, will do whatever it takes to dominate the news or any lime light so what the movies do, is demonstrate the prospects and show them how it can be done.
Also after 9/11, terrorism grew to become a major research field and now boasts of a huge body of works. Even so, Smyth et al. took issue with the manner in which the research that informs many of these publications is carried out. You see while the public is busy feasting on inaccurate films, most researchers rely on secondary data to explain terrorism. Rarely does anyone interview or come into direct contact with those who are actually involved in terrorism. This approach has also contributed towards curtailing our overall ability to fully comprehend what terrorism is and what it really is about. This comes from our having a partial mentality that makes self–reflective, probing research difficult. Publications on terrorism are also limited within certain political, legal, cultural, and academic contexts. For example, since there is no universal definition of terrorism, researchers are limited to studying the terror phenomenon of a nation based on how the syllabus in that field defines terrorism or how that county defines it. There are several weaknesses associated with this approach like the inadmissibility of sensible research findings based on slim variations in technical terminologies and political trivialities but the biggest challenge with this approach, in my view, is that it is picky, with a tendency to leave out the most prominent, potent and pervasive aspects of systematic State terror. Ignoring State–centric violence in the study of terrorism is anchored on the assumption that all State actions are right and that these are the only viable solutions to terrorism. This fallacy has given States the leeway needed to operate with impunity, trampling over civilians’ rights and their freedoms, all in the name of countering terrorism. This has also limited our understanding of terrorism which in turn has left us exposed to the whims of politicians who, as we will see, are in the habit of either inflating or downplaying the circumstances surrounding terror incidences for imbecilic reasons. Being largely ignorant, we are also easily fascinated by terrorism, we tend to panic easily and focus excessively on the violence instead of the wider social–economic, historical, and mundane milieu in which terrorism occurs. I endeavor to illustrate these issues in the succeeding Chapters.
But there is hope. To overcome some of these backdrops, Smyth et al. proposed a shift from the traditional methods of studying terrorism to something referred to as critical terrorism studies:
… a research orientation that is willing to challenge dominant knowledge and understandings of terrorism, is sensitive to the politics of labelling in the terrorism field, is transparent about its own values and political standpoints, adheres to a set of responsible research ethics, and is committed to a broadly defined notion of emancipation.
This critical approach to the study of terrorism is anchored in two epistemological perspectives: critical realism and reflectivism. Critical realism encourages one to take an objective look at reality so that instead of obsessing over the philosophical, theoretical, ideological, and redundant specificities surrounding terrorism and counterterrorism, simply focus on terrorism for what it is, terrorism. On the other hand, reflectivism compels the objective observer to reflect on his observations. Reflectivists are encouraged to go beyond the orthodox approaches of looking at terrorism as an isolated vice and proposing standalone theoretical (instead of practical) solutions to the challenge. They are required to ask questions like: what is terrorism and who defined it? What constitutes and causes terrorism? Why and how does terrorism happen? In what specific historical, political, cultural, or socio–economic contexts does terrorism occur? The answers to such questions are not universal, they are purely contextual. Researchers are also encouraged to look at the existing body of knowledge on terrorism and express their satisfaction/dissatisfaction with these as they deem appropriate. Of course, one is expected to do so in a constructive and edifying manner.
Having adopted a critical approach then it goes without saying that ontologically, the reader should regard terrorism, as being “fundamentally a social fact rather than a brute fact.” In their work, The Case for a Critical Terrorism Studies, Richard Jackson, Jeroen Gunning and Marie Smyth describe this aspect as one where an act of violence does not become an act of terrorism simply because of who committed it but rather, the nature of terrorism depends on the intention and circumstance under which the act was committed. The reader is also encouraged to regard the term terrorism as a form of contentious politics, not an ideology or a form of politics in itself. In other words, terrorism is one among many tools used by both State and non–State actors, from time to time, to achieve their ever changing social, political, and economic objectives. Consequently, this also implies that there is no such thing as a terrorist, at least not in a permanent sense, unless you are convinced that Nobel Peace Prize Laureates Sean McBride (1974), Menachim Begin (1978), Nelson Mandela (1993), Yassir Arafat (1994), and Wangari Maathai (2004) were in fact terrorists. One becomes, and ceases to be a terrorist depending on which side of the political divide they are aligned to, when, where, who is doing the labeling, why and so on. The fact is that there are no universally acknowledged standards to be referred to prior to qualifying, or disqualifying, anything or anyone as a terrorist entity. One man’s terrorist is another man’s hero, and once a terrorist, not always one.
Furthermore, it is only in critical terrorism studies where terrorism gurus and embedded scholars can engage beyond the State–centric orientation of contemporary research. It is by engaging outsiders and practitioners directly that alternative ways of solving and studying terrorism are formulated. The purpose of this essay therefore is not to apportion blame on one party while asserting the political correctness of the other, but rather, staying true to the broad epistemological base that facilitates the multidisciplinary approach to be embraced in all critical terrorism studies. This endeavors to destabilize the rigid dominant interpretations of the terror phenomenon by demonstrating a more fluid, inherently contested nature of the discourse. As a result, three key questions will be at the center of this essay. One, is Kenya a #TerrorHotbed, or not? Two, if so, then why? And three, if not, then why and what is it then? The general idea here is to reveal the underlying socio–economic and political realities, in seemingly neutral knowledge, that have long informed acts of terrorism in Kenya.
This essay attempts to address these questions by relying on two things: reliable data on terrorism and past historical facts. By looking at the available data, we will be able to objectively validate whether Kenya is indeed a # terrorhotbed or not. I do this by analyzing Kenya’s terror situation within global, continental, and regional contexts. In other words, Kenya can only be regarded as being a hot, or cold, bed of terror depending on how other nations of the world are performing in the same subject. On the other hand, looking at Kenya’s past and present realities will enable us put its struggles with terrorism into proper social, political and economic contexts. This is because terrorism, as many will agree, does not just happen from nowhere; it is always anchored in some unresolved and longstanding grievances. Objectivity calls on me to look at the phenomenon without shying away from unpopular issues touching on State incompetencies and State terrorism. Remember, realism is a critical aspect when it comes to understanding a country’s terror situation.
To be more specific, the four key thematic sections of this essay will attempt to bring to your attention some of these reasons. The first part of this book, Chapters 1 to 4, is focused on major terror incidences that took place in Kenya between 7 Aug 1998 and 2 Apr 2015. Here, I will to highlight the structural circumstances that led to the occurrence of these attacks; key perpetrators, their ideologies and motives; the glaring errors committed by the State while handling the incidences; and the diverse responses to have been elicited following these events. The second section, Chapter 5 and 6, zooms in on the State. In particular, Chapter 5 looks at how State–centric security policies have come to overshadow human centered security strategies in Kenya’s war against terrorism. Chapter 6 is on State terrorism and human rights violations; which looks at the State’s use of terrorism as a counterterrorism strategy. The main idea here is to explore the extent to which the status quo contributes towards terrorism. The third section, Chapter 7, takes a look at the available data and what it says of Kenya’s state of terrorism within its regional and global contexts. In the end, Chapter 8, I propose some practical approaches that if adopted, will likely assist Kenya resolve most, if not all, its terror challenges. I say practical because these solutions are not modeled after some abstract conceptual frameworks, no, these are actual solutions that have been, and continue to be, applied by nations that have witnessed tangible wins against terrorism. Their relative successes have even compelled scholars and policy makers in the field to recommend them every now and then.
Yes, we can all agree that terrorism is indeed a threat to sustainable development, civilized society, and human progress in general. But how much do we really know about it? What exactly is it? What is it about? Who defines what terrorism is and who decides who a terrorist is? Who controls the terror narrative, why and what do they insist on propagating? How much, honestly, do we really know and where do we know it from? We stand a chance of understanding the actual forces driving contemporary forms of terrorism when we start indulging ourselves in stimulating intellectual debates that seek to answer such questions. And when we come to know more about terrorism and appreciate that which is unknown to us, we can then forge realistic solutions to address it. It is my hope that this essay will contribute towards your appreciation of the terror phenomenon.
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten
Chapter 1 Al–Qaeda Messaging America
American history does not distinguish between civilian and military, and not even women and children. They are the ones who used the bombs against Nagasaki. Can these bombs distinguish between infants and military? …our primary targets are military and those in its employment. Our religion forbids us to kill innocents… My word to American (and other) journalists is not to ask why we did that, but to ask what had their government done that forced us to defend ourselves…it is our duty to lead people to light – Osama bin Laden
It is the first Friday of Aug 1998 and the time is 10:30 a.m. Schools all over the Kenya are wrapping up, closing down for the Aug holidays; while bank employees are busy carrying on with their industrial action strike right at the center of the nation’s capital; an unarmed guard, Benson Okuku Bwaku, can clearly hear their haki yetu [our rights] chants as he goes about manning his barrier at the rear entrance to the US Embassy parking lot. “If bankers, who do nothing save sit and count money, in their air conditioned offices, can claim to be broke, and then have the audacity to demand for more,” Bwaku wonders, “what of the likes of us?!”
He raises his gaze and accidentally catches a glimpse of the rays struggling to pierce through the gloomy skies above; shakes his head as he inhales the city’s polluted air; drops his head back to level; and then turning to his colleague, Jomo Matiko Boke, Bwaku quips with a feigned smile, “at least they can still afford to demonstrate!” Silence!
At an annual fee of USD 1 million, Bwaku’s employer – United International Investigative Services – mobilizes 540 guards to provide fulltime security at the embassy and 180 residences belonging to the diplomatic mission. Having been stationed at the consulate for six year now, Bwaku and Boke are now used to commuting from the slums, clocking twelve consecutive hours a day, five days a week; while living off a meager salary of just under USD 80 a month.
But today, as an oblivious Kenya stands at the precipice of a most gruesome event, Bwaku and Boke will do more than just raise and drop barriers for diplomats, dashing to and fro in their fancy guzzlers, and the usual, often agitated delivery truck drivers.
Back in Afghanistan, Osama bin Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden and Ayman Mohammed Rabie al–Zawahiri – respective leaders of Al–Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) – are glued to their TV sets as they take turns to scan through the many radio channels. The duos moment of stardom is rife, and they can literally smell and taste it. Not wanting to disappoint their fans, they already have a prepared statement which they cannot wait to drop on the world.
According to multiple eyewitness accounts, an old beige Toyota Dyna truck – with Dubai license plates – attempted to make a delivery to the US embassy via the main entrance before being directed to the rear side of the building. The track, packed with 600 pounds of explosives, quickly turned off Haile Selassie Ave., jumped over the pavement and roared up that lane – to avoid Bwaku and Boke’s drop barrier – before coming nose to nose with a white diplomatic Sedan that emerging from the Embassy’s underground parking garage.
The succeeding series of events were to be captured by Charles Stuart Kennedy in an interview with Prudence Bushnell, the US Ambassador to Kenya at the time. In her own recollection she narrates:
The truck drew up to the guarded entrance to the underground parking lot of the embassy. One of the two occupants got out and demanded entry. The guard refused and tried to alert the marines via radio. The perpetrator then hurled a stun grenade (the noise we and thousands of other people first heard), then ran. Seconds later, his companion detonated the explosives. The two tons of energy that hit the three buildings surrounding the parking bounced off and over the bricks and mortar with devastating effect. Two hundred thirty people were killed instantaneously. Over 5,000 people were injured, most of them from the chest up and most of them from flying glass. Vehicles and their occupants waiting for the corner traffic light to change to green were incinerated, including all passengers on a city bus. The seven story office building next to the embassy collapsed and the rear of our chancery blew off. While the rest of the exterior of our building held – it had been constructed to earthquake standards – the windows shattered, the ceilings fell, and most of the interior simply blew up. Forty–six people died – about a quarter of the occupants – while others were struck or buried by rubble. All of the cars in the parking lot caught fire, which spread to the top of our generator. On the opposite side of the building, all of the windows blew in.
A group calling itself the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks in Nairobi and a near–simultaneous explosion in Dar es Salaam but US officials believe the group was a cover name used by Al–Qaeda.
Almost immediately, the President and Commander–in–Chief (CINC) Daniel Toroitich arap Moi dispatched the military before visiting the site himself. In a televised broadcast the next day, Moi could not conceal his utter bewilderment with the incident. “Kenya is not at war with any other country and we don't deserve this kind of tragedy”, he said. True, Kenya was not at war with any nation and in fact, it had never been to war. But whether or not Kenya deserved the attack was an entirely different issue, one worth looking into.
You see, several months prior to this attack, al–Zawahiri, like bin Laden, was in full agreement with Moi: Kenya was never, and had yet to become, a target for Qaeda Al–Jihad. However, a series of CIA covert operations targeting Qaeda Al–Jihad, especially a recent one where the CIA arrested and tortured its members in Tirana, Albania, called for a response. And so, a few weeks leading to the attack, al–Zawahiri sent a letter to Al–Sharq al–Awsat [The Middle East], an Arabic international newspaper headquartered in London. The contents of this letter were then published on 6 Aug and it read in part:
We are interested in briefly telling the Americans that their messages have been received and that the response, which we hope they will read carefully, is being prepared, because, with God’s help, we will write in a language they will understand.
And as James Spader (cast as the omniscient Raymond Reddington) remarks in The Vehm – the twelfth episode of the third season to the TV series The Blacklist – “hell hath no fury like a fundamentalist scorned."
The next day, Al – Qaeda lashed out at America alright but as the saying goes, fahali wawili wakipigana, nyasi ndizo huumia [when two bulls fight, it is the grass that suffers]. Though al–Zawahiri’s message was loud, and in a language that was clear, history has shown that America never got around to fully understanding it. Why? The message was addressed and consequently mailed to the wrong address. Otherwise, how would you explain that an attack targeting Americans and American facilities ended up claiming the lives of 250 Kenyans, 10 Tanzanians, and only 12 Americans? In fact, no American died in the Dar–es–Salaam Embassy. Statistically, Kenya lost 20 civilians for every American targeted in the attacks. I acknowledge that both white and black lives matter but statistically speaking, the 260 lives lost were unnecessary casualties in a war that had nothing whatsoever to do with them.
Contrary to the mainstream accounts, it was al–Zawahiri, a surgeon by profession and bin Laden’s closest confidant, who engineered the bombings, Osama bankrolled the operation.
Months later, in a public address during the Moi Day celebrations, the disheartened President could not conceal his displeasure with the manner in which Kenyans reacted to the terror incidence. Lamenting to the nation, he said:
Nyinyi wanachi wa Kenya, nikiona nyinyi saa ingine mimi karibu kulia. Tulipoteza watu mia mbili arubaini na sita mwaka wa tisaini na nane. Kwanini hamkupiga protests, ku– demonstrate hapa kuonyesha tumepoteza watu [Citizens of Kenya, when I look at you sometimes I just feel like breaking down in tears. We lost 246 people in ‘98. Why did you not protest, demonstrate to show that indeed we have lost people]…?
Interestingly, the large crowds interjected his speech with loud laughs and heavy claps; consequently prompting him to pause in utter disbelief. “…Na huko tunaandikishwa ati walikua watu kumi tu walikufa. Sisi ni kuku [Yet there (abroad) they wrote that we only lost 10 people. Are we just chickens]?” The visibly confounded and displeased Baba [Father] Moi concluded.
On the very day of the attack, US President Bill Clinton shared his remarks concerning the twin incidences. Clinton went on to order emergency response teams – consisting of medical personnel, disaster relief experts, criminal investigators, and counterterrorism specialists – be dispatched to the region. He proclaimed the American flag be flown at half–staff at all US government buildings all around the world. Bill issued these directives while accenting to the Workforce Investment Bill of 1998, in White House’s Rose Garden, into law. This was the same time Bill was preparing to appear before a grand jury, on 17 Aug, in regards to his so called inappropriate relationship with Monica Samille Lewinsky.
On 13 Aug 1998, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 1189 which strongly condemned “such acts which have a damaging effect on international relations and jeopardize the security of States”; and as it was with the 1942 Declaration by (note not of) United Nations, resolution 1189 (1998) went on to stress:
the need to strengthen international cooperation between States in order to adopt practical and effective measures to prevent, combat and eliminate all forms of terrorism affecting the international community as a whole…
On the same day, at a ceremony held in honor twelve Americans who perished, US Secretary of Defense William Sebastian Cohen, responded to Al – Qaeda’s message thus:
Rest assured, America will continue to be present around the world, wherever we have interests to defend, friends to support, and work to do. America will not be intimidated. We will maintain our commitment to the people of Africa. We will do all we can to protect our diplomatic and military people around the world. We will do everything possible to see that those responsible for last week's bombings are held accountable. America's memory is long; our reach is far; our resolve unwavering; and our commitment to justice unshatterable.
And true America does indeed have a long reach. On 20 Aug 1998, in what was dubbed Operation Infinite Reach, America launched 88 Tomahawk cruise missiles from its warships stationed deep in the Red Sea. The first 75 of these missiles were fired at three alleged Afghan training facilities (Al Farouq, Muawai and Zhawar Kili al–Badr) in a botched attempt to eliminate bin Laden and his associates. The remaining 13 missiles struck Al–Shifa pharmaceutical factory at about 7.30 pm, killing one night guard and injuring ten Sudanese civilians in the vicinity.
So were these assaults fruitful or not and was the US justified in its decision to eviscerate Sudan’s only pharmaceutical factory? According to Cohen, at the time of the attack, America’s intelligence community was certain that Al–Shifa was owned by fundamentalists who had begun producing precursors to chemical weapons meant for America. However, it was, and has since then been established, that Al–Shifa was a legitimate pharmaceutical plant, built by Bashir Hassan Bashir, a Sudanese engineer and Ba’abood Shipping Company (owned by Salem Ahmed Ba’abood) from 1992 to 1996 at a cost of USD 32 million. Contributing to its design was Henry R. Jobe, a US pharmaceutical consultant; its construction was supervised by Thomas Carnaffin, a British engineer; with its constituent parts being imported from the US, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, India and Thailand. On 29 Mar 1998, Bashir sold his 60% share of the plant to Salaheldin Idris, a Sudanese–born Saudi millionaire with no direct ties to the Taliban, Al – Qaeda, or any other radical movement. Prior to its decimation, Al–Shifa employed slightly more than 300 Sudanese; supplied 60% of Sudan’s basic medicines; catered for 100% of the country’s intravenous liquid needs; and had recently renewed its UNSC approval (authorization number S/AC.25/1998/986/OC.1402/EXIT) to export drugs to Iraq under the UN sponsored Oil–for–Food Programme.
After the bombing, Khartoum asked the US to come and conduct its own tests at the destroyed site but the US turned down the invitation and when Sudan asked for an apology, the US refused to issue it with one. In protest, Sudan’s Minister for External Relations Gobrial Roric, wrote to the UNSC formally requesting that it sends a fact finding mission to establish whether indeed Al–Shifa had been producing chemical weapons or its precursors as had been alleged by the US and British governments. Almost immediately, the US moved to oppose Sudan’s request which was odd considering how adamant it had been in persuading the UNSC to send a special commission (UNSCOM) into Iraq on suspicion that like Khartoum, the Baghdad regime also had WMD capabilities. In another uncharacteristic and unprecedented move, the US blocked all independent lab analyses of the soil sample it said was taken from the plant, during a CIA clandestine operation, and was found to contain O–ethyl hydrogen methylphosphonothioate (EMPTA), a VX nerve gas agent. On 24 Aug 1998, the UNSC briefly entertained Sudan’s invitation but to the shock and bewilderment of Arab and African states, which had endorsed Sudan’s request to the UNSC, it took no action. This is one of those instances which clearly show just who is who in the UN and of course who calls the shots at the UNSC. Anyway, Idris, Al–Shifa’s owner, went ahead and hired American scientists, headed by Thomas D. Tullius, a Boston University Chemistry Professor, to do what the US and UN were supposed to. And as was suspected, the team found zero traces of EMPTA or any other chemical weapon compounds in their 13 carefully catalogued soil, sludge and debris samples taken from the destroyed plant. Idris sued the US but came up empty; fortunately for him though, he won a suit that saw the US Treasury Department quietly requested the Bank of America to unfreeze his UK accounts worth USD 24 million. This move was seen as a salient admission of fault, by the Clinton administration.
On 23 Mar 2004, Cohen appeared before the 9/11 Commission and when asked, by Timothy John Roemer, whether or not he regretted firing the missiles into Sudan, a cocky Cohen, like everyone from the Clinton administration, replied: “I never regretted doing it.” And on whether or not Operation Infinite Reach contributed towards 9/11, he responded by saying “Okay.”
Following the Embassy bombings and America’s response, Gary W. Richter synthesized an insurmountable volume of information on bin Laden and summarized his analyses in another lengthier report titled Osama Bin Laden: A Case Study. His thoughts: the two cruise missile attacks were ineffective; inefficient; too expensive; domestic and foreign relation nightmares; military blunders; terrifying to lesser US allies; undermined the territorial integrity and sovereignty of non–American states; humiliating to Sudan and Afghan governments; illegal under international laws; unjustifiable; unilateral and selfish; morally grotesque; embarrassing to the US; encouraged larger and bolder acts of terrorism in future; legitimized terrorism as a genuine form of warfare and not cowardly criminal acts as they were perceived before; hailed and made bin Laden a symbol of hope against an oppressive Western society; and bolstered recruitment and support for Al–Qaeda worldwide. Multiple reviewers, quoted in the report, agreed that the mirror like manner in which America responded to Al–Qaeda succeeded in galvanizing Islamic hardliners; fueling anti–Americanism among oppressed Arab nationals and aggrandizing Osama’s image in the Islamic world by unnecessarily portraying his meager stature into that of a lone underdog standing firm against a bullying aggressor. In short, not only did Operation Infinite Reach succeed in propagating terrorism but the attack convinced extremists that they too stood a chance of winning the terror war.
Richter went as far as to propose a variety of options that if effected, would ensure that the US (or any other State) was adequately prepared for future terror attacks. Note that this was back in 1999. Richter divides his proposals into four categories: how to respond to terrorism; how to build resilience against terrorism; diplomacy in terrorism; and miscellaneous suggestions.
First, under the response options, is the intelligence and law enforcement option which involves monitoring terrorists and their sponsors; sharing the gathered information with friendly nations; and using the same to disrupt terrorists’ activities. Second is human intelligence which involves applying Burrhus Frederic Skinner’s principle of operant conditioning: handsomely rewarding snitches and defectors while severely punishing terror captives. This aspect also involves planting moles inside terror cells and recruiting loyalists and apostates to spy and tell on their peers. Third, Richter encourages law enforcement agencies to continuously collect evidence before instituting legal proceedings against perpetrators and sympathizers of terrorism. He believes (as do I) that this approach legitimizes and serves to further strengthen any State’s claim in the war against terrorism.
Building resilience against terrorism involves fortification which begins with the strengthening of potential targets. To do so, prime targets (like diplomatic offices, consulates and residences) should be relocated away from urban crowds; furnished with large clear zones and controlled access roads that are barricaded with multiple checkpoints; completely fenced off with doors, windows and walls being properly shielded; fitted with threat detections (like cameras, bomb detectors) and threat warning systems (like duress alarms); manned by highly trained and seriously geared security personnel; and having a highly responsive medical and rescue system in place. Then there are military options which include planning and forward placement of assets in strategic positions; visible deployment of the military; carrying out covert (e.g. sabotage) and overt (e.g. raids, retaliations) operations; and targeted assassination of principle figures.
According to Richter, “International diplomacy is probably the single most effective tool at our disposal.” This is so because as he accurately points out, it can be (and has been) used to coerce other nations into acting against terrorism in ways that are greatly (if not only) beneficial to the US. The second reason is that diplomacy “can be used to minimize the levels of mistrust and anger with which America is viewed in much of the world” Unfortunately, unless America’s diplomatic affairs are run from a kiosk situated somewhere along La Brea Av e. Tinseltown, California, then American ambassadors would be hard pressed to justify how they positively contribute (significantly of course) in repairing their nation’s image abroad.
Under miscellaneous, Richter proposed media manipulation which involves defamation, depersonalization and public disinformation. Naturally, these can be achieved by any government. He also suggests that terrorism sponsors and sympathizers be gently stirred towards taking overt (e.g. public arrest, detention, extradition, exile, trial) and covert actions (e.g. secret repatriation, expulsion, trial, imprisonment, assassination) against terrorists. Owing to the covert approach, America’s long and shadowy reach finally caught up with bin Laden on 2 May 2011, in Bilal town, Abbottabad, Pakistan and assassinating him for the 9/11 attacks. Six weeks later, al–Zawahiri, the brains behind Osama, assumed leadership of Qaeda Al–Jihad.
Sound as these were, the US disregarded most of Richter’s recommendations and continues for the most part to act unilaterally (or within the many variations of its coalition of the willing) when tackling terrorism. Unfortunately, the consequences associated with these solo missions continue to harm the entire global community to this very day. Additionally, America tends to epitomize discrimination with the selective manners in which it applies its domestic and foreign policies. These detrimental actions are impossible to justify especially with their consequent humanitarian, geopolitical and economic repercussions lingering everywhere. This is from Richter’s report.
To qualify these observations, consider the missile attack and then America’s invasion/occupation of Iraq. To be more specific, by launching the 88 missiles, the US failed to comply with Resolution 1189 yet members of the UNSC said zilch. Then on 16 Dec 1998, the US and UK launched Operation Desert Fox. Here, the US and UK bombed Iraqi silly in the pretext that the nation had failed to comply with UNSC resolutions: S/RES/687; S/RES/707; S/RES/715; S/RES/1051; S/RES/1060; S/RES/1115; S/RES/1134; S/RES/1137; S/RES/1154; S/RES/1194; S/RES/1205; and S/RES/1284. Basically, US President George Walker Bush and the UK’s PM Anthony Charles Lynton Blair were accusing Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein Abd al–Majid al–Tikriti of covertly producing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In other words, Saddam was a terrorist.
Then between 24 Mar and 10 Jun 1999, the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members launched Operation Allied Forces in Kosovo, without the approval of the UNSC. This was followed by Operation Enduring Freedom, launched on 20 Mar 2003. Here, circumventing UNSC’s authority, the US led a coalition of willing partners (UK, Poland, Australia, Spain, Denmark, Italy and 39 others) in the most unpopular military campaign of modern (if not all) times: the illegal invasion of Iraq. This incursion came after a series of false campaigns, run by the US, claiming that the Baghdad regime was in possession of WMDs, contrary to another UNSC resolution, S/RES/1441.
By the time of its conclusion, the Iraq war had claimed hundreds of thousands in civilian lives. Multiple analyses of the war, done by scholars and specialist alike, have arrived at tones of unfavorable conclusions. Take the case of Richard D. Hooker, Jr. and Joseph J. Collins who, in their book Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War, unequivocally state that "the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq carried high costs in blood and treasure.” The contributors go on to qualify this supposition by pointing to the fact that:
More than 10,000 American… have been killed… over 80,000 have been wounded or injured, many seriously. Veterans and Servicemembers suffering from post–traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury add hundreds of thousands more to the casualty count. Our allies and partners, not including host nations, count over 1,400 dead. In Iraq alone, at least 135,000 civilians were killed, mostly by terrorists and insurgents. In Afghanistan, from 2009 to 2014, nearly 18,000 civilians were killed, over 70 percent at the hands of the enemy. The effects of these wars, at home and abroad, will be felt for many years to come… The direct costs of these campaigns are $1.6 trillion, which in the main were covered not by revenues but by deficit spending. More complex, longterm estimates exceed $4 trillion… Fourteen years after 9/11, any attempt to accurately gauge political losses and gains from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is problematic. The costs appear high and the benefits slight, though long–term outcomes remain uncertain.
Furthermore, even though the invasion and occupation succeeded in thwarting Al–Qaeda in Iraq, the withdrawal, which began in Dec 2007 and was concluded in mid–Dec 2011, gave the world the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 2013. ISIL became the Islamic State (IS) and declared the re-establishment of the caliphate in 2014.
Al–Qaeda set the stage for the emergence of a more ruthless and determined form of terrorism. IS has emerged as an even greater threat, managing to destabilize Iraq, Syria, the entire Middle East, West and North Africa regions. Today, the only thing resisting ISIL from establishing itself in the East Africa region is Al–Shabab, a rival extremist group. Simply put, it is impossible to justify America’s invasion and occupation of Iraq. But then again, Iraq has about 22.7 trillion Liters in crude oil reserves, the fifth highest in the world. Libya has slightly above 7.7 trillion Liters which is slightly below America’s which according to BP, was slightly above 8.7 trillion Liters at the end of 2015.
 A hashtag is a label or metadata tag that enables users to easily find messages with a specific theme or content online. One can create and use hashtags by placing the hash character # in front of a word or by using an unspaced phrase, either within or at the end of a message.
 (Lazzo, 2015)
 (Mutiga M. , 2015)
 (Simpson & Weiner, 1989)
 (Dodge, 1896, pp. 246-247)
 (Demosthenes & Vince, 1935)
 (Craig & George, 1983)
 (Berner, Quotations From Osama Bin Laden, 2007, p. 165)
 (Berner, The World According to Al Qaeda, 2006, p. 151)
 (Origin and Evolution: The Declaration by United Nations, 1947)
 (Smyth, Gunning, Jackson, Kassimeris, & Robinson, 2008)
 (Riegler, 2010, p. 44)
 (Smyth, Gunning, Jackson, Kassimeris, & Robinson, 2008, p. 2)
 (Jackson, Gunning, & Smyth, The Case for a Critical Terrorism Studies, 2007, p. 17)
 (Nelson, Bunker, & Miller, 2011)
 (Vick & Reid, It Was an Ordinary Day, Then Horror, 1998)
 (Claiborne, 1998)
 (McKinley Jr., 1998)
 (Vick & Buckley, 'base! Base! Terrorism! Terrorism!', 1998)
 (Reuters, 1998)
 (Vick & Buckley, 'base! Base! Terrorism! Terrorism!', 1998)
 (Kennedy, 2005, p. 93)
 (Africa Overview: Kenya, 1999)
 (Younge & Hannan, 1998)
 Qaeda al–Jihad was a merger between al–Qaeda and EIJ but this union is still commonly referred to as al–Qaeda
 (Randal, 2012, p. 144)
 (Benson, 2016)
 (Goodman, 1998)
 (Lange, 1998)
 (Coll, 2004)
 (Moi Day Celebrations, 1998)
 (C-SPAN 2 Fri.: President Clinton, 1998)
 (Russert, Meet the Press, 1998)
 (Security Council resolution 1189 (1998) [concerning the terrorist bomb attacks of 7 Aug. 1998 in Kenya and Tanzania], 1998, pp. 1,2)
 (C-SPAN Live: William Cohen, Defense Secretary, 1998)
 (Newman, Whitelaw, Auster, Charski, & Cook, 1998)
 (Daum, 2006)
 (Erwa & Roric, Letter Dated 22 August 1998 From the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 1998); (Wright, 2006)
 (Erwa & Roric, Letter Dated 21 August 1998 From the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 1998)
 (Barletta, 1998)
 (Risen & Johnston, 1999)
 (Cloud, 1999); (Bearden, 1999); (Fitzgerald, 1999)
 (Kean & Cohen, 2004, p. 127)
 (Richter, 1999)
 (Richter, 1999, p. 55)
 (Baker & Cooper, 2011)
 (Smith, 2011)
 (Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) on Restoration of the Sovereignty, Independence and Territorial Integrity of Kuwait, 1991); (Security Council Resolution 707 (1991) on Iraqi Violation of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) With Regard to Inspection of Its Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, 1991); (Security Council Resolution 715 (1991) on Plans for Monitoring and Verification of Iraq's Compliance With Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), 1991); (Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996) on the Mechanism for Monitoring Iraqi Imports and Exports, 1996); (Security Council resolution 1060 (1996) on Iraq's refusal to allow inspection teams access to sites designated by the Special Commission (UNSCOM), 1996); (Security Council Resolution 1115 (1997) on Iraq's Refusal to Allow Access to Sites Designated by the Special Commission, 1997); (Security Council Resolution 1134 (1997) on Iraq's Continued Refusal to Allow Access to Sites Designated by the UN Special Commission, 1997); (Security Council Resolution 1137 (1997) on Measures Against Iraq in Light of Iraqi Decision to Impose Conditions on Cooperation With the Special Commission, 1997); (Security Council Resolution 1154 (1998) on Endorsement of the Memorandum of Understanding of 23 Feb. 1998 Regarding Compliance by Iraq With Its Obligations Under Resolution 687 (1991) and Other Relevant Resolutions, 1998); (Security Council Resolution 1194 (1998) on Iraq's Decision to Suspend Cooperation With the Special Commission and the IAEA, 1998); (Security Council Resolution 1205 (1998) on Iraq's Decision to Cease Cooperation With the UN Special Commission and IAEA, 1998); (Security Council Resolution 1284 (1999) on Establishment of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), 1999)
 (Holmes, 2003)
 (Annan & Mousavizadeh, 2013)
 (Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) on Decision to Set Up an Enhanced Inspection Regime to Ensure Iraq's Compliance of Its Disarmament Obligations, 2002)
 (Pew Research Center, 2006)
 (Hooker, Jr., et al., 2015, p. 402)
 (BP, 2016)
- Quote paper
- B W Namano (Author), 2017, Kenya. The Makings of a #TerrorHotbed, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/368375