How to compensate the CEO? Implications of different factors that determine a CEO’s compensation structure


Bachelor Thesis, 2019

46 Pages, Grade: 1,3


Excerpt


List of Contents

List of abbreviations

List of figures

1. INTRODUCTION

2. CEO COMPENSATION AND ITS DETERMINANTS
2.1. CEO Motivation
2.1.1. General Evaluation of Extrinsic Motivation
2.1.2. General Evaluation of Intrinsic Motivation
2.1.3. Summary
2.2. Typical components of a CEO payment system
2.2.1. Fix payment
2.2.2. Flexible payment
2.2.3. Fringe Benefits
2.2.4. Summary Fix, Flex und Fringe payment
2.3. Principal-Agent Theory
2.4. Reverse Theories and Concepts
2.4.1. Managerialism Theory
2.4.2. Tournament Theory
2.4.3. Other Factors

3. INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY
3.1. Interview Guideline
3.2. Sample Description

4. INTERVIEW FINDINGS

5. DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION
5.1. Discussion of the Findings
5.2. Practical Contribution
5.3. Theoretical Contribution
5.4. Limitations and Future Research

6. CONCLUSION

References

Appendix
Appendix 1 Detailed Interview Guideline

Abstract

The objective of the present thesis is the presentation of the most important theoretical ideas to determine an adequate compensation for top managers and their empirical verification. Basis of the empirical assessment are the remunerations of the CEOs of five German companies and business units with diverse sizes and ownership structures. The principal-agent theory has proven most relevant, concluding a pay-per-performance remuneration structure that aligns the financial interests of the company and its executives. The balance between short-term goals and sustainable growth is achieved by a mix of selected short- and long-term incentives. Empirical evidence shows that recently size has become a major determinant of management remuneration and the pay-for-performance link is increasingly weak. Overall the empirical results of the thesis imply that the principal-agent theory is still seen as a valid instrument to create a balanced and for both parts favorable pay package. However, the use of long-term rewards to create sustainable growth is neglected in smaller companies. Size is seen as a relevant factor. The CEO-worker pay ratio is estimated unsuited and insignificant for determining executive compensation.

List of abbreviations

AktG = "Aktiengesetz vom 6. September 1965 (BGBl. I S. 1089), das zuletzt durch Artikel 9 des Gesetzes vom 17. Juli 2017 (BGBl. I S. 2446) geändert worden ist"

List of figures

Figure 1: Typical CEO Compensation Composition (source: Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988)

Figure 2: Total Compensation Composition in German DAX-listed Companies 2018 (source: PricewaterhouseCooper (PwC), 2018)

Figure 3: Key Findings of the Interviews (source: own illustration)

1. INTRODUCTION

2018 was the first year companies in the US were required by law to include pay ratio disclosure in their annual proxy statements. This law is part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act introduced in 2010, which was set up to strengthen consumer protection. Section 953 (b) requires all listed firms to disclose a CEO-worker pay ratio and public companies to disclose the pay ratio between the average employee and the chief executive officer or other principal executive officers of the company (U.S Government Publishing Office, 2010).

In the past decades executive compensation is a heavily discussed and, in all terms, controversial and complex topic and only a few economic issues have aroused as much interest among the general public (ZDF Nachrichten, 2019). The main reason is that CEO pay has risen to an astronomical height in the last 50 years (Mishel & Schieder, 2018) and is setting up multiple conflicts among frustrated workers, coercing CEOs to justify the high pay gap and forcing governments to take measures. This simmering conflict was fueled by Forbes publishing a widely discussed article illustrating the huge pay gap between CEOs and their workers. According to these studies, CEO pay at a S&P 500 Index firm peaked at 376-to-1 in 2018 than of a median employee in 2018 (Hembree, 2018). Since then, the gap diminished only marginally and the CEO-worker pay ratio soared to an average of around 260 times more than the average rank-and-file worker if seen with using the stock-options-realized measure in 2018 (Karabell, 2018).

A similar development is noticeable in Germany. In a recent study of the Boeckler Stiftung, led by the I.M.U. the expert Weckes, shows that in the last decade the pay gap between top managers and their average employees in Germany enlarged about 70 percent. The median of the CEO to Worker Pay Ratio lies at 85 times, although an individual evaluation of the companies shows a wide range. As a solution to prevent a further opening of the pay gap Weckes (2018) proposes, to include report recommendations about the pay ratio in the German Corporate Governance Codex, to put the financial mismatch between top managers and other employees on the agenda of the supervisory boards. Weckes assumes that the German federal government is in the duty of providing more transparency by implementing the new EU Shareholders Directive of 2017 in German law until June 10th, 2019, because the topic of Article 9 b of the directive (EU) 2017/828 is the disclosure and full information about compensation policy in the remuneration of the enterprise (Europäisches Parlament und Rat, 2017).

The scale for measuring the compensation gap is the CEO to average worker pay ratio, which was referred to in the German Corporate Governance Codex since 2013. However, up to this day it must not be published by German enterprises. Furthermore, stand now, this will not change because the experts commission for implementing the new EU Shareholders’ Directive has taken a first position to this topic. The commission published a first speaker draft on October 11th, 2018. In this draft a new implemented §87 to the German AktG sets new and higher standards of transparency and information about compensation policy but omits the topic of publishing the manager to worker pay ratio (Bundesministeriums der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, 2018).

Nevertheless, even if governments stay reluctant to force a disclosure of CEO-worker pay ratio, the press and trade unions follow and report the incredible growth of top managers’ salaries and ask for explanations justifying the enormous amounts and solutions to solve this problem (Rohwetter, 2018). Referring to the fact that the real wages of workers haven’t significantly risen in the past decades (Mishel & Schieder, 2018), it is not a surprise that the enormous payment level of executives is questioned heavily and no longer seen as fair and appropriate. But what determines a CEO’s payment? And what factors might justify its height? The elements are discussed controversially in studies and there were many theories set up on the way a CEO’s compensation scheme should be composed.

A dominant paradigm in this research is the principal-agent theory suggesting a success-dependent compensation as a mean to align the CEO’s goals to the best interest of the firm and thereby solving the principal-agent problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In the past CEO payment was not linked with the individual performance of the firm but closely associated with the growth of the stock market. Until the beginning of this century the payment level of top executives and the stock market were growing on a similar level. And even if some aberrations occurred in 2015 and 2016, the tight relationship between CEO compensation and stock prices was reestablished in 2017 (Weckes, 2018). However, this correlation weakens and signs for an increasing decoupling pop up, because stock market gains still mean a rise of the compensation level, but top managers’ wages were not accordingly falling, when stock market prices did (Mishel & Schieder, 2018). The still evident link between stock prices and CEO compensation indicates that CEO pay is determined by the overall rise in profits and stocks and not with the better performance of a CEO’s respective firm relative to his or her competitors. Empirical studies have typically found weak or statistically insignificant pay-performance relationships (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Therefore, it is questionable if Jensen’s and Meckling’s theory of 1976 is still valid or ever fully was. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Jensen’s and Meckling’s approach many other studies caught up with that theory, but also proving the necessity of additional factors determining the CEO’s total payment. Crucial factors are for example the high risks the CEO’s company and CEO are facing (Miller, Wiseman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2002), the current market situation and firm size (Gabaix & Landier, 2008). Justifications for the recent disproportionately high rise can also be found in globalization (Keller & Olney, 2017) or the level of firm-specific knowledge (Wang, Zhao, & Chen, 2017).

The main question of the bachelor thesis will be the following:

“How to compensate the CEO? Implications of different factors that determine a CEO’s compensation structure”.

The complexity of CEO compensation, the increased public scrutiny and the fact that - in spite of a wide range of diverging concepts - up to this point no suitable solution for the remuneration of top managers has been found. That gives sufficient cause to resume on that topic. The urgency is impressively shown by events going viral like the Fat Cat Day created by the think tank High Pay Centre . It demonstrates that top managers need only some days to earn the annual wage of their workers (High Pay Centre, 2019). As a first step towards adequate and socially accepted remuneration this thesis aims to clear up the basics and answer the question what implications the different factors have that determine the CEO payment structure and if and how effective they influence the CEO’s behavior and the success of its company. Only factors with positive impact on CEOs and companies should be implemented in the remuneration. This perception, shown in the findings of the thesis, is essential for the second step towards this long-term objective. Existing findings if and how different type mixes and variants of CEO payment have diverging effects on both the CEO’s and the future prospects of the company are evaluated. Subsequently the thesis aims to link them to empirical results obtained by the various interviews with the conductors of payment structures and their real live experiences. A comprehensive literature research and analysis as well as the creation of an overview of the used methodology will be the basis for answering the question above. Next, I will give an overall introduction into the major terminologies and theories and define the research questions. With an overview of the current academic research state and theories, the significance of the research questions is pointed out. After examining the relevant publications for this topic and analyzing their essentials, a presentation of the theoretical results will follow. First, I will give a juxtaposition of different compensation components and second a general overview of already existing payment strategies. In the following I will briefly describe the methodology, present the selected questions and end with a sample description of each CEO and his enterprise. Subsequently I will point out the main findings. Attached to that, a comparison between the theoretical approaches and the results, gathered by the personal opinions and experiences of different German CEOs, will be carried out. The evaluation of the interviews will give the basis to compare and discuss the outcomes with the theories presented in the beginning. With the results obtained, the research questions can be discussed and answered. In the following I will reveral practical and theoretical contributions for CEOs and future research. Finally, I will point out some further approaches and limitations of the topic. The results will be summarized and a conclusion leading to an appropriate way to compensate top managers is tried to be found.

Resumed the thesis will present management compensation theories, compare the theoretical approach and methodological issues with empirical research and, in the end, may provide a guidance to executive compensation for diverse enterprises.

2. CEO COMPENSATION AND ITS DETERMINANTS

2.1. CEO Motivation

Motivation is the basic of every action and continued lack of motivation will lead to standstill and failure. Empirical studies show that motivation can be the result of intrinsic or extrinsic rewards. Extrinsic rewards are defined as external of the motivated person and third parties control the rewards given and if and how they are granted. They consist of money, verbal reinforcements, grades or promotions (Deci, 1972). Intrinsic rewards are “mediated within the person” (Deci, 1972: 217), they boost the subject’s motivation without external rewards “except the activity itself or the feelings which result from the activity” (Deci, 1972: 217). Translated to the world of work, this means that employees satisfied with their work and how they do it are by themselves motivated to keep going on and do even better.

As early as the beginning of the 20th Century Taylor in his well-known Princ iples of Scientific Management (1911), drew attention on the great loss due to inefficiency that the United States suffered that time, caused by the lack of motivation of its working population. In his view, a development towards efficiency and prosperity could only be reached through individual motivational impact, because each person has different motivational needs. One important element of his Scientific Management was pay incentive. He saw humans mainly motivated by extrinsic factors and assumed a correlation between work structuring and money induced incentives (Taylor, 1911). Although Taylor’s concept of management was developed over 100 years ago, it seems to be relevant until today, because the economical approach still favors extrinsic motivation as a trigger for good performance.

Even today, the monetary aspect remains dominant, because extrinsic motivation is mainly granted by the height of the CEO’s pay, especially its variable part. The reason for setting the focus on the manager’s financial compensation could be, that money is the incentive easiest to generalize in regard to the diverse needs of the affected individual (Berthel & Becker, 2013).

2.1.1. General Evaluation of Extrinsic Motivation

“Money makes the world go around”, the lyric from the Musical Cabaret has become a proverb and describes its predominant role in extrinsic motivation. Today almost every individual needs money to cover the basic requirements and the majority tries to get more than that. Using money or other extrinsic rewards, it must be assumed that the respective person can be extrinsically motivated. This means he belongs to the category of the homo oeconomicus, making rational decisions and maximizing his personal profit by following economic principles (Sprenger, 2014). However, human nature creates pitfalls in extrinsic motivation.

With regard to that and building on the concept of the homo oeconomicus, Jensen and Meckling (1994) developed the Resourceful, Evaluative, Maximizing Model (REMM) with the following postulates:

First, every individual is an evaluator - cares about everything and is willing to make tradeoffs and substitutions. Second, each individual’s wants are unlimited - that means they cannot be satiated. Third, each individual is a maximizer. People want the highest utility possible. And fourth, the individual is resourceful.

Applying that to the extrinsic motivation of CEOs by remuneration, which is foremost done by variable payment, it has to be expected, that they are creative and respond to changes in their environment. Therefore, they look at their salary structure and do what they feel is in their own best interests. That implies paying CEOs for growth will result in growth, paying them for stockholder returns will likely result in higher stockholder return and sooner or later they will always find ways around controlling laws and regulations (Jensen & Meckling, 1994). Other problematic side effects are the crowding out effect, the loss of intrinsic motivation if extrinsic incentives are applied (Strang, Park, Strombach, & Kenning, 2016). Another issue are undesired target shifts. Extrinsically motivated people will seek out tasks that are easy to achieve and quantify and so possibly neglect costly tasks that are hard to quantify but may be important for the general welfare of the company (Frey, Homberg, & Osterloh, 2013). In the recent past, the self-selection-effect and hazard of gaming was also a widespread risk. Variable payment attracts in particular candidates whose focus lies on money and not the work content or the welfare of the company. They typically tend to high risk taking. That is why variable payment may promote manipulation and fraudulent behavior and not, as desired, performance (Frey & Iselin, 2017). At worst companies suffer of risky speculation for example the UBS speculative losses of 2.3 billions (Weisenthal, 2011). Other prominent examples are the Bankenskandal or the Abgasskandal. These problems would potentially not have occurred with the participation of intrinsically motivated managers, because they are not as prone to an excessive craving for money and power.

2.1.2. General Evaluation of Intrinsic Motivation

Behavioral scientists argue, that intrinsic motivation triggered by satisfaction of needs and sentiments are predominantly responsible for performance (Becker, 2019) and cognitively demanding tasks are easier solved by intrinsically motivated people (Frey, 1997). From their point of view, extrinsic motivation, like variable pay, can only push the performance of routine jobs, whereas when it comes to complex tasks, who are part of a CEO’s daily routine, negative effects may occur. This is due to a displacement effect, the above-mentioned motivation crowding-out (Osterloh & Frey, 2015). To complete complex tasks an intrinsic, task-interested motivation is essential and usually already exists. Social motivation, acting not only for their own benefit but in regard of an overall responsibility and common welfare, comes in addition. Under the application of external control or benefits, the existing intrinsic motivation will be replaced by the extrinsic one. However, if the lost intrinsic motivation is not fully replaced by extrinsic incentives, the performance will weaken and this sets in motion a self-reinforcing downward spiral of the intrinsic motivation (Sulzberger & Zaugg, 2018). Therefore, one should think, intrinsic motivation and efforts to rise it, play a major role in the motivation of top managers. Nevertheless, even in regard of the results of behavioral studies, the majority of companies and executives prefer to use extrinsic motivation factors especially variable compensation systems. The focus seems to lie on the relative height of the salaries compared to those of other managers and getting more as the top earners of companies competing to their own. Going this way remuneration becomes a positionell good, and the context between salary and the value of the obtained marginal product fades.

2.1.3. Summary

In summary an intrinsically motivated person will do things for the pleasure of accomplishing the task itself without any apparent motivators, whereas an extrinsically motivated person will perform activities, because they lead to external rewards.

This thesis will focus on extrinsic rewards like variable pay. Nevertheless, research studies indicate the direct correlation between intrinsically motivated employees, their performance and the possible loss of intrinsic motivation with the use of extrinsic rewards. Therefore, the impact of intrinsic motivation should not be neglected.

2.2. Typical components of a CEO payment system

CEOs are responsible for leading and managing a1 company. Their main task is to decide and enforce variable strategic alternatives for action, as well as the planning, controlling and coordination. As a compensatory measure and incentive for their future performance, CEOs obtain an individually tailored wage negotiated with and determined by company boards and their compensation committees. Companies design these sophisticated compensation schemes to motivate their top officers to make decisions that will benefit the companies. Each company wants its executives to focus on short-term success regarding the business of the firm and its financial results. Furthermore, they also want their CEOs to keep an eye on long-term financial performance. This is to be achieved with aligning their CEO’s interests with those of the shareholders of the company (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 2018). Incentive optimization is in competition to risk distribution. An incentive agreement that holds in mind both aspects optimally minimizes losses obtaining from the risk participation of top managers and a too weak incentive effect (Gillenkirch, 2008). Ideally pay packages should send a signal to the CEO which behaviors are likely to be rewarded (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988). With a wide range of designing possibilities to strengthen the achievement of short- and long-term targets, they are becoming more and more complex (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 2018). The continuous improvement process shows the attribute of executive compensation as a trigger of firm success (Fisher, 2017). Following Rappaport (1986: 171) “Properly designed performance measures and executive incentive compensation schemes are central to the value creation process. Their purpose is straightforward to motivate managers to create value by rewarding them for the value created”. However, as every individual is different, it is nearly impossible to activate and motivate everyone in the same way. To motivate a sustainable and anticipatory management, incentives and variable compensation must be adequate and expedient. In this way the divergent interests of both parties are converted in a congruence of interest, finally creating sustainable and value-adding company management (Hostettler, 2010).

The individual packages can vary a lot in different companies and industries, but the typical CEO compensation consists of 3 main components. A fix component, a flexible component and fringe benefits. Their sum is called total compensation (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988). Figure 1 gives a visual description of total compensation.

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Figure 1: Typical CEO Compensation Composition (source: Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988)

The compensation structure is generally splitted into a performance-related and non-related part. Both parts have major influence on the CEOs motivation, however, differentiations must be made between different groups and remuneration systems, to be able to satisfy the individual or group behavior with monetary incentives (Weber, Bramsemann, Heineke, & Hirsch, 2017). A crucial option is to put top manager under the impact of an incentive system, that rewards them financially when they make decisions favorable for the shareholders’ interests (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988). The increased focus on financial compensation is the aforementioned fact that money is the incentive factor easiest to generalize in regard to the diversified needs of individual persons.

Summarizing, incentives should activate the company-desired motives and actions and, in their entirety, they should strengthen and control the behavior in a beneficial way for the company

2.2.1. Fix payment

An in total fixed salary without variable elements is no adequate instrument to heighten a CEO’s motivation, because it disregards his increased efforts and success. Following Jensen’s REMM model, a CEO with fixed pay only will sooner or later do his job with the least acceptable effort and results and is therefore contraindicated (Jensen & Meckling, 1994). From a theoretical point of view, it could be assumed that a fixed compensation is seen as a sort of present answered with a minimum performance level (Akerlof, 1982). What is more, a complete fixed compensation not only hinders extra motivation, but it causes a total shift of the profit risk towards the shareholders as it is detached from the welfare of the company (Veliyath, 1999). Especially risk-averse top managers will need a compensation for adopted risks (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988). Consequently, motivation boosting components like flexible pay are indispensable.

Nevertheless, the fixed base salary is an essential part of a CEO’s compensation which he receives for providing his service to the firm and is usually splitted equally over 12 months. The height gets negotiated individually and is written down in the employment contract. It does not depend on the performance of the company nor the CEO and is therefore paid fully every month, helping the manager to keep his living standards and provide income security on the one hand (Lazar, 2007; Sprenger, 2010; Veliyath, 1999). On the other hand, it is also essential to guarantee a first-hand willingness to participate. Additionally, the fix salary should compensate the high risk the manager is willing to take if he takes up a full-time position on his level of income (Kuhner, Hitz, Sabiwalsky, & Drefahl, 2013). The height of the base salary is influenced by many factors, especially the CEO’s individual negotiating skills and qualifications (Chalmers, Koh, & Stapledon, 2006), the jobs requirements and responsibilities (Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, & Hinkin, 1987), but also the payment level in other companies or legal regulations (Wilke, Priessner, Schmid, Schütze, & Wolff, 2011) can be crucial factors.

First and foremost, fixed compensation gives security but does not heighten motivation. A fixed salary secures the manager, because at least a part of his total income is safe of immutable factors like initially promising investment developing negative because of environmental changes. Fixed payment is a sort of insurance for the possibility that top managers can make decisions at least partially independent of short-term performance targets but are not suited to trigger extra motivation. Substantial fixed compensation establishes an independent and secure financial status for the CEO, however it is also in the interest of shareholders, since it allows top managers to take risky but valuable decisions without being concerned about their personal financial welfare.

2.2.2. Flexible payment

Generally, variable or flexible compensation systems should reward the work results and effort individually, while keeping the labor costs flexible (Becker & Kramarsch, 2006). Characterizing the flexible or variable payment components, two subdivisions can be distinguished: short-term and long-term incentives. As both components are linked to the performance of the company, the absolute height of the variable package is not regulated in the employment contract and is often only measurable after its reference period. Usually it makes up around 50-60% of the total compensation (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 2018), as shown in Figure 2, and is higher in larger companies (Arnhold et al., 2018). However, the amount can vary in different countries (Equilar, 2018).

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Figure 2: Total Compensation Composition in German DAX-listed Companies 2018 (source: PricewaterhouseCooper (PwC), 2018)

Short-term

One-year variable components are also called short-term incentives, granted to encourage the CEO to reach imposed short-term goals by providing bonuses, which are paid out after every financial year. Their target is prompt reward for top performers and alignment to short term company goals (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010).

Being able to heighten their salary every year by working more and/or better is understandably a desirable target for top managers. However, recently strong criticism arose from short-term oriented remuneration systems which were poorly designed, distributing bonus payments even in times of negative company development (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Osterloh, Mdjdpour, & Rost, 2008). Too much emphasis on short-term incentives may lead to negligence of promising long-term strategies (Veliyath, 1999). Furthermore, many authors point out the limitations of short-term material incentives and put emphasis on the common and systematic overestimation of extrinsic rewards as performance. To prevent the risk of too much emphasis on short-term success, a well-balanced structured remuneration system has to include additional long-term oriented components (Weber et al., 2017).

Long-term

Long-term incentives last over several years, linking the height of compensation to the achievement of a value-oriented management, instead of maximizing profit as primary corporate goal. This is done mostly with shareholding and share options with the advantage of lasting motivation from the moment of granting until they are disbursed (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 2018).

The inclusion of stock options as long-term incentives supposedly directs the CEO to consider the long-term implications of decisions (Weber et al., 2017). With this component the company tries to align the CEO’s pay to the performance of the firm and the shareholder’s welfare (Veliyath, 1999; Weber et al., 2017). According to a widespread opinion, stocks and stock-options orientated compensation are the fundamental basis for sustainable management remuneration (Rapp, Schaller, & Wolff, 2012). The necessity and great importance of that compensation type is shown by the risk of managers neglecting the long-term firm performance over self-beneficial short-term gains and short-term risky decisions. The lack of factors ensuring that was a key contribute leading to the financial meltdown in 2008 (Laux, 2015). Increasing shareholdings means the harmonization of interests between top-managers and shareholders and is said to solve the problem of interest regarding diverging risk preferences. Decision makers are led to pursuit promising risky strategies despite of risk aversion as basic attitude (Miller et al., 2002). Nevertheless, even in regard to long-term incentives, diverse negative effects and impacts are discussed.

First, following Becker & Kramarsch (2006) the problem remains that it is generally difficult to record success and performance, but especially if a team of managers is acting, there is hardly a way to reward individual performance and success. Another issue is that stock returns represent the overall business operations success that might move for other reasons than the CEO performance. CEOs usually have only a small influence on these factors, implementing that achievements and efforts of individuals cannot be measured specifically (Firth, Tam, & Tang, 1999; Miller et al., 2002; Osterloh et al., 2008) Furthermore, there is always the risk of manipulation by influencing the measurement basis not according to the rules and the aforementioned issue of motivation crowding-out. Insider trading can pose a problem, because of the privileged information top managers are in possession unlike the shareholders of their companies.

[...]


1 Terms like pay(ment) system, compensation structure, compensation schemes and remuneration are used synonymously.

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Details

Title
How to compensate the CEO? Implications of different factors that determine a CEO’s compensation structure
College
Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg
Grade
1,3
Author
Year
2019
Pages
46
Catalog Number
V997201
ISBN (eBook)
9783346376220
ISBN (Book)
9783346376237
Language
English
Keywords
implications, ceo’s
Quote paper
Alice Friedl (Author), 2019, How to compensate the CEO? Implications of different factors that determine a CEO’s compensation structure, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/997201

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