branch consisting of the Office of National Assessment (ONA), and the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO). Therefore, the Australian intelligence agencies have “either a covert collection or an assessment role, but not both” (Office of National Assessment, 2006, p. 4). An unique exception is the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) which has both, collective and assessment tasks, a fact that emanates from its focus on security intelligence and “therefore has a particular, but not exclusive domestic focus” (Office of National Assessment, 2006, p. 4). The performance of Australia’s intelligence community to combat asymmetric threats is unequal. The 2003 Defence Update leaves no question that terrorism is the key security challenge for Australia by stating that “it [terrorism] may eventually be seen as the most violent phenomenon of the information age […] the reality is that terrorism has gained strategic advantages by turning the strength of tolerant and open societies into weaknesses and then striking at vulnerable points to devastating effects. For Australia this reality was brought home in Bali” (Department of Defence, 2003, pp. 11-12). Consequently, “timely and effective intelligence is the best weapon against the terrorist threat to Australia” (Howard, 2004). Therefore, it is not surprisingly that the funding for intelligence rocketed to 1.3 billion dollars each year and particular attentions has been devoted to the research and analyst capacities on terrorism in order to “improve domestic counter terrorism” (Ungerer, 2008a, p. 3). It is estimated that counter-terrorism claims more than 70 % of the current collection work in the three defence intelligence agencies (Ungerer, 2008a, p. 3). Within the fight against terrorism, ASIO takes an important role as “ASIO remains the agency in the AIC responsible for preparing and distributing threat assessments and specific warnings regarding terrorism” (O'Neil, 2007, p. 479). Furthermore, ASIO takes a strengthened role in the internal security, especially with the Australian Federal Police (AFP), hence “both the AFP and ASIO characterise their relationship as never closer” (Flood, 2004, p. 75). In addition, the Joint Counter Terrorism Intelligence Coordination Unit was established as a special branch of ASIO consolidating the Australian Intelligence agencies ASIO, ASIS, DIO, DSD, DIGO, and the AFP. The Unit coordinates the effective sharing of intelligence information across the participating agencies by providing access to all relevant databases and information sources (Grono, 2004).

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In addition, ONA and DIO “sharpened their focus on counter-terrorism as a threat to the international system and as destabilizing factor in regional politics and security” (Flood, 2004, p. 36). However, the valuation of terrorism as a imminent security threat for Australia is differing in the assessments of both agencies (Flood, 2004, p. 36). Additionally “greater emphasis has been placed on analytical capabilities relating to terrorism, with the lead commonwealth agency, the Office of National Assessment (ONA) establishing a Transnational Issues Branch, devoted largely to terrorism trends worldwide and operation as the AIC’s central point of contact for liaising with foreign intelligence agencies on the issue” (O'Neil, 2007, p. 479).

However, even though important successes where achieved, the AIC’s organisational structure impedes the fight against terrorism. The distinguishing element of the AIC is the high level of autonomy of the several intelligence agencies (Office of Legislative Drafting and Publishing, 2001, pp. 6-11). Therefore, the “level of cooperation between the agencies tends to be thin” (Jennings, 2004b, p. 4). As a reaction to the new security agenda, the National Threat Assessment Centre was established in 2004 as a body of within ASIO to prepare assessment on the danger of terrorist attacks or other political motivated violence against Australia or Australian citizens abroad. The NTAC is composed of officials from ASIO, ASIS, DIO, ONA, DOTARS, DFAT, and the AFP and the intention of NTAC is to provide 24/7 intelligence as the insight prevails that in “the area of counter-terrorism […] an ‘allsource’ intelligence approach is necessary to defect this threat” (Jennings, 2004b, p. 4). Yet, despite some ambitious approaches to co-ordinate the Australian intelligence agencies, the level of co-operation remains low since the “Australian intelligence agencies continue to exist within a basic framework in which AIC members, especially those agencies involved in foreign intelligence are largely separated from other aspects of government, including executive agencies and their intelligence units” (Gordon, 2005, p. 41). Jennings subsumes this condition by stating that “the agencies forma a community in much the way Metternich famously regarded Italy - as a geographic expression rather than a cohesive entity” (Jennings, 2004b, p. 4)

Despite the level of attention devoted to terrorism in the AIC, threats for Australia’s security are manifold. The level of threat emanating from transnational crime is

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predicted to increase in the years ahead as international criminal organizations increasingly exploit benefits of gobalization and different national jurisdictions. Australian Intelligence Agencies are increasingly responding to the international criminal activities. However, the concentration on ASIO is again a dominating factor since ASIO is the key organisation for domestic security concerns (Gordon, 2005, p. 41). In terms of transnational criminality, the AIC is dependent on close cooperation with national law enforcement (federal, state, and local) especially with the Australian Federal Police. Due to the Transnational Crime Coordination Centre and the NTAC, the AFP and the AIC share a well established liaison and data sharing arrangements (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004, p. 38). Yet, the use of intelligence in the fight against transnational crime is hindered by a variety of reasons. Law, regulations and protocols limit the use of intelligence gathering especially by the Defence intelligence agencies DSD and DIGO on a domestic level in order to protect the privacy of Australian citizens (Gordon, 2005, p. 43). Furthermore, the use of intelligence in law enforcement becomes even more difficult given that “if not actually gathered as evidence (that is in ways admissible to courts) it cannot serve any evidentiary purpose” (Gordon, 2005, p. 42). Therefore, the use of AIC derived intelligence is limited in some cases since the AIC’S success is “dependent on protecting its sources, methods and capabilities from public knowledge in order to guarantee continued access” (Flood, 2004, p. 75). In contrast, AFP’s success is dependent on revealing information to secure a prosecution (Flood, 2004, p. 75).

Furthermore, the different perceptions of priorities complicate the co-operation between AIC and law enforcement agencies. The Department of Defence recognized in 2000 that “Australia faces many non-military threats to our national life, such as cyber attacks, organised crime, terrorism […]. Our patrol boats, maritime surveillance aircraft and intelligence capabilities are fully engaged in the day to day monitoring and policing of our maritime approaches, and their efforts are closely integrated with other agencies. Our approach is drawn on the expertise of the ADF where its most appropriate to do so, but not to allow the roles - important as they are - to detract from ADF’s core function of defending Australia from armed attack” (Department of Defence, 2000, p. VIII). Therefore, the department “would not wish to see its capacity to defend Australia form military attacks seriously eroded by such demands” (Gordon, 2005, p. 43). Hence, it is “this reluctance and incapacity to use Australia’s most

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