worst-case scenario from attacking the United States with nuclear weapons (Hersh, 27.10.2003). However, this argumentation was contradicted by the IC. Rather, the CIA had “no evidence that Iraq has engaged in terrorist operations against the United States in nearly a decade and [was] also convinced that President Saddam Hussein has not provided chemical or biological weapons to Al Qaeda or related terrorist groups” (Risen, 06.02.2002). Furthermore, the DIA concluded that “there was o reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq has - or will - establish warfare agent production facilities” (Judis & Ackerman, 30.06.2003). Concerning the nuclear programme, CIA, DIA and INR followed the position of the International Atomic Energy Agency that “there are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of weapon usable nuclear material of any practical significance” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1998). In other words, within the IC prevailed the position that there was no concrete threat emanating from Iraq in either case.

However, after failing to foresee and prevent 9/11, the IC and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet were confronted with severe critique, especially from the US administration. Referring to this critique and having their political agendie in the background, the US government started to exert significant influence on the IC and the weakened DCI in an extent that according to senior CIA analysts never has been “so pervasive and so insistent” (Hersh, 27.10.2003). As a consequence of the constant pressure, the unclassified assessments of the IC exaggerated the Iraq-Al Qaeda nexus and the Iraqi nuclear programme, even though classified reports still were not convinced in either case (Judis & Ackerman, 30.06.2003). Moreover, “Senior CIA analysts, dealing with Iraq were constantly urged by the Vice-Presidents office to provide worst-case assessments on Iraqi weapons issues […] they began to provide intelligence that was wanted” (Hersh, 27.10.2003). This internal-external antagonism was made possible by the DCI’s relatively weak position within the IC and the US administration aroused by a lack of discretionary power, inadequate budget control and the fact that he is not a assigned member of the National Security Council (NSC). Therefore, the influence of the DCI as the “primary adviser to the President and the NSC on national foreign intelligence” (Executive Order 12333 -United States intelligence activities, 04.12.1981) is related to his liason with the president. However, under the pressure of 9/11, George Tenet was eager to

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consolidate his position and therefore was not able or willing to resist the influence of the administration. Hence, a more independent and assertive DCI could have resisted the pressure and influence of the administration (Hersh, 27.10.2003). However, the weak resistance to external pressure is only one reason for the failure of intelligence in the Iraq case. Intelligence collection and assessment is another one.

By arguing that the CIA assessment “isn’t worth the paper it is written on” (Landay, 19.03.2004), the US administration created an Office of Special Plans (OSP) which was established within the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis (NESA). In the following, OSP became the most influential intelligence agency to the US government, using raw intelligence material unassessed by CIA, DIA and other traditional intelligence agencies in order to justify an invasion to Iraq (Hersh, 12.05.2003). The influence of the traditional intelligence agencies decreases as the CIA wrote “reports justifying their intelligence rather than saying what’s going on. The Defence Department and the Office of the Vice President wrote their own pieces, based on their own ideology. We collected so much stuff that you can find anything you want” (Hersh, 12.05.2003). Moreover, the OSP purposeful researched the intelligence assessments on Iraq in order to find evidence for the Iraq-Al Qaeda nexus and the production of WMD. Intelligence, dissenting from the ideological agenda was not even considered (Dreyfuss & Vest, 2004). A senior Officer described the work of OSP by stating that “it wasn’t intelligence, it was propaganda. They take a little bit of intelligence, cherry-pick it, make it sound much more exciting, usually by taking it out of context, often by juxtaposition of two pieces of information that don’t belong together” (Dreyfuss & Vest, 2004). The exclusion of traditional intelligence agencies from the decision making process is recognized by a congressman, investigating the work of OSP, saying that the “office was charged with collecting, vetting and disseminating intelligence completely outside of the normal intelligence apparatus. In fact, it appears that information collected by this office was in some cases not even shared with established intelligence agencies and in numerous instances was passed on the national security council and the president without having been vetted with any one other than political appointees” (Borger, 17.07.2003). In short, the OSP produced customized intelligence following the requirements of the US administration and their political agenda, contrary to the assessment of “virtually all anti-terrorism specialists [… that the] intelligence

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agencies had it right: There was no noteworthy relationship between Al Qaeda and Iraq” (Borger, 17.07.2003).

Similarly disputed as the process of producing customized intelligence is the reliance on unreliable information sources. The emphasis on technological means and the neglect of HUMINT led to the situation that the “U.S. intelligence agencies had few if any independent sources of information in Saddam's Iraq. There was no U.S. Embassy in Baghdad—relations were essentially severed ahead of the 1991 Gulf war—to provide diplomatic cover for American spies” (Landay, 19.03.2004). After the UNSCOM mission left Iraq in 1998, the IC’s most important source of information became the Iraqi National Congress (INC) with its leader Ahmed Chalabi as well as Iraqi exiles and Kurdish refugees (Pollack). The CIA, DIA and other conventional intelligence agencies however, considered many of the reports from this source as “unreliable or downright false” (Pollack). Nevertheless, the OSP trusted the information much of it has been found “to be marginal at best, and sometimes exaggerated or fabricated” (Landay, 19.03.2004). Yet, this comes with no surprise given that the INC provided information wanted by the OSP and the US administration. The CIA’s position adverse to Chalabi and the INC was a different one, a senior CIA officer stated that “you had to treat them with suspicion. The INC has a track record of manipulating information because it has an agenda. It’s a political unit - not an intelligence agency” (Hersh, 12.05.2003). And indeed, none of the information on suspected chemical, biological and nuclear weapon programme has been proved accurate so far (Dreyfuss & Vest, 2004).

However, in 2002, the US administration used intelligence to legitimate the invasion of Iraq before the Congress. Yet, the members of Congress were not convinced that “the views of the US intelligence community are not receiving adequate attention by policymakers in both, Congress and the executive branch” (Gellman & Pincus, 10.08.2003). In order to find a decision, George Tenet was ordered to provide a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) whose classified version was published in October 2002 under the title ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (Judis & Ackerman, 30.06.2003). Yet, there are significant variations between the classified and the declassified version published three weeks later. By leaving out key works and sequences, the impression was raised that the intelligence community is unified on the Iraq case, a fact that was obviously wrong, and that there is an imminent

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