expressed in, for example, large and perennial demonstrations, political leaders could be willing to make concessions to the public in order to regain support, for example, forupcoming elections. It seems as there is no influence, however, if demonstrations are (very) weak and die away when other major issues, like an economy crisisnot caused by the war, arise.

However, before turning to the influence of U.S.public on foreign policy, it is necessary to have a look at specific theories to see how public opinion is shaped through media and government. We will see that the elite model offers explanations for the beginning of a war while the pluralist modelseems to be more reliable as war continues. ¹ The latter argues that ‘power is sufficiently dispersed throughout society … [and] the outcome [is] a range of competing positions negotiated through an open political system, a free media and … by a public that … develop[s] an independent opinion.’ ² On the other hand the elite model assumes that ‘relatively small groups within the US wield power’ ³ and therefore the political process is the outcome of elite interests which dominate media and public debate. 4

We now turn to the Vietnam War, where a decade before the beginning of the war France ended its colonial rule over Vietnam in 1954 which left the country partitioned. Whereas the North was run by a communist government, the United States sought the creation of a counterrevolutionary government in the South soon after France left. However, ‘it proved unstable and—in the late 1950s and early 1960s—a revolutionary movement … emerged’ ⁵ to fight this new government. In the wake of these events the United States increased its military involvement which led, in connection with (supposedly) attacks on U.S. ships by North Vietnam, to a direct U.S. involvement in 1964. 6

This rather long history could imply American public was getting used to a U.S.involvement for a decade. But also politicians were able to use this conflict and show their people that communism is a national security threat one has to be afraid                                                   

¹  For assumptions and further criticisms of these models see Cox/Stokes 2008, pp.  166‐178. 

² Cox, M./Stokes, D., US Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.  167. 

³ Cox, M./Stokes, D., p. 172 

⁴ Ibid. 

⁵ Berinsky, A.J., In Time of War. Understanding American Public Opinion from World  War II to Iraq (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 18. 

⁶  Ibid. 

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of. The domino theory pushed this fear by saying that after once a country was taken over by communism other countries around it would follow like dominos. ⁷ Other events around the globe, like the building of the Inner German border, the Cuba Crisis, or the Sputnik Shock, showed the strength and dedication of communist-led countries.

To ‘convince the American public of the need to take on a military burden’ ⁸ in Vietnam, it required ‘an “unprovoked” act of aggression on the USA or its forces.’ ⁹ The supposedly attacking of U.S. ships by North Vietnamese forces, the so-called Gulf of Tonkin incident, ¹⁰ provided a perfect sales argument by demonizing the enemy eventually. Thereafter the support did not just skyrocketamong the public from 42 to 72 per cent, but also the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave the president broad war powers, was passed unanimously in the House ¹¹ and with only two dissenting votes in the Senate. 12

Public support for the war, one could argue, might have influenced politicians prior to their vote for the resolution and, in this way, allowed to go to war. However, more likely is that high public support in the mid-60s seemed to be more of a reaction on a ‘strong pro-intervention message … among both government and the news media.’ ¹³ As suggested by the elite model, ‘journalists relied upon … Washington-based news sources’ ¹⁴ and, one could argue, publicised the views of the elite.

The Iraq War comes to very similar findings at the beginning of the war. Twelve years prior to it, U.S. public saw an involvement of their government when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991. A United Nations mandate in the wake of the first Gulf War demanded from Iraq to destroy ‘all long-range missile programs, as well chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.’ ¹⁵ Because the Iraqi government

⁷ Herring, G.C., America’s Longest War. The United States and Vietnam, 1950‐1975.  Third Edition (London: McGraw‐Hill, Inc., 1996), p. 17. 

⁸ Cox, M./Stokes, D., p. 81 

⁹  Ibid. 

¹⁰ Ibid. 

¹¹ Herring, p. 137 

¹² Berinsky, p. 18 

¹³  Ibid. 

¹⁴  Cox, M./Stokes, D., p. 175 

¹⁵ Berinsky, p. 27, 29 

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resisted to those demands, ¹⁶ the Bush administration quickly turned its attention to Iraq in the aftermath of 9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan. 17

Again, a lot of time passed between the first involvement and the actual Iraq War which allowed the government to sell the new war easier. The constant threat of a dictator with weapons of mass destruction, coupled with a fear of terrorist attacks, ¹⁸ led after 9/11 to an extraordinarily high public support for the Afghanistan war between 80 and 90 per cent. ¹⁹ One could assume that this high support caused ‘several administration officials [to] insinuate … that Saddam Hussein had pursued collaborations with al Qaeda,’ ²⁰ because this accusation served in many ways. First, like in Vietnam, it accused the other side of having them attacked first. Second, it offered a link between Iraq and terrorism and therefore an important national security threat. Third, it was announced just in the weeks leading up to the congressional vote and therefore it ‘pushed Congress to authorise the use of military forces[.] … In the light of this push … both the House wide margins.’ ²¹ and Senate passed resolutions by

A broad public supported the war ²² as well as media when, for example, Times author David Brooks ‘argued that “Bush has such an incredibly strong case to go in there.”’ ²³ Again, public support seems to be the result of these efforts rather than the factor which influenced the government.

However, we will see that public opinion can influence U.S. foreign policy as we take a closer look at the wars after they started. As early as 1966 opposition against the Vietnam War emerged within the Democratic Party and rose thereafter. Subsequently taken up by the media it then reflected a dissent in the coverage of the war for the first time ²⁴ (which now fits rather the pluralist model of a free media), and led to a rising opposition while the support for the war declined.

¹⁶  Berinsky, p. 30 

¹⁷  Berinsky, p. 27 

¹⁸  Berinsky, p. 194 

¹⁹  Berinsky, p. 27 

²⁰  Berinsky, p. 29 

²¹  Ibid. 

²² Berinsky, p. 31‐32 

23 Ricks, T.E., Fiasco—The American Military Adventure in Iraq (London: Penguin  Books, 2006), p. 380. 

²⁴ Berinsky, p. 19 

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