FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Examining the engagement between civil society in Southeast Asia

and ASEAN in the ASEAN Community building process

DANG THI THU HUONG

Date of submission: May 2008

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CONTENT

ABSTRACT 3

INTRODUCTION 3

I. ASEAN COMMUNITY BUILDING 4

The reasons for building an ASEAN Community 4

The ASEAN Community building process 5

II.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN COMMUNITY BUILDING 9

III.

CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 10

IV.

THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND ASEAN PRIOR

TO THE ASEAN COMMUNITY BUILDING PROCESS 13

ASEAN′s agenda-setting and decision-making 13

The engagement between civil society and ASEAN before the Asian economic crisis 14

After the Asian economic crisis 16

ASEAN People′s Assembly 16

V.

THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND ASEAN IN THE

ASEAN COMMUNITY BUILDING PROCESS 17

ASEAN Civil Society Conference and the Solidarity for Asian People′s Advocacy 18

The ASEAN Charter 20

CONCLUSION 28

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ABSTRACT

The essay examines the engagement between civil society in Southeast Asia and

ASEAN in the ASEAN community building process. It argues that in spite of initial efforts in

mutual accommodation, both sides have been divided from within, which slows the

engagement and gives it more form than substance. The efforts by ASEAN so far will only

create a community of the governing elite, not a community of the people. Regional

community building, just like nation-building, is very much a people-centered process. It is

not a simple top-down chain of command and control. If ASEAN wants to establish a real

community, it must change its modus operandi. It must be much more than an exclusive club

for the governing elite by giving more space as well as power to civil society in its agenda-

setting and decision-making.

INTRODUCTION

A community is much more a cognitive than material construction; it is something

that has to be believed in, sensed, and nurtured by the people. In Southeast Asia, the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is building an ASEAN Community, which

is its most far-reaching project. Yet is it possible for a regional organisation that has been

widely criticised by civil society for being remote to and detached from the people to

establish a community of caring and sharing societies by 2015 as its statements indicate? And

if yes, how?

Meanwhile, civil society has an important role to play in community building. Yet

civil society in Southeast Asia is weak and fragmented. It has been excluded from ASEAN′s

decision-making process. Can civil society contribute to ASEAN community building? And

if yes, how?

This essay tries to answer these questions by looking at the engagement between civil

society in Southeast Asia and ASEAN in the ASEAN Community building process. It begins

with a summary of the ASEAN Community building process, which is followed by an

examination of the role of civil society in community building. The third section introduces

civil society in Southeast Asia. And the fourth is about the engagement between civil society

and ASEAN prior to ASEAN community building. I divide this part into two periods: before

and after the Asian financial crisis. Then I move on to the fifth - the most important in this

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essay which discusses and analyses the engagement between ASEAN and civil society in

Southeast Asia in the ASEAN community building process.

Finally I sum up my examination and analysis in the conclusion, in which I argue that

in spite of their initial attempts at mutual accommodation, both sides have been divided from

within, which slows the engagement and gives it more form than substance. The efforts in

community building made by ASEAN so far will only establish a community of the

governing elite, not a community of the people. If it wants to create a community larger than

that, ASEAN must change. The ASEAN governing elite must loosen their control and give

civil society more space in the decision making process.

I.

ASEAN COMMUNITY BUILDING

ASEAN1 was founded by five countries Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,

Singapore and Thailand in August 1967. The grouping has since doubled its membership to

include Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. Of all ASEAN projects, the most

far-reaching and significant is the ASEAN Community, which is scheduled to be realised by

2015.

The reasons for building an ASEAN Community

The process of ASEAN community building is a result of the considerable change in

the association′s mission in the recent two decades. The end of the Cold War, the advance of

globalisation, the rise of China and India in economic size and political influence as well as

the Asian financial crisis have forced ASEAN to shift from its original preventive diplomacy

of maintaining peace and harmony among its members to the constructive diplomacy of

community building to cope with increasing political and economic competition in a

globalised world.

In more details, one of the most notable threats to ASEAN members is China, whose

robust economy is in direct competition with those of its Southeast Asian neighbours,

1 Several reasons lay behind the formation of ASEAN: its members′ desire for a stable external environment (so

that they could concentrate on nation building), the common fear of communism, their reduced faith in or

mistrust of external powers in the 1960s, as well as the aspiration for national economic development; not to

mention Indonesia′s ambition to become a regional hegemon through regional cooperation and the hope on the

part of Malaysia and Singapore to constrain Indonesia and bring it into a more cooperative framework. Unlike

the Europe Union, ASEAN has been made to serve nationalism. It has yet to become a sovereign-defying

project. (Alagappa, 1998: 65 ­ 114)

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especially in trade and foreign direct investment. Besides, in recent years, the sleeping dragon

has shown more interest in enhancing its economic and political presence in the region,

particularly in Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. Its awakening has increasingly

drawn ASEAN states, which share the common fear of intrusive outside powers, into the

long-term strategic competition between China and the United States in Asia Pacific (Neves,

2004: 162). To cope with China and avoid external intervention, Southeast Asian countries

feel the need to act collectively and to lean on each other, so that they can have combined

strengths as well as better bargaining power in both economic and political issues (Almonte,

2006). The same will work when dealing with an amalgamated or regional community such

as the United States and the European Union, or with international organisations such as the

United Nations and the World Trade Organisation.

Besides, in the time of economic globalisation and after it was hit hard by the Asian

financial crisis, forming an economic community which develops a single market and

production base with effective facilitation for trade and investment will help Southeast Asia

improve its economic competitiveness and attractiveness (Almonte, 2006). In terms of

political and security issues, internal ethnic and religious tensions (most dangerously in

Myanmar, Southern Thailand, Eastern Indonesia and Southern Philippines) have led to cross-

border instability, terrorism, illegal migration and drug-trafficking. These and other problems

such as air pollution, avian flu, AIDS all require regional concerted and coordinated actions.

Against this backdrop, the future of the region and of ASEAN will be, to a

considerable extent, contingent on the degree of success of community building.

The ASEAN Community building process

At its ninth Summit in October 2003, ASEAN announced its decision to establish an

ASEAN Community comprising three intertwined and mutually reinforcing pillars, namely

the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and

ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) by 2020. In January 2007, its leaders reached an

agreement to shorten the time frame to 2015. The ASC is expected to maintain and strengthen

peace, security and stability and enhance ASEAN′s capacity for self-management of regional

security. It will include maritime cooperation and fight against terrorism, but no plan for a

regional military bloc or defence pact. Besides, member countries are free to pursue their own

foreign policies and defence arrangements (ASEAN, 2003). Meanwhile, the mission of the

AEC is to develop a single market and production base that is stable, prosperous, highly

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competitive and economically integrated with effective facilitation for trade and investment

in which there is free flow of goods, services investment, skilled labours, and freer flow of

capital. But it will not adopt a common currency like the European Union (ASEAN, 2007b:

4). And last but not least, the ASCC envisages a Southeast Asia bonded together in

partnership as a community of caring and sharing societies. The ASCC Plan of Action

contains four core elements: Building a community of caring societies, Managing the social

impact of economic integration, Enhancing environmental sustainability, and Strengthening

the foundations of regional social cohesion towards an ASEAN Community (ASEAN,

2004b). In 2005, member countries agreed to establish an ASEAN Charter, which would

serve as the legal and institutional framework for the regional organisation and the ASEAN

Community. Although it will not take on any supranational functions, with its ambitious

goals, the ASEAN Community is believed to have far-reaching and important impacts on the

lives of the people in Southeast Asia.

Unlike the European Union, ASEAN is still a pure inter-governmental organisation. It

has no supranational institution (Ong, 2004) responsible for monitoring and facilitating the

realisation of the ASEAN Community. Members rely on mutual trust and goodwill to fulfill

integration commitments. However, a study by the three past secretaries-general released in

2007 showed that only 30% of commitments had actually been fulfilled (Fernandez, 2007),

including those related to community building.

ASEAN officials admit the AEC is the simplest part, as it has clear objectives and

benchmarks such as liberalisation and facilitation measures in the area of trade in goods,

services and investments; recognition of educational qualifications; enhanced infrastructure

and communications connectivity and the like. Yet, although much has been done2, the

regional economy is far from being effectively integrated. The ASEAN Free Trade Area

agreement of 1992 directs their elimination, but non-tariff barriers remain largely in place. In

addition, "Reforms of customs procedures and practices, required for the proper

implementation of ASEAN trade agreements, have been uneven. The harmonization of

product standards, necessary for an integrated market, is extremely slow. So is the conclusion

of mutual recognition arrangements that would do away with multiple tests of traded

products. Negotiations on the liberalization of trade in services, although mandated by the

1995 `framework agreement′, seem to be marking time. Transportation between or through

ASEAN countries remains cumbersome and expensive, and the development of infrastructure

2 Almost all intra-ASEAN trade is now, at least on paper, free of duty. (Severino, 2007)

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is highly uneven. Communications within ASEAN are still fragmented", former ASEAN

Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino points out (2007: 5). As a result, the intra-regional trade

share increased slightly from 22% in 2003 and 2004 to 25% in 2006, the intra-regional

investment share in 2006 was the same as the average share of the 2002 ­ 2006 period (only

11%). Businessmen still view ASEAN as 10 different countries, with 10 different customs′

authorities, rules and regulations, and 10 different borders (Taing, 2007). ASEAN trade

officials themselves said the AEC blueprint, which was approved only in late November 2007

with detailed timelines, must be implemented swiftly and effectively if the 2015 deadline is

to be met (Fernandez, 2007).

The security community is known to be more difficult to build. Although the

likelihood of war between ASEAN countries has become remote, a set of important norms

and values have been developed and shared, so far security and political cooperation within

regional framework is mostly focused on highly selective and not highly controversial issues

of common concern since several members have been obsessed with non-interference in the

internal affairs and consensus in the association′s decision-making process. Many scholars

argue that the principle of non-interference has blunted ASEAN efforts in handling the

problem of Myanmar, human rights abuses and haze pollution in the region. Meanwhile, with

the consensus-based approach, every member in fact has a veto and decisions are usually

reduced to the lowest common denominator. There has been a widespread belief that ASEAN

members should have a less rigid view on these two cardinal principles when they wish to be

seen as a cohesive and relevant community. (Chongkittavorn, 2006, 2007b; Collins, 2007:

216)

The socio-cultural question is the most complex (Ong, 2004) because of the immense

diversity in Southeast Asia. Member states include sprawling archipelagoes (Indonesia and

the Philippines) and tiny city-states (Singapore); the world′s fourth-largest country

(Indonesia) and the 170th (Brunei); modern developed economies such as Singapore and

agrarian backwaters like Laos. Their cultures, languages as well as political and economic

systems are not less heterogeneous. However, the socio-cultural pillar has received the least

attention and is the least developed among the three. The ASCC Plan of Action has vague

objectives and no detailed implementation plan. Not many activities have been conducted so

far. An ASEAN agreement on transboundary haze pollution has come into force, and some

progress has been made in terms of mechanisms and local-community consciousness. Yet the

haze problem still recurs every year. The effectiveness of an ASEAN response to an avian

influenza pandemic is uncertain. Programmes to familiarise the people of Southeast Asia with

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one another′s cultures are dependent on external funding and, therefore, inadequate. Little is

being done in informing the public or educating children in the region about ASEAN,

although these are essential for community building (Severino, 2007: 5).

ASEAN says it aims at being a community of caring and sharing societies by 2015

(ASEAN, 2007a). But observers are skeptical about its feasibility. They disbelieve countries

with protracted internal conflicts such as Myanmar, Thailand and the Philippines will become

caring and sharing societies in the next seven years. Not to mention the notorious human

rights violations in Myanmar. At the 39th anniversary of ASEAN in August 2006, Jose

Almonte, who is a respected analyst in the region, argued in his lecture that, "Even now - a

full generation since ASEAN′s founding - I think it fair to say that our peoples feel no

personal intimacy - no moral commitment - no historical continuity - with each other." In

other words, there is almost no sense of community among the people in Southeast Asia3.

Besides, the people and civil society have been excluded from ASEAN′s decision-making

process. Until now, regionalism has been essentially elite-centred and politically illiberal, and

the engagement of civil society minimal. To establish a community in the next seven years,

the governing elite are urged to work hard to put their grand declarations into practice.

The most visible efforts by ASEAN so far are those related to the ASEAN Charter.

After two years of deliberations and drafting, the Charter was signed on November 20, 2007.

It is by all accounts as good a lowest common denominator as could have been expected,

given the disparate interests, histories and sensitivities of Southeast Asian countries

(Fernandez, 2007).

The Charter confers a legal personality on the association. It codifies all ASEAN

norms, rules and values, including the cardinal principles of consensus and non-interference.

It is touted as a means of getting members to take their commitments and ASEAN′s rules

more seriously. However, the document lacks clear mechanisms for dispute settlement,

accountability and redresss. It does not offer anything new to deal with Myanmar.

The Charter will also lead to a reformed structure of ASEAN. It states that several

new institutions, including three Community Councils, the Coordinating Council, and the

long-awaited ASEAN human rights body will be created and the roles of the secretary-

general as well as the ASEAN Secretariat strengthened. But the time frames for the

establishment of these organs are unknown.

3 Analysing the results of surveys and interviews he conducted in all ten ASEAN countries from May 2004 to

July 2007, Christopher Roberts concludes that the process of embedding a sense of community will probably

occur over the course of many decades rather than by the official goal of 2015. (2007, 6)

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From the summary of ASEAN Community building above, it is clear that this process

is without three things: political will, regional institutions and the engagement of the people

and civil society. In the scope of this essay, the last one will be the main topic. Is this topic

important to community building to be written about?

II. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

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IN COMMUNITY BUILDING

A community implies a social, rather than purely instrumental, relationship (Acharya,

2004: 27). It is something that has to be believed in, sensed, and nurtured by the people

(Collins, 2007: 209). A community can form precisely because the people of the member

states begin to view one another as part of a greater whole. In security community formation,

this notion of the people having important agency is also captured in Deutsch (1957), Adler

and Barnett (1998)′s frequent reference to individuals, people and societies, we-ness and we-

feeling.

In community building, civil society which represents a proportion of the people and

advocates for their interests plays a significant role for three main reasons:

First, to an individual, according to A.Z. Pelczynski′s interpretation of Hegel′s

Philosophy of Right, a civil society is not only "an arena in which man legitimately gratifies

his self-interest and develops his individuality, but also learns the value of group action,

social solidarity and the dependence of his welfare on others" (cited in Kumar, 1993: 379).

This view is similar to that of Robert Putnam, who writes civil societies "instill in their

members habits of cooperation, solidarity and public spiritedness... Participation in civil

society organisations inculcates skills of co-operation as well as a sense of shared

responsibility for the collective endeavours" (cited in Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 571).

Membership and activity within civil society organisations (CSOs) therefore help to create a

sense of community5 in the individual, which is essential for community formation.

4 Civil society is a contested concept. There is little agreement on its precise meaning, though much overlap

exists among core conceptual components (Kumar, 1993). It is, of course, beyond the ambition of this essay to

undertake a comprehensive review of the various definitions of civil society. In this essay, the term refers to

organised non-profit groups who act, to a large extent, in the interests of neither political parties, commercial

businesses nor the private sphere of family for the sake of social good. These groups include mainly registered

charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women′s organisations, faith-based

organisations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, coalitions and

advocacy groups.

5 The most influential and cited definition of sense of community is that of D. W. McMillan and D. M. Chavis,

to whom it is "a feeling that members have of belonging, a feeling that members matter to one another and to

the group, and a shared faith that members′ needs will be met through their commitment to be together" (1986,

9).

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Second, at group level, civil society organisations share common concerns essentially

rooted in assisting local communities, alleviating the miserable living conditions of the poor,

the underprivileged, and looking into the plight of abused women and children, among others.

CSOs also share the common objective of empowering these groups to fight for social justice,

human rights, improved environmental conditions and a better quality of life (Collins, 2007:

210, 220). They fill the void that exists between the activities of the state and the market. And

because these problems can be found in neighbouring states, CSOs can create coalitions and

networks to find solutions together. A growing sense of solidarity, relatedness and mattering

emerges from CSO activities and this bodes well for the creation of a sense of community via

a bottom up process. Civil society groups can therefore act as conduits for the type of

interaction Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett note occurs in the ascendant stage of security

community formation (1998: 29 ­ 66).

Third, to varying degrees, CSOs can influence policy formulation and act as a

significant constraint on the governing elite to make community building more people-

oriented and democratic (Collins, 2007: 211). "[W]ithout a secure and independent civil

society of autonomous public spheres, goals such as freedom and equality, participatory

planning and community decision-making will be nothing but empty slogans", argued John

Keane (cited in Kumar, 1993: 385).

Yet how about civil society in Southeast Asia?

III. CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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In the early years of the post-colonial period, throughout the 1950s and 1960s,

military-backed regimes in Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Laos, and North and South

Vietnam suppressed civil society groups that were critical of, or perceived as a threat to, the

state. In the 1970s, the triumph of communism in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos aborted any

prospect of the development of civil society as the self-organisation of citizens in Indochina7.

For a while CSOs were relatively active in the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, but also

in the 1970s, President Marcos resorted to martial law to stay in power in the Philippines, and

the Malaysian and Singaporean states used a combination of legal and coercive instruments

6 In this essay, I put aside civil society in East Timor, which is also a Southeast Asian country (but not yet an

ASEAN country), because after it broke away from Indonesia in 1999, CSOs operating in this tiny enclave have

not joined the engagement of civil society in the region with ASEAN. East Timor applied for ASEAN

membership in 2006 and the accession process is expected to take at least five years.

7 Indochina comprises of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

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to exert control. As authoritarianism of various forms came to dominate the region, civil

society faced varying degrees of constraint in all the countries. (Lee, 2004: 11 ­ 12, Hewison,

1999: 228)

More importantly, from the 1970s onwards, countries like Singapore, Malaysia,

Thailand, Indonesia, and, to some extent, the Philippines were in the throes of major social,

cultural and economic changes. Rapid economic development resulted in the growth of the

middle class and more class-stratified, as well as industrialised and urbanised societies. Partly

owing to the major transformations, new social movements began to emerge in civil societies

in Southeast Asia; for example, student, environmental, women′s, human rights, consumer,

and other public interests movements. However, although the number and type of civil

society groups grew dramatically, this growth did not necessarily translate into a

democratisation process in all of these countries. (Lee, 2004: 12)

The democratisation of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand witnessed the

preeminent role of the elite, but it would not have been achieved without the active

participation of civil society organisations, which played a supportive role by generating

political pressure for reform that led to the liberalisation of political systems and eventually

brought down dictatorial regimes. In the Philippines, in the mid-1980s a number of CSOs,

notably the church and church-related groups, helped to overthrow the authoritarian Marcos

regime. In Thailand, the rise of student organisations, NGOs and trade unions proved critical

to forcing the junta out of political office in 1973 and 1992. In Indonesia, it was the wide

array of mobilisational campaigns initiated by Islamic-inspired student and women′s

organisations that finally resulted in the downfall of the Soeharto′s New Order regime in

1998, when the country was crippled by the Asian economic crisis. All these events paved the

way for the much-awaited democratisation process8. However, except from the Philippines

where the Church was invited to consult the President-elected when she had yet strengthened

her powerbase in the 1980s, civil societies in the other two have not been able to provide

substantive contributions to the consolidation of democracy and to the agenda-setting and

8 However, viewed in a Gramscian light, the realm of civil society in Southeast Asia also appears to have thrown

up many obstacles to democratisation. Individual Buddhist monks and monasteries in Thailand joined

movements to topple military rule in 1973 and again in 1992, while others backed military coups in 1976 and

1991. The Catholic Church leadership in the Philippines did not oppose the martial law in the 1970s but

eventually backed the "People Power" in 1986 to overthrow Marcos, after years of underground (and in some

cases armed insurgent) radical activity by hundreds, if not thousands, of its priests and nuns. Besides, studies in

more recent years have shown religious institutions are deeply intertwined in the reproduction of money and

machine politics in both countries. (Baharuddin, 2004: 19)

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decision-making of the state. Meanwhile, in Singapore and Malaysia, democratisation just did

not come (Bunbongkarn, 2004: 137 - 141; Lee, 2004: 54 ­ 77).

In the late 1990s, the Asian economic crisis marked a milestone in the development of

civil societies in ASEAN countries in two aspects. First, it destabilised authoritarian regimes

and helped bring about democratisation (in Indonesia) or accelerate it (in Vietnam, for

example), thereof opened up more space for civil society to organise and operate. Second, the

devastating onslaught of the crisis increased the importance and proliferation of civil society

groups as they are always at the front of tackling pressing concerns of local communities and

relieving the plight of the poor, the minorities, women and children who were among the

most affected (Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 568, 575).

However, until now, the question of whether civil society exists in authoritarian states

of different kinds such as Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Singapore, Brunei and even Malaysia is

still a much-debated issue. If one uses the Western definition of civil society, which is the

realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating and autonomous from the state

(Diamond, 1994: 5), then the conclusion is that civil society has not been present in the

above-mentioned countries where the governing elite have followed a statist perspective, in

which civil society refers to civil organisations that are under direct or indirect jurisdiction

and surveillance of the state or encapsulated by the state.

Against this backdrop, civil societies have insufficiently and unevenly developed in

ASEAN countries (Houben, 2004: 65). They represent a fragmented and complex picture

(Baharuddin, 2004: 18). But they share the same problem that unlike trade and business

groups, they have had little access to national policy making and programming, even in more

democratic countries where CSOs are on the front line of social development. Another

notable similarity is that the majority of CSOs which operate in an ASEAN country are issue-

based and they essentially concentrate on assisting local communities, alleviating the

miserable living conditions of the poor, the underprivileged, and looking into the plight of

abused women and children (Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 573).

Because poverty, economic and social injustice can easily be found in neighbouring

countries while other problems (avian influenza, HIV/AIDS or migration) that are

transnational require transnational responses, civil society groups in Southeast Asia have

created regional coalitions and networks to find solutions together. These regional CSOs

share many characteristics of the national ones and their organisations are also mostly issue-

based. Among the most prominent regional groups are those identified in their work on

democratisation, promotion of human rights and advocacy against globalisation; for example,

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the Bangkok-based Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), the

Asian Cultural Forum on Development and Focus on the Global South (Caballero-Anthony,

2004: 574).

IV. THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND ASEAN

PRIOR TO THE ASEAN COMMUNITY BUILDING PROCESS

ASEAN′s agenda-setting and decision-making

Throughout its history, ASEAN has always been an association of mostly

authoritarian regimes. Unsurprisingly, it has showed little interest in facilitating the

participation of civil society in its agenda-setting and decision-making processes, which can

be usefully understood in terms of the so-called Track I and Track II (Chai, 2003). Track I

refers to the practice of diplomacy among government channels. The participants stand as

representatives of their respective states and reflect the official positions of their governments

during negotiations and discussions. All official decisions are made in Track I. Track II on

the other hand refers to diplomatic activities that are unofficial and includes participants from

both government and non-government institutions such as the academic, economic

communities and NGOs (Kraft, 2002: 51). This track enables governments to discuss

controversial issues and test new ideas without making official statements or binding

commitments, and, if necessary, backtrack on positions.

Although Track II dialogues are sometimes cited as examples of the involvement of

civil society in the regional decision-making process by governments and other second track

actors (Acharya, 2003: 383), NGOs have rarely got access to this track, meanwhile

participants from the academic community are a dozen think-tanks9. However, these think-

tanks are, in most cases, very much linked to their respective governments, and dependent on

government funding for their academic and policy-relevant activities (Acharya, 2001: 66 ­

67). Their recommendations, especially in economic integration10, are often closer to

ASEAN′s decisions than the rest of civil society′s positions.

The track that acts as a forum for civil society in Southeast Asia is called Track III,

which is essentially people-to-people diplomacy undertaken mainly by CSOs. Track III

9 Track II activities in Southeast Asia mainly involve conferences, symposia, seminars and workshops on

various regional issues.

10 For example, ASEAN - Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) has long supported an

open economy for ASEAN and favored trade liberalisation. National and regional NGOs, on the other hand, are

more cautious, fearing the possible adverse effects. (Chandra, 2006: 77)

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networks claim to represent communities and people who are largely marginalised from

political power centers and unable to achieve positive change without outside assistance. This

track tries to influence government policies indirectly by lobbying, generating pressure

through the media. Third-track actors also organise and/or attend meetings as well as

conferences to get access to Track I officials.

While Track II meetings and interactions with Track I actors have increased and

intensified, rarely has the rest of civil society had the opportunity to interface with Track II.

Those with Track I have been even rarer. In other words, the participation of the big majority

of CSOs has been excluded from ASEAN′s agenda-setting and decision-making. (Caballero-

Anthony, 2004: 577)

Looking at the three tracks, it is clear that until now, ASEAN has been run by

government officials who, as far as ASEAN matters are concerned, are accountable only to

their governments and not the people. In a lecture on the occasion of ASEAN′s 38th

anniversary, the incumbent Indonesian President Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono admitted:

"All the decisions about treaties and free trade areas, about declarations and plans of

action, are made by Heads of Government, ministers and senior officials. And the fact that

among the masses, there is little knowledge, let alone appreciation, of the large initiatives that

ASEAN is taking on their behalf." (2005)

The engagement between civil society and ASEAN before the Asian economic crisis

At the same time, it could be argued that this situation has also been caused by the

lack of interest and pressure from civil society on ASEAN. Prior to the Asian financial crisis,

most CSOs in the region (without those in Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia, which

became members only in 1995, 1997 and 1999) saw ASEAN as a weak and elitist

organisation with little power to affect the well-being of Southeast Asian people. Therefore,

they were indifferent to engaging with it (Chandra, 2006: 71, 74).

Many others such as the Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET) and

Alternative ASEAN adopted mainly confrontational tactics that condemned ASEAN′s

pursuit of economic globalisation and its neglect of, and tolerance for, human rights abuses

and anti-democratic practices in the region (Acharya, 2003: 383). Except from the APCET11,

they have lacked the capacity, skills and opportunities to make their criticism have impacts at

national and regional levels (Chai, 2003).

11 APCET conferences brought a lot of media attention to East Timor.

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Among a minority of civil society groups that built a relationship with ASEAN were a

dozen think-tanks in the academic community such as the ASEAN ­ ISIS, the Singapore-

based Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and the Council for Security and Cooperation in

Asia Pacific... Playing the pioneering role in Track II, these think-tanks have haboured

opportunities to discuss with and make recommendations to the governing elite, therefore,

provided input to ASEAN′s agenda-setting and policy-making processes. For example, since

1993, ASEAN ­ ISIS members have met senior officials prior to their annual meetings; and

since 1999 they have had formal meetings with ASEAN foreign ministers. They have also

wanted to act as a bridge between the association and the rest of civil society. However, these

think-tanks have been perceived in certain circles as being too close to governments and

"sometimes a gatekeeper for expanded popular participation in ASEAN concerns". (Chandra,

2006: 73; Collins, 2007: 221; Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 581)

In addition, a small number of independent CSOs decided to engage with ASEAN at

that time. Such cooperation was often issue-specific, conditional and context-dependent. For

instance, in 1995, along with government officials, parliamentary human rights committees as

well as the academe in more democratic countries in the region, several high-profile NGOs

set up the Working Group (WG) for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism. In pursuing its

goal, the WG has tried to establish its national WGs and approach ASEAN high-ranking

officials such as foreign ministers and senior officials. Since 2001, the national WGs have co-

organised annual workshops on the ASEAN regional mechanism on human rights with the

host ASEAN government (through its foreign ministry) and its National Human Rights

Commission (if it has one). Governments of Brunei, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam have yet to

participate in the WG (Medina, 2006).

Besides, there were about 50 NGOs affiliated with ASEAN, most of which were set

up and sponsored by national governments such as the ASEAN Academics of Science,

Engineering and Technology or the Veterans Confederation of ASEAN countries. Of these

NGOs, less than ten worked directly on social development issues. Those related to human

rights documentation or monitoring would fail to join. For example, the ASEAN Journalist

Association has been denied accreditation for years (Kang, 2006a: 28).

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After the Asian economic crisis

After the Asian economic crisis, despite its continuing suspicion of the association

and member governments, civil society has taken a new stand on ASEAN. Instead of being

resentful or indifferent, now a lot of CSOs have shown interest in the grouping. There are

several reasons for this change. (Chandra, 2006: 74)

First, after the crisis, civil society has given more weight to ASEAN in the hope that a

more institutionalised and effective regional organisation might be better at preventing and

solving regional problems. Second is ASEAN′s intention to establish an ASEAN Community

by 2015. Many regard the ASEAN Community as its most far-reaching and important

project, one that has forced CSOs to take ASEAN more seriously (Chavez, 2006). Therefore,

Southeast Asian CSOs are increasingly of the opinion that ASEAN is a platform from which

it is possible to somehow influence policies at the regional level (Chandra, 2006: 74) to

maximize the potential benefits and minimize the negative impacts that an unaccountable

regional grouping could bring to the region′s peoples. Third, regional organisations, to

varying degrees, also make changes in national policies. Civil society hopes via ASEAN, it

can encourage "boomerang effects" on the national level, especially on Myanmar.

ASEAN People′s Assembly

In 2000, under the initiative of a pro-democracy group within ASEAN-ISIS of Track

II12, the ASEAN People′s Assembly (APA), which has been designated as a Track III

mechanism, was set up (Acharya, 2003: 386). It took the APA project about four years to be

realised with funding from outside the region due to the reservation and reluctance of several

ASEAN governments (Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 578), particularly those of Laos, Myanmar,

Singapore and Vietnam.

At first, APA was optimistically expected to become "a useful vehicle for a more

participatory form of regionalism" by Amitav Acharya (2003: 386) or "a people-empowering

mechanism" by Mely Caballero-Anthony (2004: 567). The inaugural meeting attended by

around 300 participants in 2000 in Indonesia was the first time such a diverse set of CSOs

were brought together (Collins, 2007: 220). Yet although APA1 was considered a historic

event, it represented more a symbolic move than an actual CSO participation in the ASEAN

12 The Track II grouping was seeking to make itself more effective and influential by developing a wider social

base that includes elements of the regional civil society. (Acharya, 2003: 386)

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process or even an opportunity to influence ASEAN policy. The meeting was not able to be

held in Singapore, where the fourth ASEAN Informal Summit was to take place at the same

time, as Singaporean authority cited political reasons to shake their heads. The only exchange

between APA1 and the summit was the appearance of ASEAN Secretary General Rodolfo

Severino and Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid, who delivered a presentation in his

private capacity to brief the APA1 participants of the proceedings at the actual summit

(Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 579; Chai, 2003).

There were five subsequent APA meetings. But they all took place not in other

ASEAN countries but Indonesia and the Philippines, which are more democratic than their

ASEAN counterparts. The second APA was held in Bali, Indonesia in 2002, and the rest in

Manila, the Philippines13. The latest was organised in Manila in late October, 2007.

Although APA is incorporated in the Vientiane Action Program signed during the

10th ASEAN Summit in 2004 and the ASC plan of action as a means of promoting people-to-

people contact, it is conspicuous by its absence in the ASCC′s plan of action, despite the

latter calling for region-wide networks of NGOs and other ASEAN organisations to help

strengthen social cohesion (Collins, 2007: 222). After all, it is only a general meeting place

for NGOs and civic organisations. It provides little opportunity to influence the agenda-

setting and decision-making processes of the association (Chandra, 2006: 75, 77).

V. THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND ASEAN

IN THE ASEAN COMMUNITY BUILDING PROCESS

In October 2003, ASEAN announced its intention to create an ASEAN Community,

which is its most far-reaching and important project and the one that has forced civil society

to take the association more seriously (Chandra, 2006: 74). It has drawn a lot of interest

among CSOs who saw the community building process as an opportunity to bring to the

regional agenda aspects of their advocacy that are regional in nature.

Within the academic circle, many scholars have had a strong position on the important

role of civil society in ASEAN community building. For example, at the 39th anniversary of

ASEAN in August 2006, retired General Jose Almonte, who was former Philippine national

security adviser, claimed that:

13 The ASEAN Community has become the main focus of discussion in APA meetings since the plan of

building a regional community was officially released by ASEAN in 2003. The theme of the third APA (2003)

was "Towards an ASEAN Community of caring societies". The theme of the fourth (2005) was "Towards a

People-Centered development in the ASEAN Community". That of the fifth (2006) was "The role of the People

in building an ASEAN Community of caring and sharing societies".

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"Community-building in practice is a task more suited to civil society than to

government - because community-feeling cannot be enforced by law or commanded by

force. Governments have never been good at social and communal tasks - although

governments everywhere have often tried to undertake them. Community-building belongs

properly to the dynamic side of citizenship - to public participation in voluntary associations,

the mass media, professional associations, trade unions, and similar groupings." (2006)

Outside the region, Alan Collins of Swansea University (the UK) argued:

"[I]f ASEAN is to become a security community it must change; its past experience is

a hindrance not a help to community formation. I argue that if ASEAN is to form a security

community it is only when the governing elite enable elites representing regional civil society

organisations to have an influence on policy formation that such a community can be

established. This is because regional CSOs can generate a common identification among the

people, which is essential for community formation, and, by representing that common

identification in the decision-making process, CSOs can use public opinion to constrain the

governing elite and deprive them of the option of war to resolve their problems." (2007: 205)

ASEAN Civil Society Conference and the Solidarity for Asian People′s Advocacy

And the first significant move from ASEAN was already made earlier by the

Malaysian government when it initiated the first ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC)

as a side event of the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2005 (Badawi, 2006). More

than 120 participants from a number of civil society formations were chosen to attend the

conference, which discussed a wide range of themes including human dignity, economy and

trade, environment, women, youth, indigenous groups and ASEAN identity (Chandra, 2006:

77).

At the summit, for the first time in ASEAN history, ASEAN leaders invited the

representatives of the ACSC to report their views on the process of ASEAN Community

building in 15 minutes. This unprecedented gesture heartened the whole civil society in the

region. Initially, the ACSC was supposed to be a one-off event, with no follow-ups. But

during the interface between civil society and heads of state, ASEAN recognised the ACSC

and supported its annual convening (Chongkittavorn, 2008).

CSOs expected the next ACSCs to take place at the same time and place as a parallel

event to the annual ASEAN Summit. However, ACSC II and III which were organised solely

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by civil society failed to do so due to different reasons, including the reluctance from the

Summit-host governments.

One of the main reasons why CSOs participated in the ACSC was their dissatisfaction

with APA′s slow progress and disagreement with the pro-democracy faction in Track II over

how to engage with ASEAN and over the way ASEAN regionalisation, especially economic

integration, should be pursued. However, the first ACSC was under the auspices of the

Malaysian government and representatives of CSOs were carefully selected by the host

country. After the conference, to further consolidate themselves independently, many

participants joined other civil society groups starting a loose civil society network called the

Solidarity for Asian People′s Advocacy (SAPA) in February 200614 to build a vehicle by

which regional groups could discuss, debate and strategise on ASEAN-related issues and

actions. The main areas of engagement for SAPA include issues of democracy and human

rights, peace and human security, sustainable development and environment, as well as

globalisation and trade, finance and labour. SAPA has a specific WG on ASEAN and the

ASEAN Charter15 to promote broader civil society interface with ASEAN. (Chandra: 2006,

75, 77; Chongkittavorn: 2007d)

At the regional level, SAPA WG on ASEAN organised the second ACSC in the

Philippines in December 2006 and the third in Singapore in October 2007. At the national

level, CSOs involved with SAPA WG on ASEAN managed to carry out national consultation

processes on the ASEAN Charter and on general issues of engagement with ASEAN in all

but three members countries, namely Singapore, Brunei16 and Laos in 2006 (Chavez, 2006:

1). Their objectives were twofold: (1) to familiarise local and national civil society groups

with the concept of regionalism, ASEAN and its policy-making processes, the ways in which

civil society groups can engage with ASEAN, and to examine ASEAN-related issues relevant

to their country; and (2) to ensure that national level processes can be integrated and

presented at the second ACSC, which took place before the 12th ASEAN Summit.

In essence, both ACSC and SAPA are considered alternative forums and networks for

engaging ASEAN and ASEAN Community building, apart from APA. However, unlike

14 The first SAPA meeting in February 2006 was attended by more than 50 participants representing about 35

CSOs. It was born out of common concerns about how to enhance the effectiveness and impact of civil society

advocacy by improving communication, cooperation and coordination among CSOs operating regionally, in the

face of rapidly increasing and multiplying inter-governmental processes and meetings in Asia.

15 Presently, the SAPA WG on ASEAN has more than 100 (national and regional) CSOs, as members.

16 SAPA members were not able to hold the meeting in Singapore because of obstacles from the local authority.

Meanwhile, the absence of plans in Brunei is due primarily to its CSOs′ limited participation in regional

activities so far. The national consultation process in Myanmar was held at the Thai ­ Myanmar border.

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APA, ACSC and SAPA are not mentioned in any existing formal ASEAN documents

(Chandra, 2006: 75 ­ 77). And unlike APA, which was an initiative of a group in Track II,

and the first ACSC, which was an initiative of the Malaysian government, SAPA was given

birth by civil society itself, which marked another milestone in the consolidation of civil

society in the region.

The ASEAN Charter

Also at the 11th Summit in Malaysia, ASEAN leaders announced the drafting of the

ASEAN Charter. The Charter is important because it sets the framework and lays the legal

foundation for the association to restructure its existing mechanisms and improve its

decision-making process to enhance efficiency and ensure prompt implementation of all

agreements as well as decisions. The document also provides ASEAN with a legal

personality (Ong, 2007). As the age-old ASEAN Way has been under increasing criticism,

the Charter is seen as a key part of the association′s reform to stay relevant and a significant

step to build the Community. Therefore, the Charter process at first drew a lot of interest

among CSOs who were already excited about engagement after the interface with the

leadership17.

At the summit, ASEAN formed an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) composed of

highly distinguished and well-respected citizens18 from ten member countries (ASEAN,

2005) who were asked to make "bold and visionary" recommendations on the content of the

Charter. In general, officially the EPG concurred with the idea that ASEAN and its Charter

process should be open to civil society participation. It even invited CSOs to provide input to

the Charter.

At the regional level, EPG members and civil society representatives did meet three

times to discuss issues pertaining to political and security cooperation, economic cooperation

and socio-cultural cooperation respectively19. In the meetings, CSOs expressed their belief

that regionalism is in the people′s interests. Therefore, they welcomed the building of the

17 The engagement between civil society and ASEAN in the charter process is, moreover, noteworthy as this is

their first strategic interface and also the first serious test for the relations between the two.

18 One of them is a former democratically-elected President of the Philippines, four are former deputy prime

ministers, one is a former foreign minister, and the rest are current top officials such as deputy prime minister

and foreign minister.

19 The meetings took place in April, June and November 2006. For some practical reasons, the third meeting

was mainly attended by representatives of civil society groups from the Philippines. From the EPG side,

Ambassador Rosario Manalo, who has been a special adviser to former President Ramos, received the

submission. In late November 2006, SAPA sent another letter to the EPG reiterating the key points of its

previous submissions through Fidel Ramos.

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ASEAN Community as well as the ASEAN Charter and called for a framework and

mechanism to facilitate the participation of civil society in the community building process in

general and the ASEAN charter process in particular.

Each time SAPA submitted a written statement to the EPG. In the first submission on

the security pillar, SAPA hoped the ASEAN Charter would explicitly recognize human rights

and human dignity as the foundation of the community. This principle should not be

compromised by economic and trade, as well as security commitments. The forum also

appealed for the protection of the rights of migrant workers, ethnic minorities and indigenous

people, women, children, farmers and fisher folk, among others. And it hoped the charter and

the ASC would aim for a broader definition of security. Current ASC definitions of

conventional and non-conventional security issues are comprehensive but not inclusive in

terms of perspective and without any specific reference to human security. The submission

also pointed out that the ASC plan of action contains two conflicting statements on principle.

On one hand, it declares that the ASC process "shall be guided by well-established principles

of non-interference (and) respect for national sovereignty"; on the other hand it asserts that

ASEAN shall not condone undemocratic regimes. And finally, SAPA hoped the charter

would include norms and standards that will eventually lead to a joint foreign policy.

In the second submission on the economic pillar, SAPA urged ASEAN to reconsider

its neo-liberal economic integration and called for the regional harmonization and

complementation in industry, agriculture as well as services. According to SAPA, the

ASEAN Charter should recognize a mix of heterodox economic policies and analyses. It

should include a strong element of social protection in economic development which is

founded on redistributive justice, poverty eradication and growth with equity and non-

discrimination. The forum believed the charter should encompass principles that protect

regional currencies from the vagaries of the global dominant currency exchange system, and

prepare the region for an independent exchange system. In addition, the document should

enshrine principles that move away from economic activities based largely on natural

resource extraction and promote economic growth anchored in and driven by rural

industrialization.

In the third installment on the socio-cultural pillar and institutional mechanism, apart

from the repetition of the requests mentioned in previous submissions, SAPA urged for a

people-centered and people-empowered ASEAN community with the recognition of local

culture, language and heritage. Besides, it hoped ASEAN would commit to the environmental

sustainability and a free, independent media. On the issue of drafting the ASEAN Charter,

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SAPA called for broad-based consultations at the regional and national levels, after the

engagement with the EPG would have been completed. It also strongly recommended that the

EPG put forward a proposed process for the ASEAN Charter through referendum in all

Member States. This is to ensure that the Charter is made known to all ASEAN citizens, and

that they are given the direct hand in determining the future of the regional organization. The

Charter itself should incorporate mandatory social dialogue and consultation with civil

society to ensure their access to decision making processes at all levels, national and regional.

In terms of institutional mechanisms, SAPA hoped ASEAN would be an institution

that recognises universally-accepted rights and standards, and provides mechanisms for

monitoring and securing compliance at the national and regional levels. In the area of human

rights, the ASEAN Charter should mandate the immediate creation of a regional human rights

body responsible for, among others: monitoring and reporting human rights conditions within

the region; investigating human rights violations; developing awareness on human rights

among people in the region; and, providing effective compliance and redress mechanisms.

At the meetings, the EPG always said they appreciated civil society′s contributions to

the ASEAN Charter. Among them, the two representatives from the Philippines and

Indonesia were the most active in the overall EPG - civil society engagement process. Others,

particularly those representing the less democratic countries such as Cambodia, Laos,

Myanmar, Singapore and Vietnam, were relatively silent and cautious about confronting the

CSOs (Chandra, 2006: 72 - 80). This quiet opposition soon made part of civil society in the

region question the value and fruitfulness of engaging the EPG and the charter process. In

December 2006, the second ACSC put forward the idea of an alternative ASEAN People′s

Charter.

The EPG submitted their report to ASEAN leaders during the 12th summit in the

Philippines in January 2007. A large part of the report was devoted to proposed changes to

push the association towards a more people-centered and rule-based orientation. Civil society

might feel satisfied with the frequency of the calls for the strengthening of democratic values,

good governance, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The beginning of the

report, which is Fundamental principles and objectives, was in line with civil society′s input.

The rest of the report recommended a formal dispute-settlement mechanism in all areas of

cooperation, especially concerning economic and political issues; decision-making by

majority vote rather than consensus in areas other than security and foreign policy; and steps

to monitor compliance with ASEAN′s objectives, principles, decisions, agreements, and

timetables. Besides, the EPG discussed the possibility of setting up of an ASEAN human

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rights mechanism and proposed sanctions against members who are in "serious breach" of

any of these terms, including loss of membership rights and privileges or, in extraordinary

circumstances, expulsion from the organisation. The EPG was also in favour of channels at

different levels for regular consultations through appropriate mechanisms with civil society

and parliamentarians from member states (ASEAN, 2006).

Nonetheless, civil society′s demand for the review of trade liberalisation in Southeast

Asia was completely ignored. Like other ASEAN governing elite, the EPG believes in free

flows of goods, services, investment, capital and skilled labour. Besides, in contrast to civil

society′s expectations, it also gave a limited acknowledgement to children, youth and women

(Chandra, 2007). The word "children" appears only once in the whole 55-page report, while

the word "women" was mentioned twice (ASEAN, 2006).

It is difficult to evaluate or separate the amount of input from civil society included in

the EPG report. Yet the repeated engagement with the EPG was itself a success, which made

the ASEAN governing elite gradually become familiar with civil society′s participation in

ASEAN′s decision-making process and change their mindsets. It can be considered an

important precedent for future interface.

Besides, it was a good opportunity for both sides to interact and get to know each

other′s concerns and viewpoints. In other words, the Charter engagement has increased the

interactions between Track I and Track III, which has led to a better understanding of and

sensitivity towards each other. During the process, CSOs also had chances to cooperate and

coordinate with others, thus improving their strengths and advocacy skills. It is noteworthy

that despite their widely-known fragmentation, they showed a united stance in the

engagement with the EPG.

The EPG report was forwarded to a fast-track High Level Task Force (HLTF) which

was responsible for drafting the Charter in 2007. This 10-member panel comprised five

senior officials, two directors-general, two ambassadors at large and one retired ambassador.

It is natural that one should not expect any bold initiatives from them who would speak for no

one but their governments, unless clear instructions have been given from their capitals to

push certain viewpoints and issues (Chongkittavorn, 2007b).

The HLTF also engaged in a limited direct consultation with civil society groups in

the Philippines in March 2007. At first, Thailand suggested that each member hold its

dialogue with CSOs operating on its land and then gather this input for further consideration

by the drafters of the Charter. However, time was running out so they agreed to have the

Manila dialogue. Only the Philippine member (and former Chair) of the HLTF Rosario

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Manalo participated in a meeting with 60 representatives for CSOs from ASEAN countries

before the convening of the first HLTF gathering to hear their concerns. Civil society

activists from Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines contributed much to the

richness of the discussions. Those from Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar also chipped in

from time to time. However, there was no guarantee that the views and recommendations of

civil society would be taken up because ASEAN leaders could change everything, said

Manalo (Chongkittavorn, 2007a). Several CSOs′ demands might be seen as too radical by

some ASEAN member governments (Chandra, 2006: 81), such as the proposal of adding the

environmental community as another pillar of the ASEAN Community. At the national level,

other members of the HLTF showed little intention to meet and engage with their civil

society counterparts in the drafting of the Charter. This applied even in a democratic country

such as Indonesia (Chandra & Djamin, 2007).

In the first half of 2007, bits and pieces of information which seeped through the

closed-door meetings of the HLTF revealed that under the instructions of foreign ministers,

the draft would not take in many recommendations from the EPG. For instance, the idea of an

ASEAN Union as the highest community-building goal in the region was quickly rejected, as

were the provisions for suspensions, expulsions and withdrawals. Voting as a decision-

making tool was not mentioned, meanwhile consultation and consensus remain sacrosanct.

Furthermore, the drafters were not comfortable exploring and including new dispute-

settlement mechanisms in the charter. (Chongkittavorn, 2007c)

In July 2007, ten ASEAN foreign ministers approved the first draft. They also

announced that the draft charter included a provision on an ASEAN human rights body20

(Forum Asia, 2007b: 1) that has been a target pursued tirelessly by civil society in the region

for more than ten years. Ambassador Manalo said "the HLTF wishes to institutionalize the

regional human rights body as a commission", meanwhile Singapore′s Second Foreign

Minister Raymond Lim further stated that "its powers are more likely to be consultative". It

then leads to the question whether this commission will really be effective in monitoring

human rights21. Human rights organisations in the region clearly know they cannot expect too

20 Mainly thanks to the efforts of the Philippines and Indonesia.

21 Reference to a commission offers the chance for the creation of a political body, in which those governments

most adverse to interference (often being those with the most to hide) can still be talked around. In contrast,

reference to a mechanism leaves open the possibility for the development of a regional body which could have a

real impact on the human rights situation on the ground, such as an ASEAN regional human rights court with

the power to issue legally binding decisions. (Forum Asia, 2007a: 1)

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much from such a body. However, the inclusion of such a provision is in itself a milestone for

human rights in Southeast Asia (Chavez, 2007).

After that, many CSOs requested the draft to be made available as soon as possible for

public scrutiny and consultation. Yet it was kept confidential prior to the 13th summit, which

finalised the Charter on November 20th 2007. This decision by ASEAN was heavily criticised

by civil society which has cited it as the best illustration of the association′s continuation of

their top-down elitist approach to policy-making (Forum Asia, 2007c: 1). According to the

latter, the confidentiality of the draft effectively excluded the participation and contribution

of civil society in particular and the people in general (Forum Asia, 2007d: 1).

In the first days of November, through the declaration of the third ACSC, civil society

in the region started launching the process of drafting the ASEAN People′s Charter that is

said to embody the shared values and collective aspirations of the peoples in the region. Key

issues such as human rights, social and economic justice, participatory democracy, rule of

law, ecologically sustainable development, cultural diversity, and gender equality are

promised to be enshrined here. It is set to be completed before the 14th ASEAN Summit and

the fourth ACSC in Thailand in late 2008. While they welcomed the planned ASEAN

People′s Charter, several CSOs said the ASEAN Charter creates openings for important

institutions and cautioned against rejecting it. Ray Paolo Santiago of the Working group for

an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism said, "Let us build on the gains achieved by the

ASEAN Charter, in particular, the ASEAN human rights body as an organ of ASEAN. Let us

strive to make this a credible and effective institution for the ASEAN peoples". Meanwhile,

Yuval Ginbar, legal adviser of Amnesty International elaborated, "Even if some governments

may sign things because they look good on paper, they can take on a life of their own as time

progresses." However, they agreed with others that ASEAN leaders should postpone the

signing of the Charter due to the violent crackdown on peaceful protests in Myanmar.

A few days later, Thai independent media outfit Prachatai and the Philippine Centre

for Investigative Journalism posted leaked copies of the final draft on their websites (Chavez,

2007), so that it finally became known to the public. The concern then turned into

disappointment - one failed to see the daring, visionary, people-centered and people-

empowered that had been hoped for.

The charter does its job in terms of codifying ASEAN′s many previous agreements

and declarations, and providing it with a legal personality. It clarifies issues on membership,

and delineates functions as well as responsibilities of different ASEAN organs. It creates a

new formal bureaucracy - from the formation of the three community councils (political-

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security, economic and socio-cultural) and the establishment of the Committee of Permanent

representatives, to the redefinition and strengthening of the roles of the secretary-general and

the ASEAN secretariat. It even gives a mandate to the long awaited ASEAN human rights

body. (Fernandez, 2007)

Disappointment came not so much from things that are found in the charter, but from

things that are not but should be. The charter is by all accounts as good a lowest common

denominator as could have been expected, given the disparate interests, histories and

sensitivities of Southeast Asian countries. Taking in not many important recommendations

from the EPG, the document reaffirms a state-centric ASEAN and institutionalises age-old

values of consensus and non-interference. It lacks clear mechanisms for dispute settlement,

accountability and redress. While the bodies mentioned above themselves are given a

mandate, most of the statements are parenthood statements and much is left to further

interpretation and how it is going to be concretely operationalised in ASEAN. (Fernandez,

2007; SAPA, 2007a; Chavez, 2007)

The inclusion of human rights in the charter′s preamble and statement of principles, as

well as the provision of a human rights body22 are a milestone for ASEAN. It is regrettable

that no internationally recognised standards, such as the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights was mentioned in the document, and the body′s operations remain to be determined at

the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, which is another political elite gathering. (SAPA,

2007b; Fernandez, 2007)

The charter talks about a people-oriented ASEAN (page 4), and upholds consultation

and consensus as basic principles in decision-making. Yet it neither provides clear

mechanisms for transparency and participation, nor recognises engagement and interaction

with non-state actors, including civil society. The document is also silent about how

ASEAN′s operations can be subject to independent scrutiny, how its processes can be

accessed by interested groups, and how official information should be made public. (Chavez,

2007)

Other missing elements include the complete non-mention of children who are the

future of ASEAN and migrant workers who make up a substantial portion of labour flow in

the region (Chavez, 2007). And the only reference to gender and women′s rights is in the

selection of the secretary-general and two of the four deputies.

22 Apart from the provision of the human rights body, no other inputs from civil society were accommodated.

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Therefore, even before it was signed, many analysts and civil society activists had

already written off the charter as another of ASEAN′s many grand declarations that failed to

take into account the aspirations of ordinary citizens and never got implemented (Chavez,

2007). Commentaries by civil society from the 11th summit when the ASEAN charter process

was launched to the 13th summit when the charter was signed changed from the hopeful,

optimistic and cooperative to the disappointed, skeptical and critical. After the signing,

several CSOs said they would focus on the ASEAN People′s Charter process while some

others strongly criticised and called for a boycott of the ASEAN Charter (Chongkittavorn,

2008).

The document is expected to be ratified by 10 states within one year23 and to be

adopted at the next ASEAN Summit in Thailand (Fernandez, 2007). At the 13th summit,

Philippine President Gloria Arroyo warned that she would likely have difficulty in getting the

Charter approved by Congress if the Myanmar junta refused to free Aung San Suu Kyi from

house arrest and failed to recommit to democratic reforms (Chin, 2007). Indonesian officials

have also admitted that the ratification process in their country would not be easy. Since then,

haft of ASEAN members, namely Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Laos, Cambodia and

Vietnam have come forward and fulfilled their pledge. Thailand already said that they will

ratify it by June.24

23 Each country is left to decide how best to do so, whether through a referendum, a parliamentary vote, or a

Cabinet decision (Fernandez, 2007).

24 A celebration is already scheduled for the ratification of the ASEAN Charter by all 10-member countries. It

will be held at the Saranrom Palace, where the ASEAN Declaration was signed on August 8th, 1967, 41 years

ago.

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CONCLUSION

ASEAN′s interface with civil society during the ASEAN Charter process clearly

reflects the attitudes of member countries towards civil society in the ASEAN Community

building process. In terms of engagement with CSOs, the organisation has been divided from

within. It is quite clear that three different groups exist within ASEAN. The first consists of

the Philippines and Indonesia, which are now more democratic than the rest. The two are

willing to consult civil society and welcome its input into ASEAN decision making process.

They are like a locomotive in the train. The second are Malaysia and Thailand25, who have

accepted limited interaction. The third group includes mainly the regimes of Myanmar,

Vietnam Laos, and in most of the time Singapore, Cambodia and Brunei. These regimes

would wish to stop the ASEAN ­ civil society engagement. They unwillingly join the

engagement process just to avoid pressures from the Philippines and Indonesia, and criticism

from Western countries. They are playing the cabooses in a train. Their "efforts" have made

the involvement of civil society more form than substance.

ASEAN says it aims at being a community of caring and sharing societies by 2015.

Nonetheless, community building in Southeast Asia has so far been a top-down elitist

process. The efforts by ASEAN will only create a community of the governing elite, not a

community of the people. Regional community building, just like nation-building, is very

much a people-centered process. It is not a simple top-down chain of command and

control. If ASEAN wants to establish a real community, it must change its modus operandi.

The governing elite must loosen their control of the decision making process and make

ASEAN much more than their exclusive club.

As for civil society in Southeast Asia, the participation in APA and the first ACSC,

the inception of SAPA are vivid examples of its determination to be involved with ASEAN.

Yet they also reveal the old problem which is the fragmentation of Southeast Asian civil

society in approaching ASEAN Community building. Civil society has also been divided.

The newest evidence is that the latest ACSC was held only one day after the APA in late

October 2007 in two different countries. This problem hampers the strength and skills of civil

society in achieving their aims in ASEAN.

25 During the drafting process, while the interim government in Thailand, which was installed by a military

coup, worked hard to polish its image abroad, its lack of legitimacy and the domestic controversy over the

drafting of a new Thai constitution put it in a sensitive position and greatly undermined its intentions of

supporting liberal initiatives. For example, it was quite awkward for Thailand to back the EPG report′s

recommendation for the rejection of unconstitutional and undemocratic changes of government

(Chongkittavorn, 2007b).

28

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Many other issues arise with regard to the autonomy, effectiveness and sustainability

of emerging transnational civil society mechanisms. Brunei CSOs almost disappear from

regional networks. Meanwhile, due to CSOs′ lack of independence, representatives from less

democratic countries often act on the guidance of the regimes and behave cautiously. And

because more democratic members in ASEAN are generally hospitable to civil society,

gatherings often take place in Indonesia and the Philippines, which makes it more convenient

for local CSOs to send their representatives. As a result, discussions are often dominated by

Indonesians and Filipinos.

However, their establishments should not be missed in the study of ASEAN

Community building. Their existence itself is a material structure of community building. In

addition, through consultation, cooperation and coordination among members and partners,

these associations have provided an arena of social interaction and social learning in a region

with a strikingly diverse membership in terms of ethnicity, religion, language, colonial legacy

and postcolonial polity. Therefore, they have helped create a sense of community within

Southeast Asian civil society and peoples.

Such developments also encourage community formation in the way they help the

people have a voice in community building, thus both engendering a greater sense of

belonging as well as mattering and introducing plurality to the decision-making process

(Collins, 2007: 223). Compared with the close-to-zero relationship of civil society to ASEAN

from 1967 until 1997, the engagement between the two in the last ten years is a leap forward.

2008 - 2009 could be a warm-up year for ASEAN and civil society with Thailand as

the current Chair and Surin Pitsuwan, who is widely-respected for his progressive initiatives,

as the new Secretary General. The new democratically elected government in Bangkok has

planned more extensive consultations between the grouping′s leadership and civil society at

the 14th summit (Chongkittavorn, 2008). At the ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta, Thailand′s

former Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan has already established a good rapport with regional

CSOs by meeting SAPA representatives and outlining his vision for a more active

engagement with civil society. It is a notable departure from his predecessors who were

hardly accessible to CSOs.

Nevertheless, although the Secretary General has more power than before, but as long

as consensus remains a much-treasured principle, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos and some others

are still able to shoot down liberal and democratic ideas, including those regarding the

involvement of civil society in the ASEAN Community building process. In addition, the

29

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next Chair is Vietnam. Many are doubtful, again, about the development and results of the

engagement.

30

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