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Against Raz' Notion of Second Order Reasons

Essay, 2009, 10 Seiten
Autor: Christoph Siemroth
Fach: Ethik

Details

Kategorie: Essay
Jahr: 2009
Seiten: 10
Note: A
Sprache: Englisch
Archivnummer: V126823
ISBN (E-Book): 978-3-640-33931-0
ISBN (Buch): 978-3-640-33687-6
Anmerkungen :
The essay requires knowledge of the source being criticized.


Zusammenfassung / Abstract

The essay is a critique of Joseph Raz' concept of second order reasons, especially exclusionary reasons, as presented in chapter one of his 1975 book "Practical Reason and Norms". It is argued that exclusionary reasons as defined by Raz have strange consequences that disqualify them from serious consideration. A counterproposal lays out how decision problems can be more plausibly interpreted as conflicts of first order reasons. His examples are reinterpreted in light of the counterproposal.


Textauszug (computergeneriert)

Against Raz′ Notion of Second Order

Reasons

Essay for "Seminar on Normativity"

Author:

Christoph Siemroth

Erasmus Exchange Student

University of Helsinki


Christoph Siemroth

Seminar on Normativity

Table of Contents

1. The Objective 1

2. Raz′ Account of Second Order Reasons 1

2.1. Formalizing Reasons and the Whistleblowing Example 1

2.2. Where Raz Faces Problems 3

3. Second Order Reasons as First Order Reasons 4

3.1. The Counterproposal 4

3.2. Investing or not Investing, that is the Question: Ann′s Example 4

3.3. The Example of the Complying Soldier and the Noncompliant Subordinate 6

4. Summary and Conclusion 7

List of abbreviations

FOR

first order reason

SOR

second order reason

Table of Contents


Christoph Siemroth

Seminar on Normativity

1. The Objective

In the following essay I shall try to show that Joseph Raz′ descriptions of second order reasons and

exclusionary reasons are not the most plausible way to describe deliberation and decision, because

it involves some strange consequences. Though it may be true that accepting his account of second

order reasons gives a comfortable order to some seemingly complicated cases, it is not true that they

provide the most consistent solution with our intuitions. My suggestion will be to reduce Raz′ sec-

ond order reasons to first order reasons, which suits our belief on how decisions are made better.

Since Raz′ intention merely seems to be to show that people act on second order reasons, and this

claim is mainly supported by employing some examples, I also shall try to investigate these exam-

ples in a different light. After that, it should be clear that his second order reasons are not necessary

to explain human behaviour as he claims. In order to narrow down the examination, I will only

focus on his descriptions in the first chapter. All references to Raz are meant for:

Raz, Joseph (1975):

Practical Reason and Norms

, Oxford University Press, 1999.

2. Raz′ Account of Second Order Reasons

2.1. Formalizing Reasons and the Whistleblowing Example

This chapter serves to repeat and formalize Raz′ descriptions. The example is based on Raz′ story of

Colin (cp. p. 39). Assume the company that hired you produces toxic food and you have the option

to make this public in order to protect the consumers (W = whistleblow, act). On the other hand,

this leads to an umcomfortable life for your family for the next years, due to press invasion, no

employer will hire you again etc. Also, you once made a promise never to even consider options

that are contrary to your family′s interests. Following Raz, you have an exclusionary reason that sets

aside a decision based on the merits of the case, because your family′s well-being is at stake. For

this to be an exclusionary reason, it must look like that (note that the SOR does not directly take

side for a certain option, but rejects you should make a decision on the merits at all):

pro W

contra W

first order reasons

protect lives of consumers

second order reasons

do not even consider the decision because only your family matters here

In this representation, if you were to ignore the SOR, then your choice would be to do W, since the

protection of lives is a conclusive (i.e. deciding) reason.

1



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