University of Birmingham
Centre for Russian and East European Studies
REES G 9b Reform and Crisis in the USSR after Stalin 1953-1991

1st essay
April 2002

Is it possible to isolate any one factor as more important than the
others in explaining the collapse of communism in the USSR ?

by

Maximilian Spinner

Table of Contents:

1. INTRODUCTION  4

2. SOVIET RULE AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS  4

3. SOVIET RULE AND ECONOMIC FAILURE  7
a) Social change through modernization  7
b) National awakening  8
c) The industrial cul-de-sac 8
d) Growing relative economic inferiority to the West and the loss of ideological appeal 9

4. REFORM AND BREAKDOWN 10

5. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 13

6. CONCLUSION 14

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY 15

1. Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union has been one of the most controversially discussed issues among historians and social scientists throughout the last decade. Paradoxically the imminent collapse of communism had been predicted frequently by Western observers during the early years of the Bolshevik rule. With the victory of the Second World War those voices were muted and the West accomodated with the existence of an obviously stable, mighty and economically expanding country.¹ The breakdown of communism in 1991 had been anticipated by few contemporary scholars, although the majority were aware of the symptoms of a deep crisis.

In this essay I will argue that in order to better understand the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, a central role must be given to the economy and its effects on other areas. Most symptoms of the crisis and the ultimate breakdown of the system can in fact be attributed to the impact of economic failure. Whereas, economic modernization was the motor of success in the early decades, the economy became the weakest link of the Soviet system in the later period as its structural shortcomings deeply effected other areas as well. The first part of this essay is intended to briefly outline the central role the economy played in the development of Soviet socialism. The second part analyses the far-reaching impact of the economic downturn, while the third part discusses the limits of reform before drawing a conclusion.²

2. Soviet rule and economic success

According to Marxist theory the economy plays a central role in the shaping of society. As the ownership of the means of production determines the superstructure, only equal distribution of the means of production and common ownership can create a fair and prosperous human society. When the Bolsheviks came into power a large-scale capitalist industry did not exist in Russia. Therefore economic development and its control through the party were seen as the key to the success of communism. 

After the years of NEP as ‘a temporary but deliberate reconciliation with backwardness’³, Stalin’s radical programme of economic modernization was started. Along with it went the build-up of the huge state bureaucracy for managing the new tasks the state had taken over, not only in the sphere of economic planning. For example part of this bureaucracy was the administrative structure created for the nationalities. Building and consolidating Soviet power in the Soviet periphery mostly meant overcoming ‘backwardness’ and creating the economic foundations for establishing classes with class-consciousness.

According to communist ideology state ownership and central planning was intended to prevail only for a transitional period until a classless society would be finally achieved. In the mid-1930 Stalin proclaimed the completion of socialism. The stage of a classless communist society seemed not far away.⁴ Achieving this aim had been the major rationale for massive campaigns of economic centralization, collectivization in agriculture and rapid industrialization. Economic success was justifying massive mobilization and severe measures against real or perceived enemies as it secured a bright future.

At the same time, economic success was a substitute for the lack of democratic legitimacy. Probably with the only exception of the Great Patriotic War the communists never enjoyed majority popular support.⁵ When the Bolsheviks seized power they had strong support from workers and soldiers. But very soon they resorted to terror in order to keep power when public support was fading.

[...]

1 M Cox, ‘Critical Reflections on Soviet Studies’, in: M Cox (ed.), Rethinking the Soviet Collapse, L: Pinter, 1998, p 27.

2 The author is aware that in the given scope of this essay only a minor and not necessarily representatitve fraction of the debates and works on the collapes of Soviet Communism can be touched on.

3 Y Slezkine, ‘The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or how a Socialist State promoted Ethnic Particularism’, in: S Fitzpatrick (ed.), Stalinism: New Directions, L: Routledge, 2000, p 318.

4 N Robinson, Ideology and the Collapse of the Soviet System, Hants: Elgar, 1995, p 62.

5 C Read, The Making and the Breaking of the Soviet System, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p 20.