Anglo-Amerikanische Abteilung
Historisches Seminar der Universität Köln

“Promoting War”:
 Medien und Krieg in der amerikanischen Geschichte
Wintersemester 2002/2003

Propaganda und Zensur im Golfkrieg

by

Thomas Müller-Kulmann

Index

1. Introduction

2 Promoting War
2. 1 Propaganda for the liberation of Kuwait
2.2 Kuwait’s engagement in the propaganda
2.3 Media’s support for the war plans

3 Censorship in the Gulf War
3.1 Avoiding the Vietnam Syndrome
3.2 The Pool System
3.3 The Military Ground Rules
3.4 Reporting under the government’s restrictions
3.5 “Unilateral” Reporting
3.6 The Briefings
3.7 Image vs. Reality

4 Conclusion

5 Bibliography

1 Introduction

“The Bush Administration achieved a five-month-long commercial for militarism and individual weapon systems. The American people were seduced into the celebration of a slaughter by controlled propaganda demonizing Iraq, assuring the world no harm would come to Iraqi civilians, deliberately spreading false stories of atrocities including chemical warfare threats, deaths of incubator babies and threats to the entire region by a new Hitler” (Initial Complaint of the International War Crimes Tribunal)¹

The Persian Gulf War in 1991 is considered to be one of the most strongly censored wars in American history. Besides security reasons, the censorship policy was also intended to raise and sustain support for the American troops on the home front in order to avoid “mistakes” in the handling of the media, that supposedly lead to the defeat in the Vietnam War. Besides the restrictions for free media reporting inflicted by the government, the media was one of the strongest censors themselves. This paper deals with the censorship system that was used by the US military and the media’s self-imposed censorship. It addresses the question to what extent the system exceeded the intended security purpose and how the media reacted to those restrictions. Propaganda strategies used before and during the war are also being examined. Besides, emphasis is put on the media’s role as an independent institution and its performance to provide the American people with unbiased and relevant information.

2 Promoting War

2. 1 Propaganda for the liberation of Kuwait

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, many Americans knew little about the reasons and America’s stand on Iraq’s attack. A survey² in early February 1991 showed for instance, that only 13% of all Americans knew that on July 25 1990, just days before the invasion, April Glaspie (at that time U.S. Ambassador to Iraq) assured Saddam Hussein that “we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreements with Kuwait”³ One of the widely accepted reasons for the invasion of Kuwait, Kuwait’s insistence on lowering oil prices and border disputes over an oil field, were identified by only 2% of the sample group in the same study. The study also revealed that Americans were much more likely to support an intervention against leaders that slaughter significant numbers of civilians (58%) whereas only 18% would support an intervention to support Oil interests.

As there were numerous cases of countries illegally occupying land at that time, with the U.S. not intervening, e.g. in Israel or Syria, other interests are very likely to have been the reason for the liberation of Kuwait. Despite the speculations of Bush’s domestic problems as a reason for another war, oil prices are very likely to have been an important factor for the decision to go into war. The Iraqi invasion led to a change in the oil price from $19 per barrel before the invasion to $30 a barrel after the invasion⁴, which has undoubtedly had a significant influence on U.S. economy. Other factors such as an important flow of surplus capital in the U.S.⁵ or geostrategical interests are supposed to have contributed to the decision to liberate Kuwait.

As the results of the survey suggest, the majority of Americans would have been willing to support military action to liberate a democratic country that has been invaded by a ruthless leader and is therefore posing a threat to nearby countries such as Saudi Arabia. Professional propaganda was waged to put the situation in the “right” perspective. Especially remarkable was the propaganda support that the U.S. government received from the Citizens for a Free Kuwait (CFK), a group formed of Kuwaiti citizens that happened to be outside Kuwait at the time of Iraq’s invasion.

2.2 Kuwait’s engagement in the propaganda

One of the CFK’s first moves was to hire one of the most renowned public relations companies in the U.S. Hill and Knolton (H & K), which is known for its good contacts to the U.S. government⁶. The company’s president Craig Fuller mentioned after the war in a BBC interview that he almost immediately contacted the U.S. government to find out how to best support the president’s intentions. “Getting [the Kuwaitis’] message across was completely in line with the goals of the bush administration. By helping the Kuwaiti citizens, it was clear we would be helping the Bush administration”⁷. Until the end of the war, H & K received $10.8 million from the CFK. The money came to a large extent from the Kuwaiti government that paid almost $12 million to the CFK⁸. H & K’s campaign for the liberation had primarily two aims: 1. to improve Kuwait’s image and 2. to portray Saddam Hussein as a potential new Hitler.

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1 International War Crimes Tribunal United States War Crimes against Iraq in <http://www.deoxy.org/wc/warcrim2.htm>

2 Hamid Mowlana, George Gerbner, Herbert I. Schiller. Ed. Triumph of the Image. The Media’s War in the Persian Gulf – A Global Perspective. Westview Press: Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: 1992. 220.

3 EXTRA! Special Gulf War Issue 1991. (Self-) Censored Stories. Eight Stories National Media Ignored in <http://www.fair.org/extra/best-of-extra/gulf-war-censored.html>

4 Mowlana, 40.

5 Private investments from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Emirates amount to $150 billion in the U.S.. in Roots of War, 39.

6 Among other good contacts was Craig Fuller, the company’s president, who was the former chief of staff of vice-president Bush.

7 Craig Fuller after the war in 60 minutes quoted in W. Lance Bennett, L. Paletz. Ed. Taken by Storm. The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, London: 1994. 144.

8 John R. MacArthur. Die Schlacht der Lügen. Wie die USA den Golfkrieg verkauften. DTV: München: 1993. 59.