University of Exeter

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and the
Controversy over Varying Interpretations of the “Withdrawal Clause”

by

Belabbes Benkredda

Contents

1. Introduction 2

2. Historical Context: The June War of 1967 3

3. The Making of Resolution 242 5
a) Draft Resolutions 5
b) Weeks of Intensive Diplomacy 7

4. The Withdrawal Clause 8
a) “The” of not “The” – About the Absence of the Definite Article 8
b) The Withdrawal Clause in other UN Languages 10
c) The Intended Meaning of the Withdrawal Clause 11

5. Conclusion 12

6. Bibliography 15

7. Appendix 16

1. Introduction

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 remains to this day, almost 36 years after it was adopted unanimously, the only internationally-agreed framework for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. The principle of exchanging land for peace, as expressed in resolution 242, has been the foundation of US, Western and Arab peacemaking efforts.

Yet it has also been the subject of a heated debate. Notably the centrepiece of resolution 242, calling for “Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict”, has been interpreted in significantly different ways by the parties concerned. While to the Arabs this means the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces to the positions they held before the outbreak of hostilities – a return to the status quo ante - the proponents of the Israeli position assert that the omission of the definite article before the word “territories” is aimed at enabling territorial revisions or aggrandizement, particularly in connection with the resolution’s second operating paragraph and the mentioning of “secure and recognized boundaries” therein. The aim of the following essay is to analyse the meaning of UN Security Council Resolution 242. It will start by describing the historical context it is embedded in, namely the events surrounding the June War of 1967. In chapter three, the circumstances preceding the adoption of resolution 242, notably the diplomatic efforts prior to the voting, will be depicted. The next section deals with the differing interpretations of the withdrawal clause. In subchapter 4 c) it will be argued that the adoption of resolution 242 was only made possible due to a number of assurances, given to the Arabs in general and to King Hussein of Jordan in particular, about the intended meaning of the withdrawal clause. Finally, in the conclusions, results shall be summarised and future prospects of a successful implementation of resolution 242 outlined.

2. Historical Context: The June War of 1967

The June War of 1967, also known as the Six Days War, was the most far reaching of all Israeli-Arab confrontations, with the Arabs badly defeated and their Israeli adversaries experiencing an unprecedented victory, almost tripling the territory under their control.

Mounting tensions between Syria and Israel marked the beginning of the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1967. What was initially perceived as minor and sporadic confrontations in the demilitarised border zone between the two countries soon turned into an alarming situation. On 7 April 1967, a serious aerial clash occurred in which six Syrian planes were shot down, one of them over Damascus.¹

In the following weeks, the likelihood of a war in the Middle East increased dramatically. Israel employed sharp rhetoric against Syria, threatening to overthrow the Damascene regime.² The United Arab Republic, as Egypt was then called, having entered into a military alliance with Syria the previous November, was compelled to react. Backed by reports of an imminent Israeli pre-emptive strike, president Gamal Abdel Nasser threatened to destroy the state of Israel once and for all.³

However, this was not enough for his Arab neighbours. Under high pressure, both domestic and regional, to respond with more than just fiery rhetoric, Egypt moved its troops into Sinai on 14 May and requested the removal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). Within a matter of days, UNEF had completely withdrawn and the UAR took control over the Straits of Tiran, overlooking from Sharm-El- Shaykh the naval passage to the Gulf of Aqaba. On 22 May 1967, Nasser announced that Israeli ships would be excluded from passage through the Gulf.⁴

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1  Lall, Arthur, The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967, p. 2; Finkelstein, Norman, Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, p. 125; Bailey, Sydney D., The Making of Resolution 242, p. 10. Quandt, William B., Peace Process, p. 26.

2  Finkelstein, Norman, Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, p. 125.

3 Bailey, Sydney D., The Making of Resolution 242, p. 10 et seq.

4  Bailey, Sydney D., The Making of Resolution 242, p. 28 et seq; Lall, Arthur, The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967, p. 26.