Thesis in Political Science
Specialisation: International Relations

the new `permissive` use of force:
a window for change in german foreign
policy?

Department of Political Science
Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences
University of Amsterdam
The Netherlands

by

Lutz Lindenau

June 2003

CONTENTS

List of abbreviations ... IV

I.INTRODUCTION

1.Germany and the Dual Change: Unification and The End of the Cold War ... 5

2.Focus and Scope of the Case ... 8

3.Concepts and Theoretical Literature ... 10

4.Argument and Outline of the Chapters ... 13

II. GERMANY`S POWER POSITION: THE NEOREALIST APPROACH

1.Contents ... 15

2.Relevance ... 17

3.Application ... 19
3.1 Case 1: Integration of the Bundeswehr in NATO/EU ... 22
3.2 Case 2: German participation in out-of-area operations ... 24

4.Evaluation ... 28

5.Summary ... 30

III. DOMESTIC INTERESTS: THE UTILITARIAN LIBERAL APPROACH

1.Contents ... 31

2.Relevance ... 34

3.Application ... 35
3.1 Case 1: Integration of the Bundeswehr in NATO/EU ... 37
3.2 Case 2: German participation in out-of-area operations ... 40

4.Evaluation ... 43

5.Summary ... 44

IV. ′GERMAN′ AND ′INTERNATIONAL′ NORMS: A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH

1.Contents ... 45

2.Relevance ... 49

3.Application ... 50
3.1 International norms and the dual change ... 50
3.2 Societal norms and the dual change ... 52
3.3 Case 1: Integration of the Bundeswehr in NATO/EU ... 54
3.4 Case 2: German participation in out-of-area operations ... 56

4.Evaluation ... 58

5.Summary ... 60

V.CONCLUSION

1.Results ... 61

2.Discussion ... 63

3.Where to go from here ... 66

VI.REFERENCES ... 67

I. NTRODUCTION
1.Germany and the Dual Change: Unification and the End of the Cold War
The West German state that emerged in 1949 out of complete military and moral defeat after the Second World War was from the very beginning severely restricted in its sovereignty. As a creation of the Western powers, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was designed as a result of a two-country solution, since inter-allied cooperation failed in the attempt to commonly govern the occupied zones with the rise of the Cold War. In the light of the new global confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union, West Germany’s capacities were soon needed as an additional deterrent against the perceived Soviet military threat. It was thus the Allies need and additionally West German will to integrate with the West, which granted the young Federal Republic gradually some status and (limited) space for political action.

In particular, the much-debated West-German rearmament loosened the initial strong restrictions on political sovereignty. Due to recent historical reasons, the young FRG was heavily burdened with the past, especially when it came to military affairs. West Germany’s army, the Bundeswehr, could therefore not be designed as a pure national instrument; it was supposed to contribute to the Western defense in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which served as a containment of both Soviet and West German power¹. The FRG`s political rights were largely restored, but her sovereignty, freedom of action and military power remained limited in major ways. The FRG gained in the process of its rearmament considerable sovereignty², which nevertheless left the Allies rights concerning Germany and Berlin in its entirety untouched (Trachtenberg 1999: 96). Taken the German historical impediments and requirements of the Western powers in the context of the Cold War into account, the role for a West German force was clearly defined: the Bundeswehr was shaped as an alliance army that focused exclusively on territorial defense of the FRG and its NATO -partners and abstained consistently from military operations, whether they were conducted by NATO or by the United Nations (UN).

But security policy only played a minor role in the foreign policy of the FRG due to obvious reasons. Bearing the heritage of the recent Nazi-past and aiming at political equality with its Allies, West German foreign policy settled into the mould of a ‘civilian power’ (Maull 2000: 57) which was seen as a foreign policy identity that promoted multilateralism, institutio n-building and supranational integration. The FRG gradually matured into a stable liberal democracy with a social market economy and a flourishing civil society. As once portrayed by Henry Kissinger (Schäfer 2001: 39), it was an economic giant but a political dwarf, with a political character and an external presence in Europe marked by a culture of Bescheidenheit (modesty) and Zurückhaltung (reserve) (Hyde-Price, Jeffery 2001: 6) Apart from that, West German security was largely provided by the American presence in NATO so that German foreign policy in the decades of the Cold War could concentrate on the FRG`s establishment in the West, followed by an opening up to the East with Ostpolitik.

The status quo of the bipolar world and the restrictions on West German sovereignty came to a sudden end when the global and European political landscape changed drastically with the end of the Cold War in 1989. In the “2+4” treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany the country gained full sovereignty, but had to give guarantees regarding Germanys borders, its peaceful policies and needed to limit the number of troops. The reunification in 1990 was largely hailed positively by the country’s partners and neighbors but raised doubtful and fearful voices of at the same time.³ The gain in territory, population and potential economic resources of a united Germany did not only awake the fear of political leaders about the rising German Gulliver⁴, who would eventually become the dominant power in Europe and who would attempt to pursue power oriented Weltpolitik again. Also among scholars of International Relations, in particular (Neo) realists (Krasner 1993a: 22; Layne 1993: 7; Waltz 1993:62-4), the assumptions went that Germany had significantly increased its power position that consequently lead Kenneth Waltz to assume that Germany will acquire the rank of a great power (Waltz 1993: 8) while John Mearsheimer (1990: 6) predicted that Germany will shake off NATO`s security structure that was, and further needs to be directed against eventual German aggression. According to him, scenarios in which Germany would use military force against Poland, Czechoslovakia or Austria became possible (Mearsheimer 1990: 33).

If we look back at more than a decade of united Germany’s foreign policy, then we know that these fears and predictions could not be confirmed so far. Nevertheless, there seems to be a shift away from the former military `culture of restraint` (Baumann & Hellmann 2001: 4). Throughout the 1990s, German troops have been increasingly deployed in military operations `out of area` and for the first time since the Second World War participated in combat missions in the Kosovo War in 1999. Consequently, the “FRG has read the signs of the new time and feels ready to take on the role of a European power” (Schöllgen 2001: 217). Has the reunited country actually gained power? Has the removal of the last boundaries of German sovereignty triggered a quest for more political autonomy that manifests itself in an increased militar y activity? Does this comparatively more `permissive` use of force indicate a fundamental shift away from former traditional principles of the Bonn Republic? Or does the Berlin Republic5 head toward a militarized German foreign policy in the context of Euro-Atlantic hegemony (Krippendorff 2000: 167)?

The question how the (perceived) increase in power would affect Germany’s foreign policy also triggered a heated debate inside Germany soon after unification that reached its peak in the mid- 1990s (Peters 2001: 11). While there was common agreement on the new opportunities to pursue a more assertive foreign policy (Schwarz 1994a: 8; Großheim, Weissmann & Zitelmann 1993: 10; Schöllgen 1998: 28f) and to eventually abandon the policy traditions of the old `FRG`, disagreement rose whether that would be desirable (Haftendorn 1994: 140; Link 2000: 25f; Bertram 1997: 2).6 A number of scholars, however, were convinced that “not much happened” (Risse et al 1999:167) or “while international and domestic contexts changed after 1990, German state identity did not”(Banchoff 1999b: 283).

2. Focus and Scope of the Thesis
In awareness of the historical background and that the memories of the past are still alive among Germans and Europeans, the Federal Republic’s government throughout the 1990s continuously employed the rhetoric of continuity (Hellmann 1999: 2). The question whether German foreign policy has changed since reunification implies thus an assumption that any deviation from the reliable, multilateral, integrating and peaceful policies of the `old` FRG could be seen as a change to the worse (Hellmann 1999: 1). That is the main reason why this question becomes important. However, whether this assumption is justified or not is not the topic of this work.

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1 The Germans could accept these conditions since NATO safe- guarded them against Soviet intervention, while the Soviets in turn could live with that solution too. Though it was directed against them, it would prevent the threat of a resurgent and revisionist Germany (Trachtenberg 1999: 96)

2 The political status of the FRG was lifted in preceding conferences in London and Paris (Paris Accords), where in exchange for the end of the occupational regime the FRG joined NATO, the West European Union and agreed with France on the status of the Saar area (Schöllgen 2001: 36-41)

3 For example the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher epitomized this sentiment when she wrote that a united Germany must be constrained because it is “by its very nature a destabilizing rather than stabilizing force in Europe”. Cited in McCartney (2002: 101)

4 Charles Krauthammer, Return of the German question in: Time Nr. 33, 25.09.1989. Cited in Hellmann 2000: 29

5 The distinction between Bonn Republic and Berlin Republic became prominent when intellectuals like Jürgen Habermas and Johannes Gross as representatives of the political `left` and `right` referred to them (Hellmann 2000: 12).

6 See for studies on the continuity/change debate of German foreign policy also the work of Helga Haftendorn: Deutsche Aussenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschraenkung und Selbstbeschraenkung 1945-2000. Stuttgart, München : Deutsche Verlagsanstalt 2001, Sebastian Harnisch, Hanns W. Maull.(eds) (2001): Germany as a civilian power?