Comparing Euroscepticism in Poland and the Czech Republic

von: Birte Müller-Heidelberg

Table of contents

1. Introduction

2. Development of Euroscepticism

2.1 Poland
2.2 The Czech Republic

3. Reasons for Eurosceptic tendencies

3.1 The EU accession-process
3.2 Transition losers
3.3 Independence and influence in Europe
3.4 The ‘German Factor’

4. Conclusion

Bibliography

“Shortly after the revolutions of 1989, the idea of ‘Europe’ became an all-embracing concept, which united the political elites and the masses in their burning desire to join the European Union (EU). ‘Return to Europe’ was one of the main slogans in the early 1990s. At that time, it was difficult to find a political party or movement that would seriously consider alternatives to joining the EU in its existing form; the mass public was overwhelmingly positive too. Now, more than a decade after the transitions, and shortly before the possible accession to the EU of the ECE countries, the picture appears to be radically different. Debates between and within parties are getting more intense, and criticism of the EU is growing. Moreover, as various public opinion polls indicate, mass support for EU membership has been declining as well.”1

1. Introduction

The enlargement of the European Union is scheduled for May 2004, only a few weeks from today. While all the political treaties are signed, the accession parties are prepared as big media events and the decision of ten new members entering the Union is widely accepted, there are quite a few issues that have not been discussed thoroughly enough yet; and public opinion as well as party politics do show some traces of Euroscepticism here and there. Although the mainstream voice in the Western countries is warmly welcoming their neighbours to the East, fears of economic loss through their entrance are keeping publics in the ‘old’ member states critical concerning the future. The new members to the East on the other hand are regularly portrayed as welcoming the idea of joining the Union without even the slightest concerns – not only by the media but also by numerous scholars. After all, it’s them who will profit from the enlargement. They almost seem desperate. This essay will show however that Euroscepticism is not a purely Western phenomenon. Publics in the candidate countries do have fears and concerns that often overshadow their genuine approval of the European integration process as well as their Western neighbours. These public opinions are also mirrored in party-based Euroscepticism that in some countries even raised single- issueanti- EU parties.

This essay will now focus on two countries that encompass two completely different types of Euroscepticism. First, there is Poland, which has always been seen as the country wanting to join the European Union the most desperately. The former hurry of Poland makes the existence of Euroscepticism in the country even more interesting. “[…] until recently, the idea of a ‘Polish Eurosceptic’ was something of an oxymoron.”2 The second country taken in as an example of Central/Eastern-European Euroscepticism will be the Czech Republic where Euroscepticism is based on much more practical and political facts compared to Poland’s – even if understandable – rather emotional reasons. In the following analysis, a distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism will be made. This approach follows the differentiation Aleks Szczerbiak of the Sussex European Institute has introduced in 2001. The former, also called principled Euroscepticism, encompasses outright rejection of the EU integration project and is in opposition to the respective country’s joining or staying in the Union. 3 “In reality such a position is too abstract to be applicable. In practice hard Euroscepticism can be identified by the principled objection to the current form of European integration in the EU. The principled objection comes from belief that the EU is counter to deeply held values or, more likely, is the embodiment of negative values. Examples of this would be the objection that the EU is too liberal/capitalist/socialist.”4

The latter, frequently termed contingent Euroscepticism as well, can be either concerning the policies or the national interest. Policy Eurosceptics are pro-EU but oppose deeper European integration and greater powers for Brussels. In practice, they object, for example, to particular provisions of the Maastricht treaty and the adoption of the Euro. National- interest Eurosceptics assert the primacy of national interests in EU debates. Both forms of soft-boiled scepticism are, however, compatible with support for the principle of integration. While hard Euroscepticism would not allow any European integration, soft Euroscepticism remains “compatible with the spirit of the EU project”5 because it’s qualified rather than absolute and therefore resolvable through negotiations. Further distinction has to be made between partybased and public opinion Euroscepticism. In chapter two, this essay will take a closer look on the development of Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe, focussing on the countries mentioned. Figures will be given to prove its existence and after some general numbers, the manifestation of Euroscepticism in Poland (2.1) and the Czech Republic (2.2) will be examined closer by looking at election results and the seatings in parliament. Chapter three is divided into four sections exploring different possible reasons for Euroscepticism in the respective states. In the end, a conclusion will be drawn (4).

2. Development of Euroscepticism

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1 Kopecký/Mudde, 2002, 298

2 Szczerbiak, 2001, 106

3 Taggart/Szczerbiak, 2001, 10

4 Taggart/Szczerbiak, 2001, 10

5 Lees, 2002, 250