Freie Universität Berlin
Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft
HS 15192 Empirisch-analytische Demokratietheorien
8.Fachsemester

Consociational Democracy in Multiethnic Societies

von: Patrick Bolte

CONTENTS

Introduction 1

1 The Concept of Consociational Democracy 3

1.1 Theoretical Background 3
1.2 Executive Power-Sharing 4
1.3 Segmental Autonomy 5
1.4 Proportional Representation 6
1.5 Mutual Veto Rights 6
1.6 Establishment of Consociatonal Democracies 7

2 Collected Critiques 8

2.1 Definition Deficiencies 8
2.2 Flawed Analysis? The Role of the Case Studies 9
2.3 Insufficiently Democratic? 10
2.4 Explanatory Weakness and Non-Applicability 11
2.5 Conclusion 12

3 The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy 13

3.1 Structure-oriented Factors 13
3.2 Actor-oriented Factors 15
3.3 The Status of the Factors 16
3.4 Conclusion 17

4 Making It Work 18

4.1 Executive: Parliamentary versus Presidential Systems 18
4.2 Over-representation versus Proportional Representation 19
4.3 The Modality of Veto Rights 20
4.4 The Form of Autonomy 20
4.5 Arbitration 21
4.6 Working towards Favourable Factors 21

5 Conclusion 22

References 24
 

Introduction

The central question of this paper is almost as old as the mere concept of consociationalism: to what extent can consociational democracy serve as the appropriate democratic form to divided and multiethnic societies? Soon after Arend Lijphart and Gerhard Lehmbruch had depicted consociational democracy as a viable alternative to majoritarian forms of democracy (Lijphart 1968; Lehmbruch 1967), a fierce debate about its wider applicability took root (See Nordlinger 1972, Daalder 1974, Barry 1975, Lijphart 1977, and Lustick 1979). Lijphart and Lehmbruch had presented the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland as cases of consociational democracies – but would the concept work in countries that are divided more deeply? For a good reason, the issue regained relevance and interest of scholars during the 1990s. Intra-state wars took their tolls on an unprecedented scale, many of which had an ethnic dimension. Out of 226 armed conflicts recorded for the period between 1946 and 2002, 116 of them have occurred after the end of the cold war in 1989, all but seven of them being intra-state conflicts (Eriksson/Wallensteen/Sollenberg 2003: 593). It requires no statistical analysis to acknowledge ethnic divisions as one of the most serious sources of today’s violent conflicts. In this context, it has been asked whether consociational democracy is a suitable and appropriate model to accommodate the diverse interests and cultures of groups in a multiethnic society. Is it a sustainable model able to prevent conflicts from turning violent? Should it be part of peacebuilding efforts in a post-conflict society? If applied, how should a consociational design look like? The literature on these questions is abundant (See Gurr 1993, McGarry/O’Leary 1993, Lijphart 1995a, Harris/Reilly 1998, Schneckener 2002b).

In order to answer the central question as to what extent consociational democracy can assume a viable democratic model for multiethnic societies; this paper relies exclusively on existing literature – rather than on independent analysis of a few cases studies. Thereby, it seeks to provide a general theoretical review on the issue. The analysis is structured in four parts. Chapter one describes the concept of consociational democracy as outlaid by Lijphart, presents definitions and central components. Chapter two summarises the critique to the model, ranging from the deficient definitions, to the claim that most of the original cases do not fit the model, to the contention that consociationalism would be insufficiently democratic. The focus of chapter three rests on the ‘favourable factors’; it looks at the conditions under which the development of consociational democracy can flourish. Both structure- and actor-oriented factors have been object of dispute, and Lijphart himself has modified them substantially over Patrick Bolte: Consociational Democracy in Multiethnic Societies 2 time. The final chapter then surveys crucial aspects to a sustainable consociational layout in a given case. According to Lijphart, there exists “no single consociational blueprint” (Lijphart1982:175). Nevertheless, lessons can be drawn from past and present cases that are worth considering in potential future applications.

1 The Concept of Consociational Democracy

Arend Lijphart defines consociational democracy as a model with four characteristics: executive power-sharing or “government by a grand coalition”, a high degree of segmental autonomy, proportionality as the standard of political representation, and mutual veto rights (Lijphart 1977: 25).1 The first part of this chapter presents the historical and theoretical background to the concept, while subsequent parts are to illustrate each of the four features. The final part focuses on Lijphart’s explanation of how consociational democracies come into being.

1.1 Theoretical Background

The decade of the 1960s saw a major debate among political scientists over the question of how far the stability of political regimes requires a homogenous or integrated political culture. The prevailing view, as exemplified by Gabriel Almond (See Almond 1956; Almond/Verba 1963), regarded the “Anglo-American” model of a two-party system with a majority government and a homogenous, secular political culture as inherently stable and efficient. In contrast, “Continental European” democracies with its multiparty systems, coalition governments and heterogeneous social structures were seen as inherently weak and unstable. However, in a 1956 article Almond differentiated between the Anglo-American, the Continental European, and a third category, consisting of Scandinavian and the Low Countries. According to him, these countries combined “some of the features of the Continental and the Anglo-American” systems, and stood “somewhere in between the Continental pattern and the Anglo-American” (Almond 1956:392- 393). As a Dutchman who had studied and taught in the U.S., Lijphart focussed on this latter and only vaguely analysed category, rejecting the idea that merely Anglo-American type democracies were capable to deliver stable and effective democratic government.

At the World Congress of the International Political Science Association 1967 in Brussels Lijphart and Gerhard Lehmbruch presented two papers that challenged the basic linkage between political stability and social structure. Having worked independently of each other, they showed case studies of countries that were politically stable in spite of political and social fragmentation. According to their findings, the Netherlands (see Lijphart 1968), and Austria and Switzerland (see Lehmbruch 1967) had in common an elite behaviour of co-operation rather than competition. Accordingly, Lijphart adopted the term ‘consociational democracy’.2 After having provided an explanation for political stability in the culturally fragmented societies of Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium (see Lijphart 1969), other cases were found and analysed which fitted the consociational model. Among them were Lebanon 1943-1975, Cyprus 1960-1963, Malaysia 1955-1969, Surinam 1954-1975 and Colombia 1958-1974.3 More recent studies focussed on Northern Ireland (1973/74 and since 1998), South Tyrol (since 1972), Bosnia-Herzegovina (since 1995), India (since 1947) and South Africa (since 1994).4 Lijphart and others refined the concept and concentrated on the factors conducive to the advent of consociational democracy, thereby enhancing not only the explanatory, but also the normative power of the theory (Instead of many: see Bogaards 1998). Latest publications looked at the concrete design that a successful consociational framework should feature (See Schneckener 2002a, 2002b, van den Borghe 2002). Thus, the focus of literature on consociational democracy, including Lijphart’s, has shifted over time from explaining political stability in plural societies to the theory’s normative power. To Kenneth McRae, this comes as no surprise. He comments: “The Lijphart message was an exciting one because of its fundamental optimism. It offered a normative model that could be tried in a wide array of situations of intergroup conflict, even when prospects for success appeared bleak. Its only apparent limit lay in the capacity and the will of leaders of the groups involved to understand the situation and devise appropriate solutions by negotiation. Since these limits can never be known in advance, the consociational approach can lay claim to a very broad mandate” (McRae 1991:96).

1.2 Executive Power-Sharing

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1 In later articles Lijphart further differentiates between essential primary characteristics (executive power-sharing and autonomy) and supplementary secondary characteristics (proportionality and veto rights). See Lijphart 1995b, 1999b.

2 The term ‘consociation’ is derived from the Latin ‘consociatio’, describing a close and firm link, e.g. a durable link between members of a co-operative. See Schmidt (2000): 327. Lehmbruch’s originally used term ‘Proporzdemokratie’ was soon abandoned for ‘Konkordanzdemokratie’, the German equivalent for consociational democracy.

3 For the case of Surinam see Dew (1972); for Colombia see Dix (1980); for Lebanon see Lehmbruch (1974); for Lebanon, Cyprus and Malaysia see Lijphart 1977: Ch.5 (pp. 142-176).

4 For literature on the case of Northern Ireland see McGarry (2002) and Schneckener (2002b); for South Tyrol and Bosnia-Herzegovina see Schneckener (2002a, 2002b); for India Lijphart (1996) and Lustick (1997), for South Africa Lijphart 1985, Laitin 1987, Lijphart 1999b.