Freie Universität Berlin
Otto Suhr Institut

The Influence of Business Associations in the European Decision Making Process.
A Case Study of the European Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Diplomarbeit
im Fach Politikwissenschaft

vorgelegt von

Uli Bethke

Berlin, August 2000

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Introduction ... 5
1.1 Interest groups in the European Union ... 5
1.2 Research on the Role of European Business Associations in the European Decision Making Process ... 7
1.3 The Argument ... 10
1.4 Method and Methodology ... 12
1.5 Structure ... 15

2. The Object of Research ... 17
2.1 A Definition of Business Associations ... 17
2.2 The Five Stages of the European Decision Making Process ... 18

3. The Influence of Interest Groups in the Decision Making Process ... 22
3.1 The Theoretical Approach ... 22
3.1.1 The Pluralist Explanation of Influence ... 22
3.1.2 The Neo-Corporatist Explanation of Influence ... 24
3.1.3 Summary ... 27
3.2 The Requirements of European Policy Makers ... 28
3.2.1 The Dependence of the EU Decision Making Process on Interest Groups ... 28
3.2.2 Political Resources Required by Policy-Makers ... 30
3.2.2.1 Information ... 30
3.2.2.2 Legitimacy ... 34
3.2.2.3 Miscellaneous Resources ... 35
3.2.3 Summary ... 37

4. EUROCHAMBRES’ Influence in the European Decision Making Process ... 39
4.1 An Operationalisation of the Concept of Influence ... 39
4.2 The Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry – An Overview ... 43
4.2.1 Origin and History of Chambers of Commerce and Industry ... 43
4.2.2 EUROCHAMBRES – Origin and Mission ... 44
4.3 The Availability of Political Resources within EUROCHAMBRES ... 45
4.3.1 Technical Expertise ... 45
4.3.1.1 General Introduction ... 45
4.3.1.2 The Availability of Technical Expertise ... 46
4.3.2 Budget ... 48
4.3.3 The EUROCHAMBRES Network ... 49
4.3.3.1 General Introduction ... 49
4.3.3.2 Representativeness of the Network ... 49
4.3.3.3 The Comprehensiveness of the Network ... 50
4.3.3.4 The Usefulness of the Eurchambres Network to Policy Makers ... 51
4.3.4 EUROCHAMBRES’ Access to the Decision Making Process ... 54
4.4 The Mobilisation of Political Resources - the Organisability of EUROCHAMBRES ... 60
4.4.1 The Degree of Horizontal Organisability ... 61
4.4.2 The Degree of Vertical Organisability ... 70
4.5 Summary ... 78

5. Case Studies of EUROCHAMBRES Lobbying ... 82
5.1 EUROCHAMBRES’ Role in the European Social Dialogue ... 82
5.1.1 Social Policy at European Level ... 82
5.1.2 The European Social Dialogue under the Protocol on Social Policy ... 82
5.1.3 EUROCHAMBRES’ Position in the Social Dialogue ... 84
5.1.4 EUROCHAMBRES’ Lobbying in the Context of the Social Dialogue ... 85
5.1.5 Shortcomings of the Lobbying Campaign ... 86
5.1.6 Summary ... 87
5.2 EUROCHAMBRES and the Issuing of Certificates of Origin ... 88
5.2.1 Certificates of Origin ... 88
5.2.2 The Position of the National Chamber Associations ... 89
5.2.3 The Certificates of Origin Meeting ... 89
5.2.4 Summary ... 90
5.3 EUROCHAMBRES’ Lobbying in the Gateway to Japan Programme ... 91
5.3.1 Exporting to Japan ... 91
5.3.2 Prologue – The European Court of Justice Ruling ... 91
5.3.3 Fighting for a legal basis ... 92
5.3.4 The EUROCHAMBRES lobbying campaign ... 93
5.3.5 Summary ... 95

6. Conclusion ... 96

7. Annex ... 101
7.1 Interviews ... 101
7.2 Questionnaire ... 103

8. Bibliography ... 104
8.1 Primary Sources ... 104
8.2 Books, Periodicals, Newspapers ... 105

1. Introduction
1.1 Interest groups in the European Union

Since the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 more and more competencies have been transferred by EU Member States to decision makers in Brussels. Beside the objective of the completion of the Single Market the scope of Community policies has widened to political co-operation, technological development, and social policy. In addition, the powers of the European Parliament were strengthened and qualified majority voting was introduced for decisions related to the completion of the internal market. Since the summits of Maastricht and Amsterdam European integration has further gained in momentum. National governments again handed over sovereignty to the European level. Jacques Delors’ famous quote that 80% of regulations impacting on the economic sphere were decided in Brussels today demonstrates the shift of competency. Within the last 15 years Brussels has become an important centre of power.
This transference of power to the European level also has affected the behaviour of interest groups. Before 1986 it usually was sufficient to lobby the own national administration in order to influence regulations.¹ The main function of European peak organisations at the time was on the one hand to monitor events in Brussels and report them back to their member federations on the other hand they formed a transnational network for the exchange of information. The growing power of European institutions and the strengthening of the supranational element within the European Union required interest groups to broaden their participation in the European decision making process. In addition, the technical problems regarding the realisation of the internal market, e.g. harmonisation of services, standardisation of products etc. has triggered off an enormous demand for technical input on the side of the European institutions. Since the adoption of the SEA, thus, interest groups have proliferated. New groups with new interests have emerged. Long established organisations have increased their financial and personnel resources. After Washington D.C., Brussels has become the second biggest boomtown for lobbying activities (Coss 2000: 12). In 1992 the Commission has estimated that approximately 3000 special interest groups with a total of 10,000 lobbyists try to influence the institutions of the European Union (Coss 2000: 12). The directory of interest groups lists 891 European peak organisations.² Beside these Eurogroups a myriad form of actors all trying to get their voices heard in the policy process has established offices in Brussels:

• National public representations e.g. the European regions
• National interest organisations e.g. DIHT, CBI
• Associations of multi-national companies, e.g. ERT
• Single corporations, e.g. DaimlerChrysler
• Consultants and law firms, e.g. Edelman, APCO Europe
• Individual professional lobbyists
• European peak organisations of national interest groups, e.g. UNICE, BEUC, ETUC

Regarding the function of Eurogroups the number of producer interests by far prevails over other groups. From figures alone the influence and power of the various interests, however, can not be derived. Producer groups are so numerous because they all represent a different sector of the market. Often these interests are in conflict, e.g. the producers of furniture do not necessarily have the same interests as those of computers.
After the completion of the internal market in 1992 the number of interest groups has stagnated or even slightly declined. With the accession of the EU candidate countries it is likely that a new boom of lobbying will set in soon (Coss 2000: 12).

1.2 Research on the Role of European Business Associations in the European Decision Making Process

Research on the role of Eurogroups in general and on European business associations in particular is very rare.“There has been a rapid expansion of such activities [lobbying] over the last few years. However, although this phenomenon has attracted a lot of attention, there is surprisingly little systematic research on the topic” (Andersen and Eliassen 1991). In contrast to the role of interest groups in the US legislative process comparatively little is known about their role in Brussels. Only a minority of the great many Eurogroups has been under examination by researchers so far. While the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has attracted considerable attention research has neglected the European confederation of employers and industry, UNICE. Hardly any studies are available on the multitude of business associations; practically no research has been carried out on the role of consultants, law firms and multinational corporations.
A big discrepancy exists between the important role business groups actually play in the policy process of the European Union and the knowledge about their influence. So far research on the role of the business community and its associations in the European policy process has focused on the following areas:

[...]

1 “Before July 1987, when the SEA came into effect, most decisions affecting business were taken by unanimity in the Council of Ministers. This meant that companies and federations concentrated their lobbying nationally. If they could convince their national minister of the justification of their cause, the minister could veto the measure at the next meeting of the Council, or use the threat of veto to obtain concessions” (Tyszkiewicz 1991: 94).

2 The Secretariat of the Commission has set up a database, the so called directory of interest groups where European peak organisations can register. It can be accessed under http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgc/
lobbies/en/tabledom.htm.