UNIVERSITÄT POTSDAM
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Fach Politikwissenschaft
Seminar: Europäische Sicherheitspolitik
8. Fachsemester

Geopolitics in the Taiwan Strait

by: Karl Lemberg

STRUCTURE

I INTRODUCTION (3)

II MILITARY DIMENSIONS: FACTORS AND OPTIONS IN THE GEOPOLITICAL TRIANGLE ROC – PRC – USA (4)

II.I STATE OF THE MILITARY (4)
II.II WORST CASE SCENARIO (5)

A) MISSILE ATTACK (6)
B) AIR COMBAT (7)
C) MARITIME CONTROL (9)

II.III MISSILE THREAT (10)

III U.S. INVOLVEMENT (13)

IV THE LIKELINESS OF WAR (15)

V SUMMARY & CONCLUSION (16)

REFERENCES (19)

ACRONYMS (20)
 

I. INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Cold War the Taiwan Strait is one of the remaining global ‘hot spots’. In fact, the Taiwan Strait “remains the locus of one of the most dangerous military confrontations in the world”¹, a fact that was underlined through the showdown during 1996 missile crisis when the U.S. send two carrier battle groups into the region in order to deter a hawkish mainland Chinese towards the Republic of China, Taiwan. ²

As we have evaluated during the seminar, the strategic focus of the United States has since the end of the Cold War clearly shifted from Europe to Asia (Brezinski: Die einzige Weltmacht, 1997). I have chosen to look more closely at the geopolitics of the Taiwanese-Chinese conflict theater and especially the involvement of another regional hegemon in East Asia, the United States of America. For 30 years (1949-1979) the United States was Taiwan’s principal patron tied in a mutual defense treaty that secured the tiny island republic’s stand against the highly populated communist mainland and emerging economic powerhouse. ³ In 1979 the U.S. officially recognizes the People’s Republic of China which terminated official relations to Taipei and the mutual defense treaty. ⁴ Yet, the same year, U.S. Congress’ Taiwan Relation Act ties Taiwan’s defense concerns close to American interest again. From then on, Washington is balancing its responsibility and security concerns for ROC on the one side and an interest in closer and stabilized relations with PRC. The Taiwan question – reunification, independence or status quo – bears not only geopolitical ramifications, but also has a cultural, economical, and political dimension. Yet, I will try to strap down this question to the military aspects of geopolitics.

The worst case conflict scenario is no doubt the military conflict. At this state, a declaration of independence by Taiwan would be the equivalent of a declaration of war. Thus, as long as Beijing will not renounce its right to use force on unification respectively separation issues, it is crucial for Taiwan’s defense and its independence to be realistically concerned with military scenarios and preparedness. The levels of military engagement range from a variety of non-lethal levers, such as information warfare, covert operations, and psychological warfare to serious combat hostilities from blockades, missile strikes, to a full-scale invasion. ⁵ The following pages will describe the military dimension of the confrontation between China and Taiwan and the parameter of a likely U.S. involvement. I will begin with describing the current state of the ROC and PRC military and continue to consider different conflict scenarios, with a focus on the worst case scenario – the Chinese invasion of the island. After that, will look at the missile threat and the issue of proliferation and finally I conclude with summary of policy options.

II. MILITARY DIMENSION – FACTORS AND OPTIONS IN THE GEOPOLITICAL TRIANGLE

II.I STATE OF THE MILITARY

In 1978 the Chinese military (PLA) launched a general modernization and professionalisation process to improve fighting skills and update combat equipment.⁶ Despite these efforts, the PLA is relatively backward compared to the modern military of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan. Most PLA forces are obsolete, with weak logistic support; they are large, characterized by low technology, low pay and poor living conditions for the majority of ground troops. The Chinese military employs 2.27 million personnel in over 58 army divisions, operates 2,400 combat aircraft, 63 principal surface combatants, and 69 attack submarines⁷.⁸ The plain numbers have to be reconsidered with the fact in mind that of all combat airplanes only a small fraction are modern 4th-generation fighters ⁹; Chinese warships and submarines may compare in seize and class to Russian and American counterparts but they cannot match the modern combat and engineering systems. Modernization efforts have not had the anticipated impact due to, according to US intelligence agencies, “massive, resource, technology and management deficiencies”¹⁰. Most of Chinas military forces are tied to homeland defense. Thus Air Force and Navy lack the resources that are available for the Army that makes up 75 percent of the PLA.

[...]

1 Shlapak, David A.; Orletsky, David T.; Wilson, Barry A.: Dire Strait? - Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy. RAND, 2000.p.iii.

2 Yet the CVBGs did not enter he Taiwan Strait.

3 Land area: ROC = 13,969 sq mi; PRC = 3,706,566 sq mi / Population: ROC = 22.28 million; PRC = 1.26 billion (ROC Yearbook. 2004).

4 Diplomatic relations were sustained at a lower level through the American Institute in Taiwan.

5 ICG Asia Report N°54, p.ii.

6 The military modernization campaign was a joint effort along with modernizing the economic and agricultural sector. (Ibenda, p.3-4)

7 Including two Russian Sovremenny class destroyer (ICG II p.6) and four Kilo-class submarines (Ibenda p.7).

8 Just as a comparison: the US employs 1.41 million personnel in ten army divisions and operates about 6.000 combat aircrafts,129 principal surface combatants (including twelve aircraft carriers) and 54 attack submarines (Ibenda p.4).

9 SU-27 and SU-30 fighters imported from Russia.

10 ICG Asia Report N°54, p.5.