Spoilers in Somalia: The self–sustaining
chaos and its supporters

by: Dirk Spilker

Contents

1 ABSTRACT  1

2 BACKGROUND: ON THE CONCEPT OF “SPOILERS”   1

3 HISTORY AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOMALIA 4

3.1 GENERAL SITUATION  4
3.2 THE “OLD” TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (“TNG”; 2000-2003/4)  5
3.3 THE „NEW“ TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (FROM OCTOBER 2004)  5

4 SPOILERS IN SOMALIA: SUSTAINING THE CHAOS AS RATIONAL CHOICE  6

4.1 GREED: THE WAR ECONOMY IN SOMALIA  7
4.2 GRIEVANCE: WHY NEIGHBORS WANT TO SUSTAIN THE STATUS QUO 10
4.3 AUTISM OF VIOLENCE: VIOLENCE AS A WAY OF LIFE 11
4.4 CREED 12
4.5 THE SOMALI SPOILERS AND THEIR MOTIVES: SUMMARY  13

5 NO WAY OUT? DEALING WITH SPOILERS  14

1 Abstract

This paper provides an explanation for the continuous failure of peace processes in Somalia over the last decade, using based on an extended rational choice / public choice approach. Based on the concept of “Spoilers” and their main motives as outlined by Schneckener (2003), it provides a mapping of the main actors in stateless Somalia and analyses their respective motives. As a result, this paper argues that the behavior of the main actors in Somalia is completely rational. The two main motives out of which the actors involved have spoiled peace processes in the past reflect the basic dichotomy that has been discussed in recent literature concerning intra-state wars. The most important reason for spoiling peace processes in Somalia is greed, which applies mostly to local warlords and businessmen as well as to international companies. To a lesser degree also neighboring countries are affected by greed. The second important motive is grievance; which affects mostly neighboring countries as external actors, and - to a lesser degree - “separatist” actors from the northern autonomous regions of Somalia. Two other motives – “creed” and “autism of violence” are not as important, but also play a distinct role for some actors, in the first case foremost for members of local militias, in the latter case for the “separatist” regions. Based on the detailed analysis, this paper provides a summary mapping of the relevant actors according to their predominant motives. It concludes with some strategies on how to deal with the different Spoilers in the Somali context.

2 Background: On the Concept of “Spoilers”

In explaining inter and especially intra-state wars in sub-Saharan Africa¹, ethnic diversity as a result of artificial colonial borders without prior nation building processes (see among others Ayoob 1996, Laremont, 2002) is still used widely as main explanatory variable. However, a direct causality between ethnic diversity and the emergence or absence of (civil) war can not be observed². Thus, scholars have concentrated more on primarily economic explanations recently (see e.g. Collier / Hoeffler 1998, 2001).

This approach can be traced back to “Rational Choice” (RC), which became prominent as an explanation of social action largely through the efforts of James S. Coleman (late 1980s and early 1990s). RC is mainly based on neoclassical economic theory, utilitarian theory and game theory. Actors are perceived to act purposively and intentionally and weight the cost and benefit of their actions. The latter are aimed towards specific ends or goals. Essentially, an actor will choose an action - based on his preferences, values, utilities - that promises that highest net benefit and/or the highest probability of its occurrence (Levi 1990). The RC approach was used to develop “Rational Choice Theory” (RCT) by sociologists and “Public Choice Theory” (PCT) by political scientists (Zey 1998: 1). Similarly to the RC approach, the basic assumption of PCT is that individuals act as rational egoists who pursue their private interests – also in political life. Hence, political actors act rationally to maximize their utilities. “In one sense, all public choice or economic theory of politics may be summarized as the discovering […] that people should be treated as rational utility maximizers, in all their behavioral capacities.” (Buchanan 1987). PCT assumes that individual (political) actors are guided by self-interest in choosing the course of action to maximize their personal advantages ³. For explaining intra-state wars, the basic questions evolving from RCT / PCT are who is interested in starting or maintaining violent intra-state conflicts under which conditions and what is the rationale behind it? In other words, what are different actors’ rational motives for starting or maintaining violent conflicts? In recent literature, there has been a “need vs. grievance” dichotomy. Collier / Hoeffler (1998) reach the conclusion that “opportunity”⁴ is a more important reason for civil wars than “objective grievance”. However, there has been some significant criticism upon Collier’s / Hoeffler’s model arguing that it concentrates too much on the purely economic / financial “greed” aspect and neglect other possible aspects (see e.g. Ehrke 2004). This paper considers “greed” and “grievance” prominently. It does, however, take into account additional motives for “Spoilers” as proposed by Schneckener (2003) and Zartman (2000).

The term “Spoilers” refers to individuals and/or groups who sabotage a peace process to maximize their economic or political advantages. In other words, they prefer the (violent) status quo over a peace process out of self-interest. What are their motives? In a nutshell, they oppose any peace process completely or at least under the conditions that are being discussed because under a peace accord they might lose power and/or access to resources. In other words, the Spoilers’ ultimate aim is not winning the war (Keen 2000: 39) but maintaining the violent status quo as a good basis for economic activities (Paffenholz 2004: 275). Schneckener (2003) summarizes four possible categories of motives for Spoilers ⁵.

Need / Grievance

The Spoilers are not satisfied with a peace accord because they feel that their political demands have not been met. They either feel that grievances have not been abolished or they feel that their needs have not been taken into account. In particular, they fear that a peace deal would discriminate against them or completely exclude them from political power and access to resources. As mentioned above, state that is characterized by ethnic homogeneity. However, ethnicity has often been used to politicize conflicts and thus contributed to their respective intensity (see e.g. Tetzlaff, 1991). the significance of grievance aspects⁶ has been neglected by Collier / Hoeffler. However, other scholars have found evidence for a correlation between level of democratization and the probability of war (see Elbadawi / Sambanis 2000).

Greed

[...]

1 The arguments presented in this chapter to a lesser degree also apply to other regions. However, due to the fact that in this paper I use Somalia as an example, I will also use explanatory concepts with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa.

2 For example, two of the ethnically most diverse countries (Tanzania and Burkina Faso) have not seen civil wars ; on the other hand, the most prominent example of complete state failure (Somalia) is the only African territorial

3 For a more detailed discussion see e.g. Tullock et. al. (2000); Buchanan (1987).

4 Conceptualized as the incentive of starting a civil war which is big enough when compared to the cost incurred. The expression “opportunity” is coherent with what other scholars call “greed”. Collier / Hoeffler themselves call one of their publications “Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars” (2001).

5 For a detailed discussion see Schneckener 2003: 4-7.

6 In their analys is Collier / Hoeffler (2001: 6ff.) use „ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality” as proxies for “objective grievance”.