EU and Russia

by: Georg Schwedt

Table of contents

1. Introduction  4

2. History of the EU-Russia relations  5

2.1. The Gorbatshev Years  5
2.2. The Yeltsin Years  5
2.3. The Putin Years  7

3. The instruments of the EU-Russia relations  9

3.1. Agreements 9

3.1.1. The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA)  9
3.1.2. The EU Common Strategy on Russia 9
3.1.3. Technical and financial assistance programmes 9
3.1.4. Sectoral Agreements 10

3.2. Meetings and bodies  10

3.2.1. Summits 10
3.2.2. The Permanent Partnership Council 10
3.2.3. Co-operation Committees and other bodies  11

3.3. Policy Examples  11

3.3.1. Kaliningrad  11
3.3.2. The Energy Dialogue 11

4. The interests of the EU and Russia  12

4.1. Common interests 12

4.1.1. Economic  12
4.1.2. Security 12
4.1.3. Political 13

4.2. Divergent interests 13

4.2.1. Economic  13
4.2.2. Security 14
4.2.3. Political 14

5. What is the overall concept of interests?  16

5.1. for the EU  16
5.2. for Russia 17

6. Conclusion 18

References  20

1. Introduction

Russia is the biggest country in Europe, as well in population as in area. Therefore it is impossible for the other big entity, as well in population as in area, the EU, to ignore Russia. Even more because through the enlargement both now have a common border. Not only for this reason, but also stemming from economic interest in the big market and its resources, the EU developed multi-faced “partnership” with Russia. How did these partnership develop? How is it shaped? These are the first two questions this essay wants to answer. The Kaliningrad policy and the Energy Dialogue thereby serve as actual policy examples. But are the EU and Russia following common interests as the term “partnership” indicates? What is missing, what are their concepts and what are the future prospects? These are the questions for the second part.

2. History of the EU-Russia relations

2.1. The Gorbatshev Years

Already before Russia as a separate state came into existence the EEC¹ and the Soviet Union² started approaching each other. Gorbatshev³ formulated the idea of “a Common House Europe”, something completely new in the foreign policy, which until then neglected the idea of an united Europe. Gorbatshev this way tried to overcome the political and economic isolation, which had paralysed his country. It was meant more as invitation for co-operation rather than for integration, first economically, later as well in matters of security in the shape of co-operation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. (Mommsen: 2002, p. 672) After the radical changes in the Central and Eastern European Countries the wish for cooperation from the EEC as well as from Russia culminated in the conclusion of a Trade and Co-operation Agreement in December 1989. It ended the era of complete neglect of the EEC. (Mommsen: 2002, p. 672/673) Disintegration nevertheless brought a quick end to this offer.

2.2. The Yeltsin Years

Also Yeltsin had the plan to “bring back Russia to Europe”. (Mommsen: 2002, p. 673) In Yeltsin’s understanding this meant a partnership with the USA and an integration into the European Organisations and the International Monetary Fund. (Mommsen: 2002, P. 673) Nevertheless other foreign policy concepts remained, such as the Eurasia orientation. Also the “Derschwanost” concept, propagating a more imperial approach, gained importance and formed a decisional base for the military intervention in Chechyna. (Mommsen: 2002, p. 674) But the orientation on Europe remained strong and already in the end of 1992 the EC⁴ and Russia started negotiations about a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement supposed to replace the one concluded with the S.U. (Mommsen: 2002, p. 675)

Since December 1991 the CIS⁵, including Russia, benefited from the EEC’s TACIS⁶ focused on supporting the transformation process towards market economy. (Mommsen:2002, p. 676) In June 1994 the EU and Russia finally signed the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation, which, after the ratification process, became binding not before December 1997. It was a laborious compromise between Russia’s interest to gain merely economical and trade advantages and the EU’s to integrate Russia into the community of European values. It gained all the “Four Freedoms”, except the free movement of workers, the same as in the association agreements with the CEEC⁷. Additionally a regularly political dialogue was set up and Russia was from then on considered as a state with an economy in transition rather than with state trade (Mommsen: 2002, p. 676), an important step on Russia’s way to the membership in WTO⁸. For the EU it was important to tie the agreement to certain conditions, such as democratic structures and observance of Human Rights. (Mommsen: 2002, p. 676) As result of these the EU in January 1995 in the light of the Chechyna events suspended the ratification process of a PCA interim agreement.

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1 European Economic Community

2 below: S.U.

3 General Secretary of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union (S.U.)

4 European Community, successor of the EEC

5 Commonwealth of Independent States

6 Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

7 Central and Eastern European Countries

8 World Trade Organisation