Raise of the Midgets. Towards a European Security and Defence Policy.

by

 Weronika Tkocz

TABLE OF CONTENT

List of abbrevations 1

Introduction/ Overview 2

Short History of European Security and Defence Integration 2

First Steps: There`s No Europe without the USA 2

French Initiatives: Visions and Failures 3

The 1990s: Political Integration in a New World 5

Driving The Visions of Integration 6

′Motors′: France and Germany 6

′Brakes′: ′Uncle Sam′ and Great Britain 7

′Co-Drivers′: Europe′s Neutral States 8

Speeding up the Process 8

Clapping the Brakes: England 9

Kosovo Crisis: The Old Structures Fail 9

Turning Over: The Franco-British "Declaration on European Defence" 10

Progress and Solutions: Basics of an ESDP 11

Building up ESDP Basics: The Summits of Cologne and Helsinki 11

Security and Defence - Still State Policies? 12

List of Literature 14
Publications 14
Articles 14

INTRODUCTION/ OVERVIEW

In 1998, JAN ZIELONKA, professor at the European University of Florence, declared that the Common European Foreign and Security Policy, established in 1991, failed. Furthermore, he found that the European Union should perceive itself as a "civic power" and not try to enter the field of common defence nor grasp the honour of leading the European security matters (ZIELONKA: 1998). The arguments he presented were very interesting and, over all, quite convincing. But, what happened in the following few months was the complete opposite of what he assumpted. Later that year, the most important sceptic of the European integration in security and defence matters, Great Britain, broke its ′splendid isolation′. The UK signed (together with its traditional "political opponent", France) the ′Saint Malo′ declaration about cooperation in creating a common European Defence. Within one year, the 15 states of the EU grounded the European Security and Defence Policy during their official summits, unofficial meetings, and bilateral agreements - something they had not been able to create in the forty-years long history of the European integration.

Regarding security matters, the European Union is very heterogeneous inside and it will be even more after the near eastern enlargement. The ESDP is organised between both NATO and WEU members, the NATO and non-WEU member Denmark and the ′neutral and notallied′ ones (see Diagram). That means, that the ESDP is partly inside NATO and the WEU, partly only within NATO and partly completely outside. As LOTHAR RÜHL noticed (RÜHL: 1999, pp. 8-10) - the whole construction was narrower than NATO (before the 1999 enlargement) where only Turkey, Norway, and Iceland were both outside the EU and the WEU. Apart from that amusing "tongue twister", this heterogeneous structure reflects remarkably in the ESDP policymaking.

This paper briefly presents the long path leading to the 1999 summits of Cologne and Helsinki and explains why the security and defence policy integration did take that long. Second, it introduces the main actors - even if the EU has 15 members, only few of them can be named something like ′fathers′ of the ESDP. The fact, that the European structures are tightly connected with each other, makes the problem incomplete, without referring to two others security organisations: the Western European Union and The North Atlantic Alliance. Policy of Germany, France or Great Britain are strictly connected with the interests and expectations they set in these structures from one side and with the influence these structures have on states mentioned above, from the other.

SHORT HISTORY OF EUROPEAN SECURITY
AND DEFENCE INTEGRATION

The tendency and the first attempts to create a regular cooperation for the security questions among the European states are everything but a new idea, though one cannot perceive recognisable success on this field before the end of the last century.

First Steps: There`s No Europe without the USA

Already in the same decade of the Second World War ending, the allied states made the first attempts to coordinate a defence policy. At the beginning, the key motive was to eliminate a possible rebirth of the German military power, then also to create a barrier defending Western Europe from the more or less probable Soviet aggression. In this context, one has to mention the 1947 French-British Dunkerque Treaty on friendship and common support and the multilateral 1948 Brussels Treaty . The latter did not only establish the military alliance ′Western Union′ but also was the first serious, though quickly deactualised, step into the European afterwar integration (PARZYMIES: 1999, p.31). Its significance was stressed by the fact that the contracting parties decided to enhance the casus foederis in the treaty - "in case of an armed attack in Europe the contracting parts would afford all the military and other aid and assistance."

Solely the participating states, seriously damaged in all spheres by the war, were too weak, even together, to play any significant role in international politics. Without the support from Washington, without the American "nuclear umbrella" and the army stationing in Europe, the security of the Old Continent could not have been maintained at the beginning of the ′Cold War′. First, the Washington Treaty and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1949 gave Europe the necessary guarantees. This specific balance of powers, transatlantic partnership, and perception of the US as a ′somehow European′ state have not changed until nowadays.

The alliance however, did not give the absolute guarantee of military help in case of attack of a third country. The contracting parts decided to take only "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force". Comparing with the clear casus foederis of the Brussels Treaty this was definitively one step back. Especially France, which decided to restore its leading position in Europe at any cost, was not satisfied and looked for a new solution. In addition, other states were interested in broad cooperation, also in security matters, with only European states as participants, though they did not exclude connection and cooperation with the NATO.

French Initiatives: Visions and Failures

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