The Cuban Missile Crisis
Page 1
I. Index
Page
I. Introduction
2
II.
Situation on Cuba before 1962
2
III.
The fourteen days
3
IV. Soviet ambitions for missile deployment on Cuba
9
V.
Estimation of Cuba's threat
9
VI. Why did the crisis nearly escalate?
10
VII. How close was the war
11
VIII. Why would an escalation probably have led to a 3
rd
world war?
12
IX. Follow
up
12
X.
Our own Opinion-Conclusions
13
XI. Additional
Information
14
XII. Sources
16
XIII. Judgement of sources
16
The Cuban Missile Crisis
Page 2
I. Introduction
The Cuban Missile Crisis lasted from October 15
th
, 1962 to October the 28
th
, 1962. It
is often described as the climax of the Cold War and almost brought the world to a
third world war. In this report, we will first sum up the historical events of the fourteen
days and then have a closer look at possible explanations.
II. Situation in Cuba before 1962
Since Fidel Castro and Che Guevara organised a putsch and removed the old
dictator Batista on Cuba by the year of 1957, the island in the Mexican gulf was ruled
by a socialist system. Geographically seen this was the closest communist satellite to
USA ever since.
The Soviet Union gained more and more influence in the isolated country and
supported it.
The USA always wanted to remove the socialist system from Cuba (from their
backyard, as some people said), but they were not sure how to do so. They had the
ideas of an open invasion or covert operations.
However President Kennedy, who was elected president in 1961 (and assassinated
in 1963), decided to make the CIA organise an invasion by exile Cubans on Cuba.
The invasion was carried out on the 15 April 1961 at the "Bay of Pigs". But the exile
Cuban mercenaries were discovered early by the Cubans. Kennedy refused to give
support by the Air-Force and so 1100 out of 1300 mercenaries were imprisoned.
It was discovered early that the Soviet Union supplied Cuba with defensive material,
like radar or anti-aircraft missiles. President Kennedy warned the Soviet Union in
September 1962 not to place offensive ground-to-ground-missiles on Cuba. The
Premier of the Soviet Union at that time was Nikita Khrushchev, who was in office
from 1958 up to 1964.
The Cuban Missile Crisis
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III. Fourteen Days
15. October 1962
On a reconnaissance flight over Cuba, an U-2
1
aircraft took photos of the ground and
discovered, that the Soviets had shipped some SS4
(see III)
middle range missiles onto
the island. These had a range of about 1100 miles and were not completely installed
yet.
16. October 1962
The next morning, the President was informed about the discovery. Instantly he
arranged two meetings.
The first one was to have a look at the photos himself. For the second one, he hand-
picked a group of trusted government officials, who are later referred to as the "EX-
COMM"
2
. They agreed on three major directions, how the conflict could be solved:
1. "The political course of action." Try to achieve a diplomatic victory over the
Russians, so they would take their missiles back.
2. "Open surveillance" of the Russian offensive weapons entering Cuba
combined with a blockade against new deliveries of missiles to the island.
3. "Military action directed against Cuba, starting with an air attack against the
missiles," which would then be followed by an invasion.
A map of the Soviet Missile sites on Cuba.
The Cuban Missile Crisis
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The American government also learned that more ships with more missiles were on
their way to Cuba, too.
17. October 1962
If the whole problem had become public, a panic would have been very probable.
That's why Kennedy followed his planned schedule and visited Connecticut, to
maintain secrecy.
When he returned, he was informed about the outcome of that day's EX-COMM
discussions. They had discovered SS5
(see IV)
missiles, that had even a wider range
than the SS4s. The army chiefs recommended a surprising attack against the
missiles, that could be followed by an invasion. But Kennedy could not agree to that
solution until then.
18. October 1962
Kennedy met with Soviet foreign
minister "Andrie Gromyko". That
meeting was long-planned. This
meeting was a strange one, because
the Americans did not know, if Gromyko
knew, that they had discovered the
missiles and so they did not ask him
about them. Kennedy just reminded
Gromyko one more time, that he would not accept offensive weapons in Cuba.
In the evening the EX-COMM members met again and were more and more
convinced by the idea of a blockade instead of air-strikes. The blockade could only
stop new missiles from arriving and would give the USA some diplomatic advantage,
but they were still to deal with the missiles already there.
Before the day was over, Kennedy ordered two speeches for the 22
nd
of October.
One for the case of a blockade, the other one in case of an attack.
Gromyko and Kennedy
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19. October 1962
Kennedy's Joint Chiefs still recommended an Air-Strike, but Kennedy was still not
convinced and went on a trip to the Mid-West, to prevent a panic within the
population.
20. October 1962
The EX-COMM agreed to the two speeches, that were prepared. Kennedy had to
return earlier from his trip, because a final decision between quarantine or air-strike
had to be made. Kennedy preferred the blockade, because it would start in a minor
category than the air-strikes.
21. October 1962
Kennedy met again with his top advisors and asked them if all missiles could be
destroyed by an air-strike. But the chiefs couldn't guarantee this and the calculated
casualties were very high too.
It was decided, that Kennedy would use the word quarantine instead of blockade in
his speech, because a blockade implements a military action. So the Americans
would have their blockade with a legal touch.
Also the press started learning about the situation in Cuba, but Kennedy told them to
remain still for one more day, as he would talk to the public on the following evening.
22. October 1962
During the day, many actions were taken to prepare the speech of the president in
the evening. Also all American allies were informed and about 300 Navy ships were
sent on their way to create a 800 miles quarantine zone around Cuba.
Military alert was raised to DEFCON 3
3
and instructions were given to be ready to
launch missiles immediately.
At 7.00 pm Kennedy gave his TV speech, but before that, he had sent a copy
to Khrushchev, who replied and warned Americans that they were
endangering world peace.
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As a reaction to Kennedy's speech, Castro mobilised all of Cuba's military forces,
because they feared an invasion.
23. October 1962
The USA launched low level reconnaissance missions
4
, to see how far the Soviets
had got in preparing their missiles. On the same day the Organisation of American
States unanimously approved of the quarantine against Cuba, because the missiles
were a threat to them, too.
Robert Kennedy talked to the Soviet Ambassador and blamed him for lying. But the
ambassador still denied the existence of offensive weapons in Cuba. Soviet vessels
came close to the quarantine zone, and Kennedy wanted to give Khrushchev more
time and reduced the line to 500 miles.
24. October 1962
Exactly at 10.00 am the quarantine became active, but Russian ships did not make
any attempt to stop, yet.
The American ships had instructions to stop the Soviet ships. First by communicating
with them, if they didn't stop, a warning shot should be placed right before the ship.
Then finally, the rudder of the ship should be destroyed, so they couldn't get any
further.
The situation was getting more difficult, as the Soviet vessels were accompanied by
submarines.
Then, at 10.25 am, 14 of 20 ships turned back and the Americans felt a first victory.
But 6 ships had not halted yet and Kennedy received a new warning letter from
Khrushchev, telling him that the USSR did not accept the act of piracy. The military
alert was raised to DEFCON 2 (highest alert ever in history of US).
25. October 1962
The Secretary General of the UN tried to propose a deal, equal for both players, but it
was not accepted.
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Stevenson in the general assembly of the UN.
US ambassador to the UN (Adlai Stevenson) confronted the Soviets at the United
Nations and showed the photos of Soviet missile sites. This was another step of
diplomatic victory, because the Russians had still denied the existence of missiles on
Cuba.
In the press the idea of a missile
exchange with missiles in Turkey
5
came
up and it was regarded as Kennedy's
idea, but it is said that he had nothing to
do with it.
Ships which couldn't be suspicious (ex.
Tanker) were able to pass the quarantine
line. On this day, the CIA discovered that
the first missiles were fully operational.
26. October 1962
The Russians started to camouflage their missiles. Kennedy and the EX-COMM
came to the conclusion that a missile trade or an invasion of Cuba were the only
possibilities.
In order to prepare a possible invasion the number of low level reconnaissance flights
was increased. The air strikes and invasion were planned to start on Monday the
29
th
, if everything else failed.
The KGB in Washington contacted one of the highest US television correspondents
(ABC) and suggested a deal. They also said that Russia would probably agree to US
terms.
The deal was as follows: On the one hand, the Soviets would remove all their
missiles from Cuba under UN supervision. On the other hand the US would
guarantee never to attack Cuba or support anybody to do so.
It is not said that the agent (named Fromin) was authorized by Moscow, although he
talked as if he was.
Still discussing if the offer was to be taken seriously the White House received a
letter from Khrushchev in the evening, that offered the same deal. As this letter
sounded rather personnel some of the EX-COMM members doubted if it really
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passed through all the official channels. So there were doubts about the validity of
both offers.
27. October 1962
October the 27
th
1962 was the worst day of the whole crisis. A U-2 was shot down
over Cuba. Some of the low level jets were also shot at. Actually this was not even
authorised by Moscow.
As a consequence of that matter the joint chiefs increased the pressure on President
Kennedy to start bombing At least they wanted a small raid on the Anti-Aircraft-
Missile-Site to take revenge for the U-2. A second letter from Khrushchev arrived,
which now sounded better formulated. This made EX-COMM expecting a harder way
in the Kremlin. The letter enforced the deal of the first letter and added a new term of
agreement: The American missiles in Turkey should also be removed.
Important to mention is that the way of communicating changed at this point of time.
The named letter was not sent on the "old" way of many different telegraph stations
but directly through the media. (It was read out). This speeded the whole process up
but made the conflict even more public.
Kennedy was not willing to accept the Turkey-deal. Not because of an strategic
disadvantage (the missiles in Turkey were old and should have been removed
anyway), but because he did not want to lose face and give Khrushchev the feeling
he could ask for everything he wanted.
Robert Kennedy, who was a member of EX-COMM and
Attorney General at that time
suggested to ignore the second letter and only reply to the first one. This idea was
accepted and an answer paper was created.
Kennedy feared that the Soviets would not accept the deal and decided in a small
round to agree to the Turkey-deal in secret. Robert Kennedy went to the Soviet
embassy and made clear that the USA would remove their Turkey missiles within a
few
months. This deal should be kept secret so America would not lose face. He
posed the deadline for an answer until Sunday. Monday would be too late, because
on Monday the two super powers would have gone to war!
Late that evening the paper answering the first letter was published (again distributed
by the media).
The Cuban Missile Crisis
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28. October 1962
On that day Khrushchev received the offer and is also informed about the secret
Turkey-deal. He also learned that the invasion on Cuba would probably be the next
day or on Tuesday and got more aware of the situation ever since.
On the same day Khrushchev published an answer letter and agreed to the
suggested terms, this agreement finally ended the crisis.
IV. Soviet ambitions for missile deployment on Cuba
There is only very little information available of what has happened behind Kremlin's
walls during the crisis. Khrushchev later said in his memoirs, that the reasons for
deploying missiles on Cuba had more political than military reasons. The Russians
knew, that Cuba annoyed the US intensely. By the deployment he tried to protect
Cuba from further American actions. The second reason was the psychological
positive effect on the countries in middle America. It was hoped, that there would be
a revolution similar to Cuba's, as this would mean Soviet support.
As the ratio of intercontinental nuclear missiles was 1:17 at that time, Khrushchev
also wanted to gain a strategic advantage.
It is interesting to learn, that both sides did not really take into account the opinions of
their allies, neither Cuba nor western Europe were integrated in the process of taking
decisions.
V. Estimation of Cuba's threat
The discovered SS4 missiles had a range of about 1100 miles and the SS5 a range
of 1300 miles, this meant that nearly every part of US territory was endangered and
could have been a possible target. The close position would have given the
Americans just five minutes to react until the first missile would strike the ground. It is
also known that the Soviets placed tactical nuclear bombs on Cuba. The Soviet
commanders were allowed to use them on their own command in case of an attack.
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A third factor was
probably, that Cuba was
the closest communist
satellite and through the
nuclear weapons it had an
enormous political and
military meaning was
given to the island.
VI. Why did the crisis nearly escalate?
You can't blame one side or a special group among them for bringing the conflict
near to escalation. Many factors were responsible for the development in those days.
Earlier plans of the US Government:
It is a generally known fact that the Pentagon had plans since 1961 for any case to
invade or fight Cuba. At the beginning of October, President Kennedy received the
authorisation by the congress to prepare actions against Cuba, also violent ones.
Nearly at the same time, Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara ordered the Navy
to prepare a blockade of Cuba. These facts allow the idea, that the USA were well
aware of the rising Cuban problem and not totally "shocked" by the. There are
thesises that state that an escalation was well calculated by the American
government, because they needed a victory over the Soviet Union. This would have
several reasons, for instance the failed invasion in the "Bay of Pigs" or the weakness
The range of Cuban Missiles. Almost the whole US could be
attacked directly from Cuba.
The Cuban Missile Crisis
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of President Kennedy in his own country. New documents are said to prove this
thesis.
5
Surprises in Kennedy's policy
Khrushchev thought of Kennedy as a president who was too weak, too liberal and too
inexperienced. He hoped to take his unawares.
Many people in the world thought like Khrushchev and this is one of the reasons why
Kennedy acted as he did. He wanted to show the world, that he was not too weak
and was able to stand for US interests even in such a crisis.
Different positions among the US Government:
During the 14 days in October the US government can't be described as
homologous. There was a group of hard-liners (mainly military players) who wanted
the escalation by any chance or at least did not see a diplomatically acceptable
approach.
Then there was a second group around President Kennedy who were more
convinced of achievements by diplomatic actions, this was the group who had to
convince the opposition to risk more for peace.
Even before the Vietnam War one be able to identify "Hawks and Doves", even in the
White House.
Communication at that time:
In the 1960s there was a lack of a reliable form of communication between
Washington and Moscow. It could take up to seven hours to transmit a message from
one capital to the other. That's why both governments later changed their methods
and used the media to transmit their letters.
VII. How close was the war?
We learned that the invasion of Cuba was planned and nearly happened. Without the
agreement the war was nearly unavoidable. October the 27
th
was the most
dangerous day, if the joint chiefs had been allowed to take revenge for the U-2 a
Soviet reaction couldn't have been excluded. We also found some additional
examples which underline how prepared both sides were for war.
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During Kennedy's speech on October 22
nd
, American jet fighters took off from Florida
and headed for Cuba in case of an instant attack.
Another important fact is, that on October the 27
th
another U-2 over western Alaska
came into Soviet airspace, because of a navigation mistake. The Soviets launched
their jets. The American aircraft radioed for help and was guided home. American jets
also launched to protect the U-2. Fortunately the U-2 left the soviet airspace in time
and the jets of the two super powers never met. At that time such an incident was
very likely to lead to escalation.
VIII. Why would an escalation probably have led to a 3
rd
world war?
In case of an American invasion it was very probable that Castro, or to be more
exact: the Soviets on Cuba, would use his/their nuclear missiles or use his/their
tactical nuclear bombs.
At this point the Soviet Union might have declared war on the USA or at least taken
revenge for Cuba. For example taking West-Berlin. This would have meant war in
Europe which would be a NATO matter. It would not take long until one of the two
superpowers started to use a great mass of their nuclear arsenal.
While thinking about the worst case it's interesting to learn that the military
intelligence calculated 10,000 Soviet troops on Cuba plus 100,000 Cubans. The
actual numbers say that there were much more men. The Soviets had 43,000
combat-ready soldiers and Castro had mobilised 270,000 Cubans to fight. Plans for
the American invasion called for a first day air strikes consisting of 1080 runs and an
amphibious landing of 180,000 soldiers. Furthermore, EX-COMM and the Joint
Chiefs were also unaware of the tactical nuclear weapons stationed along Cuba's
shores.
IX. Follow up
As a result of the crisis, a hot line was established between the Kremlin and the
White House so that the two world leaders could communicate directly. Neither side
wanted to risk starting a nuclear war just because of poor communications.
In the next year Kennedy and Khrushchev signed an agreement to forbid nuclear
testing in the atmosphere. This was a first step towards the end of the Cold War. On
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November 22nd, 1963 JF Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas (Texas). In October
1964 Premier Khrushchev was deposed by Brezhnev a communist hard liner.
Perhaps Kennedy and Khrushchev would have been able to speed up the end of the
Cold War.
Removing the missiles worked quite well, but there were still bombers on Cuba.
Beginning on November 20, the planes were finally dismantled and returned to the
Soviet Union. The next day, Kennedy formally ended the quarantine and lowered
Strategic Command's Defence Condition from DEFCON 2 to DEFCON 4.
The Cuba Missile Crisis was about to cost the lives of all humans alive, but in fact it
resulted in only one direct casualty: The U-2 Pilot "Major Rudolph Anderson, Jr."
X. Own Opinion-Conclusions:
In our opinion the Cuban Missile Crisis has a much too small place in the general
recollection. Working on this topic showed us how near the world was to a nuclear
war in those days of October. But only few people are able to estimate the meaning
of this crisis properly.
In cold war topics it's often not possible to get the same amount of information from
both sides as there is always very little from the Soviet Union.
But the two of us tend to doubt the one sided aggressive escalation by the Soviet
Union. We believe, that many things went wrong in those days. Additionally we think,
that the thesis of a conscious escalation by the United States is also right. We doubt
that the discovery of missiles on Cuba was such a big shock to the US. As Cuba is
right in the US's backyard and a Soviet satellite, they should have taken a
deployment of missiles into account at all times during the Cold War. All these factors
coming together form an explanation for the dimension of the Cuban Crisis.
From today's perspective we must say, that it is also interesting to see, where bad
communication might lead to.
The Cuban Missile Crisis
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XI. Additional Information:
1
The U-2
was designed and built for
surveillance missions in the thin
atmosphere usually above 60,000
feet. It was nearly invisible for
enemies and able to take photos on
a wide range of land.
2
The EX-COMM (Executive Committee of the United States National Security
Council)
was a group of 12
advisors. It was formed by
President Kennedy on 16
th
October 1962. Members
were:
Vice President Lyndon Johnson
Attorney General Robert Kennedy
Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara
Secretary of State Dean Rusk
Chairman of the JCS General Maxwell Taylor
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy
Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon
CIA Director John McCone
Under-secretary of State George Ball
Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen
Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric
Soviet Specialist Llewellyn Thompson
There were also 7 more unofficial members in the EX-COMM.
3
In the USA DEFCON, is the level of Strategic Command's Defence Condition,
especially for the nuclear forces. It's ranged between 1 and 5. 1 stands for war with
all means. 5 is the least intensive one.
A U-2
An EX-COMM meeting
The Cuban Missile Crisis
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4
Low Level reconnaissance flights were
undertaken with "F-8 Crusaders" and "Air Force
RF-101s". They were necessary to prepare the
bigger air strikes. A problem was that the
surprised forces on Cuba couldn't be sure if it was
a surveillance mission or an attack.
5
Since 1957 the USA also had medium ranged
missiles (Type: Jupiter) near to the Russian
motherland, namely in Turkey. They had a range
of ~1400 miles and were even able to reach
Moscow and Leningrad.
6
When President Nixon was deep down in his Watergate-trouble he tried to relative
his tapping
by saying that many Presidents did so before him. This did not help him
at all but it was true. In the JFK-Library in Boston many were tapes found which
recorded many conversations in the White House. 18 of them tell us about the two
weeks in October 1962. These tapes do conform with the thesis mentioned above.
Range of US missiles in Turkey.
The two described types of aircraft
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XII. Sources:
http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/index.html
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/index.html
http://www.hausarbeiten.de/archiv/geschichte/gesch-kubakrise.shtml
http://www.kssursee.ch/schuelerweb/kalter-krieg/kk/kubakrise.htm
http://www.hausarbeiten.de/archiv/geschichte/gesch-text146.shtml
http://www.historychannel.com/speeches/index.html
http://www.thirteen-days.com/
Film: "Thirteen Days" (New Line Cinema
-
Directed by: Roger Donaldson )
Much information in our sources bases on the book of Kennedy, Robert F., Thirteen
Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: 1969.
Much information in our sources bases on the book of B. Greiner, Kuba-Krise.
Hamburger Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts
XIII. Judgement of sources:
We have hardly any arguments to criticise the information on the web-sites. What we
did, is comparing the given information with other web-sites in order to assure that we
don't adept wrong facts.
In our opinion you have got to deal very carefully with sources like the book of Robert
Kennedy. As he was really involved in the conflict and even was the brother of JFK it
is very probable that he was ambitious to present himself and the policy of his brother
in a good way.
We think that the tapes discovered in the JFK-library are very good sources as they
are very unlikely to be changed. But of course you have got to be careful in
interpreting them.
Another advantage in our topic is that the main agreements and threats were
published (Kennedy's speech, letters). All this documents are public.
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