1
University of Bielefeld
Faculty of Sociology
Section ,,Sociology of the political system and risk policy"
WS 2007/2008
,,Grundrechte"
Mechanisms of isomorphism Why Myanmar's
military government strives for a constitution
Author:
Florian Sander
BA Political Science
2
Table of contents
Abstract
3
1. Introduction
4
2. New institutionalist theory
Concept and terms
The "world polity" approach
5
5
8
3. Isomorphism and de-coupling in Myanmar
Historical and present overview
Mechanisms of isomorphism in Myanmar
10
10
12
4. Conclusion
15
5. References
17
3
Abstract
This essay analyzes the question why the military regime of Myanmar recently makes efforts
to give the country a constitution, although it used especially the missing of a constitution for
a stabilization of its power and would limit it through an installation of a constitution and the
included basic rights. For a reply to this question I raise the new institutionalist "world polity"
approach of John W. Meyer, which is suitable to explain this apparently contradictory
proceeding and also makes the political proceedings of the country in the past more distinct.
4
1. Introduction
For the first time after many years the Southeast-Asian country Myanmar, which was called
Birma before its official renaming, got back into the Western public gaze in the autumn of
2007. The country that is ruled by a military regime and without a constitution, was shook by
insurrections which were mainly lead by buddhist priests and monks and which were aimed
against the repressive policy of the government.
The regime, which presented a constitution bill on September 3
rd
in 2007, then again reacted
with even more repressive policy, imprisonments and violent dismissals, but stated in the
February of 2008 that there will be a referendum on the constitution bill in May of 2008 and
free elections in 2010.
It is known that since the early 90's the junta of the country has forbidden democratization,
free elections und the implementation of human rights with the explanatory statement that a
constitution as a legal basis is missing. From the political scientist and the sociological view
now raises the question for the motive which brought the generals to the decision to introduce
at least an apparent democratization through presenting a constitution bill, initiating a
referendum and fixing a date for free elections. The regime probably knows that though it has
a national propaganda machine it can't count on a high popularity when it comes to really free
elections after the pictures of its brutality reached the rest of the world and surely couldn't
been concealed from the own population.
The new institutionalist "world polity" approach by John W. Meyer shows a solution
suggestion that is suitable to explain the apparently contradictory policy-making of the regime
from a sociological point of view through its conceptions of mechanisms of isomorphism and
de-coupling. For that reason this work will pick up this approach and apply it to the
constitutional, legal and political development of Myanmar.
The first part of this work consists of the description of the new institutionalist "world polity"
approach and its organizational sociological roots. The second part gives a historical and
present overview of the political situation of the country and finally applies the approach to it.
In the third and last part I draw a conclusion.
5
2. New institutionalist theory
2.1 Concept and terms
The "world polity" approach by John W. Meyer which is a part of the global governance
discipline has originally organizational sociological roots. In the 70's Meyer and his team in
Stanford based not at least on empirical studies began to frame a theory which applied the
rationality term of Max Weber and corrected it. Weber had seen the role of bureaucracy in the
task, "rational geordnetes Gesellschaftshandeln ins Leben zu rufen und planvoll zu leiten"
(Weber 1972: 548). So according to Weber organizations tend to produce efficiency with the
help of bureaucracy that develops rationality and expertise. The produced efficiency then
again ensures the legitimacy of the organization outward.
New institutionalists blind out the point of efficiency as a relevant factor and advance the
thesis that it is the appearance of efficiency that should ensure legitimacy, whereas the
material real status does not play any significant role. Admittedly here and there bureaucratic
and rational structures are in fact designed to produce efficiency, but all together the main
goal is to legitimate as an organization towards the environment through the pure showing of
rational structures no matter how efficient they really are. Meyer et al. defined some terms
to describe this process which is seen as central in new institutionalist theory. In the following
passages they will be delineated more closely and explained with some practical examples.
It seems to be important particularly with regard to the name of the theory to define the term
of institution more closely and in the sense which is meant here. It is not understood as a
meaning of a formal state-run organization which would be described as "polity" by classical
political science. Instead of that, in the new institutionalist meaning the term has to be seen
with a sociological point of view, and that happens to define it as "kulturelle Regeln, die
bestimmten Einheiten und Handlungen kollektiven Sinn und Wert verleihen" (Meyer / Boli /
Thomas 2005: 18). Following this definition by Meyer et al., the term institutionalization
means an establishment of those cultural rules: Patterns of action become accepted as
implicitnesses or regularities.
In the new institutionalist vocabulary institutions like the pressure to build up rational
structures described above are termed as myths. If for example a new established federal
administrative body builds up a broad bureaucracy system, it follows a myth that says that
6
administrative bodies have to legitimate themselves by showing that their work gets done in
an efficient and a rational way. In other words: Max Weber's thesis about administration and
rationality is the myth that has to be proved at least outwardly.
Of course this still does not ensure that the efficiency of the administration body is really
warranted. That takes us to the term de-coupling which means a drifting apart between formal
status on the one hand and material reality on the other hand (cp. Meyer / Boli / Thomas /
Ramirez 2005: 99 ff.). Applied to our example that would mean: The federal administration
body stages as a modern organization with efficient work processes, smooth procedures and
solid expertise. But if in reality nothing of that was available and the administration body
turned out to be an uneffective, turbid, money-eating bureacracy-cliché, it would be a clear
case of de-coupling. Against the negativity of this example de-coupling does not always need
to be negative and can sometimes even be necessary, like an example shows that tells of a
university that hires a Nobel Prize winner: That "brings great ceremonial benefits to a
university. The celebrated name can lead to research grants, brighter students, or reputational
gains. But from the point of view of immediate outcomes, the expenditure lowers the
instructional return per dollar expended and lowers the university's ability to solve immediate
logistical problems" (Meyer / Rowan 1991: 56).
Legitimacy is strived by an organization towards its institutional environment. The term of
"environment" has a specific meaning also in other well-known sociological theories, so it
seems to be necessary to introduce the new institutionalist definition. The environment term
in new institutionalism is also paraphrased with the term of organizational fields, which
means every reality the concerned organization acts in and which forms the framework for its
actions (cp. Hasse / Krücken 2005: 25). Raimund Hasse and Georg Krücken bring on an
example from economy: "Für Wirtschaftsorganisationen wären dies beispielsweise
konkurrierende Firmen, Zuliefer- oder Abnehmerbetriebe sowie politisch-regulative
Instanzen" (ibd.: 25). After all the example of the federal administration body would be
reversable, so that it itself becomes an organizational field, maybe for a company. Finally, it is
to say that the new institutionalist environment term should not be confused with the systems
theoretic variation of it: Mechanisms like coercive isomorphism allow operative interventions
on the institutional environment which shows the biggest difference between the two
conceptions.
7
This brings us to the next term: Isomorphism is the central process for the whole approach. If
the myths described above were picked up by an organization and the process continues on
and on so that the myths spread, it would be a case of isomorphism, of structural similarity. It
is today, for example, an international consensus that administrations legitimate their
existence and their actions with expertise and rational proceedings, so that as well in Germany
as in Japan or Australia we could find basically similar forms of administrational
organizations. Finally, this is a practical case of isomorphism: "Indem Organisationen diese
Mythen aufgreifen, kopieren und zeremoniell zur Geltung bringen, wird eine
Strukturähnlichkeit (,,Isomorphie") zwischen Organisation und Gesellschaft hergestellt" (ibd.:
23).
New institutionalists like Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio have categorized three
mechanisms which contribute to the distribution of myths and therewith to the establishment
of isomorphism: Coercive isomorphism, mimetic procresses and normative pressure (cp.
Powell / DiMaggio: 67 ff.).
As the term suggests, coercive isomorphism means the installation of structural similary
through measures which are binding for an organization, like laws, regulations and
judgements. But also less official forms of coercive isomorphism are possible like "kulturell
bedingte Erwartungen in einer Gesellschaft" (Walgenbach 1995: 283). An example for this
complex could be the political party Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen which has to elect an executive
council although its ideology leads to an aversion against hierarchical principles: It needs a
board which has the legitimation to officially represent it otherwise it had neither the capacity
to act nor to communicate as a party. The mechanism of coercive isomorphism in the sense of
a cultural related expectation has shown here.
Isomorphism is a result of mimetic process if organizations apply myths of their own initiative
after realizing that they have approved somewhere else. This mechanism, also called imitation
(cp. Hasse / Krücken 2005: 27), proceeds with the condition that the organization has to cope
with a huge degree of uncertainty: "Je uneindeutiger die Ziele der Organisation sind und je
mehr Unsicherheit von der Umwelt ausgeht, um so stärker ist das Ausmaß, in dem
Organisationen ihre Strukturen und Prozesse nach dem Vorbild solcher Organisationen
gestalten, die als erfolgreich wahrgenommen werden" (Walgenbach 1995: 284). A historical
example for the mechanism of imitation names the Japan of the 19
th
century in its relationship
to the western countries: "The effort of Japan's modernizers in the late nineteenth century to
8
model new governmental initiatives on apparently successful Western prototypes" (Powell /
DiMaggio 1991: 69) is one of the most prominent cases of mimetic isomorphism.
In the case of the mechanism of normative pressure the chosen example of the federal
administration body becomes expressive. The aforesaid mechanism is definable as the
pressure that brings organizations to the decision to use expertise by refering to specialists for
specific area fields to prove their seeming efficiency and to legitimate themselves. Hasse and
Krücken name the example of administrations, too: "Die (...) Dominanz von
Verwaltungsjuristen in sämtlichen deutschen Ministerien stellt ein gutes Beispiel für
institutionelle Isomorphie durch Personalselektion dar, ebenso wird die Definition legitimer
Problemlösungsmuster im Organisationsfeld ,Gesundheitswesen' in hohem Maße durch
ärztliche Professionsvereinigungen geprägt" (Hasse / Krücken 2005: 26 ff.). An example from
the sciences also makes the mechanism of normative pressure more distinct: It is not unusual
that researchers who want to put through an empirical study include an expert for statistics
into their team. Even if their knowledge is broad enough to put through the study on their own
the name of a profiled expert for statistics makes the study even more serious.
Nevertheless it would be wrong to see proceedings of the three categories of mechanisms as
strictly separate from each other. There are other situations possible: The researchers in our
last example could be forced by a higher authority to bring an expert for statistics into their
team. That would be a coupling of the mechanisms of coercive isomorphism and normative
pressure. It is also possible the team realized that empirical studies of the past, which had
been supported by experts for statistics, had delivered more precise results than those which
had not had the support of statistics experts. In that case we could additionally recognize the
affecting of mimetic isomorphism.
2.2 The "world polity" approach
Developing the organizational sociological new institutionalism, John W. Meyer has shaped
the "world polity" approach which projects the processes described above onto the global
level and identifies great powers like the USA as well as especially NGO's and organizations
of the United Nations, like IMF or the world bank, as bearers of isomorphism (cp. Meyer /
Jepperson 2005: 65 ff.). Latter set criteria for their granting of credit to developing countries
which can be broadly described as western principles. For reaching financial benefits poor
countries must show that they are making progress on their way to democratization, rule of
law, liberalization of the markets or reforms at the educational policy. Those criteria are
9
examples for the complex that is called myths in the theoretical vocabulary, which spread not
at least like this and therewith cause isomorphism. Also the described mechanisms can be
found here: Countries copy and imitate political measures other countries have already
profited from, but at the same time they are also submitted to coercive isomorphism because
of the ligation to international contracts, organizations or confederations.
Nevertheless no-one should make the mistake to understand the global isomorphism of
western principles / myths as identical with the process of globalization. Admittedly many
effects of globalization can be described as parts of the global isomorphism, but also
globalizational critical NGO's like Attac can rank among the bearers of isomorphism, because
"als aktive Verfechter zentraler Bestandteile der Weltkultur kämpfen sie für Menschrechte
(...), Verbraucherschutz (...), Umweltschutz (...), soziale und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung (...)
sowie für menschliche Gleichheit und Gerechtigkeit (...) Als Agenten sozialer Probleme
treiben sie den Strukturausbau in rationalisierten Systemen voran" (Meyer / Boli / Thomas /
Ramirez 2005: 115 ff.). Not at least at this point it becomes clear that subsumptions of the
"world polity" approach as "theory of a western cultural imperialism" must fail because the
myths described here surpass developments like the worldwide expansion of McDonald's
stores by far. Talking about the United Nations as a whole, those are a bearer of isomorphism
through their symbolic powers: "Die UNO ist zwar eine schwache Organisation, die aber
insofern eine besondere Ebene der Interaktion darstellt, als sie viele Regeln der modernen
Weltordnung symbolisiert und weiter verbreitet" (Wobbe 2000: 36).
Especially in the case of world polity de-coupling is a phenomenon that can be observed quite
often: Countries include the word "democratic" in their names although they are far away
from being that; they install constitutions with a broad catalog of fundamental rights, from
which in fact nothing is implemented (most prominent example at this time: the
parlamentarian democracy of Iraq) or they create a broad educational system with ambitious
curricula, whose budget is however way to low to install anything of that. Even though de-
coupling does not need to be negative like I described above; sometimes it is even
unavoidable: It is not unusual that myths like "creation of free trade areas" and "welfare state"
contradict each other, whereat a de-coupling of the two goals can become in fact inevitable.
Just as well cases are known that tell of one myth having the function of preventing the
spreading of another myth: "In dieser Hinsicht haben sich afrikanische Intellektuelle
hervorgetan, die sich auf die Prinzipien der Selbstbestimmung und der kulturellen Autonomie
10
berufen haben, um die Anwendung westlicher feministischer Lehren auf ihre Gesellschaften
zu verhindern" (Meyer / Boli / Thomas / Ramirez 2005: 125).
It should not be forgotten that partly the myths of the world polity are of a much more
fundamental nature than the myths described before in this section. At this point Meyer et al.
name the western principle of the souvereign nation-state (cp. Meyer 2005a: 146; Meyer /
Boli / Thomas / Ramirez 2005: 105 ff.). A prominent example in this context is the island
example (cp. Meyer / Boli / Thomas / Ramirez 2005: 86). According to this thesis an
untouched society on an to the island unknown to the rest of the world, which exists in an
archaic way and which has not had contact to civilisation before, would change dramatically
after the first contact with the modern world: "Es würde sehr schnell ein Staat entstehen, der
(...) über viele der üblichen Ministerien und Behörden verfügen würde. In der Folge würde er
von anderen Staaten offiziell anerkannt werden und den Vereinten Nationen beitreten" (ibd.:
86). Then all the other myths described above would spread but the first step would be the
development of a nation-state.
All these factors show that nothing is so appropriate to prove the new institutionalist theses
like the political processes and structures on the global level, like world polity. In the
following empirical part of this work this assessment becomes more plastic.
3. Isomorphism and de-coupling in Myanmar
3.1 Historical and present overview
After 14 years of parlamentarian democracy in Birma, how it was still called back then, a
socialist military government under General Ne Win tookover in 1962. The leading
government board, the so-called revolution council, installed a constitution in 1974 firstly.
Pursuant to typical socialist structures a government party arose that was called Burma
Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), ruled by a politbureau. In the course of the beginning
worldwide breakdown of the socialistic bloc riots flared in 1988, democracy and market
economy were claimed. Ne Win refused that and withdrew in the same year because of
opposition against his position in the BSPP. Riots that now flared in the whole country were
violently subdued. The new military regime announced free elections that were realized in
1990, one year after the renaming from "Birma" to "Myanmar".
11
Against the hopes of the regime the government party National Unity Party (NUP) did not
win at the elections, instead the National League for Democracy (NLD), the party of
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who got back into the public gaze in 2007 and who is
under house arrest since 1989, achieved a very clear victory. The NLD caused a trauma for
the government party by reaching 392 of 485 seats, while the NUP had to put up with only 10
seats in parliament. How it was to be expected, the elections were not accepted by the regime.
The government established the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) as the
new central government board and summoned a national assembly for the elaboration of a
constitution in 1993, which was wound up in 1996 after 3 years of unsuccessful debates
though after members of the NLD had refused to contribute to the assembly any longer
because of undemocratic proceedings.
In 1997 the regime replaced the SLORC by the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC). The NLD, on the other hand, formed the Committee Representing the People's
Parliament (CRPP) in reaction to the not-accepted elections in 1990 and the abortively
finished debate about a constitution. When the military government answered at this with
more repressive actions against the opposition, a foreign isolation of Myanmar set in because
other countries, especially the USA, but also the European Union, put sanctions on it.
Not at least as a result of that a new dialogue between SPDC and NLD was started in 2000
that achieved the release of ca. 450 political prisoners, mainly politicians of the NLD, and the
re-opening of NLD offices. At the same time delegations of the UN, the EU and the Red
Cross were allowed to visit the country. In 2002 the house arrest against Aung San Suu Kyi
was canceled, though her freedom only lasted 1 year. The opposition leader is placed under
house arrest still today, also after a new dialogue with members of the government in autumn
of 2007.
In 2003 the government announced a Myanmar Roadmap to Democracy with the goal of a
"disciplined democracy" that lead to a re-summoning of the national assembly for a new
constitution in 2004. Finally the assembly came to an agreement about the basic principles of
a constitution in the September of 2007.
Mid-September peaceful protests, initiated by buddhist monks, began to expand to large
demonstrations throughout the whole country. When the military, as also explicitly reported
in Western media, subdued the protests violently and again answered with more repressive
measures, around 200 to 300 men and women lost their lives according to valuations of the
German foreign office. About 2000 people were imprisoned.
12
In the February of 2008 the regime announced a referendum on a constitution bill for May of
2008 and free elections for 2010.
3.2 Mechanisms of isomorphism in Myanmar
Already the political history of Birma / Myanmar in the second half of the 20
th
century is a
history of spreading of myths, of isomorphism and of de-coupling. The same applies to the
history of the beginning 21
st
century and the current situation. In the following passage I will
show how far the structures and processes the new-instutionalist concept oberserves can be
found in Myanmar.
In the 60's and the 70's the country experienced a form of institutional isomorphism that was
a result of the dominant world-political position of the then second hegemomic power USSR,
the structure of which affected the other countries of the socialist Eastern bloc in a formative
way. The myth "political structure of a socialist state" was copied by Birma from the socialist
institutional environment, with the result of the development of an at least intended mass
party (BSPP), ruled by the typical politbureau. The mechanism of imitation respectively
modeling, like Powell and DiMaggio call it (cp. Powell / DiMaggio 1991: 69), is indicated
here: Political structures, that had approved to date in socialist model states, were copied a
process also interesting for new institutionalist theory showing that also countries outside of
the Western hemisphere have contributed to spread myths. In other words: ,,Das globale
Schichtungssystem ist (...) multidimensional" (Meyer / Boli / Thomas / Ramirez 2005: 115).
At the end of the 80's the east-bloc was confronted with its beginning breakdown, with the
result that the Soviet Union lost its role as the bearer of a "socialist isomorphism". As a
consequence, in 1988 the regime of Ne Win had nothing to win when it balked at market
economic reforms and democratization. Instead of that a new military regime realized the
signs of the times and, closer, the now more influential bearer of isomorphism, the Western
culture. It announced free elections for 1990 and therewith picked up on a myth that came
from the soon-to-be global affecting bearer of isomorphism: democracy. The mechanism of
coercive isomorphism gave the impetus for picking up on this myth the regime was under
pressure, cornered by people's anger. In a naïve manner it believed in a victory of the
government party NUP, whereby there was actually no de-coupling neither in the run-up to
nor during the elections, which is unusual for countries like this elections in autocracies are
13
usually de-coupled already in the run-up (through falsifications and other interventions).
These elections went off without interventions by the regime and lead, as a result of this, to
the overwhelming victory of the NLD. Only through not-accepting the results of the election
afterwards the regime created a status of extreme de-coupling between appearance and reality
which exposed the elections as a measure to calm down people's anger that never had the
purpose to democratize the country.
Also the installation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council and later the State Peace
and Development Council are new institutionalist isomorphism at its best. Not only that the
titling of the SLORC suggested that to date there was chaos and disorder (which also gave the
possibility to defame all the protests as riots of rebels), it also picked up the Western myth of
the "rule of law". Like the case of the elections of 1990, too, it indicates the function of the
deliverer of legitimicy, where it is not that important to really enforce rule of law but to keep
the appearance outwards. The same we can observe in the case of the SPDC: "peace" and
"(economic) development" are Western myths. A country that posits that it stands for peace,
economic growth and the development of infrastructure has "earned" its sovereignity and
legitimated itself in the eyes of the environment. So also Myanmar had to pick up on those
myths to legitimate itself as a sovereign towards the suspicious observation from the own
population and foreign countries. Of course again with a high grade of de-coupling: There is
no economic or structural development and the word "peace" is, at best, rhetorical in
Myanmar. Dominating mechanism was again coercive isomorphism which was a result of the
danger of a civil war and the growing impatience from abroad. However, additionally a
mimetic isomorphism played a significant role that caused Myanmar to copy the agenda-
setting of the myths "law and order", "peace" and "development" which can be oberserved at
other countries und which has the purpose to point out positive goals of politics for
legitimating it and its measures.
The most eye-catching und central myth that shaped Myanmar since the last 15 years is
"constitution" and the included catalogue of fundamental rights. The factor of basic and,
related with that, human rights constitutes one of the most important elements of global
isomorphism (cp. Meyer 2005a: 152 ff.) and thereby precipitates also in Myanmar. In 1993
the regime had to cope with people's anger about the not-accepted results of the free elections
from 1990 after the victory of the NLD had been completely ignored by the government. This
lead to the mechanism of coercive isomorphism that let the myth of "human rights" spread
14
which is protected by a broad catalogue of basic rights in constitutions of many countries in
the world. The announcement of the elaboration of a constitution and the following national
assembly charged with the task are a direct product of isomorphism though with clear
constraints. For the regime a serious acting for installing a constitution would be an acting to
limit its own power, wherefore the grade of de-coupling is, then again, high: The working out
was protracted using undemocratic methods and even stopped at first in 1996. But the
announcement to work out a constitution bill did also serve as a political trick: It was,
conclusive, also an official declaration of the missing of a constitution in the present that
automatically declares the elections of 1990 as null and void, because the legal basis was
missing. A political action new institutionalists can identify immediately: Instead of simply
ignoring the elections (how it would have been executed in Burma hundred years ago), the
regime had to follow a political rationality that obliges to legitimate the ignoring of the
election results (which at least only served as a measure to secure the power) with a
constitutional legal explanatory statement. Thus not only the discussion about the constitution
itself, but also the political and legal appearance is a specific myth. This indicates the
mechanism of normative pressure for the first time: the pressure of political rationality.
When the EU stepped up its sanctions as a reaction to the more repressive policy in Myanmar
at the end of the 90's and the USA limited the trade and put a weapon embargo on the
country, this was an extraordinary reinforcement of the mechanism of coercive isomorphism.
Not only did it lead to a new dialogue between government and opposition, but also to the
presentation of the Myanmar Road to Democracy by the junta, which reconvened the debate
about a constitution and its arrangement. Already the name of the plan picks up on a myth, but
certainly just as interesting is the articulated goal of a "disciplined democracy" which reminds
of the Russian propaganda of a "managed democracy" and tries, in terms of a de-coupled
isomorphism, to picture an autocracy as an "orderly , tight democracy" to legitimate the
system.
In autumn of 2007, a short time after the agreement on the basic principles of the constitution,
not only the massive protests, but also the worldwide attention and outrage because of the
repressive measures of the regime and the resulting European and American demands for
more rigid sanctions lead to a boost of the coercive isomorphism that was unattained before.
Apart from that, the urgent appeals of Russia and China, which back their power political
basis on the stability on the military regime, also had an impact. In February of 2008 these
15
facts lead to the regime's announcements of a referendum to the constitution bill in May of
2008 and free elections in 2010. According to the UN Special Representative Ibrahim
Gambari the constitution bill suggests a political system with democratic parlamentarian and
civil elements which is by far controlled by the military though. The planning of this concept
is primarily orientated towards the example of Indonesia where the handover of power from
military to civilists had a similar course. That, after the identification of coercive
isomorphism, also indicates a process of modeling and imitation that is characterized by a
picking up on myths that has already legitimated political processes and structures in the
institutional environments in other words: other countries, like Indonesia. It remains to be
seen which grade of de-coupling this "disciplined democracy" and the elections in 2010 will
show.
4. Conclusion
It can be stated that all three mechanisms of isomorphism normative pressure, coercive and
mimetic isomorphism have been involved in the spreading of myths and thereby have had
an influence on the policy of the regime of Myanmar. Consequently, Myanmar is a perfect
example for global isomorphism in many ways. It also delivers an explanation of the
motivation of the regime's policy.
First of all with the new institutionalist concept of coercive isomorphism it becomes clear that
it was the fear of a civil war on the one hand and of North-Korean-like state because of
sanctions of the foreign countries on the other hand, that lead the junta to concessions like the
planned constitution and the announcement of free elections. The cost-benefit-analysis, that
has been executed by the generalissimo obviously, seems to prefer the self-reliant power
limitation in opposite to a state of civil-war-like riots and the total foreign political isolation.
The expectable de-coupling between the democratic appearance of Myanmar and the real
political situation in the future may have helped the regime to facilitate its decision for a
referendum and the elections in 2010.
The political facts that cause the spreading of myths and the following isomorphism in
Myanmar are ambivalent for the opposition as well as for the country's regime. Thanks to the
coercive isomorphism (protests and riots; sactions and embargos by the UN, USA and EU;
pressure by China and Russia) and the upcoming installation of constitution and fundamental
16
rights the opposition can probably hope for a political recognition, whereas the regime has to
expect power loss. But at the same time there are mechanisms like normative pressure
(political legitimacy through rationality) and imitation (orientation at the example of
Indonesia) which allow the regime to legitimate itself as the political power against chaos and
for law and order, especially in times of riots or even civil war, where a democratic
government would seem way to weak to secure stability and peace. Exactly these facts give
the regime the opportunity to limit the self-limitation in the constitution bill, which also may
have eased the decision for a referendum: After all, it seems that it needs the "strong hand" of
the military to prevent that the country falls victim to chaos again that is and will be the line
of reasoning. The opposition will not have much answers for that. Especially one thing
becomes clear: Mechanisms of isomorphism, thanks to the "option" of de-coupling, do have
benefits and costs for both sides.
Will there be a working constitution with a real legally binding catalogue of basic rights in the
near future? It is not improbable that , also as a result of the referendum, the human rights
situation will improve in the long term, wherein, however, a distinct grade of de-coupling will
be observable in the future. It is also fact that the myth "constitution" is, first of all, a political
mean. It serves not only as catalogue of basic rights, but is also a compromise that stabilizes
the power interests of the military regime at least temporarily. It remains to be seen if this
kind of isomorphism will have to be evaluated whether positive or negative.
17
5. References
New institutionalism
Hasse, Raimund / Krücken, Georg (2005): Neo-Institutionalismus. transcript, Bielefeld
Kieser, Alfred (ed.) (1995): Organisationstheorien. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart / Berlin / Köln
Meyer, John W. (2005): Weltkultur Wie die westlichen Prinzipien die Welt durchdringen.
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M.
Meyer, John W. (2005a): Der sich wandelnde kulturelle Gehalt des Nationalstaats. In: Meyer,
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