Examining the engagement between civil society and ASEAN in the ASEAN Charter process

  CONTENT NA  

  INTRODUCTION 3 NA  

  I ASEAN 5  

  THE ASEAN WAY 5  

  ASEAN S AGENDA-SETTING AND DECISION-MAKING 7  

  ASEAN COMMUNITY BUILDING 8  

2.  CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 11  

3.  THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND ASEAN BEFORE  

  THE ASEAN CHARTER PROCESS 14  

  BEFORE THE ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS 14  

  AFTER THE ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS 15  

4.  THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND ASEAN IN THE  

  ASEAN CHARTER PROCESS 19  

  CONCLUSION  27

  BIBLIOGRAPHY  30

2  NA  

INTRODUCTION

When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) announced that, after nearly 40 years of existence, it was finally going to draft the ASEAN Charter, civil society in the region heartily gave its blessings and eagerly cooperated with the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), who was tasked to prepare recommendations on the charter. But, when the grouping announced its signing, an active part of civil society called for a boycott and started to draft its own ASEAN People’s Charter. How did the interactions between civil society and ASEAN turn bad during the ASEAN Charter process and what is in the Charter that upset civil society? And is there any bright future for their engagement?

In looking at these questions, the essay examines the engagement between ASEAN and civil society in the ASEAN Charter process. This process is essential as it creates the ASEAN Charter, which sets the framework and lays the legal foundation for the regional grouping to reform in order to stay relevant. More importantly, it is a weighty part of ASEAN Community building - ASEAN’s most far-reaching project. The engagement between civil society and ASEAN in the charter process is, moreover, noteworthy as this is their first strategic interface and also the first serious test for the relations between the two. Yet it did not produce pleasant results.

The introduction is followed by the first section that provides readers with basic information about ASEAN, how ASEAN was born and how it has operated, expanded and developed over the years. My focus is on the ASEAN Way, ASEAN’s agenda-setting and decision-making as well as ASEAN Community building. The second section describes the fragmented, complex picture of civil society in Southeast Asia, which has insufficiently and unevenly developed under unfavourable conditions. The third is about the engagement between civil society and ASEAN, which has often been criticised by the former for being elitist and state-centric, prior to the charter process. I divide this section into two periods: before and after the Asian financial crisis. And the fourth - the most important in this essay discusses and analyses the engagement of ASEAN and civil society in the ASEAN Charter process, in which I examine the interactions between the EPG and civil society, the latter’s efforts to get access to the actual drafters (the High-level Task Force) and to the draft itself in spite of the uncooperative attitudes of the ASEAN senior officials, as well as civil society’s reactions to the content of the charter.

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Finally I sum up my examination and analysis in the conclusion, in which I argue that despite civil society’s disappointment, the engagement has made the ASEAN governing elite gradually become familiar with civil society’s participation in ASEAN policy formulation process. It can be considered an significant precedent for future interface. Besides, it was a good opportunity for both sides to interact and get to know each other’s concerns and viewpoints. During the process, civil society organisations (CSOs) also had chances to cooperate and coordinate with others, thus improving their strengths and advocacy skills. ASEAN says it aims at being “a community of caring and sharing societies” by 2015. Nonetheless, the charter drafting process still showed the association’s top-down elitist approach to community building. The efforts by ASEAN so far will only create a community of the governing elite, not a community of the people. Regional community building, just like nation-building, is very much a people-centered process. It is not a simple top-down chain of command and control. If ASEAN wants to establish a real community, it must change its modus operandi. It must be much more than an exclusive club for the governing elite by giving more space as well as power to civil society in its agenda-setting and decision-making.

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I. ASEAN

ASEAN 1 was founded by five countries Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,

Singapore and Thailand in August 1967 2 . The grouping has since doubled its membership by

admitting Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos, Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999.

THE ASEAN WAY

In the 1960s, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore were all nations in

the making because they as sovereign independent nations came into the world only after the

end of the WWII. The fact that ASEAN was at the beginning a group of newly independent

(with the exception of Thailand, which was never a colony) developing countries made non-

interference 3 the central tenet of intra-regional relations hardly surprising. Besides, smaller

members such as Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei were consciously fearful of force and

coercive measures from much bigger neighbours like Indonesia. As a result, non-interference,

consensus 4 , non-use of force 5 and non-confrontation became the key principles of the

organisation (Acharya, 2001: 49 - 58).

On the surface, the process of consultations and consensus is supposed to be a

democratic approach to decision making, but the ASEAN process has been managed

1 ASEAN is one of the most remarkably divergent groups of states. Member states include sprawling

archipelagoes (Indonesia and the Philippines) and tiny city-states (Singapore); the world's fourth-largest country (Indonesia) and the 170th (Brunei); modern developed economies such as Singapore and agrarian backwaters like Laos. Their ethnicities, cultures, languages as well as political and economic systems are not less heterogeneous. They also lacked any significant previous experience in multilateral cooperation (Acharya, 2001: 47).

2 Several reasons lay behind the formation of ASEAN: its members’ desire for a stable external environment (so

that they could concentrate on nation building), the common fear of communism, their reduced faith in or mistrust of external powers in the 1960s, as well as the aspiration for national economic development; not to mention Indonesia’s ambition to become a regional hegemon through regional cooperation and the hope on the part of Malaysia and Singapore to constrain Indonesia and bring it into a more cooperative framework. Unlike the Europe Union, ASEAN has been made to serve nationalism. It has yet to become a sovereign-defying project. (Alagappa, 1998: 65 – 114)

3 According to Amitav Acharya, the implementation of this principle in ASEAN has had four main aspects: (1)

Refraining from criticising the actions of the governments of member states towards its own people; (2) Directing criticism at the actions of states that are perceived to constitute a breach of the principle of non- intervention. (3) denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilise or overthrow the government of a neighbouring state. (4) Providing political support and material assistance to member-states in their actions against subversive activities).

4 The principle of consensus understood in the ASEAN context is not to be confused with unanimity. Lee Kuan

Yew, who was Singapore’s founding father, once said: “When four agree and one does not object, this can still be considered a consensus and the four should proceed with a new regional scheme” without damaging the remaining one. (Acharya, 2001: 69)

5 The principle of non-use of force in Southeast Asia means an agreement among its members to refrain from

the use of force to resolve interstate disputes. (Acharya, 2001: 48)

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significantly through informal contacts 6 among the top leaders, who often share a reluctance to institutionalise and legalise cooperation which can undermine their regime’s control over the conduct of regional cooperation. (Acharya, 2003: 379) All of these features, namely non-interference, informality, minimal institutionalisation, consultation and consensus, non-use of force and non-confrontation have constituted what is called the ASEAN Way. (Acharya, 2003: 379) Since the late 1990s, many scholars have argued that the principle of non-interference has blunted ASEAN efforts in handling the problem of Myanmar, human rights abuses and haze pollution in the region. Meanwhile, with the consensus-based approach, every member in fact has a veto and decisions are usually reduced to the lowest common denominator 7 . There has been a widespread belief that ASEAN members should have a less rigid view on these two cardinal principles when they wish to be seen as a cohesive and relevant community (Chongkittavorn, 2006, 2007d; Collins, 2007: 216).

Unlike the European Union, ASEAN is still a pure inter-governmental organisation. It has no supranational institution (Ong, 2004) responsible for monitoring and facilitating the realisation of the ASEAN Community. Members rely on mutual trust and goodwill to fulfill integration commitments. However, a study by the three past secretaries-general released in 2007 showed that only 30% of commitments had actually been fulfilled (Fernandez, 2007), including those related to community building.

In terms of finances, member countries, rich or poor, contribute equally to the ASEAN budget. Although beffer-off members agreed to provide less developed ones 8 with additional funding to carry out various development projects on a bilateral basis, with poverty-stricken countries like Laos and Myanmar in its fold, this principle of equal contribution has capped ASEAN’s financial resources at the lowest level and further handicapped the organisation 9 (Lohman & Kim: 2008). To make up partially for the lack of money, it has sought external funding support from 11 dialogue partners and donour

6 Carlos Romulo, the Foreign Secretary of the Philippines, was believed to have said: “I can pick up the telephone now and talk directly Adam Malik [Indonesia’s Foreign Minister] or Rajaratnam [Singapore’s Foreign Minister]. We often find that private talks over breakfast prove more important than formal meetings”. ASEAN leaders always believe that such informality was necessary in view of the diversity of views and positions held by member countries. (Acharya, 2001: 65) 7 In other regional organisations such as the European Union, Mercosur or the African Union, the principle of majority-rule voting is employed to facilitate meetings and policy decisions.

8 They are Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia.

9 In May 2004, the ASEAN Secretariat announced that it was only able to pursue 35 percent of its projects because of the lack of funding, with activities, such as the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) project requiring 20 percent more funding (Lim and Walls 2004: 99).

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organisations for the operation of the ASEAN Secretariat and the implementation of its projects.

ASEAN’S AGENDA-SETTING AND DECISION-MAKING

Apart from consultations and consensus, ASEAN’s agenda-setting and decision- making processes can be usefully understood in terms of the so-called Track I and Track II (Chai, 2003). Track I refers to the practice of diplomacy among government channels. The participants stand as representatives of their respective states and reflect the official positions of their governments during negotiations and discussions. All official decisions are made in Track I. Track II on the other hand refers to diplomatic activities that are unofficial and includes participants from both government and non-government institutions such as the academic, economic communities and NGOs (Kraft, 2002: 51). This track enables governments to discuss controversial issues and test new ideas without making official statements or binding commitments, and, if necessary, backtrack on positions. Although Track II dialogues are sometimes cited as examples of the involvement of civil society in the regional decision-making process by governments and other second track actors (Acharya, 2003: 383), NGOs have rarely got access to this track, meanwhile participants from the academic community are a dozen think-tanks 10 . However, these think- tanks are, in most cases, very much linked to their respective governments, and dependent on government funding for their academic and policy-relevant activities (Acharya, 2001: 66 – 67). Their recommendations, especially in economic integration 11 , are often closer to ASEAN’s decisions than the rest of civil society’s positions.

The track that acts as a forum for civil society in Southeast Asia is called Track III, which is essentially people-to-people diplomacy undertaken mainly by CSOs. Track III networks claim to represent communities and people who are largely marginalised from political power centers and unable to achieve positive change without outside assistance. This track tries to influence government policies indirectly by lobbying, generating pressure through the media. Third-track actors also organise and/or attend meetings as well as conferences to get access to Track I officials.

10 Track II activities in Southeast Asia mainly involve conferences, symposia, seminars and workshops on various regional issues.

11 For example, ASEAN - Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) has long supported an open economy for ASEAN and favored trade liberalisation. National and regional NGOs, on the other hand, are more cautious, fearing the possible adverse effects.. (Chandra, 2006: 77)

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While Track II meetings and interactions with Track I actors have increased and intensified, rarely has the rest of civil society had the opportunity to interface with Track II. Those with Track I have been even rarer. In other words, the participation of the big majority of CSOs has been excluded from ASEAN’s agenda-setting and decision-making. (Caballero- Anthony, 2004: 577) Looking at the three tracks, it is clear that until now, ASEAN has been run by government officials who, as far as ASEAN matters are concerned, are accountable only to their governments and not the people. In a lecture on the occasion of ASEAN’s 38 th anniversary, the incumbent Indonesian President Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono admitted: “All the decisions about treaties and free trade areas, about declarations and plans of action, are made by Heads of Government, ministers and senior officials. And the fact that among the masses, there is little knowledge, let alone appreciation, of the large initiatives that ASEAN is taking on their behalf.” (2005)

ASEAN COMMUNITY BUILDING

Of all ASEAN projects, the most ambitious is the ASEAN Community, which is scheduled to be realised by 2015. The process of ASEAN community building is a result of the considerable change in the association’s mission in the recent two decades. The end of the Cold War, the advance of globalisation, the rise of China and India in economic size and political influence as well as the Asian financial crisis have forced ASEAN to shift from its original preventive diplomacy of maintaining peace and harmony among its members and in the region to the constructive diplomacy of community building to cope with increasing political and economic competition in a globalised world.

In more details, one of the most notable threats to ASEAN members is China, whose robust economy is in direct competition with those of its Southeast Asian neighbours, especially in trade and foreign direct investment. Besides, in recent years, the sleeping dragon has shown more interest in enhancing its economic and political presence in the region, particularly in Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. Its awakening has increasingly drawn ASEAN states, which share the common fear of intrusive outside powers, into the long-term strategic competition between China and the United States in Asia Pacific (Neves, 2004: 162). To cope with China and avoid external intervention, Southeast Asian countries feel the need to act collectively and to lean on each other, so that they can have combined strengths as well as better bargaining power in both economic and political issues (Almonte, 2006). The same will work when dealing with an amalgamated or regional community such

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as the United States and the European Union, or with international organisations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation.

Besides, in the time of economic globalisation and after it was hit hard by the Asian financial crisis, forming an economic community which develops a single market and production base with effective facilitation for trade and investment will help Southeast Asia improve its economic competitiveness and attractiveness (Almonte, 2006). In terms of political and security issues, internal ethnic and religious tensions (most dangerously in Myanmar, Southern Thailand, Eastern Indonesia and Southern Philippines) have led to cross- border instability, terrorism, illegal migration and drug-trafficking. These and other problems such as air pollution, avian flu, AIDS all require regional concerted and coordinated actions. Against these backdrops, the future of the region and of ASEAN will be, to a considerable extent, contingent on the degree of success of community building.

At its ninth Summit in October 2003, ASEAN announced its decision to establish an ASEAN Community comprising three intertwined and mutually reinforcing pillars, namely the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) by 2020. In January 2007, its leaders reached an agreement to shorten the time frame to 2015. The ASC is expected to maintain and strengthen peace, security and stability and enhance ASEAN’s capacity for self-management of regional security. It will include maritime cooperation and fight against terrorism, but no plan for a regional military bloc or defence pact. Besides, member countries are free to pursue their own foreign policies and defence arrangements (ASEAN, 2003). Meanwhile, the mission of the AEC is to develop a single market and production base that is stable, prosperous, highly competitive and economically integrated with effective facilitation for trade and investment in which there is free flow of goods, services investment, skilled labours, and freer flow of capital. But it will not adopt a common currency like the European Union (ASEAN, 2007b: 4). And last but not least, the ASCC envisages a Southeast Asia bonded together in partnership as “a community of caring 12 and sharing societies”. The ASCC Plan of Action contains four core elements: Building a community of caring societies, Managing the social impact of economic integration, Enhancing environmental sustainability, and Strengthening the foundations of regional social cohesion towards an ASEAN Community (ASEAN,

12 In the ASEAN Vision 2020 which was put forth in 1997 as a guide for future ASEAN cooperation, a socially cohesive and caring ASEAN is defined as “where hunger, malnutrition, deprivation and poverty are no longer basic problems, where strong families as the basic units of society tend to their members particularly the children, youth, women and elderly; and where the civil society is empowered and gives special attention to the disadvantaged, disabled and marginalized and where social justice and the rule of law reign” (ASEAN, 1997).

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2004b). In 2005, member countries agreed to establish an ASEAN Charter, which would serve as the legal and institutional framework for the regional organisation and the ASEAN Community. Although it will not take on any supranational functions, with its ambitious goals, the ASEAN Community is believed to have far-reaching and important impacts on the lives of the people in Southeast Asia.

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2. CIVIL SOCIETY 13 IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 14

In the early years of the post-colonial period, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, military-backed regimes in Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Laos, and North and South Vietnam suppressed civil society groups that were critical of, or perceived as a threat to, the state. In the 1970s, the triumph of communism in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos aborted any prospect of the development of civil society as the self-organisation of citizens in Indochina 15 . For a while CSOs were relatively active in the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, but also in the 1970s, President Marcos resorted to martial law to stay in power in the Philippines, and the Malaysian and Singaporean states used a combination of legal and coercive instruments to exert control. As authoritarianism of various forms came to dominate the region, civil society faced varying degrees of constraint in all the countries. (Lee, 2004:

11 – 12, Hewison, 1999: 228)

More importantly, from the 1970s onwards countries like Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and, to some extent, the Philippines were in the throes of major social, cultural and economic changes. Rapid economic development resulted in the growth of the middle class and more class-stratified, as well as industrialised and urbanised societies. Partly owing to the major transformations, new social movements began to emerge in civil societies in Southeast Asia; for example, student, environmental, women’s, human rights, consumer, and other public interests movements. However, although the number and type of civil society groups grew dramatically, this growth did not necessarily translate into a democratisation process in all of these countries. (Lee, 2004: 12) The democratisation of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand witnessed the preeminent role of the elite, but it would not have been achieved without the active participation of civil society organisations, which played a supportive role by generating 13 Civil society is a contested concept. There is little agreement on its precise meaning, though much overlap exists among core conceptual components (Kumar, 1993). It is, of course, beyond the ambition of this essay to undertake a comprehensive review of the various definitions of civil society. In this essay, the term refers to organised non-profit groups who act, to a large extent, in the interests of neither political parties, commercial businesses nor the private sphere of family for the sake of social good. These groups include mainly registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, coalitions and advocacy groups.

14 In this essay, I put aside civil society in East Timor, which is also a Southeast Asian country (but not yet an ASEAN country), because after it broke away from Indonesia in 1999, CSOs operating in this tiny enclave have not joined the engagement of civil society in the region with ASEAN as well as that of civil society in the ASEAN Charter process. East Timor applied for ASEAN membership in 2006 and the accession process is expected to take at least five years.

15 Indochina comprises of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

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political pressure for reform that led to the liberalisation of political systems and eventually brought down dictatorial regimes. In the Philippines in the mid-1980s a number of CSOs, notably the church and church-related groups, helped to overthrow the authoritarian Marcos regime. In Thailand, the rise of student organisations, NGOs and trade unions proved critical to forcing the junta out of political office in 1973 and 1992. In Indonesia, it was the wide array of mobilisational campaigns initiated by Islamic-inspired student and women’s organisations that finally resulted in the downfall of the Soeharto’s New Order regime in 1998, when the country was crippled by the Asian economic crisis. All these events paved the way for the much-awaited democratisation process 16 . However, except from the Philippines where the Church was invited to consult the President-elected when she had yet strengthened her powerbase in the 1980s, civil societies in the other two have not been able to provide substantive contributions to the consolidation of democracy and to the agenda-setting and decision-making of the state. Meanwhile, in Singapore and Malaysia, democratisation just did not come (Bunbongkarn, 2004: 137 - 141; Lee, 2004: 54 – 77).

In the late 1990s, the Asian economic crisis marked a milestone in the development of civil societies in ASEAN countries in two aspects. First, it destabilised authoritarian regimes and helped bring about democratisation (in Indonesia) or accelerate it (in Vietnam, for example), thereof opened up more space for civil society to organise and operate. Second, the devastating onslaught of the crisis increased the importance and proliferation of civil society groups.

However, until now, the question of whether civil society exists in authoritarian states of different kinds such as Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Singapore, Brunei and even Malaysia is still a much-debated issue. If one uses the Western definition of civil society, which is the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating and autonomous from the state (Diamond, 1994: 5), then the conclusion is that civil society has not been present in the above-mentioned countries where the governing elite have followed a statist perspective, in which civil society refers to civil organisations that are under direct or indirect jurisdiction and surveillance of the state or encapsulated by the state.

16 However, viewed in a Gramscian light, the realm of civil society in Southeast Asia also appears to have thrown up many obstacles to democratisation. Individual Buddhist monks and monasteries in Thailand joined movements to topple military rule in 1973 and again in 1992, while others backed military coups in 1976 and 1991. The Catholic Church leadership in the Philippines did not oppose the martial law in the 1970s but eventually backed the “People Power” in 1986 to overthrow Marcos, after years of underground (and in some cases armed insurgent) radical activity by hundreds, if not thousands, of its priests and nuns. Besides, studies in more recent years have shown religious institutions are deeply intertwined in the reproduction of money and machine politics in both countries. (Baharuddin, 2004: 19)

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Against this backdrop, civil societies have insufficiently and unevenly developed in ASEAN countries (Houben, 2004: 65). They represent a fragmented and complex picture (Baharuddin, 2004: 18). But, in all these countries, they share the same problem that unlike trade and business groups, they have had little access to national policy making and programming, even in more democratic countries where CSOs are on the front line of social development. Another notable similarity is that the majority of CSOs which operate in an ASEAN country are issue-oriented and they essentially concentrate on assisting local communities, alleviating the miserable living conditions of the poor, the underprivileged, and looking into the plight of abused women and children (Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 573). Because poverty, economic and social injustice can easily be found in neighbouring countries while other problems (avian influenza, HIV/AIDS or migration) that are transnational require a transnational response, civil society groups in Southeast Asia have created regional coalitions and networks to find solutions together. These regional CSOs share many characteristics of the national ones and their organisations are also mostly issue- oriented. Among the most prominent regional groups are those identified in their work on democratisation, promotion of human rights and advocacy against globalisation; for example, the Bangkok-based Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), the Asian Cultural Forum on Development and Focus on the Global South (Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 574).

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3. THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND ASEAN BEFORE THE ASEAN CHARTER PROCESS

BEFORE THE ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS

As mentioned above, until now, regionalism in Southeast Asia has been essentially elite-centred and politically illiberal. However, it could be argued that this situation has also been caused by the lack of interest and pressure from civil society on ASEAN. Prior to the Asian financial crisis, most CSOs in the region (without those in Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia, which became members only in 1995, 1997 and 1999) saw ASEAN as a weak and elitist organisation with little power to affect the well-being of Southeast Asian people. Therefore, they were indifferent to engaging with it (Chandra, 2006: 71, 74).

Many others such as the Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET) and Alternative ASEAN adopted mainly confrontational tactics that condemned ASEAN’s pursuit of economic globalisation and its neglect of, and tolerance for, human rights abuses and anti-democratic practices in Southeast Asia (Acharya, 2003: 383). Except from the APCET 17 , they have lacked the capacity, skills and opportunities to make their criticism have impacts at national and regional levels (Chai, 2003).

Among a minority of civil society groups that built a relationship with ASEAN were a dozen think-tanks in the academic community such as the ASEAN – ISIS, the Singapore- based Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and the Council for Security and Cooperation in Asia Pacific... Playing the pioneering role in Track II, these think-tanks have haboured opportunities to discuss with and make recommendations to the governing elite, therefore, provided input to ASEAN’s agenda-setting and policy-making processes. For example, since 1993, ASEAN – ISIS members have met senior officials prior to their annual meetings; and since 1999 they have had formal meetings with ASEAN foreign ministers. They have also wanted to act as a bridge between the association and the rest of civil society. However, these think-tanks have been perceived in certain circles as being too close to governments and “sometimes a gatekeeper for expanded popular participation in ASEAN concerns”. (Chandra, 2006: 73; Collins, 2007: 221; Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 581) In addition, a small number of independent CSOs decided to engage with ASEAN at that time. Such cooperation was often issue-specific, conditional and context-dependent. For instance, in 1995, along with government officials, parliamentary human rights committees as

17 APCET conferences brought a lot of media attention to East Timor.

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well as the academe in more democratic countries in the region, several high-profile NGOs set up the Working Group (WG) for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism. In pursuing its goal, the WG has tried to establish its national WGs and approach ASEAN high-ranking officials such as foreign ministers and senior officials. Since 2001, the national WGs have co- organised annual workshops on the ASEAN regional mechanism on human rights with the host ASEAN government (through its foreign ministry) and its National Human Rights Commission (if it has one). Governments of Brunei, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam have yet to participate in the WG (Medina, 2006).

Besides, there were about 50 NGOs affiliated with ASEAN, most of which were set up and sponsored by national governments such as the ASEAN Academics of Science, Engineering and Technology or the Veterans Confederation of ASEAN countries. An affiliated NGO cannot get funding from ASEAN but may submit its own project proposals for Third Party funding, to be channeled through the ASEAN Secretariat, to the Standing Committee for approval (ASEAN, 1986). Of these NGOs, less than ten worked directly on social development issues. Those related to human rights documentation or monitoring would fail to join. For example, the ASEAN Journalist Association has been denied accreditation for years (Kang, 2006: 28).

AFTER THE ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS

After the Asian economic crisis, despite its continuing suspicion of the association and member governments, civil society has taken a new stand on ASEAN. Instead of being resentful or indifferent, now a lot of CSOs have shown interest in the grouping. There are several reasons for this change. (Chandra, 2006: 74) First, after the crisis and the outbreak of avian flu, which were highly contagious due to growing regionalisation, civil society has given more weight to ASEAN in the hope that a more institutionalised and effective regional organisation might be better at preventing and solving regional problems. Second is ASEAN’s intention to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015. Many regard the ASEAN Community as its most far-reaching and important project, one that has forced CSOs to take ASEAN more seriously (Chavez, 2006) (see Page 7

- 9). Therefore, Southeast Asian CSOs are increasingly of the opinion that ASEAN is a platform from which it is possible to somehow influence policies at the regional level (Chandra, 2006: 74) to maximize the potential benefits and minimize the negative impacts that an unaccountable regional grouping could bring to the regions’ people. Third, regional

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organisation, to varying degrees, also make changes in national policies. Civil society hopes via ASEAN, it can encourage “boomerang effects” on the national level, especially on Myanmar.

In 2000, under the initiative of a pro-democracy group within ASEAN-ISIS of Track II 18 , the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), which has been designated as a Track III mechanism, was set up (Acharya, 2003: 386). It took the APA project about four years to be realized with funding from outside the region due to the reservation and reluctance of several ASEAN governments (Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 578), particularly those of Laos, Myanmar, Singapore and Vietnam.

Initially, APA, whose annual conference has been attended by a wide range of CSOs, was optimistically expected to become “a useful vehicle for a more participatory form of regionalism” by Amitav Acharya (2003: 386) or “a people-empowering mechanism” by Mely Caballero-Anthony (2004: 567). However, in reality, it represents more a symbolic annual meeting place than an actual CSO participation in the ASEAN process or even an opportunity to influence ASEAN policy. Although APA was incorporated in the Vientiane Action Program (VAP) signed during the 10th ASEAN Summit in 2004 and in the ASC plan of action as a means of promoting people-to-people contact, it is conspicuous by its absence in the ASCC plan of action, despite the latter calling for region-wide networks of NGOs and other ASEAN organisation to help strengthen social cohesion (Collins, 2007: 222). Nonetheless, the appearance of APA still marked the first milestone in the consolidation of Southeast Asian civil society in its engagement with ASEAN.

After ASEAN declared its intention of building an ASEAN Community, within the academic circle, many scholars have had a strong position on the important role of civil society in ASEAN community building. For example, Alan Collins of Swansea University (the UK) argued:

“[I]f ASEAN is to become a security community it must change; its past experience is a hindrance not a help to community formation. I argue that if ASEAN is to form a security community it is only when the governing elite enable elites representing regional civil society organisations (CSOs) to have an influence on policy formation that such a community can be established. This is because regional CSOs can generate a common identification among the people, which is essential for community formation, and, by representing that common identification in the decision-making 18 The Track II grouping was seeking to make itself more effective and influential by developing a wider social base that includes elements of the regional civil society. (Acharya, 2003: 386)

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process, CSOs can use public opinion to constrain the governing elite and deprive them of the option of war to resolve their problems.” (2007: 205) Before Collins, at the 39th anniversary of ASEAN in August 2006, retired General Jose Almonte, who was former Philippine national security adviser, claimed that: “Community-building in practice is a task more suited to civil society than to government - because community-feeling cannot be enforced by law or commanded by force. Governments have never been good at social and communal tasks - although governments everywhere have often tried to undertake them. Community-building belongs properly to the dynamic side of citizenship - to public participation in voluntary associations, the mass media, professional associations, trade unions, and similar groupings.” (2006) And the first significant move from ASEAN’s side was already made earlier by the Malaysian government when it initiated the first ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) as a side event of the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2005 (Badawi, 2006). More than 120 participants from a number of civil society formations were chosen to attend the conference, which discussed a wide range of themes including human dignity, economy and trade, environment, women, youth, indigenous groups and ASEAN identity (Chandra, 2006: 77).

At the summit, for the first time in ASEAN history, ASEAN leaders invited the representatives of the ACSC to report their views on the process of ASEAN Community building in 15 minutes. This unprecedented gesture heartened the whole civil society in the region. Initially, the ACSC was supposed to be a one-off event, with no follow-ups. But during the interface between civil society and heads of state, ASEAN recognised the ACSC and supported its annual convening (Chongkittavorn, 2008).

CSOs expected the next ACSCs to take place at the same time and place as a parallel event to the annual ASEAN Summit. However, ACSC II and III which were organised solely by civil society failed to do so due to different reasons, including the reluctance from the Summit-host governments.

As the ASEAN Chair this year, Thailand is planning more extensive consultations between the grouping’s leadership and civil society at the 14 th summit and its Foreign Ministry has already established a good rapport with Thai CSOs. (Chongkittavorn, 2008) One of the main reasons why CSOs participated in the ACSC was their dissatisfaction with APA’s slow progress and their disagreement with the pro-democracy faction in Track II over how to engage with ASEAN and over the way ASEAN regionalisation, especially economic integration, should be pursued. However, the first ACSC was under the auspices of

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the Malaysian government and representatives of CSOs were carefully selected by the host country. After the conference, to further consolidate themselves independently, many participants joined other civil society groups starting a loose civil society network called the Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA) in February 2006 19 to build a vehicle by which regional groups could discuss, debate and strategise on ASEAN-related issues and actions. The main areas of engagement for SAPA include issues of democracy and human rights, peace and human security, sustainable development and environment, as well as globalisation and trade, finance and labour. SAPA has a specific WG on ASEAN and the ASEAN Charter 20 to promote broader civil society interface with ASEAN. (Chandra: 2006, 75, 77; Chongkittavorn: 2007d) At the regional level, SAPA WG on ASEAN organised the second ACSC in the Philippines in December 2006 and the third in Singapore in October 2007. At the national level, CSOs involved with SAPA WG on ASEAN managed to carry out national consultation processes on the ASEAN Charter and on general issues of engagement with ASEAN in all but three members countries, namely Singapore, Brunei 21 and Laos in 2006 (Chavez, 2006:

1) 22 . Their objectives were twofold: (1) to familiarise local and national civil society groups with the concept of regionalism, ASEAN and its policy-making processes, the ways in which civil society groups can engage with ASEAN, and to examine ASEAN-related issues relevant to their country; and (2) to ensure that national level processes can be integrated and presented at the second ACSC, which took place before the 12th ASEAN Summit. In essence, both ACSC and SAPA are considered alternative forums and networks for engaging ASEAN and ASEAN Community building, apart from APA. However, unlike APA, ACSC and SAPA are not mentioned in any existing formal ASEAN documents (Chandra, 2006: 75 – 77). And unlike APA, which was an initiative of a group in Track II, and the first ACSC, which was an initiative of the Malaysian government, SAPA was given birth by civil society itself, which marked another milestone in the consolidation of civil society in the region.

19 The first SAPA meeting in February 2006 was attended by more than 50 participants representing about 35 CSOs. It was born out of common concerns about how to enhance the effectiveness and impact of civil society advocacy by improving communication, cooperation and coordination among CSOs operating regionally, in the face of rapidly increasing and multiplying inter-governmental processes and meetings in Asia.

20 Presently, the SAPA WG on ASEAN has more than 100 (national and regional) CSOs, as members. 21 SAPA members were not able to hold the meeting in Singapore because of obstacles from the local authority. Meanwhile, the absence of plans in Brunei was due primarily to its CSOs’ limited participation in regional activities so far.

22 The national consultation process in Myanmar was held at the Thai – Myanmar border.

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4. THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND ASEAN IN THE ASEAN CHARTER PROCESS

At the 11th Summit in Malaysia, ASEAN leaders announced the drafting of the ASEAN Charter. The Charter is important because it sets the framework and lays the legal foundation for the association to restructure its existing mechanisms and improve its decision-making process to enhance efficiency and ensure prompt implementation of all agreements as well as decisions. The document also provides ASEAN with a legal personality (Ong, 2007). As the age-old ASEAN Way has been under increasing criticism, the Charter is seen as a key part of the association’s reform to stay relevant and a significant step to build the Community. Therefore, the Charter process at first drew a lot of interest among CSOs who were already excited about engagement after the interface with the leadership, and saw it as an strategic opportunity to bring to the regional arena aspects of their advocacy that are regional in nature (Chavez, 2006: 2).

At the summit, ASEAN formed an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) composed of highly distinguished and well-respected citizens 23 from ten member countries (ASEAN, 2005) who were asked to make “bold and visionary” recommendations on the content of the Charter. In general, officially the EPG concurred with the idea that ASEAN and its Charter process should be open to civil society participation. It even invited CSOs to provide input to the Charter.

At the regional level, EPG members and civil society representatives did meet three times to discuss issues pertaining to political and security cooperation, economic cooperation and socio-cultural cooperation respectively 24 . In the meetings, CSOs expressed their belief that regionalism is in the people’s interests. Therefore, they welcomed the building of the ASEAN Community as well as the ASEAN Charter and called for a framework and mechanism to facilitate the participation of civil society in the community building process in general and the ASEAN charter process in particular.

Each time SAPA submitted a written statement to the EPG. In the first submission on the security pillar, SAPA hoped the ASEAN Charter would explicitly recognize human rights 23 One of them is a former democratically-elected President of the Philippines, four are former deputy prime ministers, one is a former foreign minister, and the rest are current top officials such as deputy prime minister and foreign minister.

24 The meetings took place in April, June and November 2006. For some practical reasons, the third meeting was mainly attended by representatives of civil society groups from the Philippines. From the EPG side, Ambassador Rosario Manalo, who has been a special adviser to former President Ramos, received the submission. In late November 2006, SAPA sent another letter to the EPG reiterating the key points of its previous submissions through Fidel Ramos.

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and human dignity as the foundation of the community. This principle should not be compromised by economic and trade, as well as security commitments. The forum also appealed for the protection of the rights of migrant workers, ethnic minorities and indigenous people, women, children, farmers and fisher folk, among others. And it hoped the charter and the ASC would aim for a broader definition of security. Current ASC definitions of conventional and non-conventional security issues are comprehensive but not inclusive in terms of perspective and without any specific reference to human security. The submission also pointed out that the ASC plan of action contains two conflicting statements on principle. On one hand, it declares that the ASC process “shall be guided by well-established principles of non-interference (and) respect for national sovereignty”; on the other hand it asserts that ASEAN shall not condone undemocratic regimes. And finally, SAPA hoped the charter would include norms and standards that will eventually lead to a joint foreign policy.

In the second submission on the economic pillar, SAPA urged ASEAN to reconsider its neo-liberal economic integration and called for the regional harmonization and complementation in industry, agriculture as well as services. According to SAPA, the ASEAN Charter should recognize a mix of heterodox economic policies and analyses. It should include a strong element of social protection in economic development which is founded on redistributive justice, poverty eradication and growth with equity and non- discrimination. The forum believed the charter should encompass principles that protect regional currencies from the vagaries of the global dominant currency exchange system, and prepare the region for an independent exchange system. In addition, the document should enshrine principles that move away from economic activities based largely on natural resource extraction and promote economic growth anchored in and driven by rural industrialization.

In the third installment on the socio-cultural pillar and institutional mechanism, apart from the repetition of the requests mentioned in previous submissions, SAPA urged for a people-centered and people-empowered ASEAN community with the recognition of local culture, language and heritage. Besides, it hoped ASEAN would commit to the environmental sustainability and a free, independent media. On the issue of drafting the ASEAN Charter, SAPA called for broad-based consultations at the regional and national levels, after the engagement with the EPG would have been completed. It also strongly recommended that the EPG put forward a proposed process for the ASEAN Charter through referendum in all Member States. This is to ensure that the Charter is made known to all ASEAN citizens, and that they are given the direct hand in determining the future of the regional organization. The

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Charter itself should incorporate mandatory social dialogue and consultation with civil society to ensure their access to decision making processes at all levels, national and regional. In terms of institutional mechanisms, SAPA hoped ASEAN would be an institution that recognises universally-accepted rights and standards, and provides mechanisms for monitoring and securing compliance at the national and regional levels. In the area of human rights, the ASEAN Charter should mandate the immediate creation of a regional human rights body responsible for, among others: monitoring and reporting human rights conditions within the region; investigating human rights violations; developing awareness on human rights among people in the region; and, providing effective compliance and redress mechanisms. At the meetings, the EPG always said they appreciated civil society’s contributions to the ASEAN Charter. Among them, the two representatives from the Philippines and Indonesia were the most active in the overall EPG - civil society engagement process. Others, particularly those representing the less democratic countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Singapore and Vietnam, were relatively silent and cautious about confronting the CSOs (Chandra, 2006: 72 - 80). This quiet opposition soon made part of civil society in the region question the value and fruitfulness of engaging the EPG and the charter process. In December 2006, the second ACSC put forward the idea of an alternative ASEAN People’s Charter.

The EPG submitted their report to ASEAN leaders during the 12 th summit in the Philippines in January 2007. A large part of the report was devoted to proposed changes to push the association towards a more people-centered and rule-based orientation. Civil society might feel satisfied with the frequency of the calls for the strengthening of democratic values, good governance, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The beginning of the report, which is Fundamental principles and objectives, was in line with civil society’s input. The rest of the report recommended a formal dispute-settlement mechanism in all areas of cooperation, especially concerning economic and political issues; decision-making by majority vote rather than consensus in areas other than security and foreign policy; and steps to monitor compliance with ASEAN's objectives, principles, decisions, agreements, and timetables. Besides, the EPG discussed the possibility of setting up of an ASEAN human rights mechanism and proposed sanctions against members who are in "serious breach" of any of these terms, including loss of membership rights and privileges or, in extraordinary circumstances, expulsion from the organisation. The EPG was also in favour of channels at different levels for regular consultations through appropriate mechanisms with civil society and parliamentarians from member states (ASEAN, 2006).

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Nonetheless, civil society’s demand for the review of trade liberalisation in Southeast Asia was completely ignored. Like other ASEAN governing elite, the EPG believes in free flows of goods, services, investment, capital and skilled labour. Besides, in contrast to civil society’s expectations, it also gave a limited acknowledgement to children, youth and women (Chandra, 2007). The word “children” appears only once in the whole 55-page report, while the word “women” was mentioned twice (ASEAN, 2006).

The EPG report was forwarded to a fast-track High Level Task Force (HLTF) which was responsible for drafting the Charter in 2007. This 10-member panel comprised five senior officials, two directors-general, two ambassadors at large and one retired ambassador. It is natural that one should not expect any bold initiatives from them who would speak for no one but their governments, unless clear instructions have been given from their capitals to push certain viewpoints and issues (Chongkittavorn, 2007b).

The HLTF also engaged in a limited direct consultation with civil society groups in the Philippines in March 2007. At first, Thailand suggested that each member hold its dialogue with CSOs operating on its land and then gather this input for further consideration by the drafters of the Charter. However, time was running out so they agreed to have the Manila dialogue. Only the Philippine member (and former Chair) of the HLTF Rosario Manalo participated in a meeting with 60 representatives for CSOs from ASEAN countries before the convening of the first HLTF gathering to hear their concerns. Civil society activists from Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines contributed much to the richness of the discussions. Those from Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar also chipped in from time to time. However, there was no guarantee that the views and recommendations of civil society would be taken up because ASEAN leaders could change everything, said Manalo (Chongkittavorn, 2007a). Several CSOs’ demands might be seen as too radical by some ASEAN member governments (Chandra, 2006: 81), such as the proposal of adding the environmental community as another pillar of the ASEAN Community. At the national level, other members of the HLTF showed little intention to meet and engage with their civil society counterparts in the drafting of the Charter. This applied even in a democratic country such as Indonesia (Chandra & Djamin, 2007).

In the first half of 2007, bits and pieces of information which seeped through the closed-door meetings of the HLTF revealed that under the instructions of foreign ministers, the draft would not take in many recommendations from the EPG. For instance, the idea of an ASEAN Union as the highest community-building goal in the region was quickly rejected, as were the provisions for suspensions, expulsions and withdrawals. Voting as a decision-

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making tool was not mentioned, meanwhile consultation and consensus remain sacrosanct. Furthermore, the drafters were not comfortable exploring and including new dispute- settlement mechanisms in the charter. (Chongkittavorn, 2007c) In July 2007, ten ASEAN foreign ministers approved the first draft. They also announced that the draft charter included a provision on an ASEAN human rights body 25 (Forum Asia, 2007a: 1) that has been a target pursued tirelessly by civil society in the region for more than ten years. Ambassador Manalo said “the HLTF wishes to institutionalize the regional human rights body as a commission”, meanwhile Singapore’s Second Foreign Minister Raymond Lim further stated that “its powers are more likely to be consultative”. It then leads to the question whether this commission will really be effective in monitoring human rights 26 . Human rights organisations in the region clearly know they cannot expect too much from such a body. However, the inclusion of such a provision is in itself a milestone for human rights in Southeast Asia (Chavez, 2007).

After that, many CSOs requested the draft to be made available as soon as possible for public scrutiny and consultation. Yet it was kept confidential prior to the 13 th summit, which finalised the Charter on November 20 th 2007. This decision by ASEAN was heavily criticised by civil society which has cited it as the best illustration of the association’s continuation of their top-down elitist approach to policy-making (Forum Asia, 2007b: 1). According to the latter, the confidentiality of the draft effectively excluded the participation and contribution of civil society in particular and the people in general (Forum Asia, 2007c: 1).

In the first days of November, through the declaration of the third ACSC, civil society in the region started launching the process of drafting the ASEAN People’s Charter that is said to embody the shared values and collective aspirations of the peoples in the region. Key issues such as human rights, social and economic justice, participatory democracy, rule of law, ecologically sustainable development, cultural diversity, and gender equality are promised to be enshrined here. It is set to be completed before the 14th ASEAN Summit and the fourth ACSC in Thailand in late 2008. While they welcomed the planned ASEAN People’s Charter, several CSOs said the ASEAN Charter creates openings for important institutions and cautioned against rejecting it. Ray Paolo Santiago of the Working group for

25 Mainly thanks to the efforts of the Philippines and Indonesia.

26 Reference to a commission offers the chance for the creation of a political body, in which those governments most adverse to interference (often being those with the most to hide) can still be talked around. In contrast, reference to a mechanism leaves open the possibility for the development of a regional body which could have a real impact on the human rights situation on the ground, such as an ASEAN regional human rights court with the power to issue legally binding decisions. (Forum Asia, 2007a: 1)

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an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism said, “Let us build on the gains achieved by the ASEAN Charter, in particular, the ASEAN human rights body as an organ of ASEAN. Let us strive to make this a credible and effective institution for the ASEAN peoples”. Meanwhile, Yuval Ginbar, legal adviser of Amnesty International elaborated, “Even if some governments may sign things because they look good on paper, they can take on a life of their own as time progresses.” However, they agreed with others that ASEAN leaders should postpone the signing of the Charter due to the violent crackdown on peaceful protests in Myanmar. A few days later, Thai independent media outfit Prachatai and the Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism posted leaked copies of the final draft on their websites (Chavez, 2007), so that it finally became known to the public. The concern then turned into disappointment - one failed to see the daring, visionary, people-centered and people- empowered that had been hoped for.

The charter does its job in terms of codifying ASEAN's many previous agreements and declarations, and providing it with a legal personality. It clarifies issues on membership, and delineates functions as well as responsibilities of different ASEAN organs. It creates a new formal bureaucracy - from the formation of the three community councils (political- security, economic and socio-cultural) and the establishment of the Committee of Permanent representatives, to the redefinition and strengthening of the roles of the secretary-general and the ASEAN secretariat. It even gives a mandate to the long awaited ASEAN human rights body. (Fernandez, 2007) Disappointment comes not so much from things that are found in the charter, but from things that are not but should be. The charter is by all accounts as good a lowest common denominator as could have been expected, given the disparate interests, histories and sensitivities of Southeast Asian countries. Taking in not many important recommendations from the EPG, the document reaffirms a state-centric ASEAN and institutionalises age-old values of consensus and non-interference. It lacks clear mechanisms for dispute settlement, accountability and redress. While the bodies mentioned above themselves are given a mandate, most of the statements are parenthood statements and much is left to further interpretation and how it is going to be concretely operated in ASEAN. (Fernandez, 2007; SAPA, 2007a; Chavez, 2007) The inclusion of human rights in the charter's preamble and statement of principles, as well as the provision on a human rights body are a milestone for ASEAN. It is regrettable that no internationally recognised standards, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was mentioned in the document, and the body's operations remain to be determined at the

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ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, which is another political elite gathering. (SAPA, 2007b; Fernandez, 2007) The charter talks about a people-oriented ASEAN (page 4), and upholds consultation and consensus as basic principles in decision-making. Yet it neither provides clear mechanisms for transparency and participation, nor recognises engagement and interaction with non-state actors, including civil society. The document is also silent about how ASEAN's operations can be subject to independent scrutiny, how its processes can be accessed by interested groups, and how official information should be made public. (Chavez, 2007) Other missing elements include the complete non-mention of children who are the future of ASEAN and migrant workers who make up a substantial portion of labour flow in the region. And the only reference to gender and women's rights was in the selection of the secretary-general and two of the four deputies. (Chavez, 2007) Therefore, even before it was signed, many analysts and civil society activists had already written off the charter as another of ASEAN's many grand declarations that failed to take into account the aspirations of ordinary citizens and never got implemented. A study by three past secretaries-general released in 2007 showed that only 30% of commitments had actually been fulfilled (Fernandez, 2007), including those related to community building. To civil society, the charter is a letdown. It neither equips ASEAN to deal with controversial issues that hounded it in the past, and nor offers anything new that could help it deal with Myanmar (Chavez, 2007). Apart from the provision of the human rights body, no other inputs from civil society were accommodated.

Commentaries by civil society from the 11 th summit when the ASEAN charter process was launched to the 13 th summit when the charter was signed changed from the hopeful, optimistic and cooperative to the disappointed, skeptical and critical. After the signing, several CSOs said they would focus on the ASEAN People’s Charter process while some others strongly criticised and called for a boycott of the ASEAN Charter (Chongkittavorn, 2008).

The document is expected to be ratified by 10 states within one year 27 and to be adopted at the next ASEAN Summit in Thailand (Fernandez, 2007). At the 13 th summit, Philippine President Gloria Arroyo warned that she would likely have difficulty in getting the 27 Each country is left to decide how best to do so, whether through a referendum, a parliamentary vote, or a Cabinet decision (Fernandez, 2007).

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Charter approved by Congress if the Myanmar junta refused to free Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest and failed to recommit to democratic reforms (Chin, 2007). Indonesian officials have also admitted that the ratification process in their country would not be easy. Since then, haft of ASEAN members, namely Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia have come forward and fulfilled their pledge 28

28 A celebration is already scheduled for the ratification of the ASEAN Charter by all 10-member countries, It will be held at the Saranrom Palace, where the ASEAN Declaration was signed on August 8 th , 1967, 41 years ago.

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CONCLUSION

The ASEAN Charter is an important document as it sets the framework and lays the legal foundation for the Southeast Asian association to restructure its existing mechanisms and improve its decision-making process, to enhance efficiency and ensure prompt implementation of all agreements as well as decisions. It also accords ASEAN a legal personality. As the age-old ASEAN Way has been under increasing criticism, the Charter is seen as a key part of the association’s reform to stay relevant and a significant step to build the ASEAN Community. Therefore, the Charter process at first drew a lot of interest among CSOs who were excited about engagement after the interface with the leadership, and saw it as an strategic opportunity to bring to the regional arena aspects of their advocacy that are regional in nature (Chavez, 2006: 2).

However, the excitement and optimism did not last long. The caution and quiet opposition to the involvement of civil society from the EPG members of less democratic countries such as Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia soon made many CSOs question the value and fruitfulness of engaging in the charter process.

In the EPG report, it is difficult to evaluate or separate the amount of input from civil society included. Nonetheless, the repeated engagement with the EPG was itself a success, which made the ASEAN governing elite gradually become familiar with civil society’s participation in ASEAN’s decision-making process. It can be considered an important precedent for future interface.

Besides, it was a good opportunity for both sides to interact and get to know each other’s concerns and viewpoints. In other words, the Charter engagement has increased the interaction between Track I and Track III, which has led to a better understanding of and sensitivity towards each other. During the process, CSOs also had chances to cooperate and coordinate with others, thus improving their strengths and advocacy skills. It is noteworthy that despite their widely-known fragmentation, they showed a united stance in the engagement with the EPG.

However, the following uncooperative attitude of the HLTF and foreign ministers, especially the latter’s decision to keep the draft confidential further discouraged the willingness as well as the participation and contribution from civil society to the charter process. Part of Southeast Asian civil society then raised the idea of an alternative ASEAN People’s Charter process and no longer full-heartedly pursued the engagement with the governing elite.

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The excitement in the beginning turned into concern and finally disappointment when the draft was leaked out. One failed to see the daring, visionary, people-centered and people- empowered that were hoped for. Therefore, even before it was signed, many analysts and civil society activists had already written off the charter as another of ASEAN's many grand declarations that did not take into account the aspirations of ordinary citizens. The document neither equips ASEAN to deal with controversial issues that hounded it in the past, and nor offers anything new that could help it deal with Myanmar (Chavez, 2007). Apart from the provision of the human rights body, no other inputs from civil society were accommodated. Several CSOs said they had better focus on the ASEAN People’s Charter process while some others strongly disapproved and called for a boycott of the ASEAN Charter (Chongkittavorn, 2008).

After the charter process, civil society in Southeast Asia has been disillusioned and divided about future involvement with ASEAN. The majority of CSOs that have engaged with the organisation still want to continue in the hope of making any kind of progressive influence, big or small, in the agreements and decisions made by ASEAN, which will, in turn, have progressive influence on the lives of the people. They also want to nurture ASEAN’s culture of interaction with civil society. Part of them, take for instance the Working group for an ASEAN human rights mechanism, have refrained from expressing their disapproval; whereas the rest (e.g. the Think Center, Forum Asia and SAPA) have kept on engaging while feeling free to criticise the association. A considerable minority of CSOs, nonetheless, have been frustrated with the way ASEAN treasures their engagement and decided to focus on their own work without bothering about the grouping. After a short time being in a united stance, now civil society in the region is fragmented again in terms of dealing with ASEAN. As for ASEAN, its interface with CSOs during the Charter process clearly reflected the attitudes of member countries. In terms of engagement with civil society, the organisation is also divided from within. It is quite clear that three different groups exist inside ASEAN. The first consists of the Philippines and Indonesia, which are now more democratic than the rest. The two are willing to consult civil society and welcome its input into ASEAN decision making process. They are like a locomotive in the train. The second are Malaysia and Thailand 29 , who have accepted limited interaction. The third group includes mainly the 29 During the drafting process, while the interim government in Thailand, which was installed by a military coup, worked hard to polish its image abroad, its lack of legitimacy and the domestic controversy over the drafting of a new Thai constitution put it in a sensitive position and greatly undermined its intentions of supporting liberal initiatives. For example, it was quite awkward for Thailand to back the EPG report's

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regimes of Myanmar, Vietnam Laos, and in most of the time Singapore, Cambodia and Brunei. These regimes would wish to stop the ASEAN – civil society engagement. They unwillingly join the engagement process just to avoid pressures from the Philippines and Indonesia, and criticism from Western countries. They are playing the cabooses in a train. Their “efforts” have made the involvement of civil society more form than substance. ASEAN says it aims at being a community of caring and sharing societies by 2015. Nonetheless, the charter drafting process, which is an important component of ASEAN Community building, still showed the association’s top-down elitist approach to community building. The efforts by ASEAN so far will only create a community of the governing elite, not a community of the people. Regional community building, just like nation-building, is very much a people-centered process. It is not a simple top-down chain of command and control. If ASEAN wants to establish a real community, it must change its modus operandi. The governing elite must loosen their control of the decision making process and make ASEAN much more than their exclusive club.

2008 - 2009 could be a warm-up year for ASEAN and civil society with Thailand as the current Chair and Surin Pitsuwan, who is widely-respected for his progressive initiatives, as the new Secretary General. The new democratically elected government in Bangkok has planned more extensive consultations between the grouping’s leadership and civil society at the 14 th summit (Chongkittavorn, 2008). At the ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta, Thailand’s former Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan has already established a good rapport with regional CSOs by meeting SAPA representatives and outlining his vision for a more active engagement with civil society. It is a notable departure from his predecessors who were hardly accessible to CSOs.

Nevertheless, although the Secretary General has more power than before, but as long as consensus remains a much-treasured principle, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos and some others are still able to shoot down liberal and democratic ideas, including those regarding the involvement of civil society. In addition, the next Chair is Vietnam. Many are doubtful, again, about the development and results of the engagement.

recommendation for the rejection of unconstitutional and undemocratic changes of government (Chongkittavorn, 2007b).

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