Introduction

Following September 11 th , 2001, U.S. policy towards the Arab World has undergone a significant change of paradigm. Islamic values and democratic development were increasingly considered to be compatible instead of mutually exclusive, and the establishment of liberal democratic societies in the Arab World was thought to be an incentive for young men not to join fundamentalist organizations such as Al-Quaeda. The U.S. recognised the link between “repressive regimes in the region and anti-West terrorism” (Halabi, 2006, p. 341) and “during the last three and a half decades, US foreign policy towards the Middle East has shifted from advocating authoritarianism, to embracing capitalism, and finally, to promoting democratisation” (Ibid., p.340). To achieve security and to avoid economic and political marginalization that might contribute to the emergence of anti-Western terrorism, the U.S. realized that promoting democracy was a promising strategy in the region (Ibid., p. 357). In the case of Morocco, the U.S.’ democratisation efforts encounter a classical dilemma, a situation in which there are two different options, but no way out, since both options lead to undesired results. The United States promote democracy and civil society in Morocco, which however might lead to an empowerment of Islamism, since Islamic opposition features prominently in Moroccan civil society. On the other hand the U.S. pursue security interests and cooperate with the Moroccan regime to fight fundamentalism and terrorism, which however might lead to the U.S. supporting anti-democratic, repressive policies towards Moroccan society. In other words, the situation constitutes “a long, vexing dilemma for U.S. policy makers: should the United States exert pressure on Arab governments to open their political systems and respect human rights with the knowledge that Islamists, the most popular opposition force in Arab politics, stand to benefit from regional democratization?” (CRS Report for Congress, 2006).

About the State of Democracy in Morocco

Morocco’s 1962 Constitution guarantees a “constitutional, democratic and social monarchy”. The monarch (King Mohammed VI since 1999) is the “supreme representative of the nation and commander of the faithful”. Despite a formal separation of powers prescribed in the Moroccan constitution, the King retains a significant amount of executive and legislative power (ENP Country Report 2004, pp.5 ff). The last general elections which took place in 2002 were reported to be largely free and fair and saw the re-election of a broad coalition government under Chris Jettou. Morocco has a constitutionally enshrined multi-party system

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with currently 29 parties represented in parliament. “At present, the biggest parties in the ruling coalition are the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), the Istiqlal conservatives and the Berberspeaking parties of the Popular Movement. The moderate Islamists of the Justice and Development Party are main opposition.” (Ibid.) Morocco has made an effort to improve the general human rights situation (abolition of torture, women’s rights etc.) and to guarantee fundamental freedoms (freedom of expression, freedom of press etc.) Despite remaining criticism about e.g. the Western Sahara policy and the oppression of a free press, Amnesty International has attested Morocco a positive development towards rule of law. Especially the King’s commitment to increase women’s rights, social policy and “western” development, as well as the special commission devoted to uncover human rights violations under his father’s regime has been welcomed by human rights NGOs and Western governments (FAZ, 26.06.07). However, despite such improvements and major legislative reform the record remains mixed. Critics hold that “Morocco is no closer today to a decisive democratic breakthrough than it was four decades ago. The Constitution still plainly locates sovereignty with the king, limiting the role of the government and the parliament to managing social and economic affairs” (Maghraoui, 2002, p.30). Any reform towards democracy lies within the will of the monarch.

It can be argued that Morocco’s “long and gradual liberalization has advanced relatively smoothly in both the economic and political spheres, but it has not led to democracy” (Ibid., p.31). Maghraoui is doubtful whether liberalization necessarily goes along with democratisation, or whether the latter necessarily results from the former. According to Western democratic standards, Morocco is not yet a full-fledged democracy, but rather what Cavatorta calls a “liberalised autocracy” (Cavatorta, 2006, p. 212). The situation has deteriorated further since September 11 th , 2001, and the Casablanca bombings in 2003, both after which the regime has ruled oppressively to counter fundamentalist tendencies within the population. Morocco is considered not to satisfy the criteria of good governance and respect for fundamental human rights (Cavatorta et al., 2006, p. 11).

US Strategies and Policies towards Morocco

Morocco has traditionally maintained close relations to Europe and France and has been allied to the United States during the Cold War, but has not ranked high on the political agenda of the U.S. This changed after the end of the Cold War and with the rise of political Islam in the Maghreb countries, and was reinforced drastically with the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 11

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September 2001: “The United States no longer considered the Maghreb as France’s or Europe’s chasse gardée (private reserve)” (Zoubir, 2003, p. 172). Its close linkage with the United States, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East as well as its transitional state from an autocratic monarchy towards democracy made it a country of strategic importance to the US. Besides the dangers of illegal migration and drug trafficking, the U.S. are especially concerned about fundamentalism in Moroccan society and want to involve Morocco in the struggle against international terrorism. The US approach to counter radical and fundamentalist tendencies in Arab countries is democratisation, and the US government has enacted several strategic programmes to this end.

US involvement can be divided into three levels which are interrelated and none of which can be grasped without understanding the others: The first level consists of programmes that operate at a grassroots level and grant funding to democracy support and democratisation projects. The main programmes discussed here are MEPI and BMENA. On a second level, the United States have used traditional diplomatic channels and public diplomacy to emphasize time and again the priority accorded to democracy promotion: “Since 2001 public commentators and state officials, not to mention the top administration officials, including the President himself and secretaries of state Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, have emphasized that democratic reform in the Middle East has become a core objective of US policy in the region” (Dalacoura, 2005, p.964). The third level on which the United States promote democracy has been the level of intervention such as in Iraq or Afghanistan. “Democracy promotion has become an integral part of an interventionist US foreign policy in the Arab Middle East” (Ibid., p.964), in that democracy has always been an important part of the rationale behind invasion and a post-invasion objective. Such intervention has obviously not taken place in Morocco.

On the first level, clusters of projects have been designed to support civil society organizations and to reform state institutions with the objective to encourage democratic reform. USAID has been a first step towards democracy promotion since 2001 as a means to reduce poverty and enhance security, but MEPI has been by far a more ambitious project. Launched in 2002 by US Secretary of State Colin Powell based on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Arab Human Development Report 2002, MEPI addresses key deficits in political freedom, women’s empowerment, and knowledge. The initiative introduced a number of country-specific and region-wide projects in four different pillars, economic, political, educational and women’s rights (Dalacoura, 2005, p.964; Homepage of the U.S. Department of State on MEPI). Within MEPI, the U.S. have “sponsored over 100

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