Syrian Media Control in Times of Change

1.  Introduction  3

2.  Mechanisms of Media Control in Syria  6

2.1.  Print Media Censorship  6

2.2.  Internet Censorship  8

3.  Media Control in a Changing Syria  9

3.1.  Creation of a New Leader  10

3.2.  Creation of a New Leadership Network  11

3.3.  New Objectives of Media Control: Camouflaging Economic Reform and Calming  its

  Losers  14

4.  Conclusion: Media Control in the New Syria  15

5.  References  20

2  NA  

1. Introduction

It is permissible [for licensed non-state actors to issue newspapers, TG] within cer- tain measures. What is the aim of the paper? This is the basis. Does it serve the na- tional and pan-Arab line? […] There will be principles that aim to make the mass media contribute to the development process. The paper should not be with no clear objective, nor should its objective be a hindrance to the development process.

The existence of open information does not mean that issues would be out of co n- trol of the Ministry of Information, and this indicates clearly that the State 1 wants people to possess means of knowledge including information. Otherwise, the State would have prevented [Satellite, TG] dishes and this is not difficult for the State. This indicates that the state’s wish is to enable Syrian citizens to receive informa- tion. The one who is not open cannot be closed with local press and open with for- eign press. 2

Bashar Al -Assad made these two statements in the same interview with Al-Sharq al-Awsat

in early 2001. They serve as a great example for a dilemma his gover nment faces. On the one

hand, it assumes that the media should contribute to a program of national development, and on

the other hand, it has to cope with the fact that there is foreign information flowing into Syria that

cannot be restricted without immense political and economic costs. Despite Bashar Al- Assad’s

declaration that it would be easy for “the State” to prohibit satellite dishes, I feel quite safe to

agree with Dale Eickelman, who argues that

access to new technologies has multiplied the channels through which ideas and in- formation can be circ ulated and has enlarged the scope of what can be said and to whom. It has eroded the ability of authorities to censor and repress, to project an uncontested ‘central’ message defining political and religious issues for large num- bers of people. 3

Even if president Assad desired to prevent any flow of dissenting information, his state ap-

paratus would not be able to do so. There have always been ways to bypass the censor, and the

emergence of New Media has increased the costs of efficient media control. It has become techni-

cally easier to bypass the censor without having to cope with unreasonably high economic and

personal risks.

1 Capitalized in the original document 2 Al-Sharq al-Awsat: Interview with President Bashar Al-Assad, 8 February 2001 3 Eickelman, Dale: Communication and Control in the Middle East, in: Eickelman/Anderson 2003, p.32

3

However, media control in Syria is not so much about preventing every unwanted commu- nication in order to control peoples thoughts, as it is about trying to stabilize the regime by restrict- ing unwanted information, and shaping mainstream political and societal discourse in favor of na- tional development. Censorship can also be seen as a form of communication between the state and its citizens. By censoring a political newspaper article for example, the state signals that it is unwilling to compromise on the respective issue with which the article is dealing. John Phelan correctly states that censorship falls into the same category as state propaganda. It is done in order to reaffirm that the state is in control. 4 Alan George argues:

[T]he regime’s dogged insistence on censorship of domestic news outlets is in es- sence much the same as its requirement for 99.9 per cent approval rates in preside n- tial plebiscites and its state-managed pro-regime demonstrations by ‘the popular masses’. No one in Syria or anywhere is fooled, but that is not the point. What really matters about such absurdities is that they are an expression of regime power. 5

Under Hafiz Al-Assad Syria has managed to create a very sophisticated mosaic of tools to control its media. However, the Syrian government does not have the means to control all forms of unwanted communication, although in a 2004 worldwide press freedom index the media watchdog Reporters without Borders ranked Syria only as low as 155th among 167 countries. 6 But since Syria has never been a totalitarian state, the objective has not been to control every flow of “bad” communication. 7 Total control of people’s minds is not the objective of Syrian media control. In- stead, its objective is to prevent the proliferation of destabilizing news to large audiences, to ex- press the regime’s power, and to provide all Syrians with the same basis of information, which paves the way for the creation of a common nationalist discourse, which in turn has a unifying impact on Syrian society. The last reason is in my opinion especially relevant for censorship of pornographic or other non-political materials.

Syrians know that print media are heavily controlled and serve as mouthpieces of the go v- ernment. They als know how to bypass the censor, and they master reading between the lines 8 so that even the heavily controlled print media carries valuable information for them. Since Syria is a small country with large families, interpersonal communication plays an important role for spread-

4 Phelan 1968, p.xiii 5 George 2003, p.134 6 Reporters without Borders, East Asia and Middle East have worst Press Freedom Records, Press Release, Paris, 26 October 2004 7 Hinnebusch 1999, p.89; Perthes 2004, p.11 8 Zubaidi 2004, p.77

4

ing non-controlled news, too. Even before people were able to access Satellite TV and the Internet, about two thirds of them used their radios to listen to foreign radio stations. 9 For this reason we should not make the mistake to assume that Syrians are cut off from critical vie wpoints, although Syrian media control seems overwhelming to the western observer. Traditional forms of commu- nication, for example a chat in the suq , a discussion in the street, or a conversation at home, etc. are still very important in Arab societies. Kai Hafez argues that traditional communication in many countries and regions is the most important source of political information. In many cases where modern mass media became victims of state censorship, traditional communication took care of the distribution of the banned items of information. 10

This paper sets out by providing a brief overview of the Syrian mosaic of media control mechanisms. How does Syria control its Internet and print media, and who and what are the main targets of media control? We will see that media control is much tighter for the local printing press, which for many people still is the most accessible channel of information, than for the Inter- net, which still is mainly consumed by small elites.

Having talked about the mechanics of media control, I will interpret my findings against the background of Syrian politics under Bashar Al-Assad. What exactly are the political underpin- nings of the ongoing media control in Syria? Can there be economic development in a globalizing world based on the free flow of information in a country that heavily curtails its citizens’ freedom of information and how is this dilemma being solved by Assad’s regime?

I will argue that Bashar’s coming to power in June 2000 did not lead to more media free- dom in general. Instead, it changed the objective of media control. While under Hafiz Al-Assad the media was controlled in order to demonstrate the state’s power and to prevent the citizenry from receiving and spreading unwanted information, Bashar’s media policy is embedded in his agenda of economic reform. While the new Syria, represented by Bashar’s young leadership cir- cles, uses a relatively uncensored Internet and has jumped on the globalization bandwagon, a con- servative old guard of officials, who have already served under Hafiz Al- Assad keeps the Syrian masses under control. They use the still much more accessible print media to camouflage the rami- fications of economic reform and to reaffirm the fact that the state still is in control. This allows

9 George 2003, p.134 10 Hafez, Kai: Mass Media in the Middle East – Patterns of Political and Societal Change, in: Hafez (ed.) 2001, p.11

5

the new westernized business elite to profit from globalization without having to cope with regime destabilization and social upheaval from the public sector dependent masses.

2. Mechanisms of Media Control in Syria

Since the Baath Party’s 1963 coup d’etat an emergency law has been in power in Syria. Until today, it is constantly used to justify infringements on media freedom. 11 According to the

Syrian government the emergency law cannot be abolished as long as Syria is at war with Israel. The law serves as a great means for restricting media, because it provides the judicial basis for censorship of materials that “threaten national security,” “disturb public confidence,” or “consti- tute a general danger.” 12 A Martial Law Governor, who is appointed by the president, has the right

to authorize preventive as well as prohibitive actions against such materials. According to the 1965 decree No.6 it is also illegal to “oppose the aims of the revolution” and to publish “false informa- tion with the intention of shaking the confidence of the masses in the aims of the revolution.” 13

This chapter provides a brief overview over the mechanisms by which media are controlled in Syria. For space reasons I will not talk about radio and television broadcasting, but focus on print media, which represents the heavily controlled old media, and the Internet, which is relatively di f- ficult to control, although some efforts have been made to restrict access to politically unwanted information and freemail services.

2.1. Print Media Censorship

The initially quoted statement of Bashar Al- Assad demonstrates that he ascribes a very clear-cut role to the print media. In his opinion it must promote the official agenda of national de- velopment. For him print media is a tool for pursuing official state policies. A system of media control, which marginalizes and criminalizes dissenting views, makes sure that the print media fulfills this obligation. Preventative and prohibitive censorship are certainly the most obvious means of media control. Based on the emergency law and different decrees the Martial Law Gov- ernor is autho rized to arrest journalists and censor newspapers, periodicals, broadcast, drawings, and all other means of communication before i ssue. He can also seize, confiscate, suspend and close the places where, and the machines with which unwanted media is produced. Apart from direct ce nsorship, the state controls print media by owning it. All Syrian print media are owned

11 Zubaidi 2004, p.77 12 Quoted in: Zubaidi 2004, p.81 13 Quoted in: Zubaidi 2004, p.81

6