Yale University, Fall 2006
American Conservatism in the 20th Century
January 21, 2008

Partnership of convenience
Neoconservatism and the difficult defense of capitalism against the Left and the Right

by

Simon M. Ingold

Table of contents

1. Introduction... 3

2. Defining neoconservatism: origins of an intellectual ideology... 5

3. Variants of capitalism and neoconservative philosophy... 9

3.1. The liberal attack: Defending capitalism against the counterculture... 10
3.2. The losing battle: Saving capitalism from libertarian encroachment... 14

4. Conclusion... 18

5. Bibliography... 20

1. Introduction

This paper attempts to undertake a seemingly trivial task: to outline the relationship between two sets of ideas, neoconservatism and capitalism. There are a number of factors, however, that add complexity to the analysis. First of all “conventional wisdom” has gradually tainted an objective and sober appraisal of neoconservatism. Against the backdrop of the steady rise of neoconservatism since the late 1960s and its increasingly visible influence on government policies and the political culture in America, criticism arose not only in the liberal camp but also in conservative (or “paleoconservative”) circles. Precisely because the figureheads of the emerging neoconservative movement were outspoken and controversial – Norman Podhoretz was notorious for ferociously lashing out against opponents and allies alike – they scandalized their political adversaries as well as those parts of the public that were willing to listen. It is no surprise then that the debate on neoconservatism became highly emotionalized, thereby clouding its fundamental tenets and contributing to a “semantic quicksand that swallows all meaningful distinctions in American politics.”¹ Almost everyone seemed to have an opinion on the topic. As a consequence, it has become somewhat of a challenge to separate myth from fact.
On a direct level, then, neoconservatives themselves bear responsibility for the confusion. A serious attempt was never made on their part to provide an exhaustive definition of their ideology and its foundations. This is partly due to the fact that the neoconservative thrust was strongly personality-driven. Hence Irving Kristol is dubbed the “godfather” of the movement to this day. Whenever strong personalities fight a common cause, however, consensus remains elusive. This puts into question the concept of a “movement” proper. It also virtually precludes agreement on a topic such as capitalism. Although neoconservatives share views on the desirability of a market economy, they are divided by more than nuances in regards to its concrete form. These internal differences escape conventional wisdom, however. Instead, critics have found it expedient to portray neoconservatives as the apologetics of a free market capitalism gone wild.² It is therefore usually assumed that neoconservatism and capitalism mesh by default.
While adding complexity, the factors just mentioned also provide the justification for a thorough examination of the neoconservative-capitalist nexus. In order to do so, we shall begin with a brief synopsis of the salient features of neoconservative thinking. This is essen- tial for the subsequent discussion of the neoconservative perspective on different aspects of capitalism. The chronological focus will be mainly on the 1960s and 1970s during which neoconservative ideology and radical leftist counterculture simultaneously emerged. This parallelism was critical in shaping the intellectual development of neoconservatives. Some references will also be made to the 1980s which provided an environment strikingly different from the two preceding decades.

2. Defining neoconservatism: origins of an intellectual ideology

Neoconservatism did not emerge from a vacuum. Its origins are deeply rooted in the intellectual climate of the post-war period. In fact, the essential characteristic of neoconservatism lies in its reactionary nature, whereas reaction is to be understood in its literal sense. Neoconservatism was not an innovation per se, it was a direct response to an existing set of ideas. Blumenthal notes that “conservatism requires liberalism for its meaning.”³ Accordingly, denunciation is its favourite mode of expression.⁴ In the wake of the New Deal, a virtually undisputed liberal consensus had been firmly established in the United States to the extent that some declared the end of ideology.⁵ Sceptics criticized that this broad based consensus had spawned a liberal establishment, or “ideological ruling class” that dominated the political discourse, riding on the coattails of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society. This “New Class,” which was “half analytic concept, half polemical device”⁶ served as a diffuse collective term for such equally fuzzy expressions as the “university-government-media”⁷ complex and conjured up conspiracy theories. The concern raised by critics of the New Class was that its existence was contingent on the expansion of government. By putting forward demands such as a shift in public expenditures towards welfare and more equality, the New Class overburdened the government.8 The resulting crisis of authority undermined the legitimacy of the governing institutions, thereby threatening the stability of the social fabric. Hence critics called for a reassertion of authority and for the insulation of the government from excessive demands by the New Class. The crisis had cultural roots, not institutional ones. It was nihilism, the perceived lack of values and norms, that troubled the nascent neoconservative movement. It is important to note that the voices of caution at the time were affiliated with the Left themselves, either as socialists or Marxists. By the time the New Class and counterculture emerged in the 1960s, this small group of critical thinkers was utterly disillusioned with liberalism. They became conservatives “not by inheritance, but by conversion.”⁹ This consequential step bears witness to a sense of alienation that is a recurrent theme in neoconservative self-consciousness.

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1 T. V. McAllister. (2003). Reagan and the Transformation of American Conservatism. In W. E. Brownlee & H. D. Graham (Eds.), The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and Its Legacies. Kansas: University Press, p. 40.

2 The late Milton Friedman’s sympathetic view of neoconservatism certainly contributed to the popularity of this assumption.

3 S. Blumenthal. (1986). The Rise of the Counterculture: From Conservative Ideology to Political Power. New York: Times Books, p. 6.

4 Ibid., p. 131.

5 Cf. L. Hartz. (1991; original 1955). The Liberal Tradition in America. Orlando: Harcourt.

6 P. Steinfels. (1979). The Neoconservatives. New York: Touchstone, p. 57.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., p. 58.

9 G. Dorrien. (1993). The Neoconservative Mind. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, p. 7.