TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ACRONYMS
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1.1. Background of Uganda’s oil and gas industry
1.2. Statement of the Problem
1.4. Objectives of the study
1.5. Research Questions
1.6. Scope of the Study
1.7. Chapter synopsis
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Summary of Literature Review
2.1.1. Overview of PSAs in other African countries: NIGERIA
2.1.2. Challenges of relying on PSAs as a contractual regime in the oil and gas sector.
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.0. Legal Context and Research Setting
3.1. Research Design
3.1.2. Area of Study
3.1.3. Research Method
3.2. Sample and Sampling Techniques
3.3. Data Collection Strategy/Methods
3.3.1 Documentary Review
3.4. Data Analysis Plan
3.5. Case study approach
3.6. Ethical Considerations
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Recap of research objectives
4.2 Synchronizing Primary and Secondary findings
4.2.1 The legal frameworks on PSAs in Uganda’s oil and gas industry
4.2.2 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995
4.2.3 The Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act, 2013 (the Upstream Act)
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Discussion of conclusions
5.2 Limitations of the Study
5.2.1 Inadequate time and funds
5.2.2 Limited availability of literature, data about the topic under study
5.2.3 Confidentiality policy in oil and gas transactions
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research
This work would not have been possible without the assistance and management of many people. Although it is not possible to mention all of them here by name, I would like particularly to thank and acknowledge the following:
I wish to thank my Supervisor, Mr Ivan Mugabi who has been more than generous with his expertise, guidance and precious time. I specially thank him for his countless hours of reflecting, reading, encouraging, and most of all patience throughout the entire process.
I would like to acknowledge and thank my university especially the Institute of Petroleum Studies Kampala for allowing me to conduct my research and providing any assistance requested.
I am grateful to all of those with whom I have had the pleasure to work during this and other related projects. I would like to thank my parents especially my father Mr Kaahwa James and my mother the late Kyomugisa Margret, whose love and guidance are with me in whatever I pursue. They are the ultimate role models. Most importantly, I wish to thank my friends, Sylvia, Brian, and Charles who have provided unending inspiration.
LIST OF ACRONYMS
1. CNOOC -Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation
2. IOC -International Oil Company
3. NOC -National Oil Company
4. PAU -Petroleum Authority of Uganda
5. PSA -Production Sharing Agreement
6. STOIIP -Stock Tank Oil Initially In Place
7. FDI -Foreign Direct Investments
8. OFID -OPEC Fund for International development
9. PEDP -Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act
10. NNPC -Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation
11. NNOC -Nigerian National Oil Corporation
This research paper analyses the existing laws and regulatory frameworks in the oil and gas sector with a particular focus on Uganda’s oil and gas industry. This research analyses the background of the country’s oil and gas industry with specific reference to the adaptation of the Production sharing agreement (PSA) model in as far as oil and gas contracts are concerned.
The research commences by undertaking an in depth analysis of the basic laws, regulatory, policy and institutional frameworks concerning the management and administration of the oil and gas sector. The research then focuses on the legal framework on the PSA model pertaining to the ownership of the resources, the issuing of licenses and concessions, in as well as efforts undertaken to safeguard the effects of signing PSAs on aspects of environmental protection.
This research is also designed to critically analyse the weaknesses and strengths of the current legal regime as well as identifying the gaps in laws relating to the applicability of PSAs and measures being taken to tackle such gaps in the regulatory framework of the country and exploring the ways in which aspects of transparency and effective management of the oil and gas industry are concerned.
The research paper also discusses if other factors such as the different stakeholders like media houses, civil societies, Non-governmental organisations and International Oil and gas companies have a had a role to play in influencing the PSA model as the most appropriate choice of the Ugandan oil and gas contracts .
Conclusively the research puts forward recommendations regarding how the gaps in the legal framework on the PSA model should integrate or regulate the identifiable influences of other stakeholders in Uganda’s oil and gas industry.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) are one of the most popular types of contractual arrangements that are being used for petroleum exploration and development activities.1
According to Taverne2, PSAs are a form of contract between an oil company (contractor) usually an International oil company (IOC) and a state entity usually the National Oil Company (NOC) where the latter authorises or grants rights to the former to exploit and develop an oil and gas field by providing technical and financial services for the oil and gas operations and in return for the risk taken and services rendered IOCs are compensated in accordance with the terms of the PSA.3
However under a PSA, host countries retain the ownership of the natural resources and the oil produced which is only subject to the IOCs’ share. Host countries are also allowed to participate in oil exploitation and development processes to any extent as is expressly stipulated in the PSAs.4
PSAs give developing countries an opportunity to reap and benefit from the technical resources provided by the IOCs in the development of the oil and gas industry without incurring any financial burdens.5
PSAs were first used in Indonesia in the 1960s in order to facilitate the exploitation of natural resources and to enable the country retain ownership and control of the natural resources and the exploitation and development processes respectively.6 PSAs were adopted as a new legal regime to replace concessions that allowed IOCs not only to own but also to manage oil and gas projects which was to the detriment of the host countries and its people consequently leading to stagnation in these projects.7
PSAs have been widely adopted by especially developing countries because of the need for foreign investment due to their inadequate potential or limited financial and technical abilities in terms of exploiting and developing these natural resources. The advantage of the PSA regime in terms of a developing country such as Uganda is that the financing risk is borne by IOCs and the ownership to petroleum remains with the host government.8
They have also been adopted because of their nature to increase the generation of revenues for the benefit of both the state and its people thus their acceptance and usage globally today9.
PSAs are different from other types of petroleum contracts in such a way that under a PSA the IOCs carry the entire risk of exploitation and development of oil and gas projects by investing in the technical and financial services required and are in return compensated by a share of oil produced referred to as “Cost recovery oil” 10 in accordance with the terms of the agreement.11 However, key to note is that an IOC is only rewarded dependant on the oil produced which implies that if no commercial production is made then they do not recover the costs incurred12.
Under PSAs, IOCs carry out majority of the oil and gas operations but under the supervision of the host state through a committee made up of representatives of the parties13.
IOCs are entitled to recover expenses incurred in the carrying out of petroleum activities through “Cost recovery oil” 14 . After deduction of the cost oil, the remainder is referred to as “profit oil” and this is shared between the contracting parties in accordance with the pre-agreed formula in the agreement, however the host state retains ownership of the natural resources and oil produced.
Host governments have the rationale to impose royalties on gross production rather than profit15. IOCs are subjected to payment of income tax chargeable on its share of the profit oil16, export taxes, production and discovery bonuses in accordance with the terms of the PSA and the laws applicable.
Uganda in particular runs a hybrid PSA which in addition to cost and profit oil requires IOCs to pay other royalties prescribed by law such as the discovery and production bonuses. It is important to note that PSAs differ in different ways depending on the legal framework, negotiations between the IOCs and host governments and the geological risk profile17.
This research paper analyses the existing legal frameworks on Production Sharing Agreements in the oil and gas industry with a particular focus on Uganda’s oil and gas industry and hence commences by briefly highlighting the background of the country’s oil and gas industry.
1.1. Background of Uganda’s oil and gas industry
Uganda is located on Eastern subcontinent of Sub-Saharan Africa bordered by South Sudan in the North, Kenya from the East, Democratic Republic of Congo in the west, Tanzania from the south and Rwanda in the Southwest18.
Uganda made her first commercial discovery of petroleum in 2006 in the Albertine Graben in the western part of the country with an estimated total volume of about 6.5 billion barrels Stock Tank Oil Initially In Place (STOIIP) out of which 1.4 billion barrels of oil are recoverable and 500 billion cubic feet of gas resources.19 Since the discovery of petroleum resources in Uganda, the country put forward stringent measures to address key elements of exploration, development and production of the country’s oil and gas resources among which measures included enacting laws namely; The Petroleum(Exploration, Development and Production) Act, 2013, The Petroleum ( Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream storage Act, 2013, the formulation of a National Oil and Gas policy of 2008, establishment of the Petroleum Authority of Uganda (PAU) and the National Oil Company (NOC) whose mandate is to regulate the different key players in the industry and to handle commercial interests of the state and its participation in the industry respectively20.
To date, nine production licenses have been issued by the government of Uganda to licensed companies. And subsequently government is now proceeding to development, production and commercialization of the oil and gas resources.21 The production Licenses have been awarded over the blocks of the Kingfisher project in Hoima and Kikuube districts that were issued to CNOOC in 2012. Five production Licenses were also awarded to Tullow Uganda Ltd and these are being operated since 2016 over blocs of Mputa-Nziz-Waraga, Kasamene-Wahrindi, Kigogole-Ngara, Nsoga and Ngege fields. Additionally, other three production Licenses were issued to Total E&P Uganda in 2016 over blocs situated regions of Ngiri, Jobi-Rii and Gunya fields.
The development and production of the oil resources shall at the moment be executed through two separate projects, one at Tilenga project in Buliisa and Nwoya districts and the other at the Kingfisher Project in Hoima and Kukuube districts.
Commercialisation shall be undertaken through a country refinery with capacity of up to 60,000 bpd as well as the East African Crude Oil Pipeline with capacity of up to 180,000 bpd respectively which projects are being developed concurrently to receive the first oil by 2022/23.22
1.2. Statement of the Problem
The exploration, extraction and production of oil and gas is a very expensive and complex process that involves use of highly trained technocrats and sophisticated technological machinery. Due to the complexity and expenses involved in the extraction of hydro-carbons, less developed countries such as Uganda face a very big challenge since they lack availability of adequate expertise in terms of the required human resource, technology and the finances for sustaining activities of the oil and gas industry.
In the circumstances, in order to tackle this challenge, developing countries with oil and gas natural resources have a tendency of subcontracting the usually more experienced multinational companies with the capacity to exploit and produce the oil and gas.
Such commercial relationships with multinational companies are made possible through contractual arrangements such as Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) which can be broadly defined as an agreement or contract between an oil and gas company (IOCs/ contractor) and a national oil company/ state party (NOC).23
Developing an effective legal and policy frameworks for regulating these commercial contracts in the oil and gas industry plays a key role in determining the investment levels in the industry. It is important to design, develop and adopt a logically coherent legal framework to protect the priorities and objectives of the host governments as well as providing a conducive environment for foreign investment.
In that context, Uganda has enacted different laws and policies to regulate the oil and gas industry for example the, Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act, 2013, The Petroleum (Refining, conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage) act, 2013, The Public Finance Management Act, 2015 among others.
Under the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act, 2013, Laws of Uganda section 6 (2) of, the Minister shall develop or cause to be developed a model Production Sharing Agreement or any other model agreement as maybe entered into by Government under this section which shall be submitted to Cabinet for approval.
Furthermore, according to Section 6 (3) of the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act, 2013, The Minister shall lay before Parliament the model Production Sharing Agreement or any other model agreement approved by Cabinet under subsection (2).
Finally, Section 6 (4) of the same act also requires that a model agreement approved by Cabinet shall guide negotiations of any future agreements under this section.
Though the Ugandan government has taken greater strides in enacting laws for regulating the oil and gas industry, there is still a need of designing a more comprehensive legal and institutional policy framework on Production sharing agreement models.
Uganda’s legal and regulatory framework limits the powers of designing and negotiating the PSA terms to the minister in charge of the industry and manifests a narrow focus on environmental protection in the oil rich regions. Other areas that still have room for improvement relate to negotiating and overseeing PSAs as well as the management of oil revenue collection from and by beneficiary entities and hence this research.
The importance of this research is based on the usefulness of its findings in ensuring the future adopting of viable policies by the Government of Uganda, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development and other oil and gas institutions such as the Petroleum Authority of Uganda (PAU).
The study is equally useful to other researchers and/ or academicians in fields of oil and gas, energy governance and geologists aspiring to improve their knowledge on legal frameworks and regulatory tools governing Production sharing agreements in the oil and gas industry.
1.4. Objectives of the study
i. To identify the current state of the legal frameworks in Uganda’s oil and gas industry.
ii. To investigate ways in which Ugandan laws fails affording an effective legal framework for regulating actors involved in the country’s production sharing agreements.
iii. To examine how the gaps in the frameworks of Ugandan oil and gas laws lead to compromising capabilities of regulatory and institutional actors in supervising and managing actors in the country’s production sharing agreements of the oil and gas industry.
iv. To put forward possible recommendations or measures to fill the legal gaps with possible reforms in regulatory frameworks on Production Sharing agreements.
1.5. Research Questions
i. What is the current state of the legal frameworks in Uganda’s oil and gas industry?
ii. What are the ways in which Ugandan laws fails affording an effective legal framework for regulating actors involved in the country’s production sharing agreements?
iii. What are the gaps in the frameworks of Ugandan oil and gas laws that lead to compromising capabilities of regulatory and institutional actors in supervising and managing actors in the country’s production sharing agreements of the oil and gas industry?
iv. What are the possible recommendations or measures that can be undertaken to fill the legal gaps in regulatory frameworks on Production Sharing agreements?
1.6. Scope of the Study
The scope of this research shall cover three areas namely the Content, geographical and time scopes.
i. Content Scope
The research focuses on reviewing if and how the Ugandan law is affording an effective and viable legal framework for acting as a regulatory and institutional tool for governing production sharing agreements as used in the oil and gas industry in Uganda’s industry.
ii. Time Scope
The research covers data from 2006 to present and this is because Uganda made her first commercial discovery of oil and gas in 2006 and a lot of policies, laws and institutions have been adopted and put in place to guide and regulate the oil and gas industry hence the time scope choice was influenced by the availability and accessibility of data for this particular period.
iii. Geographical Scope
The research focuses on Uganda’s oil and gas industry in as far as its Geographical scope is concerned. Uganda made her first commercial oil discovery in 2006 and has not yet started commercial production this makes her one of the African countries in which oil and gas industry remains a recent economic activity in its formative stages. Uganda’s oil and gas industry still has considerable gaps and lessons of good practice to learn from other African countries with a longer period of experience in this industry hence a suitable choice for purposes of the geographical scope.
1.7. Chapter synopsis
The research will be comprised of five (5) distinct chapters.
This chapter will cover the introductory and explanatory part of the study by discussing aspects of the study; the background information of the research topic, statement of the research problem, general and specific objectives, research questions, limitations, highlighting the significance and scope of the study, give a brief description of the study methodology and a summary of the literature review which will be discussed fully in the second chapter.
The second chapter will review the available literature on the subject matter in much broader detail and at this stage the researcher will identify and compare what other authors have previously discussed in relation to this topic, consequently establishing the presently existing body of knowledge on the legal framework on product sharing agreements remains among the major objectives of the chapter. This chapter shall also critically examine such literature with an aim of also highlighting and pointing where the gaps subsist in the available literature, in so doing this chapter shall be fulfilling its second objective of demonstrating how this work builds upon work of other scholars and which gaps it addresses
The third chapter will discuss the methodology that will be adopted and used in the course of the research. This chapter shall further explain the suitable research design and the contractual law theory on unconscionable bargains as the theoretical/conceptual framework of the analysis of law and PSA.
It will also explain the choices made for the methodological and theoretical framework.
The fourth chapter will discuss the findings of the research taking into account the research observations and discussing how the theoretical framework is applicable to the findings. The findings shall be used as a basis for the measures or recommendations.
The fifth chapter will be the last chapter of the research and shall discuss the conclusions and recommendations to the findings of the research.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Although there is a lot of literature on the legal frameworks related to the oil and gas industry, there is limited literature when it comes to the area of the legal regimes regulating production sharing agreements in the oil and gas industry. Even the presently identifiable literature remains far from being comprehensible and falls short in terms of exploring the relationship between substantive law on production sharing agreements and ways in which that law has effectively regulated the respective parties involved in different activities along the chain of exploration and production stages. The above observation accounts for the research gaps in the existing body of knowledge in as far as legal frameworks on production sharing agreements are concerned. Therefore this study is set out to review the present literature in line with the research objectives and questions of the study.
2.1. Summary of Literature Review
Eze Emem Chioma24, expounds an account of the complexity of the processes associated with the exploitation and production of hydrocarbons.
This proponent further states that undertaking petroleum operations has pre-requisites such as being highly capital demanding and technologically intensive that would require high-profile skills and expertise.25 The scholar also notes that this sector involves complicated highly risky activities such as surveying, identifying, exploiting, transporting and storing and discovering hydrocarbons deposits.26, It is imperative to note that the availability of the above pre-requisites are usually inadequate in developing countries. Consequently developing countries are more likely to grant their rights of oil exploitation and development to International Oil Companies (hereafter the IOC) that have the capacity to carry such investments in the oil and gas industry
The transferring of those exploitation rights is normally done by granting licenses or concessions and contractual arrangements depending on the preferred level of State participation by the hosting State and the extent of control granted the State concerned to the IOC.27
According to Eze Emem Chioma, concessions were the earliest form of arrangement under which IOCs were granted total and exclusive ownership rights over a specific area. Such concessionary rights not only relate to the ownership of hydrocarbons produced within a particular area but also confer such rights for a given period of time that usually ranges from 70-90 years. Concessions were also subject to the obligatory payment of royalties and other taxes related remittances like the income tax, among others. All risks were borne by the concessionaire simply because of the nature of the concessions, and as a result all benefits, attendant rights and interests in the petroleum, control of production and development activities were all in favour of the concessionaire.28
In line with the UN Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of 1962, licenses were introduced as newer form of concessions. Licences are often but not always perceivable as standardised contractual regimes that are found in legislation and are commonly used in developed countries like the UK, Norway among others.29 The most unique feature with licenses is the possibility of retaining ownership over the natural resources by the host state while granting exclusive rights to IOCs. Given the legality of those mining rights, the IOC can carry out petroleum activities within a given contract area for a period usually between 20-30years.30
Contractual arrangements that are capable of being adopted by parties within the oil and gas industry include Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) which have been adopted by especially developing countries because of the need to maintain the stability of the contractual obligations between the parties through stabilisation and renegotiation clauses.31 Eze Emem Chioma, adopted Taverne’s definition of PSAs that means a contract between an oil company (contractor usually an IOC and a State entity usually the National Oil Company (the NOC). In terms of the operational mechanisms for PSA, the NOC authorises the IOC to carry out petroleum operations within a contract area in accordance with the terms of the agreement.32
According to this form of contractual arrangement, the IOCs takes on the various risks and expenses as well rights of exploitation, development, and production
Those rights are compensated in accordance with the terms of the PSA whereas the host State retains the supervisory role and ownership over all the natural resources and produced oil. The PSAs also allow developing countries to reap and benefit from the technical resources provided by the IOCs in the development of the oil and gas industry without having to shoulder the financial burden.33
However, IOCs sometimes take advantage of the financial weaknesses of developing countries to negotiate the PSA terms and conditions in their favour. Meaning that even though the States hosting the IOC retains ownership of the natural resources, those States are always subject to accept whatever share of the oil barrels that are claimed to be produced by the IOCs.
It is also noted from Eze Emem Chioma’s analysis that the objectives of the parties to a PSA differ, in such a way that on one hand, the aim of the host States is maximising revenue and retaining the sovereign control over its natural resources as whereas the IOCs on the other hand are more interested in profit maximisation as and recovering the expenses incurred when investing in the oil and gas sector.34
Conclusively, the author discusses advantages of PSAs to developing countries in terms of enabling these countries to maximise their benefits from the oil and gas resources. However, Eze Emem Chioma’s analysis largely limited in terms of failing to expound on possible risks that developing countries are likely to face because of licencing national proprietary interests in natural resources to a percentage share of the oil and gas ratios which are influenced by IOCs. The above author also emphasizes the value of preserving the sanctity of contractual arrangements between parties. This is achievable by illustrating the importance of stabilisation clauses and renegotiation clauses in the PSAs. Eze Emem Chioma further states that stabilisation clauses are vital in reinforcing the principle of “pacta sunt servand” by committing the host State to ensure the stability of any applicable regulatory framework needed in governing the agreement. Such commitment is important in balancing the "stability" and "flexibility" needs of both the IOC and the host state. This proponent also states that a renegotiation clause that is well drafted must provide necessary economic equilibrium for the overall effectiveness of PSAs.
1 Kristen Bindemann, “Production Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis” Oxford Institute for Energy studies, WPM 25, October, 1999.
2 Bernard Taverne, "Production Sharing Agreements in Principle and Practice" in M.R. David (ed.), Upstream Oil and Gas Agreements (1996), p.44.
3 N’di and T.W. Walde, "Stabilising International Investment Commitments: International Law versus Contract Interpretation" (2003) 1 O.G.E.L. Archive Issue 32.
4 Kristen Bindemann, “Production Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis” Oxford Institute for Energy studies, WPM 25, October, 1999.
6 Achmad Zen Umar Purba, 'Production Sharing Contract: Is It within Private or Public Domain' (2009) 7 Indonesian J Int'l L 21
7 Kristen Bindemann, “Production Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis” Oxford Institute for Energy studies, WPM 25, October, 1999.
8 Ali Ssekatawa, “Understanding Cost Recovery in Uganda’s Petroleum Sector”, https://pau.go.ug/site/assets/files/1105/article_on_cost_management_final.pdf accessed on 5th May, 2020
9 Achmad Zen Umar Purba, 'Production Sharing Contract: Is It within Private or Public Domain' (2009) 7 Indonesian J Int'l L 21
10 Miguel Branco, "Product Sharing Agreements-Legal Blessing or Curse for Developing Countries?" (2012) 4 I.E.L.R. 147, 148
11 N’di and T.W. Walde, "Stabilising International Investment Commitments: International Law versus Contract Interpretation" (2003) 1 O.G.E.L. Archive Issue 32.
12 Bernard Taverne, "Production Sharing Agreements in Principle and Practice" in M.R. David (ed.), Upstream Oil and Gas Agreements (1996), p.44.
13 Miguel Branco, "Product Sharing Agreements-Legal Blessing or Curse for Developing Countries?" (2012) 4 I.E.L.R. 147, 148.
14 M. Branco, "Product Sharing Agreements-Legal Blessing or Curse for Developing Countries?" (2012) 4 I.E.L.R. 147, 148
15 Bryan Land, "Capturing a Fair Share of Fiscal Benefits in Extractive Industry" (2009) 18(1) Transnational Corporations 157.
16 Tade Onyewunmi, "Stabilisation and Renegotiation Clauses in Production Sharing Contracts: Examining the Problems and Key Issues" 276, 277.
17 Ali Ssekatawa, “Understanding Cost Recovery in Uganda’s Petroleum Sector”, <https://pau.go.ug/site/assets/files/1105/article_on_cost_management_final.pdf> accessed on 5th May, 2020
18 The oil and gas sector in Uganda, <https://pau.go.ug/site/assets/files/1116/uganda_oil_and_gas_sector_brochure-_april_2019.pdf> accessed 24th March, 2020.
19 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development; Uganda’s Second oil and gas licensing round, <http://www.energyandminerals.go.ug/site/assets/files/1275/africa_oil_article-final_eddition2-1.pdf> accessed on 24th March, 2020.
20 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development; Uganda’s Second oil and gas licensing round, <http://www.energyandminerals.go.ug/site/assets/files/1275/africa_oil_article-final_eddition2-1.pdf> accessed on 24th March, 2020.
21 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development; Uganda’s Second oil and gas licensing round, <http://www.energyandminerals.go.ug/site/assets/files/1275/africa_oil_article-final_eddition2-1.pdf> accessed on 24th March, 2020.
22 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development; Uganda’s Second oil and gas licensing round, <http://www.energyandminerals.go.ug/site/assets/files/1275/africa_oil_article-final_eddition2-1.pdf> accessed on 24th March, 2020.
23 Miguel Soares Branco: Product Sharing Agreements-Legal Blessing or curse for developing countries, I.EL.R. 2012, 4, Pg 2.
24 Eze Emem Chioma; “Examining the crucial impact of a well drafted stabilisation and renegotiation clause on production sharing agreements” I.E.L.R, 2015, 5,212-217
25 Eze Emem Chioma; “Examining the crucial impact of a well drafted stabilisation and renegotiation clause on production sharing agreements” I.E.L.R, 2015, 5,212-217
26 Eze Emem Chioma; “Examining the crucial impact of a well drafted stabilisation and renegotiation clause on production sharing agreements” I.E.L.R, 2015, 5,212-217
27 Nutaroot Pongsiri, “Partnership in Oil and Gas Production-Sharing Contracts” (2015) 17(5) International Journal of Public Sector Management 431-442
28 Tade Oyewunmi, “Natural Gas Exploration and Production in Nigeria and Mozambique: Legal and Contractual Clauses,” (2015) 13(1) O.G.E.L. 2.
30 Eze Emem Chioma; “Examining the crucial impact of a well drafted stabilisation and renegotiation clause on production sharing agreements” I.E.L.R, 2015, 5,212-217
31 Nutaroot Pongsiri, “Partnership in Oil and Gas Production-Sharing Contracts” (2015) 17(5) International Journal of Public Sector Management 431-442
32 Bernard Taverne, "Production Sharing Agreements in Principle and Practice" in M.R. David (ed.), Upstream Oil and Gas Agreements (1996), p.44.
34 Eze Emem Chioma; “Examining the crucial impact of a well drafted stabilisation and renegotiation clause on production sharing agreements” I.E.L.R, 2015, 5,212-217