In this essay; the background of the insurgencies in Somali, counterinsurgency (COIN) responses from Ethiopia and the United States, and the reaction of insurgents will be summarized.
Somali/Somalia is considered as a “failed state” by the international community, for it does not have functioning state institutions since the fall of Siad Barre regime in 1991. The constant political and humanitarian crises in Somalia have deeper roots in history. The territories where Somali people lived were colonized by French (north, today’s Djibouti), British (today’s Somaliland) and Italian (southern parts of today’s Somali) states. While the imperial powers shared lands in Africa in 18th and 19th centuries, none of them considered exactly what is happening on the soil and which ethnic groups were living where. The borders that were drawn on maps have created enormous problems in the future that no one would ever imagined before. The different agendas and interests of imperial states have initiated conflicts among tribes (or clans), such as British was involved in extracting resources, while Italians were improving cultivation in southern parts. These different kinds of exploitation by imperial powers caused disputes about land and water resources among Somali clans.
At a glance
- Examines Ethiopian and US counterinsurgency alongside the African Union mission in Somalia
- Examines AMISOM’s shift toward decapitation, city liberation and increased troop strength
- 22 sources in the bibliography
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Background:
2.1 Somalia After Independence, 1969 Coup d’état and Ziad Barre Regime
2.2 Fall of Barre Regime, Civil War, Somaliland’s Declaration of Independence, Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Ethiopian Invasions, Transitional Governments, Al‐Shabaab, AMISOM
3. Lessons Learned from AMISOM
4. Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
This essay examines how counterinsurgency strategies pursued by Ethiopia, the United States and the African Union Mission in Somalia relate to the growth of Al‐Shabaab. It places foreign interventions and insurgent responses in the context of Somalia’s political history and asks how these strategies contributed to the movement’s development.
- Colonial legacies, independence and Siad Barre’s rule
- Civil war, clan politics and transitional governments
- The emergence of Islamic movements and Al‐Shabaab
- Ethiopian and US interventions in Somalia
- AMISOM’s mandate and counterinsurgency strategy
- Local legitimacy and humanitarian consequences
Excerpt from the Book
Somalia After Independence, 1969 Coup d’état and Siad Barre Regime
Somalian state had many structural problems after gaining independence from colonial powers (British in the north and Italian in the south) and unification of post‐colonial north and south. The systems such as education, taxation, governing, trainings in the military were all different than each other in the north and south, one in British style and the other Italian. Somalia tried to merge these two systems and eliminate the discrepancies between the regions; however, it did not work well as thought (Dualeh, 1994). There were many politicians from both regions who opposed the unification of two counties because of this huge divergency. Also, the majority and the influence in politics were in the hands of southern, which created opposition in the north against united Somalia. Doraad and Hawiye clans from south were the dominant groups in power between 1960 and 1969. The clan culture and structure are quite powerful and effective in Somalia, although politicians and religious authorities have tried to create more powerful Islamic identity among all Somalis and dissolve all clan‐based discriminations and problems, it has never really worked (Ndegwa, 2018). Northern clans felt left out after the unification, and they were losing money and resources because of the structural changes made in favor of southern people; such as the changes in taxation system (Dualeh, 1994).
In the 60s after independence, Somalia had two parliamentary elections, respectively in 1964 and 1969, and between those they had presidential elections in 1967. Abdirashid Sharmake was elected as president, however, he could only serve two years as president since he was assassinated on 15th October 1969 by one of his guards. Right after Sharmake’s funeral, the military took control of the administration in the country. The military regime, under Siad Barre’s control, has abolished the government, the constitution and supreme court, banned the political parties (Hussein, 2017).
Sharmake’s assassination was never thoroughly investigated. Since the government of Somalia had close ties with the West until 1969 and afterwards Barre regime had embraced socialism as a mere ideology of Somalian state, conspiracies about Sharmake’s death were mainly as follows: attack was planned and realized by support of Soviet Union (Ingiriis, 2017). One of the incidents that can work for these conspiracies would be that the military got fully armed and alarmed after president’s death, which would be in normal circumstances impossible because the Somalian army had to lock up their arms every night until they get orders from generals. Basically, after the funeral of president, Barre and his comrades did not have to find ways to arm the soldiers and make the coup, the army was already armed and ready, and this made it easier for top generals in the army to declare the military government (Dualeh, 1994).
Chapter Summaries
Introduction: The introduction outlines Somalia’s colonial history, political crises and the foreign involvement that frames the essay’s inquiry into Al‐Shabaab.
Background: This section traces developments from independence and Barre’s rule through civil war, the rise of Islamic movements and the interventions of Ethiopia, the United States and AMISOM.
Lessons Learned from AMISOM: This section considers the mission’s strategy, local legitimacy, coordination and treatment of civilians in the context of its counterinsurgency campaign.
Conclusion: The conclusion brings together the author’s assessment of foreign intervention, Somali political struggles and Al‐Shabaab’s growth.
Keywords
Somalia, Al‐Shabaab, counterinsurgency, Ethiopia, United States, AMISOM, African Union, foreign intervention, Islamic Courts Union, Transitional Federal Government, clan politics, political legitimacy, humanitarian crisis
Frequently Asked Questions
What is this work about?
It examines the relationship between foreign counterinsurgency interventions in Somalia and the growth of Al‐Shabaab.
What are its central topics?
The essay discusses Somali political history, clan relations, Islamic movements, foreign intervention, counterinsurgency and the legitimacy of governing institutions.
What is the main research question?
It asks how the counterinsurgency strategies of Ethiopia, the United States and AMISOM contributed to Al‐Shabaab’s growth.
What research method does the author use?
The author presents a historical and analytical discussion drawing on published scholarship, institutional reports and other cited sources.
What does the main body cover?
It follows Somalia’s history from independence through civil war and transitional governments, then discusses Islamic movements, foreign interventions and AMISOM’s campaign.
Which keywords characterize the work?
Key terms include Somalia, Al‐Shabaab, counterinsurgency, Ethiopia, the United States, AMISOM, clan politics and political legitimacy.
How does the essay discuss the Islamic Courts Union?
It describes the union’s emergence, its role in Somali governance and the Ethiopian intervention against it, before considering the subsequent rise of Al‐Shabaab.
How did AMISOM’s mandate change?
The essay describes a transition from a peacekeeping role focused on defending designated locations to a peace-enforcement mandate permitting military operations against Al‐Shabaab.
Why are clan relations important to the analysis?
The author considers clan relationships as part of Somalia’s political history and discusses their importance to local support, territorial access and the legitimacy of armed and governing actors.
- Quote paper
- Gülşah Gürsoy (Author), 2019, How the Counterinsurgency Strategies of Ethiopia, the United States and the AMISOM have Triggered the Growth of Al-Shabaab?, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1010487
