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Table of Abreviations
II. Hypotheses and Questions of Concern
III. Evidence and Discussion
3.1 Communists against Islamists
3.3 Islamism -as a political ideology based on Islam
3.4 Relations Between Tajik and Uzbek Policies
3.5 Policies in Tajikistan
3.6 The Islamic Renaissance Party -one of the fundementalist forces
3.7 The Emergence of the United Tajik Opposition
3.8 Policies in Uzbekistan
3.9 Islamist Threat in and from the Ferghana Valley
4. Establishment of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
4.1 Growing Influence of Islam and Islamism
4.2 Instrumentalization of Islam
4.3 The Ottoman Model
VII. Maps of Central Asia and Tajikistan
Table of Abreviations:
Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten
Central Asia’s future is hard to predict, “a rising China to the east, trans-border Islamic affinities, new opportunities for Iran and Turkey to increase their influence, and a declining Russian hegemon make for a volatile mix“.1 The problem in Central Asia is that rival forms of rule such as clan membership, Islam, and ethnic and regional affinities have not been replaced by centralizing, high-capacity states2. In this paper I would like to focus on what influence Islam in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan has on politics today. Furthermore, I would like to look at how Islam as a political factor is either excluded or integrated into political processes by analyzing what political Islamic groups there are and to what extent they are important. Since September 11 2001 the topic of Islamism has come to the forefront and I would like to focus on how big the treat of Islamist terrorism is in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Is it being influenced by Islamist forces in Afghanistan?
Analyzing the role of Islam today, one has to consider its influence during pre- revolutionary times, although never unified under a single state with borders coterminous with those of Soviet Central Asia, Central Asia3 once belonged to a common Islamic civilization that encompassed portions of modern-day Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and other regions and this distinctive cultural heritage is likely to exert a substantial influence on the internal processes and external relations between Central Asian states today4.
I have chosen Tajikistan and Uzbekistan because their leaders‘ strategies represent different models of dealing with Islam as a political factor: Tajikistan more openly by integrating Islam into politics and the other one by proceeding more of a policy of exclusion (Uzbekistan). Tajikistan is more in the sphere of influence of Afghanistan and Iran due to the fact that it belongs to a Persian context than to a Turkic one. Uzbekistan on the other hand is more in the sphere of influence of other Turkic Central Asian states and Turkey itself5. These different spheres of influence existed in pre-Soviet times, but they are still have an impact today. Even though Iran’s influence in Tajikistan is limited due to the fact that Iran is a Shiite country and the majority of Tajikistan‘s Muslim believers are Sunnite6.
II. Hypotheses and Questions of Concern :
1.) During Soviet times Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had only one way to go, the communist way. Since independence communism has stayed an alternative, but has lost influence. The possibilities that have opened since then are a state system based on Islamist principles, on nationalism or possibly on democratic principles even though these are not very influential yet. The leaders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have mainly chosen the nationalist path. Is this the most appropriate one to choose and could it be combined with other ideologies?
2.) Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are dealing with Islam as a political factor and with Islamism as a threat to internal and regional stability in different ways. In the following I would like to find out why this is the case. Which factors have led to such different policies?
3.) To a big extent Islam in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is instrumentalized in order to legitimize the use of force in on-going conflicts. Islamic symbols are used in order to gain supporters externally in the Muslim world. The question is why has Islam and Islamism7 gained so much popularity and influence since the independence of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan?
4.) Finally I would like to look at how Islam could be turned into a unifying and therefore stabilizing factor from partly being a threatening factor now. I would like to discuss whether the “Ottoman model“ concerning its association with Islam could be a possible model for Tajikistan or Uzbekistan.
III. Evidence and Discussion:
To a certain extent one could claim that there is a fight between ideologies going on in those countries. Especially in Tajikistan this has been very eminent. Analysts often claim that the two sides fighting against each other in the civil war in Tajikistan were basicly the communists against the Islamists.
3.1 Tajikistan: Communists against Islamists
The Khujandis, as the Communists, have been more interested in peserving their own interests than to address challenges of post-Soviet existence. During Soviet times the Khujandis were the main elite group in Tajikistan that cooperated with the Soviets. Therefore the Khujandis supported the Soviet ideology and in exchange for that a big amount of the Tajik budget ended up in this region. The Khujandis were the regional hegemon in Tajikistan during communist times. In order to keep this power position the Khujandis have held on to communism as their main ideology.
On the other side stood the opposition, mainly consisting of Islamist forces and mainly represented by the IRP with its strongholds in the Garm region, but also represented by the Democratic Party of Tajikistan which was aiming to introduce democracy and market economy, to eradicate localism and achieve a more equal distribution of power. “It is in this light that the Khujandi elites‘ power struggle with the opposition had ideological overtones.8
In general one has to be careful to use the term nation in this region because before this political category was forced on the indigenous populations as an organising principle by Stalin from the 1920s, on this understanding of the term did not exist in the region. In Central Asia a different concept of state than that of the nation-state has to be used. Because presenting Tajikistan in terms of ethnic categories such as “Tajiks“ and “Uzbeks“ means to impose a set of Western terms onto a constructed reality which does not exist in the region.9 For this concept the region is ethnically to diverse. The alternative would be a civic nationalism, based on the membership to the Tajik state as a citizen, no matter whether one is Tajik, Uzbek, Kyrgyz etc.
“In Central Asia the search for national identity has taken place against a distinctive but complex demographic and cultural background.“10 Central Asia’s historical connection to the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and China have left an imprint on all the new states. The relations between the Persian-related Tajiks and the Turkic peoples of Central Asia have been characterized especially since the Bolshevik revolution by a persistent element of cultural and political rivalry which was puposely pursued by the Soviet power. As a consequence none of the Central Asian peoples had a clearly developed sense of nationality. “Although a handful of intellectuals were committed nationalists, the bulk of the population was more firmly attached either to supranational identities, particularly an association with Islam, or to subnational clan, regional, or tribal loyalities, which exercised the strongest influence on the self- conception of most of the region’s inhabitants.“11 As the “Central Asian national republics were created by Moscow’s decree, the post-Soviet states of Central Asia still exhibit more marks of artificiality than do countries in which organic development outweighed administrative fiat in the shaping of the state.“12 Although distinctive Central Asian national identities did gradually coalesc around the national republics during the Soviet era, nationalist impulses in the region remained relatively weak at the time of the USSR’s collapse.“13 In no Central Asian country a nationalism developed in part due to tight political control maintained by local party chiefs even after Moscow’s proclamation of the principle of glasnost. According to Western speacialists, national consciousness has developed in the cities in Central Asia, but the identity of rural inhabitants still is defined primarily in terms of religious or regional affiliation“14. Nationalism has been instrumentalized by the former communist elites in order to hold on to their power positions.
Soviet ethnographic theory, which was based on language does not work for Tajikistan as it did for Uzbekistan to develop a Tajik nationalism because the language (Persian) is not limited to Tajikistan, as Uzbek language is to Uzbekistan, but is also used in Iran and parts of Afghanistan.15 The political movement Rastokhez was very ambitious concerning the state-building process and tried to pursue pan- Iranian and Zoroastrian, rather than Islamic roots and an attempt to use these concepts as “truly“ Tajik. Whose agenda was later patterned by issues of national revival, promotion of a national culture, the recognition of the national language Farsi as the state language.16
“The need for Muslims to claim so vehemently that they are traditional, and that their women miraculously escape social change and the erosion of time, has to be understood in terms of their need for self-representation and must be classified not as a statement about daily behavioral practices, but rather as a psychological need to maintain a minimal sense of identity in a confusing and shifting reality.“17 What Fatima Mernissi is describing here, is part of the process of finding and re-defining one’s own identity as being the basis for a national identity. It can also serve as an explanation for the radicalization of Islam in Central Asia today.
In many of the new Central Asian states an inclusive definition of nationality has been introduced accepting all inhabitants as citizens of the country. But this concept does not work in all Central Asian states, the example for this is Tajikistan. Here the admixture of ethnic identity seems to be too small (62% are Tajiks18 ) on the one hand and the sense of the nation as a “unique people“ is too weak on the other hand. These factors makes the process of state-building exceptionally difficult.19 The right wing of the democratic movement is fond of an ideology called national Islamism meaning not to reject the idea of a rebirth of Islam, but to put more of an emphasise onto the national component. Maybe this could actually be a way to go.
3.3 Islamism -as a political ideology based on Islam
The power struggle between the government and the “opposition coalition“ in Tajikistan led to the fact that various oppositional parties developed (Rastokhez, Democratic Party and IRP) that mobilized people by declaring Islamic principles to be their priority in governing the country20. In this aspect Tajikistan differs from Uzbekistan where such movements were excluded from the political process right away. These developments eventually led to the fact that in 1991 the IRP, Rastokhez, the Democratic Party, the La ’ li Badahshon and Nosiri Khusraw Societies, as well as forces loyal to Qadi Akbar Turajonzoda21 under Islamist and “democratic“ principles could be united into one opposition.22
Before the establishment of the present republics by Stalin in the 1920s, Central Asia had never known the principle of creating a state by associating a given territory with an ethnic linguistic group, but had been built on loyalty to dynasties and fidelity to Islam.23 Maybe even today the nation could be unified by Islam as a state religion as it has worked in Morocco, for example, where different ethnic groups have been unified in one nation on the basis of Islam. The problems that might occur is that almost all Tajiks are Muslims, but not all Sunnites. The Pamiris are Ismailites who speak East Iranian dialects.24 In general Tajiks are not included in inclusive concept that could strengthen their identity (for example pan-Turkism or pan-Shiitism) and a union with Iran to which it is tied by the languages is unlikely because of the confessional difference: Shiitism in Iran and Sunnism in Tajikistan.
With the establishments of the government of reconciliation25 the defeat of the Islamist movement in Tajikistan had paradoxical consequences: Islamism no longer appeared as an ideological alternative to sovietism, nationalism and localism. Instead it became normal to ally with democrats and nationalists.26 Out of that an ambiguity emerged: The IRP was legalized, while secularism remained central to Tajikistan’s constitution and therefore in the long-run, the important dilemma of secularism versus Islamicism will still have to be decided.27 The IRP is actually unique in the region as an Islamist movement participating peacefully in the political life of a secular state. The Islamist groups only agreed to negotiate when they realized that they were not backed by a majority of the population. De facto most of the Tajikistanis preferred secular political ideologies and resisted Islamicism. Still one of the major outcomes of the Tajik peace process was the peaceful incorporation of Islamist movements into the constitutional political process.28
The big question is whether a well-balanced combination out of these “ideologies“ could create a stable system for Tajikistan as well as for Uzbekistan. The dominant trend in Western orientalism tends to accept Christianity as promoting and buttressing democracy, while viewing Islam as likely to undermine the prospects of establishing democratic political systems.“29 Therefore Islamism and democracy seem to contradict each other. In my point of view the essence of the question does not lie in the kind of religion (Christianity or Islam), but in the degree of secularization and belief. In the Western world state and religion are either totally separated (secularism as for example in the USA and France) or people are simply not strong believers anymore (as for example in Germany).
However, establishing a secular state does not necessarily mean to ban Islam out of public life, simply out of state affairs and maybe the Islamic force could agree to such a proposal due to the fact that the majority of the Islamic forces in Central Asia does not actually wish to establish an Islamic State, but only to have the right to Islamic education and Islamic practices in every-day life and therefore, to a certain extent, those two ideologies are compatible.30
3.4 Relations Between Tajik and Uzbek Policies
Developments in Tajikistan have an influence on politics and policies carried out in Uzbekistan and also the other way around. As a result those countries‘ policies have eventually led to further radicalization of Islamist groups.
Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have been exaggerating th existence of militant Islamic movements in order to legitimate repressive measures by their governments. This has also led to the fact that their governments and also Russia have been using exaggerations in order to justify strong cooperative international security measures against the commonly perceived threat and also in oder to win assistence of Western governments. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan repress a range of Islamic religious practices and domestic religious groups. Their policies consequently are actually exacerbating simmering social and political tensions and increasing the risk of new outbreaks of violence in the region. The ruling elites feel a certain threat and so they use repression and eventually social discontent is fuelled even more.
Tajikistan perceives a certain variety of threat to security arising from the actions of a militant Islamist group opposed to the Uzbek government, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). But this movement is not actually strongly enough supported internally or externally to pose a major threat to any of the two governments.31 The reactions by the governments to the low-level operations of the IMU in 1999 and 2000 have themselves created instability. “The governments have cited need to counter the IMU as justification for further domestic repression of unofficial Islamic activity, which in turn is driving some sections of the community towards greater militancy.“ Especially Uzbekistan has provoken additional regional tensions by conducting cross-border operations against the IMU in Tajikistan. The security problems of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan keep growing. The degree of militancy of the Islamist groups is increasing and the opposition to the ruling governments, especially in Uzbekistan, is growing.32 External factors add up to the conflict and threat of radical Islamism. The possibility that militant Islamists will obtain refuge and training in Afghanistan and Tajikistan has gotten more likely and the presence of civil war veterans from those countries prepared to fight for the Islamist cause anywhere. Other external factors are contributions of the Taliban, bin Laden, other governments and non-governmnetal entities which increase radicalization. But actually in this context even though the external factors should be considered, the internal factors are more important. Right now the public support for the ruling governments is still quite strong, but it tends to decline. The prospect for the future, especially in Uzbekistan, is that actually wider segments of the population will resort to radical, maybe even violent opposition to the government, especially if Karimov keeps pursuing his policy of targeting all unofficial religious groups.33
Islams role and Islamist mobilisation in Central Asia is about to undergo a radical change and become more of a threat. Until recently the main role of Islam was in cultural revival rather than active opposition to post-Soviet governments. Right after independence Islam played only a minor role in politics in the region. It took some time for new political movements to realize that Islamist ideology could be used in order to mobilize people and make them fight for one’s own ends.
An example for this sudden radicalization were the Tashkent bombings in Feburary 1999 which all of a sudden transformed perceptions completely because the Islamist threat actually turned out to be real. The question of where these developments would lead to emerged.34
In order to understand the developments concerning religion as a political factor in Central Asia one has to consider the late Soviet period as a legacy. The period of perestroika brought greater freedom of religion, which consequently led to broader popular participation in a revival of Islam in cultural practices and social institutions. After the actual achievement of independence, the Uzbek and Tajik governments moved away from this liberalism that perestroika had brought. Most Central Asian governments aggressively tried to prevent Islam from assuming a political role. From 1992 on especially the Uzbek government began to crack down on religious groups and institutions which were not under the control of the offocial, semi-state institutions.35 Tensions grew and when in Uzbekistan police officers were killed in Namangan city these incidents were attributed to Islamist extremists.36
“Though all the Central Asian leaders are committed to the development of secular societies, a second “ethnic card“ they hoped to use is that of Islam.“ I first hesitated to actually use the term “ethnic card“ because to me religion seems to be the most unstable attribute to ethnicity, but Olcott uses this term due to the fact that during the Soviet-era Central Asian leaders thought of religion primarily in ethnic terms.
Other important questions are whether the secular leaders of Central Asia will have the smartness to differentiate between radicals and moderates and therefore offer political participation to Islamist moderates or will the leaders through their policies push them towards militancy by excluding them from the political process and forcing them into the underground.37 Since independence in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan emerged a range of political Islamic groups. Where do they stand within the political spectrum and what are their strategies?38
3.5 Policies in Tajikistan
In 1990 Islamic believers and clergy started to become active in the political process so that Kazi-kolon Turajonzada, the highest ranking official cleric, issued a warning to all clerics that they were forbidden to join political parties, including Islamic ones. In September 1990 the popular Imam Sokidyhan Bedimogov was found guilty of formenting the Feburary riots and was sentenced to four years of prison. But at the same time the opening of the Islamic institute in Dushanbe was permitted to stage a large farewell ceremony as five hundred hajis39 set out for Mecca.40 The general line of policies was neither clearly anti-Islamic, nor clearly pro-Islamic. Islam was instrumentalized for whatever goals had to be achieved. The figure that disturbed leaders elsewhere in Central Asia and Russia was Kazi-kolon Turajonzada who became part of the Presidium of the parliament, which was interpreted as a signal that Tajikistan was about to turn Islamist.41
In Tajikistan, as the Central Asian country most open to Islamic influence, the IRP for one year operated as a legal party. “The dominant attitude of the traditional and acquiescent Muslim clergy of the region is that Islam must be kept out of direct involvement in politics.“42 In general Central Asian countries seem to be looking up to other Sunni countries where a secular state seems to be “natural“ in most cases.43
In rural Tajik areas people are very religious and are fond of the idea that Islam unifies the masses as believers equal to each other. In these unstable times people turn to religion even more. Kurgan-Tiube44, for example, has been a place where traditional Islamic practices remained very strong, as it was a place to which people from other parts of Central Asia had been forcibly moved at various points of Soviet history.“45 Terms as “Islamic state“ or “Islamic republic“ are perceived very positively in Tajikistan. The Islamic urban population is Europeanized to a large extent and is not especially religious. Urbanized people are not very likely to sympathize with Islamic fundametalism in the future. However, one should also not forget that especially in young towns such as Dushanbe the whole Islamic population moved there from other regions of the republic and for them the connection to rural areas is still very important.46
The war and the failure of a stable independent Tajik state have led to a state of anomie. Welfare and education systems have broken down. This means that the gap between rural and urban communities keeps even growing larger. In the rural areas the people are much less educated and the birth rates are still extremely high47. Therefore the number of strong believers will probably grow much faster than the number of the secularized urban population. Thus, due to demographic factors, Islam and Islamism as a political factor will become more important as time goes on. But actually this objective contradiction in society does not resemble a threat yet as far as the people do not perceive it as such. Only when this difference is perceived as a threat by someone and he starts to mobilize people on such a basis, can it turn into a war-causing factor.
3.6 The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) -one of the fundementalist forces
In June 1990 the Tajik IRP was created in order to meet the need to defend Islam against atheistic attacks. It espoused the principle of equal legal treatment of all religions and was open to political cooperation with other parties. Strongest support for the party came from Tajikistan. “The notion of a political party based on Islam was highly unwelcome to the Central Asian governments both before and after they declared their independence from Moscow and so after the IRP’s foundation the leaders sought to brand the IRP as a vehicle for Islamic radicalism“, because the elites who stayed in power were the Communist elites and Islamism as a political ideology resembled a threat to their power which they obviously did not want to loose. As a further explaining factor could serve that if the leaders would openly have supported Islam as a political factor, that this would have spoiled their relations with Moscow, on which they were still highly dependent.
The IRP had to deal with major obstacles, but also achieved substantial gains. Nevertheless, the party managed to win widespread popular support. Tensions within the party are results of the ambivalence of pan-Islamic desires and separate Central Asian states.48 In 1992 the IRP called for the establishment of an Islamic republic in Tajikistan. Formally being a republic-wide party the IRP’s members mainly come from the Garm region49.
“The IRP is a socio-political organisation which is based on the values and ideals of Islam. It unifies Muslim believers, which support the rebirth orf fundamental Islam, who are willing by fight for the rebirth to bring Koran and the Sunna to their peoples as well as to turn the real Islam into the way-of-life of those peoples.“50
Out of all the Islamicist parties in Central Asia, the IRP was the only one that participated in elections51. The IRP is unique in the region as an Islamicist movement peacefully participating in the political life of a secular state and in 2000 the IRP was actually one of the most powerful political parties in Tajikistan52.
There is another Islamist political movement, called Rastokhez53, that defines itself as national-democratic and Islamic. It is trying to achieve a “cultural renaissance“ (in secular terms), calls for economic and political reforms, supports the idea of pan- iranism and supports the Gorno- Badakhshan movement for independence.
In September 1992 Islamist activists joined regional and democratic forces and finally succeeded in ousting the president of the republic, Rakhman Nabiyev. Parts of the IRP were active in the coalition of groups that resisted Nabiyev’s repressive regime, further advocating Islam to become a central guide for foreign policy. It has to be noted however that they did not openly advocate the establishment of an Islamic state. On the other hand Akbar Turadzhanzade, the hightest Islamic authority in Tajikistan, called for the establishment of a secular state based on human rights. Most of the new Islamic movements have a moderate rather than a revolutionary orientation.54
When Rakhmonov became president of Tajikistan in 1994 this also resembled a shift of elites from one region into another. Rakhmonov was from Kulyab and he appointed other Kulyabis to most of the leading positions in the new government.
3.7 The Emergence of the United Tajik Opposition
The IRP as part of the UTO on the other hand came mainly from the Garm region and Rastokhez had strong-holds in Gorno-Badakhshan and therefore the Khujandis lost their former hegemonic position. In late 1992, most Islamist activists were forced into exile where they formed the Movement for Islamic Revival in Tajikistan (MIRT), in order to coordinate their initiatives. In 1994 this movement became the dominant group in the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). The Islamist groups eventually agreed to negotiate as they realised that most Tajikistanis preferred secular political ideologies and resisted Islamism.55 The fact that the Tajik peace process has facilitated the peaceful incorporation of Islamist movements into the constitutional political process is a major achievement.56
In Tajikistan, the government has pointed at a threat posed by Islamist elements in the UTO and the support which they receive from Afghan Islamists, both to bolster its authority, but also to gain support from other governments (the overall hegemon Russia and the regional hegemon Uzbekistan) who feel similar dangers. The big question during the peace negotiations was whether the Tajik government could sacrifice the principle of secularism, favored by most people living in Tajikistan, to accommodate Islamist demand for a share of state power. “Although the UTO did not openly question the constitutional principle of secularism, the ghost of an Islamic state hovered over the negotiations.57
Religion has directly affected the foreign policy orientations as with the initial hesitation of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to participate in joint peace-keeping operations in Tajikistan.58 Furthermore the outbreak of the Tajik civil war made reliance upon religion as a strategic asset look even riskier and had an influence on other Central Asian states such as Uzbekistan.59 The risk of the ill-defined “Islamic threat“ has often been cited as the cause of unrest in Tajikistan and the reason political Islam has been surpressed in Uzbekistan.60
A stronghold for Islamist extremists in Tajikistan as well as in Uzbekistan is the Ferghana Valley and the groups throughout this area are interlinked. A radical opposition to the Uzbek government on the Tajik side of the Ferghana Valley arms up for an ideological and military offense. Due to its bad socio-political conditions Tajikistan is the open for Islamist radicals. Similar movements are especially active in the anomic space between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Their strategies remind of the Basmachi movement which during the 1920s resisted the Soviet power and used the mountains to hide.61
In Tajikistan, in 1991 and 92 in the course of the collapse of the short-lived coalition consisting out of Islamist, democratic and nationalist groups what was originally a quite moderate Islamic movement became radicalised and was forced into exile in northern Afghanistan where it heavily came under the influence of Afghan Mujaheddin fighters. Even until now military commanders from both sides continue to control territory independently from the Tajik government into which they are officially integrated. As a consequence it has been possible for Islamists from other parts of Central Asia to find refuge in Tajikistan and to use it as a base for operations. Since Emomali Rakhmonov came to power he has sought to marginalise the Islamic, former-opposition leader and his followers and therefore the Islamist militant movement in Tajikistan has become more orientated toward involvement in insurgency in other parts of the region.62
Emomali Rakhmonov, the wrote in 1999: “The Republic of Tajikistan is totally different from those ancient states. The differences are that today’s state is a secular state based on the Tajik nation , rather than on the community of the faithful people…, it is necessary to purge the society of any and all elements that might hinder national sovereignty, secularism and democracy…This does not mean that Tajikistan is completely rejecting its past. Rather there is a reinterpretation of history and a synthesis of inherited and borrowed elements which are still going forward today in the name of a modern, secular, democratic and original culture.“63
3.8 Policies in Uzbekistan
Most leaders have blocked the creation of religiously based political movements and parties64. But on the other hand President Karimov has made his pilgrimages to Mecca and kept strong contacts to the Arab world.65 In general political leaders are committed to building secular polities because under an Islamist dispensation they would quickly be shunted aside. “Karimov is a gambler who has staked his political future on being able to neutralize and disarm political Islam in Tajikistan.“66
Karimov does not want to achieve peace at the cost of politically empowering the UTO because of their close ties to Uzbekistan’s own Islamist opposition.67
“The desire of the Central Asian governments to prevent political spillover from the revival of religion has prompted them to try to ‘nationalize‘ Islam by bringing established religious institutions under their direct control.“ In 1993 Islam Karimov introduced a new Mufti68 to Uzbekistan (Mukhtarkhan Abdullaev) in order to establish more control over the Islamic religious establishment in Uzbekistan.
“There is little doubt that Central Asia’s leaders were all primarily interested in Islam for financial reasons, since Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Persian Gulf states were obvious potential sources of aid and investment. Uzbek leaders were motivated to pursue contacts with other Muslim states aggressively being expressed in travelling widely throughout the Arab world, where they encouraged commercial representatives and Muslim religious leaders to expand their activities to Uzbekistan. Karimov also swore the presidential oath to the Koran and proclaimed that in his house only halal meat is being served.69 But due to the ouster of Nabiev in Tajikistan Karimov became nervous about Islamist extremism (meaning the Tajik opposition from 1992-94) spreading to Uzbekistan.70 Therefore one has to differentiate different periods for analyzing the impact of Islam in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The policies carried out towards Islam in Uzbekistan right after the independence are different from the ones being pursued nowadays.
On the other hand the world’s Muslims have not been in a great hurry to embrace their brethren in the region. Saudi Arabia for example shipped millions of Korans to the region and has given a lot of money for th construction of religious establishments, but this does not have a political dimension yet. “In general, though, the Muslim world seems content to keep a certain distance from these states, at least while ex-communists dominate Central Asia. The leaders of the Central Asian states may espouse or applaud selected Muslim ideals, and some may even don traditional dress if the occasion merits, but at heart the remain adherents to a concept of a secular world that is nearly as alien to a Muslim believer as it was to an old Soviet one.“71
Still Islam as a political and social factor has gained a new nuance and therefore it is reasonable to expect that the next generation of leaders or the one after that, might embrace Islamic ideals.72
Karimov has been extremely cautious in his treatment of Islamic groups in his country, as Uzbekistan is home to Central Asia’s largest and potentially most restive Muslim community. As a consequence out of Karimov’s communist past, he is the target for Uzbekistan’s clerics accusing him of hypocracy and apostasy. Since the independence Karimov’s regime has found itself enegaged in a losing battle with the country’s Islamic leaders, who no longer required the services of a sympathetic intermediary between themselves and the “godless“ Soviet regime. Islamic revivalists then claimed religious instruction in state schools intending to undermine secularism, religious figures to be given more exposure in all media outlets, Friday to replace Sunday as the officilal closing day and Islam to be the state religion. This led to the result that by the time of independence, hundreds of young people were receiving an advanced Islamic training. Uzbek-language press started to address religious questions on a regular basis and for some time the Mufti Muhammad Yusuf had a half-hour television show on Fridays.73 After R. Nabiev had been forced to submit to power-sharing with the Islamic democratic opposition, Karimov began to withdraw his pro-Islamic policies. “Uzbekistan’s mufti became a target of particular criticism“ partly due to the fact of being a friend of Turajonzada. The mufti was later on forced to leave his position and accused for several crimes and finally members of the Central Asian Spiritual Directorate of Muslims (SADUM) were charged with selling weapons to Tajik mujahideen.74 “Ever since Yusuf’s dismissal, Karimov has continued his assault against “extremists“, in the Ferghana Valley and border regions close to Tajikistan and Afghanistan, even though Karimov has tried to keep his campaign from appearing anti-religious.75 As that might seem quite akward, using Islamic ritual in order to keep up his power position but fighting against Islam on the other side.
3.9 Islamist Threat in and from the Ferghana Valley
In the Ferghana Valley there are Islamist terror groups that are constantly moving around and among them the influence of the Taliban is growing. For almost a decade Islam Karimov has been leading a “secular fight“ against those religious extremists. On the one hand he opposes them the most, but on the other hand he is also the one who produces them. Uzbekistan has very rigid religious laws, even telling the Muslims how and when to practice their religion. These draconic methods of dealing with religion force Islam in the underground. Even to have a beard is seen as a crime. Under the cover of Islamic fundamentalism Karimov even got rid of the opposition and made them and his personal competitors leave the country. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is the most important of the guerilla troops. To this movement belong the two fanatics Joldachev and Namangani, who both turned into bandits in the underground. What they are fighting actually does not have anything to do with Islam anymore. They instrumentalize Islam in order to be able to mobilize mercenaries. Tajikistan is a good area for recruitment. These chiefs are said to pursue the establishment of an Islamic state with the Ferghana Valley as its center. However, their agenda does not look as if they are establishing anything, rather as if they aim to destabilize the whole region politically and militarily in order to defend their business against state intervention.76
“These groups have their roots in the Islamic underground of the Soviet era.77 When the Soviet Union was bout to break apart a movement called Adolat 78 arose in the city of Namagan in the Ferghana Valley. It was besieging the city administration buildings, forming its own police force which “administered summary justice on the streets“. Among the population this movement actually enjoyed some support as it gave a response to petty crime and official corruption. After a period of restraint the Uzbek government cracked down on this movement.79
The mountains between Afghnaistan and Tajikistan as well as the the Ferghana Valley are strategically important because they are border zones where drugs move north and weapons south. Kyrgysz sources even say that Namangani contols 70% of the invisible “street of opium“ from Afghnaistan to Central Asia. Sources in Moscow even reported that Namangani was offered an important post on northern Afghanistan. Namangani is not the only volunteer from the Ferghana Valley in northern Afghanistan helping the Taliban to arm for the attack of the United States. Namangani and his mercenaries are ready for the case that the Taliban will be attacked from the north. All these fighters (Namangani’s people as well as the Taliban) are trained in the same camps. The Americans are trying to convince Karimov that with the simple repression against believers in his own country, the Islamic question cannot be solved sufficiently and sustainably.80 De facto by the time of 1992, Uzbekistan had begun to drive its Islamic opposition underground and into exile, especially into neighboring Tajikistan and Afghanistan81. “People who belonged to unofficial mosques or who simply dressed in a manner that indicated devotion to Islam were subjected by the police to forced shaving of their beards, harassment, arrests and beatings.“82 The repression went so far that some religious figures even disappeared. For example, the well-known imam Abduvali Qori Mirzoev of Andijan was repeatedly arrested before finally disappearing in 1995. The only distinction that the government made was between those who belonged to mosques and schools subordinated to the semi-official religious administration that remained from the Soviet times and those that did not belong into this category. Without any consideration the latter were simply treated as being enemies to the state no matter how moderate or apolitical their beliefs and activities are. The development seems to a gradual process becoming more repressive as time goes on. In 1997, the crackdown took actually on the dimensions of massive campaign.83 Thousands were arrested in Uzbekistan, some simply for possessing unofficial Islamic literature! The eventual effect of this policy was that radical activists left the country and turned out to be even more hostile to the state and finally “increasingly falling under the influence of militant Islamist movements antagonistic to the post-Communist regimes in Central Asia.“84
4. Establishment of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
The question that arises in this context is how Kariov could legitimize such an authoritarian policy? Karimov actually kept pointing at Tajikistan and telling the ruling Uzbekistan with a strong hand was the only way. This radical change of Islamism in Central Asis which I already mentioned in the introduction to this second hypothesis in Uzbekistan has mainly found its manifestation in the formation of groups which eventually led to the establishment of the IMU, the organisation behind a number of armed incursions in Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000. One of these armed incursions was the bombing symbolically important buildings in Feburary 1999, killing at least 16 people and injuring 100. This act can be seen as a reaction and, of course, ciritcism of Karimov’s general policy of the strong hand for which he had been admired by Uzbeks, other Central Asian states and even by some Western scholars, for bringing stability to the region. Due to the fact that this attack had been so very well-planned, speculations arose that it was planned from inside of the security apparatus. The official version was, of course, that Islamist extremists had organised this attack.85 Wide-ranged arrests followed. The most prominent was one- time leader of Adolat in Namangan, Tohir Yuldosh, now being the political leader of the IMU as well as Muhammad Solih, the leader of the banned Uzbek opposition party Erk, who has been driven into exile since he dared to oppose Karimov in the presidential election of 1991. As a consequence the number of arrests of persons suspected of association with unofficial Islamic organisations following this incident increased dramatically. Especially forced into exile were members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir- al-Islamii86 which officials accused of cooperating with the IMU.87 The situation has escalated so far that Hizb-ut-Tahrir-al-Islamii has claimed that 50,000 to 100,00088 Muslims have been arrestd for supporting this party and are held in concentration camps in western Uzbekistan! The Uzbek government has recently even acknowleged that detention camps exist. “In virtually every family one can find people who know someone who has been harassed, detained, arrested or convicted on grounds related to alleged association with non-sanctioned Islamic groups.“89
At this point I briefly have to include Kyrgyzstan into my analysis because in August 1999 a group of reportedly nearly 1,000 fighters took dozens of hostages in the Ferghana Valley (Kyrgyz part) demanding to freely pass the state in order to get to Uzbekistan, its actual target. This confrontation actually continued for two months even though Kyrgyz troops tried to expel the insurgents, but they actually appeared to be powerless. Uzbekistan then offered military support, but without Kyrgyzstan‘s or Tajikistan’s agreement went ahead to bomb their territories.90
4.1 Growing Influence of Islam and Islamism
The answer to the question why Islam and Islamism has gained so much influence since Tajikistan’s and Uzbekistan’s independence has to be based on two sets of factors: external and internal one. Since independence the stability within Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and in Central Asia as a whole has stagnated significantly. Therefore I presume that the average citizen perceives more threat than during Soviet times. Consequently he has to protect himself against this upcoming threat of falling through social networks, for example. He is forced to take sides. He has to decide whether he is an Islamist, a nationalist, a communist or democrat. He therefore is also more likely to use force in order to defend his personal security. As he is used to fight for some kind of ideology, he will pick one of the ideologies and is likely to instrumentalize Islam in order to emphasize that he is the one fighting for the right thing.
In general in times of transformation when people feel that they cannot be sure what things a moving towards, they start looking for something to hold on to. In many cases for people this is religion. As the Soviet structures broke away everybody in Central Asia was free to practice his Muslim belief. It can therefore be also understood as a reaction to surpression suddenly existing “freedom“.
In order to understand the impact of religion on modern politics today one has to think about what role Islam played in the pre-Soviet times. Back then Islam constituted an important element in the identity of people from Central Asia but did not generate a set of political loyalties that overrode all others. People felt as part of the umma91 , but “Islam constituted only one of several markers of identity, with tribal and clan loyalties and attachments to subnational regions often having greater salience.“92 Even though extremely surpressed by Stalin and later on again by Khrushchev, a strong attachment to Islam has persisted in Central Asia.93 “The demise of Soviet- sponsored atheism has cleared the way for a new Islamic groundswell embodied in the growth of religious oberservances, the expansion of religious education, and the construction of new mosques.“94 For most leaders in Central Asia Islamic revival presents something of a political conundrum.95
“The fundamentalist wave is a statement about identity. And that is why their call for the veil for women has to be observed in the light of the painful but necessary and prodigious reshuffling of identity that Muslims are going through in these often confusing but always fascinating times.”96
4.2 Instrumentalization of Islam
Islam is being instrumentalized in order to legitimize the use of force and to get access to new financial sources.97 These opportunities simply were not present during Soviet times. The system was too repressive, one could not simply establish a good relationship to Turkey or Iran emphasizing the unifying spirit of Islam. But nowadays the people are looking for something new to hold on to. One could claim they are searching for a new ideology and as such Islamism is competing with communism, nationalism and democratic standards. New sources (other Muslim countries) are being used and on the other hand they are open to being used since the breakdown of the Soviet Union. There is also something for them to gain, even if it is just some kind of moral influence, but as time goes on for example economic exchange is also growing with such countries.
One can also argue that Islam has kept its influence during Soviet times but played a role in the underground. Nowadays it come up to the surface again. On the one hand many mosques were closed in Tajikistan during the Soviet period, but at the same times illegal establishments for the practice of cult emerged and therefore one could say that religion was simply moved to a different level. Islam turned into something that was closer to the people than before.98
In Janurary 1989 there were only 17 officially registered mosques in Tajikistan, in the summer of the same year there were already 24 and a year later the number had even amounted to 47. But regarding this amazing increase it is hard to speak of an “Islamic boom” than more a process of legalizing such establishments for the practice of cult, which existed during the Soviet period illegally. The more the pressure by the Soviet authorities had increased, the more the gap between official and inofficial Islam had widened.99
External influences are, for example, that neighboring countries are promoting radio broadcasts of Koran readings and other Islamic programs and giving scholarships for students to study at madrasas.100 Such initiatives could soon be expanded to upper political levels.
As Islamic organisations gain members, a key element in the political evolution of Islam is and will be in the future, whether members of the urban population, now the most secular element of Central Asian societies, are won over to Islamist views and will take on leadership roles in radical Islamic movements and therefore would make Islamism gain influence.101
I define fundamentalism (as coming from the Latin word fudamen: basis) in general as: “The taking literally of a wholy book (i.e. Koran, Bible) its facts and described codes of bahavior.“ I would like to explain how religion is instrumentalized for other purposes. Fundamentalism can be seen as a reaction to the modern world and arises out of the contradiction between traditionalism and moderness. In the Islamic context fundamentalism means the traditional orientation on the basis of Islam as general reference points for theology, law and ethics102. Actually the influence of of Islamic and Islamist movements did not emerge all of the sudden. This was a gradual process and even in the 70s among the inofficial clerics a movement was born whose members and supporters in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was refered to as “Wahabites“, but who themselves preferred to be called fundamentalists. They fought for the purity of religion and for a return to the claims of the early Islam.103 In Tajikistan the ideas of fundamentalism have especially found supporters where the ”Muhadshir” live, people were removed from their original regions (Garm, Matsha, Darwas, Wachio etc.)104.
4.3 The Ottoman Model
The emergence of the concept of Ottomanism has to be seen in the wider Muslim context. For the first time in history it institutionalized the separation between state and Islam.105 In the Ottoman Empire census methods classified the population by religious (millet) affiliation.106 Ottoman officials redrew their institutions along lines of Western enlightened absolutism. The Sultan attempted to depoliticize national feeling and therefore he issued an edict in 1856 that proclaimed the equality of all subjects of the empire regardless of their ethnic or religious background. This was an amazingly modern concept for those times in the Muslim world. The idea formed the basis of a special kind of civic nationalism, the concept of Ottomanism. As a form of official nationalism, Ottomanism developed in reaction to the rise of popular national movements and defined a more modern and secular form of political allegiance. It was based on a common Ottoman citizenship. The purpose of Ottomanism was to counter the growing nationalist and separatist tendencies. In the 1860s reforms were carried out aiming to diminish the power of the clergy and increase the influence of laypeople and put an emphasis on secular education.107
Even though Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have lately carried out different kinds of policies, these policies have pretty much led to the same negative outcome. This might hint at the fact that concerning this issue, external factors have played a significant role. Islam and Islamism (political and radical) have not been brought under a more effective control, but in opposition to that Islam as a political factor has been radicalized even more.
Some scholars say that until now Islam as a political factor has not played a great role in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and the Central Asian region in general. I think I have disproved this hypothesis by, for example, those incidents of radical Islamism that I have been presenting. Islam and Islamism as political factors in Central Asia have been important since those states’ independence and their importance will grow even more in the future, in case the same policies are continued to b carried out.
The only way to find a way out of this tricky situation is to change policies, to apply more inclusive concepts. The experience of the Ottoman Empire to a certain extent could serve as a role model, even though it would, of course, have to be adapted to modern times. It would then be similar to civic nationalism, conferring citizenship and membership based on attributes that can be acquired regardless of original ethnic affiliation in opposition to an ethnic nationalism resembling a very exclusive concept as cultural traits that cannot be acquired would serve as the criteria for community membership108. But such a civic nationalism would have to include Islam and Islamist forces to participate to certain degree. A country cannot only be secularized or not secularized, there are steps in between that. The policies for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan would have to be located somewhere in between of those two. But repression on an Islamic basis has to be stopped, it only fuels further radicalization which has to be taken as a serious threat to security in the region.
Asadullaev, Iskander: The Tajikistan government, In: www.c.r.org/accord10/tgovernment .htm
Buettner, Friedemann: Islamischer Fundamentalismus -eine Herausforderung fuer den Westen?
Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security; In: International Crisis Group Asia Report No.4, Osh/Brussels 2001
Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, Cambridge 1995
Fal’kov, Mikhail: Islamskoe dvizhenie Uzbekistana (IDU); In: Nezavisimaia gazeta, 08/24/2000, via Tsentral’noaziatskie novosti: www.ferghana.ru/news
Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki’s report: Uzbekistan: Persistent human rights violations and prospects for improvement, New York 1996
Introduction to Tajikistan; On: www.cpss.org/casiabk/chap16.txt, October 10th 2001
Menon, Rajan & Spruyt, Hendrik: Possibilities fir Conflict and Conflict Resolution in PostSoviet Central Asia; In: Rubin, Barnett R. & Snyder, Jack: Post-Soviet Political Order. Conflict and State Building, London 1998
Mernissi, Fatima: Beyond the Veil. Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society.Revised Version, London 1985
Mulladshan, Parwis: Islam und Politik in Tadschikistan, samizdat 1990
Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington 1996
Olimova, Saodat & Olimov, Muzaffar: The Islamic Renaissance Party. Perspectives on the War and Peace Process, In:www.c-r.org/accord10/islamic.htm
Rakhmonov, Emomali: Tajik People in the Reflection of the History, Irfon 1999
Roy, Oliver: The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations, London
Thumann, Michael: Freunde, die zum Fuerchten sind. Usbekistan und Tadschikistan stellen sich im Kampf gegen den Terror an die Seite Amerikas. Gegen die Guerilla daheim kaempfen sie ohne Gnade und ohne Erfolg; In: Die Zeit, 27.09.2001
Introduction to Tajikistan; On: www.cpss.org/casiabk/chap16.txt, October 10th 2001
1 Menon, Tajan & Spruyt, Hendrik: Possibilities for Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Post-Soviet Central Asia, page 104
2 Menon, Tajan & Spruyt, Hendrik: Possibilities for Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Post-Soviet Central Asia, page 109
3 Central Asia in this context is means to include Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
4 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 45, Cambridge 1995
5 This external orientation is partly being expressed by the fact that Uzbekistan has changed its alphabet to Latin letters lately (as in Turkey) and Tajikistan has kept its cyrillic letters, but has been teaching the Arabic alphabet (also being used in Iran and Afghanistan) in elementary schools.
6 There only exception are Ismailite communities in the autonomous region of Gorno-Badakhshan.
7 I am using the term ‘Islamist’ as referring to individuals and groups which use Islam as a mode of political and sometimes also military mobilisation. Radical Islamists are those who are uncompromising in seeking to remove existing regimes from power, usually in order to replace them with some kind of Islamic government which can either be based on strict adherence to Shari’ah law or can simply give Islamic religion and values a central role. Militant Islamists are those who are prepared to resort to violent means in order to achieve these ends. See: Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page 1
8 www.cpss.org/casiabk/chap16.txt, October 10th 2001, page 3
9 Roy, Oliver: The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations, page xi
10 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 80
11 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 80
12 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 81
13 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 81
14 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 81
15 Roy, Olivier: The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations, page 122
16 www.cpss.org/casiabk/chap16.txt, October 10th 2001, page 3
17 Mernissi, Fatima: Beyond the Veil. Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society.Revised Version, page viii
18 Der Fischer Weltalmanach: Tadschikistan, page 702
19 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 88
20 Rakhmonov, Emomali (President of the Republic of Tajikistan): Tajik people in the reflection of the history, page 118
21 Qadi Akbar Turajonzoda is chief Islamic cleric of the Tajik republic.
22 www.cpss.org/casiabk/chap16.txt, October 10th 2001, page 2
23 Roy, Olivier: The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations, page 2
24 Roy, Olivier: The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations, page 9
25 Government which was established to end the civil war, which included representatives from different factions (nationalists, communists, islamists, democrats).
26 Roy, Olivier: The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations, page 157
27 Olimova, Saodat & Olimov, Muzaffar: The Islamic Renaissance Party. Perspectives on the War and Peace Process, page 1
28 Olimova, Saodat & Olimov, Muzaffar: The Islamic Renaissance Party. Perspectives on the War and Peace Process, page 2
29 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 285
30 This has been showed by the “Turrkish moder”.
31 But this is, of course, my view, the view of an outsider, and the threat that counts is not the objective one, but the one that is actually being received.
32 Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page iii
33 Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page iv
34 Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page 1
35 Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page 2
36 Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page 3
37 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 118
38 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, page 31
39 Those Muslims who have made a pilgremage to Mecca.
40 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington 1996, page 123 & 124
41 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington 1996, page 126
42 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 114
43 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 114
44 Kurgan-Tjube is region in the south-west.
45 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington 1996, page 122
46 Mulladshan, Parwis: Islam und Politik in Tadschikistan, page 7-8
47 In Tajikistan the population grows 1.9% and in comparison in the Russian Federation it decreases with -0.1% (numers from 1990-1996); See: Der Fischer Weltalmanach, page 592 & 702
48 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 115
49 The Garm region is situated west of Gorno-Badakhshan.
50 This is what is says in the party’s program.
51 Olimova, Saodat & Olimov, Muzaffar: The Islamic Renaissance Party. Perspectives on the War and Peace Process, page 1
52 Olimova, Saodat & Olimov, Muzaffar: The Islamic Renaissance Party. Perspectives on the War and Peace Process, page 1
53 Rastokhez means renaissance in Tajik and this makes the party’s name quite similar to the one of the IRP.
54 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 116
55 Olimova, Saodat & Olimov, Muzaffar: The Islamic Renaissance Party. Perspectives on the War and Peace Process, page 1
56 Olimova, Saodat & Olimov, Muzaffar: The Islamic Renaissance Party. Perspectives on the War and Peace Process, page 2
57 Asadullaev, Iskander: The Tajikistan government, page 2
58 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 218
59 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington 1996, page 31
60 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington 1996, page 113
61 Thumann, Michael: Freunde, die zum Fuerchten sind. Usbekistan und Tadschikistan stellen sich im Kampf gegen den Terror an die Seite Amerikas. Gegen die Guerilla daheim kaempfen sie ohne Gnade und ohne Erfolg
62 Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page 3
63 Rakhmonov, Emomali: Tajik People in the Reflection of the History, page 131 &132
64 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 113
65 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 113
66 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington 1996, page 161
67 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington 1996, page 162
68 Mufti is the highest post in the Islamic hierarchy.
69 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington 1996, page 31
70 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington 1996, page 31 & 32
71 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington 1996, page 33
72 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington 1996, page 33
73 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington 1996, page 117
74 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington 1996, page 118
75 Olcott, Martha Brill: Central Asia’s New States. Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington 1996, page 119
76 Thumann, Michael: Freunde, die zum Fuerchten sind. Usbekistan und Tadschikistan stellen sich im Kampf gegen den Terror an die Seite Amerikas. Gegen die Guerilla daheim kaempfen sie ohne Gnade und ohne Erfolg
77 Fal’kov, Mikhail: Islamskos dvizhenie Uzbekistana (IDU); In: Nezavisimaia gazeta, 08/24/2000, via Tsentral’noaziatskie novosti: www.ferghana.ru/news
78 meaning justice
79 Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page 4
80 Thumann, Michael: Freunde, die zum Fuerchten sind. Usbekistan und Tadschikistan stellen sich im Kampf gegen den Terror an die Seite Amerikas. Gegen die Guerilla daheim kaempfen sie ohne Gnade und ohne Erfolg
81 Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page 4
82 See the section entitled ‘An alarming new trend: The crackdown against independent Muslims’; In: Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki’s report: Uzbekistan: Persistent human rights violations and prospects for improvement, New York 1996
83 Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page 4
84 Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page 5
85 Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page 4-5
86 The Islamic Freedom Party (the translation) is an international movement active in various parts of the Islamic world, with the declared goal of reestablishing the Caliphate and Islamic, Shari’ah-based rule. In Uzbekistan it has only been able to operate as an underground movement; see Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page 6
87 Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page 6
88 Unfortunately, accurate figues are not avaible for those arrested for the association with unofficial Islam in Uzbekistan. The Chief Justice of Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court, Ubaidulla Mingboyev, Acknowledged in September 2000 that some 2,000 people had been convicted on political grounds since 1991, even though the capacity of the internment camps is only supposed to be about 70,000; Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page 6 see
89 Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page 7
90 Central Asia. Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, page 7-8
91 Umma is the community that every Muslim believer belongs to.
92 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 111
93 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 111 & 112
94 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 112
95 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 112 & 113
96 Mernissi, Fatima: Beyond the Veil. Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society. Revised Version, page ix, London 1985
97 Kyrgyzstan’s president Akayev, like some of his Central Asian counterparts openly talks about that he is interested in improving relations with Islamic countries mainly due to the money that might flow in due to confessional ties., see: Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval
98 Mulladshan, Parwis: Islam und Politik in Tadschikistan, page 2
99 Mulladshan, Parwis: Islam und Politik in Tadschikistan, page 2
100 Madrasas are Islamic schools; See: Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge 1994, page 117
101 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge1994, page 218
102 Buettner, Friedemann: Islamischer Fundamentalismus -eine Herausforderung fuer den Westen?
103 Mulladshan, Parwis: Islam und Politik in Tadschikistan, page 3
104 Mulladshan, Parwis: Islam und Politik in Tadschikistan, page 7
105 In general the separation between state and religion is called secularism.
106 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective, New York 1997, page 99
107 Dawisha, Karen & Parrott, Bruce: The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective, New York 1997, page 100-105
108 Menon, Rajan & Spruyt, Hendrik: Possibilities fir Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Post-Soviet Central Asia; In: Rubin, Barnett R. & Snyder, Jack: Post-Soviet Political Order. Conflict and State Building, page 111
- Quote paper
- Gunda Wiegmann (Author), 2001, Democratization Theory, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/106833