Neo-patrimonial regimes in Africa and the rest of the world and their economic repercussions. A comparison


Academic Paper, 2020

26 Pages, Grade: 10th


Excerpt


Table of Contents

Abstract

1. Introduction

2. The evolution of Neopatrimonialism

3. The rise of neopatrimonialism in the African continent

4. Neopatrimonialism outside Africa

5. Effects of neopatrimonial rule in Africa
5.1. Cameroon
5.2. Nigeria
5.3. Sierra Leone

6. Neopatrimonial regimes effects outside the African continent
6.1. Afghanistan
6.2. Italy

7. Conclusion

References

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to differentiate between neopatrimonial regimes in Africa with the ones outside Africa, and set neopatrimonialism in the Sub Saharan regions as one completely distinguishable and discrete from the rest of the world.

Neopatrimonialism had a long history with numerous African states, specifically the Sub Saharan ones, several conditions, and circumstances bolstered the emergence of neopatrimonialism in the Sub Saharan societies its continuity throughout the years and its existence until the current day.

This paper is going to tackle four points: 1 Definition of the terms patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism, 2 The emergence of neopatrimonialism outside and inside Africa, 3 the repercussions of neopatrimonialism, 4 Conclusion about neopatrimonialism in Sub Saharan countries versus the rest of the world.

1. Introduction

Going by the many articles defining the definition of neopatrimonialism, many researchers intertwine neopatrimonial regimes with developing countries and correlate the term with the levels of corruption and poverty in those countries.

Several studies have been applied to neopatrimonialism to explain the depravity in several developing countries from different continents, without distinguishing between neopatrimonialism in Africa and neopatrimonialism in the other parts of the world.

Neopatrimonial regimes in Africa are way different from their counterparts in the rest of the world; several reasons contributed to the rise, the continuity and the failure of transition to democratic regimes in Africa, among those reasons: traditions, ethical representations, and personality rule those three conditions are present and repetitive in every case of the Sub Saharan countries under neopatrimonial regimes, however, that’s not the case fo the rest of the neopatrimonial states outside Africa.

Research around the term neopatrimonialism and its features seem to be one of the most intricate things about this term.

Some scholars have stated that neopatrimonialism spurs democracy, they have argued that patrimonialism may promote both democracy (Pitcher et al., 2009) and developmental governance (Crook, 1989; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Kelsall, 2013). 2009; Bach, 2011; “ patrimonialism is the base of social cohesion, redistribution, administrative effectiveness, and development and likewise, increasing attention to ‘developmental’ forms of neopatrimonialism.” Others, like Roth, speculated that personal rule under neopatrimonialism is a feature that can be found in any society.

While both of the arguments stated might be true, there are not found in every society, neopatrimonialism might or might not bolster democracy depending on the type of the community, the personal rule is pivotal in neopatrimonial states; however, it’s not found in every neopatrimonial regime.

In this article, I argue that Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Neopatrimonialism outside Africa are two different things in so many aspects, making the case of neopatrimonialism in Africa a distinguishable and different one than the rest of the world, that should be taken into consideration for further studies discreetly.

In this paper, I also argue that while neopatrimonialism might leverage some nations and support democracy, the same case doesn’t apply to the Sub Saharan regions.

2. The evolution of Neopatrimonialism

The definition of the term neopatrimonialism is a dialectical one.

The initial focus toward neopatrimonialism was brought by the writings of the German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920), where Weber singled out three types of authority in a patrimonial regime: legal, traditional, and charismatic, without mentioning any correlations between patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism, However, in the “Democratic Experiments in Africa” Bratton and van de Walle (1997) were the first ones to establish the idea that presents neopatrimonialism as clearly distinct from patrimonialism. “Under patrimonialism, all power relations between ruler and ruled, political as well as administrative relations, are personal relations; there is no differentiation between the private and the public realm,” on the other hand, the neo in Neopatrimonialism stands for the reformation of the term “patrimonialism” which was in the past the dominant type of government in the Sub Saharan regions, patrimonialism as explicated by Bratton and Van de Walle stands for the domination of all sector and aspects of the country under one ruler, a system where the distinction between private and public realm is absent, this system evolved throughout the years into neopatrimonialism an allegedly new and permuted patrimonialism.

Under neopatrimonialism in the context of the African governments, all the power is still held under one ruler just like patrimonialism, a quote stated by Hastings Banda, the former president of Malawi that depicts the behavior of a president that follows the ethics of neopatrimonialism: “1972, Nothing is not my business in this country: everything is my business, everything. The state of education, the state of our economy, the state of our agriculture, the state of our transport, everything is my business” As noted from his quote, the heads of the governments in Africa dominate every aspect of life; nonetheless, the difference between neopatrimonial and patrimonial regimes is that unlike patrimonialism under neopatrimonialism public and private sectors are supposedly distinguished and separate.

In the Seventh African Governance Forum Report (2007) African leaders characterized that a ‘capable’ state is a one that should: (a) create, promote and sustain an enabling environment of peace, security, and stability to enable people to engage in creative and productive activities; (b) encourage and support constitutionalism, the rule of law and due process of law; accountability and transparency; ensuring a better understanding of citizenship entitlements and obligations; (c) create and maintain an appropriate and continuously flexible balance between the efficiency of the market forces and the availability and delivery of the public goods and services; (d) create the enabling environment and the appropriate policies, regulatory mechanisms, and processes for the promotion of the private sector; ensuring good corporate governance; avoiding cronyism, and preventing corruption; (e) empowers the people to decide the form and composition of government; (f) manage diversities; (g) mobilize human and material resources; (h) promote and consolidate gender equality; (i) promote trust, understanding and the imperatives of national consensus amongst the political parties; and (j) promote democracy and good governance.

The question that remains is that are those things mentioned by the African leaders applicable and found in African neopatrimonial regimes? And are neopatrimonial regimes ever able to achieve democracy and stability?

Those two questions differ based on what neopatrimonial state you’re referring to. If we’re talking about neopatrimonialism then all of those qualities in neopatrimonialism delineated by African governors are not a reality and have not been achieved in the Sub Saharan societies, those governors are well aware of the reforms that should come with neopatrimonialism to make it different than patrimonialism, yet, unfortunately, in most cases, they have failed to obtain those qualities regardless of the rulers’ familiarity of the importance of their existence. (Graf Lambsdorff 2005; Kaufmann et al. 2005a).

During the Second Republic, a leadership code obliged all cabinet and Central Committee members to separate public office and private interests (Kaunda 1972: par. 4). Yet, the text of the code was not put into practice, the reasons behind the failure of the Sub Saharan states to obtain legitimate neopatrimonialism that supports democracy freedom and equality is affiliated with several ideas that are intertwined with the African society as a colonial legacy and traditions. I will be explaining the nexus of the failure of obtaining truthful neopatrimonialism in Sub Saharan regions more meticulously in the next sections of this paper.

Moving on to the neopatrimonial regimes outside Africa, some of them have shown a significant advancement, development, economic prosperity, and democracy under neopatrimonial rule, some of them even respected the mends that came alongside with neopatrimonialism which make it distinguishable from patrimonialism in real life, unlike their African counterparts.

Now the question is, why is there such a divergence between neopatrimonialism in African versus neopatrimonialism outside Africa?

First of all, let’s start by divulging the conditions that led to the rise of neopatrimonialism in several countries in Africa and compare them with the reasons that led to the emergence of neopatrimonialism in countries outside the African continent.

3. The rise of neopatrimonialism in the African continent

Jean-Francois Vincent, a French anthropologist, described in 1986 a traditional tale narrated by the Mofu tribe of Northern Cameroon to confer legitimacy on an incoming chief, they say that a panther was hunted and killed, transported to the village by an administrator, and eventually eaten by the entire town.

Because the panther was the most powerful and feared of forest animals, the person who haunted him became the chief of the tribe and made the inhabitants claim his political legitimacy.

The chief, according to the Mofu tribe, needed neither prisons nor gendarmes to enforce his will; instead, his ability to kill the panther was enough to gain the respect of everyone; however, in return for that power, a chief had the responsibility of protecting and feeding his subjects.

Vincent elaborated on the ritual described by the Mofu community to explain how the term legitimacy is obtained and how it is understood among this community and how this ritual in such a small community turned to be the base of authority and legitimacy in several African countries.

That comes to show how the inhabitants of the sub-Saharan regions are so clutched with their cultures and traditions that they try to convert it into real life.

After independence, many African rulers applied the persuasive power of such beliefs of rituals among their communities to establish the governments.

One of the main features of neopatrimonialism in Africa that is obtained from the African traditions and seen in the African societies and governments currently is how the leaders as mentioned in the ritual told by the Mofu, claim themselves to be the fathers of the nation who are going to protect and feed everyone in their communities, those leaders twist history and take advantage of the African rituals to make themselves representative of certain dominant race or ethnicity; this scene can be noticed in several African nations, numerous rulers have appealed to traditions that associated chiefs with panthers or national leaders with leopards (and related visual representations), or have cited ancestral policies that precluded competition and enforced solidarity to build their legitimacy.

Schatzberg argues that such repertoires of myth and metaphor, imagery and rhetoric constituted the “moral matrix” on which Africa’s leaders based their legitimacy because they resonated so well with the cultural understandings of local populations (2001:23–31).

Michael Schatzberg reinforced that that political images depicting leaders such as Félix Houphouët Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire or Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya as “Father of the Nation,” and portraying those over whom they ruled as their “children,” were common across Africa, In Mobutu’s Zaire, Zambia, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Cameroon, Senegal and Tanzania, those kinds of paternal metaphors were particularly widespread and potent and was because as Schatzberg notes, “there are two sides to this particular coin. On the first side, there is the loving, kind, understanding, always solicitous, and caring paternal—and occasionally maternal—figure. The second side of the coin is less loving, less nurturing, and less paternal. If the father smiles and forgives, the chief snarls and punishes” (2001:24–25). Schatzberg reinforces that while the African leaders acted as the caring fathers of their nations, who wish nothing but welfare to their communities, they also had their other opposite side who would chastise anyone that goes against their will or commands, this example is quite similar to the smaller scale of the African societies, the families which are dominantly patriarchal ones, so here there is an affiliation between the way the leaders in Africa run their countries and the ways individuals or ordinary citizens operate their daily lives, the African neopatrimonial regimes are nothing but a bigger image of the African society.

Countries under neopatrimonial regimes in Africa are often under the practice initiated by the leaders of the nation, claiming to be the fathers of the government and turning the society into one big family to unify the citizens under one umbrella making them cluster together and strengthen their ties, love, and trust to the ruler, a practice that’s not found in neopatrimonial states outside Africa, yet so repetitive in the sub-Saharan states.

Cameroon, for example, counts over 200 ethnic groups comprising various types of Bantus in the south, semi-Bantus on the Adamawa Plateau (or the Grassfields) in the west, as well as Fulbes and Kiedis in the north, under this tremendous ethical diversity the former president of Cameroon Abhijo claimed to be the father of the nation and as the 'guide supreme' who would lead it toward development. He cultivated his image as the protector of the country, and the close ties he had with every ethnicity in Cameroon through 'lecturing' the country over the radio.

Sierra Leone is another example, where Siaka Stevens depicted himself as the head of the extended Sierra Leonean family and claimed roots in all major ethnic groups. He cultivated the picture of himself as 'Pa Siakie,’ the father of the nation.

The same case happened in Botswana where both of the formers Robinson and Parsons (2006:120–), adopted the same idea, they claimed themselves as the fathers of the nation, consolidated their ties with local chiefs, and with some tribal circles of relatives and cattle owners, managed land and production issues, they settled disputes and ruled communities through the kgotla—assemblies at which the chief “not only delivered judgments and laws but where he listened to his people” this institution acted as a nexus between the society and the central authority, where the chief was close to his people through those assemblies that were directly between the people without any representatives and the president, those kinds of intimate and emotional relations were the way for African leaders to obtain the trust and greatness in the eyes of the citizens.

The examples above were not the only ones where the rulers of the nation claim themselves as the fathers of the state and strive for close ties with the citizens; this practice is widely prevalent in all the African countries under neopatrimonial regimes as Schatzberg argued, "The imagery and language of father and family are widespread in Africa because they strike a resonant and deeply embedded cultural chord."

The question in this case, what makes those rulers highly and widely respected and feared among the people?

The answer to this question is personal rulership, which the practice used by most African rulers to promote their personality cults through cultural domination, As Ellis writes, "The cultivation of religious and cultural symbols.” Neopatrimonial rulers promote a particular type of strong omnipotent personality through dominating the national media, which describes their every public action with gushing enthusiasm; their likenesses graced the currency, their portraits hung in every public building, and the national printing press graciously publishing collections of their speeches and writings.

Nevertheless, some scholars go against the importance of personality in neopatrimonial states, as For Roth (1968: 196), “personal rulership operates based on loyalties that do not require any belief in the ruler’s unique personal qualifications, but are inextricably linked to material incentives and rewards” where that might be true for neopatrimonial regimes outside Africa, which I will be elaborating how neopatrimonialism can operate without the personal rulership, however, in the African case personality rule plays a vital role in the adoption and continuity of neopatrimonialism.

While personal rule is an essential factor in the emergence of neopatrimonialism in Africa, it is not the only one.

The second factor that I will be explaining next is private welfare or self-interest.

J. p. Olivier de sardan argued that “most African villages are conglomerates of specific subcommunities (families, peer groups, ritual societies, etc.), often existing in a climate of rivalry and antagonism, with no culture of ‘general interest,’” and extrapolated from these micro-level conditions of African society to account for the lack of a sense of the public domain at a macro level, and this is one of the issues of African neopatrimonialism, are the pervasiveness, ubiquity, and widespread acceptability of it by the people who find it as a way to ensure their private interests uncaring about the public domain.

The pervasiveness of neopatrimonial regimes in Africa became so extensive that Africa turned to be the epicenter of neopatrimonialism, as advanced by Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, “although neopatrimonial practices can be found in all policies, it is the core feature of politics in Africa and a small number of other states” by the people who find it as a way to ensure their private interests uncaring about the public domain.

For chabal and daloz, “the notion of representation, fair voting, and common good has no meaning in Africa because when people vote, they are expected, or “asked,” to do so in exchange for the favors they have received, meaning that they do not vote because they support the ideas of a particular political party but because they must placate the demands of their existing or putative patron.” (Cammack, 2007) It is difficult for African politicians to make credible commitments to investments in public goods as in Western elections, for public finances and public services are lacking. Even if resources were available, it might be electorally illogical, as it is difficult for many voters to judge the credibility of politicians given their poor education and access to reliable information. Many, especially in rural areas, are critical of democracy because the promised benefits have not materialized (Cammack, 2007). Thus African politics focus on personalities and historical connections rather than issues. Voters tend to back a candidate from their region, religion, tribe, or ethnic group.

As Weghorst and Lindberg (2013) argue, African voters are often assumed to be non-persuadable based on the conventional wisdom that their voting preference is fixed along ethnic lines or based on clientelistic ties. There are several studies on this theme that explicitly test the linkage between ethnicity and the allocation of distributive goods in the African context reflecting the idea of patron-and-client relationships where patrons seek to provide various types of material rewards to their clients in exchange for the latter’s loyalty (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Weinstein 2011; Jablonski 2014; Briggs 2012). In contrast, the swing voter model posits that the government targets its distributive goods to swing voters “who are not solidly committed to one candidate or the other as to make all efforts of persuasion futile.”

Candidates in Africa use patronage linkages as the primary source to gain votes, both of the voters and candidates are utterly agreeing with the idea, which may be due to the given traditional expectations for leaders to share the wealth. Hence voters frequently prefer a candidate from their tribe that honors bargains and can divert resources to supporters, albeit through clientelism and patronage.

Politicians, as mentioned above, are aware that an efficient bureaucracy is essential for development, but these are not priorities if voters judge their performance by tangible private contributions. This may logical: game theory suggests rational voters prefer politicians that act clientelistic ally until incomes reach a level whereby they are indifferent to the individual goods offered by politicians (Lynne, 2007, in Kelsall, 2011)

From this argument, we move to the third contributor to the emergence of neopatrimonialism, which is clientelism, which as well plays a pivotal role in retraining neopatrimonial regimes in Africa throughout the generations.

According to Merriam Webster, clientelism is a political or social system based on the relation of the client to the patron with the client giving political or financial support to a patron (as in the form of votes) in exchange for some special privilege or benefit.

The survival of clientelism in the African case, and its reconfiguration was related to an epoch of dependency and modernization, and after independence, it began existing alongside a bureaucratic logic, thus giving the contemporary state its neopatrimonial character.

These states after colonization witnessed an amalgamation between the clientelistic relations that arose during the colonization era and the democracy and democratic thinking that was brought and learned from the European example, so the African states were in a constant battle with democracy and clientelistic relations that impede this democracy leading to an absence of distinguishing between public and private realms, and they crowd out other forms of autonomous social organization. “parochial identities” (Hyden 2006:62) ethnic ties, and communitarianism prevail, and the growth of “civil society” as an independent check on state power faces severe challenges.

In the recent years, several countries have been adopting neopatrimonialism which is a reformed patrimonialism, where private and public sectors are allegedly separated that should be the case at least, neopatrimonialism in Africa builds on that analysis but applies the term more deliberately to describe the behaviors and patterns of authority established by particular national leaders and their followers after independence. Examples of this kind of analysis can be found in Callaghy’s work on Zaire (1984) and Nigeria (1986) as well as in Joseph (1987) on Nigeria, Ellis (1993) on Togo, and Bayart (1985) and van de Walle (1994) on Cameroon.7 Reno (1995, 1998) extended the label (though he applied it rather sparingly) to a set of extreme cases in his work on the warlord states of Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, while Vidal (2003, 2008) and Hodges (2008) have recently applied the term to Angola.

Examples of clientelism can be seen in most of the sub-Saharan neopatrimonial states exemplifying Cameroon, the massive distribution of state resources tied the elites to the president by providing them with jobs, contracts, and licenses; in return, they had to demonstrate loyalty by participating in the political rituals of the UNC or (Union Nationale camérounaise) As Willame implies, “the Cameroonian elite preferred shopping to real development; after all, consumption is easier than production” clientelism or the distribution of public resources through public sector jobs, licenses, contracts, and projects, by the patron to consolidate his or her rule is usually related to ethnic representations or elite representations and serve to win the elections.

In Kenya, as Kimenyi (2013) observes, patronage systems were created both by Presidents Kenyatta and Moi. By this, they “were able to discriminate in favor of members of their communities for government appointments, contracts, land and the concentration of public services” (Kimenyi, 2013:164).

In Uganda, the 1986 revolution that brought the incumbent Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement to power had promised so much regarding security, individual freedoms, equality and sustainable development across the ethnic and political divide. After almost three decades in power, the goal of remaining in force even longer has eliminated all these promises. The central government and all its arms of power are firmly under the control of the President and his ruling party. This situation has systematically created “vertical linkages of dependency and patronage” (Tripp, 2010:125), where financial and developmental resources mainly go to family members, friends, and companies proxy to the system. This “state-based clientelism,” Tripp argues, “has been one of the main obstacles to democratization, especially when it has favored certain groups over others, permeated the military, and become the main source of power” (Tripp 2010:128).

As seen from the three examples of the neopatrimonial regimes, the same scenario keeps repeating in every state, the leaders are aware of the reforms they should make and the limits they shouldn’t exceed, nevertheless their impulse to maintain their power and authority, and the acceptability of the clientelistic relations by the lump of the members of the society, and their favoring of private good over common welfare hinders democracy and annihilates the concerns of the leaders about the effectiveness of the their democratic rule, there is an interdependent relation here where the leaders follow the ill of the citizens and award private favors to get elected, and the people are agreeing with it with no problem, the citizens themselves see clientelistic ties as something a leader should do based on their traditions and rituals the leaders should share their wealth with the society, so the African rulers in that case just give up on fighting for democracy and turn their focus instead into private rewards for their supporters averting and forgetting about implementing policies or projects that are going to contribute into the the common good for the society in the African case even the community disagrees with long term policies that are not going to lead to direct leverage to them so also if the presidents tried to implement procedures for the sake of the public advantage the society would disagree with them and follow another candidates that proves private favors.

Africa is not the only place where traditional thinking and rituals affected the economy and how the society is run, China is another example, China was once upon a time deemed a significant barrier to Asia’s development due to Confucianism which was cited as one of the cultural pillars of the new economies.

Culture does matter in the development process, but it does so in a complicated way, every culture affects our habits and preferences, In interracial relationships, personal habits might cause issues the same way they would when they are acceptable in one country like the clientelistic relations, ethnic representation, and particular rule for the African case but not tolerated in another. For that reason, any attempt at establishing a one-to-one relationship between culture and economic variables is not helpful. Neopatrimonialism may be pointing to social practices and social hierarchies in Africa, but it has little predictive value.

As a paradigm, neopatrimonialism has had to deal with a wide range of discomfiting facts, but it soldiers on due to the acceptability of it and the normalization of its practice by the African traditions and heritage.

4. Neopatrimonialism outside Africa

In the upcoming sections, I will be moving my focus more towards neopatrimonial states outside Africa, what led to their emergence, their features and how different they are from the African ones, and finally, I will end up by comparing the effects of neopatrimonial rule on the economies of the states inside and outside Africa.

The first example that will be given to depict neopatrimonialism outside Africa is Italy.

Italy completely contradicts the belief that was intertwined with neopatrimonialism which is underdevelopment and depravity, while there might be some scenes or incidents of corruption caught in the Italian government, that did not allow neopatrimonial regimes to hinder Italy from the development and economic achievements it has reached today and is the fourth most significant and most influential economy in Europe, with a GDP of 2,050,000 USD.

According to Antonella Coco (2018), “In Italy, the personalization of politics concerns the more direct relationship between citizens and politics, no longer mediated by traditional party structures, but giving representative legitimacy to individual actors” (FABBRINI, 1999; PASQUINO, 1992). (MUSELLA, 2009) Personalization of politics leads to progressive freedom and autonomy for individual actors and groups to establish personal apparatus, alliances, coalitions, and networks of private and autonomous relationships (PIZZORNO, 1997), and this makes institutions more vulnerable to illegal phenomena.

Later changes in political parties’ structure and the growing importance of lobbies, corporatists, and causes groups to favor personal relationships for reciprocal benefits and consequently expose them to higher risks of corruption (CROUCH, 2004). The introduction of the new public management could give rise to forms of personalization within public administrations and subsequently, the creation of oligarchic groups based on interpersonal relationships, which could favor clientele exchanges (DELLA ROCCA, 2008).

In the South of Italy, political clientelism has become a systemic characteristic of the political system, representing a particular model of exercising power (GRAZIANO, 1980) and a mechanism of social regulation (FANTOZZI, 1993). In the South, a ‘political–criminal-capitalism’ also has been arising based on interactions among politics, bureaucracy, local economies, and criminal organizations, which give rise to ‘grey zones’ of com penetration within formally legal economic activities, and which has been extending to Central-Northern regions (SCIARRONE, 2011)

With specific concern to neopatrimonialism, it has been hypothesized that there is a correspondence between two tendencies reciprocally influencing each other (COSTABILE and FANTOZZI, 2012): “on the one hand, the disposition towards a private use of power (neopatrimonialism), on the other one, the demand for personal protection for powerful actors to reach different types of advantages, establishing however asymmetric, unequal and dependent exchange-based relationships It can be hypothesized that these trends occur mostly in those regions where illegality is more widespread, but also in other regions where the current legitimation crisis in politics and processes of power personalization, deregulation, and social fragmentation tends to weaken the rule of law.”

The second example is Afghanistan which is just like Italy also depends on the personalization of politics held by several people who are taking complete and utter power of the country, without dependency on any personal rule or ethical representation and unlike the African countries where the whole authority and power are between the hands of one omnipotent leader feared by everyone.

The case for Afghanistan is that the personalization of politics is dominated by warlords, According to Giustozzi (2009, 5), a warlord is a ‘legitimate, a charismatic and patrimonial military leader with autonomous control over a military the force capable of achieving/maintaining a monopoly of large scale violence over a sizeable territory.

In late 2003 and early 2004, 27 out of 32 (84%) provincial governors were former commanders from the civil war period and hence, closely associated with the warlords, many more were mainly assigned as governors because of their close connections with the warlords, while the peacebuilders in Afghanistan expected the co-opted warlords to be at the mercy of the state, warlords acted as if they were ‘entitled’ to a share of the state for the services they had offered to the country in the past.

The prevalence of this form of transaction and the ease with which such transactions are made can point to the belief in an ‘entitlement’ among state officials who deal with state institutions in a manner akin to dealing with private property, warlords have frequently justified this sense of entitlement by invoking the discourse of having fought against the Russian army, the communist government, and the Taliban regimes to support their demands for a share of political power or to request social and economic policies compensating for their past efforts.

Examples of extreme forms of impunity and officials being described as what glue the system together Transactions, reciprocity, and legitimacy: the backbone of Afghan neopatrimonialism.

Doling out administration positions to patronage networks and potential supporters is based on the premise of reciprocity and expectations of future returns. Inevitably, the allegiance of these state officials goes to the warlords. Furthermore, these transactions can benefit warlords. As described by one of the respondents who work at the parliament: installing their associates in the customs services means that when a warlord imports goods, taxes will be overlooked by the customs officials; or when convoys of narcotics pass through a police checkpoint, the police do not stop or confiscate the drugs; or an MP would give a vote of confidence to the minister that is supported by a warlord. Such examples are countless in Afghanistan, (Weeda Mehran) (2018).

The third example would be taken from the South American continent and exactly, Chile in the year 1973 under president Augusto Pinochet, the story in Chile is different from both Italy and Afghanistan, and even more different than the neopatrimonial regimes in Africa.

While Chile did experience neopatrimonial rule, unlike Africa Chile witnessed a successful transition that ended up the neopatrimonial era in Chile and starting a period of democracy and economic prosperity.

Chile during that epoch of neopatrimonialism the whole authority was in the hands of one person who did not rely on the rule of his ethnic or tribal representation or as in the African case he rather focused on representing and getting the support from the military and military-related jobs in the country, he favored them over the citizens and best positions and clientelistic ties prosper between the people and families of people who serve in the military.

In the Chilean Case power concentrated in the hands of a single individual at the expense of rule by the military as an institution, Pinochet Was determined to remain in office, and he obtained the repressive capability to do so despite serious divisions within the governing coalition, the erosion of his regime's social base, and growing fears that his continuation in office enhanced rather than reduced the "threat from below”.

'This development of neopatrimonialism in Chile can be understood in the structure of the Pinochet Regime and its relationship to the armed forces The Chilean Military Tradition which contributed to the growing pressure of civilian opposition by the separation of the military institution from the rest of society.

(Karen L. Remmer) 1989, Nearly 50 percent of cabinet officials since 1973 have been military officers. Active-duty officers have also served as sub secretaries, university rectors, diplomats, administrators of state corporations, regional intendants, mayors, governors, and members of the junta's four legislative commissions. As of 1985, 35 percent of the army generals on active duty held some sort of government post. (Karen L. Remmer) 1989, The principal vehicle has been the National Association of Mothers' Centers(CEMA), which was designed to rally support behind the regime by administering patronage programs at the local level, this hierarchy of the organization parallels that of the military, where Pinochet's wife was the national head, and the wives of other high-ranking officers play leadership roles at the provincial and regional levels.

For this type bolster toward of military as an institution, and causing a division in the society between the military sector and the rest of the citizens as well as strengthening ties between the president and the military was considered as a significant consequence was the expansion of career opportunities and related politicization of the military institution unquestionably helped Pinochet To maintain the support of the officer corps after 1973.

As can be noted from the comparison between the circumstances and conditions that contributed to the rise of neopatrimonial rule inside and outside Africa, there was a repetitive pattern in the neopatrimonial regimes in Africa, they were all based on the same set of factors that led to the emergence of neopatrimonialism, personal rule, ethnic representation and the acceptability of the concept in the society, all of those reasons took part in the sustainability and the continuity of neopatrimonial regimes in Africa, on the other hand, the case was way different outside Africa, wherein each country the reasons that led to the emergence of neopatrimonialism were different from the other, the circumstances or the goals that led to the rise of neopatrimonial regimes in Africa were absent in the three examples given showing how neopatrimonialism in Africa is a whole another case that is more intricate and complex and distinguished than the rest of the neopatrimonial states in the world.

5. Effects of neopatrimonial rule in Africa

“Neopatrimonialism in postcolonial African states is often viewed as ‘usurpation of imported formal governance structures by indigenous informal societal forces’ that is perceived to lead to state fragility (Boege et al. 2009, 15). However, as a form of hybrid political order, neopatrimonialism does not necessarily mean state fragility or state failure (Boege et al. 2009, 15)”

Neopatrimonialism is not related to state failure or a sign for corruption or underdevelopment; nevertheless, it is the case in the sub-Saharan regions, as I will be presenting in the sections below on how neopatrimonialism either did not influence the economy negatively or was successfully transformed into a democracy, however, the case is different for Africa where neopatrimonialism is related to several states depravity and democratic transition failures.

5.1. Cameroon

Cameroon, the idea of buying turn-key industries, was part and parcel of clientelism and the massive distribution of state resources. It tied the elites to the president by providing them with jobs, contracts, and licenses; in return, they had to demonstrate loyalty by participating in the political rituals of the UNC. As Willame implies, the Cameroonian elite preferred shopping to real development; after all, consumption is more accessible than production. .According to Van de Walle, state payrolls exploded from less than 20000 at the time of independence to around 250 000, including perhaps 80 000 in the parastatal sector (1994:143). Under Biya, the policy changed but only in name; it was now called communitarian liberalism (Ndi Mbarga 1993:88-99). The period ended in 1985, when suddenly, and for several reasons, the the economy went into a 10-year tailspin. The financial sector was in particular difficulty (Rettinger 1998:143-47). Significant banks had closed their doors or were on the verge of bankruptcy. In 1995, the 182 Journal of Contemporary African Studies World Bank reported that half of the banks, representing 75 percent of the market, had severe liquidity problems (1995:20). Furthermore, most public financial institutions were settled with so many poor loans that they, too, could not conduct regular business. The loans were mainly those from parastatals, of course, which is a fair indication that political considerations were more important than commercial ones (Jeune Afrique Economie 1998b; Mutations 1997a). To this day, the major obstacle to growth is the lack of credit. In the past few years, total investment has been at an all-time low. Private investment, too, has sharply declined and often emanates from informal sources. Public expenditure, which in the early 1980s averaged 15 percent of the GDP, was down to 2.2 percent in 1993. Today, Cameroon's rate of investment is substantially below the sub-Saharan average and far inferior to that of East and Southeast Asian countries (World Bank, 1995:9-30). Cameroon has been going through these economic and social struggles that straggle the nation from developing for ages and still is stuck in those intergenerational problems because its poverty reduction rate is lagging behind its population growth rate, the overall number of poor in Cameroon increased by 12% to 8.1 million between 2007 and 2014, and poverty is increasingly concentrated, with 56% of the poor living in the northern regions.

Cameroon suffers from weak governance, hindering its development and ability to attract investment. It ranks 152 out of 180 countries in the 2018 Transparency International corruption perceptions index, and 166 out of 190 economies in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2019 report.

5.2. Nigeria

Nigeria’s price of oil fell dramatically while Nigeria’s debt rose. Per capita incomes, which in 1980 stood at $1,000, dropped to $250 by the 1990s as local non-oil industries collapsed. At the same time, Babangida imposed a structural adjustment program that imposed austerity across the nation’s fragile public service infrastructure. Beset from above and below, most Nigerians fell into deep poverty, such that by 2006 the World Bank estimated that 70% of Nigerians lived on less than a dollar per day, and 92% lived on less than two dollars.

This is among the significant causes of Nigeria’s underdevelopment and the endemic corruption that leads to moral laxity and lack of law and order. It is common knowledge that Nigeria lacks active institutions, structures, procedures to tame corruption. Today, any person in Nigeria could “become fabulously wealthy” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 394) and famous without any discernible source of income, and nobody blinks (see “Before our politicians empty the treasury,” 2010). Public servants do not show up for work on time and do not take their actions seriously, and they expect to get paid every month without being productive. The mentality that hard work and honesty does not pay (or is not adequately rewarded) has found its way into the school system as students do not take their studies seriously any longer. The “I don’t care attitude” and the mentality to get rich through fraud often discourage the spirit of competition and hard work, and thus, inhibit national development.

Nigeria lacks inclusive political and economic institutions (Acemoglu, 2003; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Edison, 2003) to ensure proper rights and to empower the people with the skills and knowledge to realize their full potential. The political leaders have created these extractive institutions to enrich themselves and their cronies, leaving the majority of the people to struggle for survival (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). This is one of the reasons for the incessant social unrest in the society, which has combined with the turbulent global economy and financial crisis to undermine the people’s ability to earn a living and improve their livelihood (World Economic Forum, 2007).

Many factors are retarding development and prosperity in Nigeria. There is widespread social injustice in Nigeria; the government rhetorically talks about the welfare of the needy and the growing number of jobless and sick people. But it does not provide them the tools to make a decent living; the majority of them survive under the traditional safety net—the extended family system. As mentioned earlier, there are conflicting statistics about the rate of unemployment in Nigeria: The Nigerian Labour Congress, at some point, estimated the unemployment rate to be 35%. At the same time, the National Bureau of Statistics report showed that about 10 million Nigerians (about 20% of the entire labor force) were unemployed as of March 2009. Recently, the World Bank reported that more than 40 million Nigerians are unemployed (see “Before Our Politicians Empty the Treasury,” 2010). The unemployment figure, as pointed out above, has worsened, particularly among the youth.

5.3. Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone One of the essential factors causing poverty within Sierra Leone lies within the government. Since colonial rule departed, the government has been characterized primarily by either a one-party law or a military regulation as a one-dimensional rule that does not allow for opposition and breeds corruption. The government has been extremely incompetent in providing its citizens with the most basic needs because these needs have been usurped for government officials themselves.

As Riddell points out, Sierra Leoneans “were not just neglected, uninvolved, or would catch up later in the nation’s development. They were actively exploited or ‘ripped off’ and had been for roughly a hundred years – first by colonialism and then by the policies, plans, and programs of the government of independent Sierra Leone.”

According to Sharanya Ricachandran (2011), Sierra Leoneans lack primary health care, adequate provision of food and drinking water, and structurally sound housing. This corruption is starkly evident in the healthcare sector, where “drugs and other free health-related items find their way onto the shelves of pharmacies and other outlets not fit for such a purpose to be sold. While the Health Minister, Dr. Soccoh Alex Kabia, has verbally recognized this occurrence, he has yet to take any proactive measures to stop this practice, free medical assistance provided by donor nations do not reach the poor within Sierra Leone; instead, individuals, both within and outside the government, sell these free drugs for profit. These unnecessary health-care expenses have played a significant role in propelling and E-International Relations Funds, both from within Sierra Leone itself and from assistance given by donor nations, have been taken away from projects that could truly benefit the people to bring them out of poverty. Instead, these funds have been used to serve the specific and inordinate needs of government officials and the urban elite, who happen to be government supporters, While the country’s budget is a minimal $500 million a year, senior officials still usurp both aid money and internal funds for luxuries such as plasma-screen televisions and hunting rifles. Funds that could have been used toward improving daily living conditions for impoverished citizens, such as providing free healthcare, adequate salaries for workers, and free education, have instead disappeared amongst the government and urban elite for personal purposes. One significant example of this can be found within the rule of Siaka Stevens, the first President of Sierra Leone. Stevens’ regime was infamous for its inordinate level of corruption; he had appropriated a vast amount of government revenue for his gain, and along with fellow government officials, he lived in luxury while his people went hungry. He used up most of the financial resources that were meant for his state and people; as a result, poverty and underdevelopment reigned and has continued within Sierra Leone.

Due to such consistent corruption within the government, Sierra Leone is embroiled in poverty and has one of the lowest GDP figures: as of 2010, it was $900, even less than previously war-torn countries such as Rwanda.9 The diamond industry, one of the primary sources of revenue for the Sierra Leonean government, has brought significant income to the country, but the top-down effect is virtually non-existent; lower-class and rural citizens still experience exploitative labor relations and persistent poverty within mining communities. They do not see the money that they worked so hard to bring in and are still impoverished because the government mismanages the funds; in addition, external factors such as a decreased demand for diamonds worldwide have thrown many Sierra Leoneans out of jobs and into poverty. The diamond industry’s slump has slowly picked up in recent years, with a major mine in Koidu rehiring a few hundred workers as the market for diamonds recovers. The government has outwardly taken minimal measures to rehire mine workers. However, the parallel trade of “conflict diamonds” by militiamen and government elites has earned them personal revenues of $7.5 billion. The loss of such a significant amount of money that could have been allotted toward alleviating poverty within Sierra Leone has instead gone to the personal benefit of government officials and militia rebels.

6. Neopatrimonial regimes effects outside the African continent

6.1. Afghanistan

Afghanistan Patronage networks can have a stabilizing impact and be effective in delivering services and can contribute positively to both economic and political development. For example, Englehart and Grant (2015) illustrate that provincial governors in Afghanistan who were deeply rooted within the patronage networks in a province were more likely to bring security in their respective province than more educated and qualified governors who lacked a strong patronage network.

Likewise, Mukhopadhyay (2009; 2014) argues that given the historically weak central state in Afghanistan, the hybrid form of warlord-governors is the best compromise in delivering services and maintaining security in the periphery where the central the government often has limited access. Mukhopadhyay (2009) views the performance of ‘strongmen-governors’ such as Atta and Sherzai ‘exceptional.’ Research elsewhere also shows that state affairs of any nature (e.g., economic, political, religious or regional) run by personal relations and personal networks enjoy a certain level of effectiveness as a result of being embedded in the social norms that bring about a certain level of political and economic development (Bayart et al. 1999, 91).

6.2. Italy

According to the Center for global development (2013), Italy's economy comprises a developed industrial north, dominated by private companies, and a less-developed, highly subsidized, agricultural south, with a legacy of unemployment and underdevelopment. In 2015-16, Italy's economy grew at about 1% each year, and in 2017 growth accelerated to 1.5% of GDP.

According to World Bank (2019), Italy's gross domestic product shrank by 12.4 percent on quarter in the three months to June 2020, following a revised 5.4 percent contraction in the previous period and compared to market expectations of a 15 percent fall. That was the steepest pace of contraction since comparable series began in the 1960s as the country was one of the hardest hit by the coronavirus pandemic. The government was forced to introduce rigid restriction measures from March 9th, which were only gradually eased from May 4th.Chile According to Freedomhouse, Chile, between 1973 and 1988, Chile was governed by an authoritarian military regime led by General Augusto Pinochet, who was the first one to establish a neopatrimonial system through creating a division in Chilean society between the military and the rest of the people.

A new constitution in 1980 imposed severe restrictions on political parties and placed most power in the hands of the military president. Protests began to increase in size and regularity starting in 1983, led by urban civic movements, which also began to link up with trade unions. The Catholic Church, which had sought to preserve its moral authority throughout the postcoup period, joined with these groups to protest human rights violations. In ensuing years, violent repression declined, and there was a rise of major public protests as civic organizations, trade unions, and political parties reemerged. A broad coalition—the National Accord for a Full Transition to Democracy—was the principal civil society force that used nonviolent means to press for gradual democratization and liberalization, including an end to restrictions on civil liberties and free and open elections.

Unions played an important role and in 1982 were joined by the middle class and students in the wake of an economic crisis. The decision of political parties to work together became the main impetus for a broad ideological coalition created around an effort to defeat the military in the 1988 plebiscite on Pinochet’s rule.

Their efforts were successful; the “no on Pinochet” vote won a clear majority, and the military heads decided to honor the results. Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin assumed the office of the presidency after winning open elections held in December 1989. Since that time, Chilean democracy has consolidated, and the country has become a successful political and economic model for Latin America.

According to World Bank (2018), Chile has been one of Latin America’s fastest-growing economies in recent decades thanks to a stable macroeconomic framework, which enabled the country to cushion the effects of a volatile international context and reduce the population living in poverty (on US$ 5.5 per day) from 30 percent in 2000 to 3.7 percent in 2017.

7. Conclusion

In this paper, I aimed to establish a separating line between neopatrimonialism in Africa and neopatrimonial regimes outside the African continent or the Sub Saharan regions more precisely.

While neopatrimonialism might bolster the democracy of some countries, or support their economies, or might even be transitioned to a successful democratic rule like the case in Chile, where neopatrimonial regimes were withdrawn by the people and successfully turned into democracy which contributed to economic prosperity and social equality in Chile and turning the country into a South American economic miracle, the situation is entirely different in the Africa, neopatrimonial states had a complex past, a dark present and even gloomier future, neopatrimonial regimes were one of the main reasons of government depravity and degeneration, and even transitions either were not implemented or brought into attention or were encountered by a failure, and the reason is the prevailing acceptability of the term due to the favor of private interest over common and public welfare, ethnic representation and traditional ethics hat were blended into the African governmental and economic realms, in Africa neither the presidents nor the citizens are entirely against the neopatrimonial states regardless of its negative repercussions, the rulers and elite favor it for what it brings to them from authority, respect, fear and wealth the citizens even the impoverished ones prefer private materialistic inclination over the public welfare that might not directly influence them.

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Title
Neo-patrimonial regimes in Africa and the rest of the world and their economic repercussions. A comparison
College
Princeton University  (Princeton University)
Course
Political Eeconomics
Grade
10th
Author
Year
2020
Pages
26
Catalog Number
V1129937
ISBN (eBook)
9783346490469
ISBN (Book)
9783346490476
Language
English
Keywords
#Africa #Nigeria #Chile #Turkey #Neopatrimonial #Roots #Politics #Economics #Comparison #Indonesia #Gabon
Quote paper
Manar Lezaar (Author), 2020, Neo-patrimonial regimes in Africa and the rest of the world and their economic repercussions. A comparison, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1129937

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