The COVID-19 response of China was not generally different than those of other countries – social distancing, contact tracing, lockdown, vaccination – however, Chinas authorities restricted the spread more effectively and prevented the second and third wave that nearly every other country experienced. Primarily responsible for this success was the very early and rigorously implementation of the measures above – however, the costs to achieve the currently low numbers were high. Since the early days of the pandemic until today, Beijing has strictly enforced limitations of civil liberties, accepting – and, as I will show in the following, even intending – violations of human rights and freedom of expression as well as increased inequality and discrimination of marginalized and especially vulnerable groups.
In this Policy Critique I will focus on two laws which criminalize the disruption of the public order in the analogous life and in the cyberspace which can be seen as new kind of public place. I argue that Article 293 of the "Chinese Criminal Law" and the set of cyberspace guidelines known as "Provisions on the Governance of the Online Information Content Ecosystem" were misused to suppress objective reporting and free speech during the COVID-19 pandemic.
For this I will provide some background information about the original intention of the laws and the problems they were designed to address as well as about the general situation of press freedom in China and its position on relevant treaties of the United Nations (UN). Afterwards, I examine their application and effectiveness during the first months of the Coronavirus pandemic. Using several examples of policies that based on those laws, I will show how they were misused to suppress the freedom of expression of the Chinese population, especially affecting medical staff, journalists, and human rights activists. In the following I will evaluate China’s use of those policies, including potential consequences for neighboring countries and recommended reactions of the international community before I end with a short conclusion.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Issue
3. Background
3.1 “Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China”, Article 293
3.2 “Provisions on the Governance of the Online Information Content Ecosystem”
3.3 General situation of media freedom in China
3.4 China’s position on international treaties
4. Application and Problems
5. Evaluation
6. Conclusion
Objectives & Core Themes
This policy critique examines how Chinese authorities utilized specific legal frameworks—Article 293 of the "Criminal Law" and the "Provisions on the Governance of the Online Information Content Ecosystem"—to suppress objective reporting and civil liberties during the COVID-19 pandemic under the guise of public order.
- The misuse of "catch-all" criminal laws to punish dissent.
- Systematic state censorship and digital propaganda control.
- The intersection of pandemic response measures and human rights violations.
- The geopolitical implications of China’s digital surveillance model.
- The impact of state-enforced information blackouts on marginalized minority groups.
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“Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China”, Article 293
Originally, Article 293 was designed to maintain the public order by preventing people from physically or verbally attacking other persons as well as vandalizing in public areas or causing other forms of serious disorder. Therefore, it belongs to the group of laws which punish disorderly conducts that might disturb the peace. Those statutes are also known as “catch-all crimes” (FindLaw 2019), a colloquial term which refers to a well-known problem that occurs when disorderly conducts are interpreted and applied: It is relatively easy to use those laws as basis for the criminalization and punishment of all people who behave in an unwanted, disruptive manner.
I will show that the current Chinese administration misuses it to prevent and suppress a behavior which is not generally harmful or dangerous for the society but could threaten the stability and the reputation of their own government. In those cases of misguided application, public order and peace are not in real danger which means that the original intention of the law is missed. Instead, completely different, even unjust goals can be achieved by using the mentioned article as pretext, for instance in order to justify a limitation of the freedom of expression at public events or the general prohibition for civilians to hold a rally in the public.
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: Provides an overview of China’s pandemic response and outlines the core argument that legal provisions were used to suppress free speech.
Issue: Defines the specific legal basis of the "Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China," specifically Article 293, regarding public order disturbances.
Background: Examines the legal, ideological, and historical context of Chinese internet regulations and the status of press freedom under the current administration.
Application and Problems: Analyzes concrete examples of how authorities enforced these laws to silence journalists, activists, and scientists during the early stages of the pandemic.
Evaluation: Assesses the disproportionate nature of these policies in light of international human rights standards and the risks of regional imitation.
Conclusion: Summarizes the findings, emphasizing that the Chinese state prioritizes image management and control over open, objective health communication.
Keywords
COVID-19, China, Censorship, Article 293, Cyberspace Administration, Human Rights, Freedom of Expression, Public Order, Surveillance, Pandemic Response, Propaganda, Minority Rights, Digital Authoritarianism, Information Control, Rule of Law.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this paper?
The paper examines how the Chinese government utilized internal security laws and cyberspace regulations to restrict objective reporting and suppress dissent during the COVID-19 health crisis.
What are the core thematic areas discussed?
The study focuses on the intersection of legal policy, digital censorship, human rights, and the geopolitical influence of China's surveillance tactics.
What is the central research question?
It investigates whether Article 293 and the new cyberspace provisions were genuine tools for maintaining public order or pretexts for silencing information about the pandemic.
Which scientific methods were employed?
The author uses a policy critique methodology, combining legal document analysis with the evaluation of human rights reports and journalistic evidence from the first year of the pandemic.
What is the focus of the main section of the paper?
The main section details specific cases of detention and censorship, illustrating how the government targeted activists, medical professionals, and researchers who attempted to report on the realities of the pandemic.
Which keywords characterize this analysis?
Key terms include censorship, pandemic response, digital authoritarianism, freedom of expression, and state surveillance.
How does the paper relate the pandemic to minority groups in China?
It discusses how media blackouts in Xinjiang specifically impacted Uighurs, preventing them from accessing vital health information and facilitating further state exploitation.
What are the potential international consequences of these policies?
The paper suggests that China acts as a role model for other regimes, potentially encouraging neighboring countries like Myanmar to adopt similar repressive digital laws.
Does the author believe the Chinese response was effective?
The author acknowledges the containment of the virus but argues that the human cost, in terms of rights violations and the suppression of critical information, was disproportionate and unjust.
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- Ariatani Wolff (Autor:in), 2021, Policy Critique. Human Rights Violations in China, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1161886
