The discussion about the Free Will raises mixed opinions. Some share the belief that Free Will must exist, because imagining a world where we do not have the liberty to choose what we ought to do, does not seem right. Hard determinists, however, fully deny the existence of the Free Will and at the same time, ignore the notion of moral responsibility. The opposition to hard determinism is created by the Libertarians. Their opinion is that science is not able to talk about the human mind. For they say that science is trying to analyze humans as if they were machines, which is not possible. Humans have a Free Will, even without science being able to justify it.
The goal of my paper will be to show if we can be satisfied with the definitions of free will given so far. For this, I will briefly explain the main point of view of the ones who defend the idea of the free will. How does free will exist and how do we know that we are acting freely? Mentioning all the issues that raise when talking about the free will, would go beyond the scope of the discussion, this is why I will mainly focus on the idea of events caused by luck. Since to me, this is a point that neither libertarianism nor compatibilism seems to consider, I will base my main argumentation on how luck is not mentioned in their speeches.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Free Will explained
i. Free Will defenders
3. Against Free Will
i. Against compatibilism
ii. Against libertarianism
iii. Further argumentation
4. Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
This paper examines the validity of existing arguments for the existence of free will. It aims to determine whether current definitions provided by libertarians and compatibilists are sufficient or if they fail to adequately address the role of luck in human decision-making and moral responsibility.
- The conceptual distinction between libertarianism and compatibilism
- The definition of free will and the role of agent causation
- The critique of moral responsibility in the presence of luck
- The conflict between determinism, indeterminism, and human agency
- An analysis of how situational and constitutive luck undermine freedom
Excerpt from the Book
Further argumentation
Another argument I am willing to bring up, is that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with the term luck. Luck erodes moral responsibility since it undermines responsibility control. What I mean by this, is that for some things in life, we simply use the notion of luck, as we do not have the control over them. If I am born in a rich family, I say that I am “lucky”, because I do not have to face financial crisis during the time, I am financially dependent from my family. This is what Thomas Nagel calls constitutive luck. The conditions in which I am born, constitute my being and I do not have the control over these.
There is also the type of present luck. This luck is present when a supposedly free and moral action is taking place. Present luck can depend on my mood, which I as an agent will not be considering as significant, in opposition to the constitutive luck. I act presently lucky when my actions do not depend on what constitutes me. Meaning that when facing a situation, I can act either one way or another, it might depend on my mood.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: The introduction outlines the central debate regarding free will, positioning the perspectives of hard determinists and libertarians, and states the paper's goal to investigate the impact of luck on these theories.
2. Free Will explained: This chapter defines free will through the lens of traditional dictionary entries and explores how libertarians and compatibilists attempt to justify its existence within their respective frameworks.
3. Against Free Will: The chapter presents a critical assessment of both compatibilist and libertarian views, arguing that neither adequately accounts for the influence of external manipulation or the erosive nature of luck on moral responsibility.
4. Conclusion: The conclusion synthesizes the arguments, asserting that the problem of free will remains unsolved and suggests that a new definition is required to reconcile agent-causation with the absence of luck.
Keywords
Free will, Libertarianism, Compatibilism, Determinism, Indeterminism, Moral responsibility, Agent causation, Luck, Constitutive luck, Present luck, Human agency, Metaphysics
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this academic paper?
The paper explores the philosophical concept of free will, questioning whether the arguments typically provided by libertarians and compatibilists are strong enough to justify its existence.
What are the primary theoretical frameworks discussed?
The work focuses on libertarianism, which rejects the idea that humans can be analyzed purely like physical machines, and compatibilism, which attempts to reconcile free will with determinism.
What is the central research question?
The author seeks to determine if existing definitions of free will are satisfying and specifically investigates how the concept of "luck" complicates the notion of moral responsibility.
What scientific or philosophical methodology is applied?
The author uses conceptual analysis and logical argumentation to critique existing theories, specifically highlighting the lack of consideration for "luck" in current philosophical discourse on agency.
What is addressed in the main body of the text?
The main body examines definitions of free will, the distinction between libertarian and compatibilist positions, and provides a critical argument against both based on the interference of luck.
Which keywords best characterize this research?
Key terms include Free Will, Libertarianism, Compatibilism, Agent Causation, Moral Responsibility, and various forms of Luck (constitutive and present).
How does the author define "constitutive luck"?
The author adopts Thomas Nagel's definition, referring to the conditions under which a person is born—such as family background or financial status—which constitute their being despite them having no control over these factors.
What is the significance of "present luck" in the author's argument?
Present luck refers to situational factors, such as mood, that influence an agent's decision-making at the moment of action, making it difficult to claim that an action is entirely under the agent's control.
Why does the author conclude that the problem of free will is unresolved?
The author concludes that because current definitions fail to isolate an agent's choice from the interference of luck or deterministic values, they cannot provide a robust defense of free will.
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- Sabrina Fiel Abade (Autor:in), 2021, Free Will, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1168144
