The possibility of free will has been discussed for a very long time. Similarly, the question whether our world is determined has been discussed for an equally long time. It did not take long until the discussion united both aspects and the question whether free will and determinism could both be true at the same time or if they excluded one another was asked.
This paper will argue in favor of free will by presenting arguments in favor as well as disprove some of the arguments against it. In the next step, determinism will be criticized and arguments that are regularly brought forward to defend determinism will be proven wrong. We will then examine whether compatibilism could still be true, but this will only prove to be the final nail in the coffin for determinism. Being free in our actions and being able to change and influence the world around us is at first glance a rather intuitive position. However, this essay will back up our intuition by analyzing different arguments in favor and against the different components.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Free Will
2.1 The strengths of Free Will
2.2 A Defence of Free Will
3. Determinism – A weak position
4. Are Free Will and Determinism compatible?
5. Conclusion
Objectives and Core Topics
This paper explores the philosophical tension between free will and determinism, aiming to demonstrate that free will is a defensible position while refuting various arguments for determinism and the possibility of compatibilism.
- The intuitive basis and defense of human free will.
- Critical analysis of the Libet experiment and its implications.
- Evaluation of macro-level and neural determinism.
- Examination of the compatibility between free will and causal determinism.
- Investigation into the logical consequences of the consequence argument.
Excerpt from the Book
A Defence of Free Will
It might sound rather mundane, but there is a reason why free will has been discussed as much as it has been. How can we be sure that we are in fact free? There are endless possibilities how our actions could be unfree and influenced by factors that lie outside of us – and we would not even know about them. Many different philosophers have argued against free will, and a lot of them did so by referring to the Libet experiment. The neurologist Benjamin Libet constructed experiments to investigate the role of consciousness in the generation of a motor action (Libet et al., 1983). He concluded, “that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous, freely voluntary act can begin unconsciously, that is, before there is any (at least recallable) subjective awareness that a ‘decision’ to act has already been initiated cerebrally” (Libet et al., 1983, 623). Opponents of free will utilized those findings to strengthen their position. According to them, we cannot have free will because it is already unconsciously decided that we are going to act in a certain way before we consciously decide to act.
In “Free Will and Luck”, Alfred Mele argued against this interpretation of the experiment. He acknowledges that “when Libet’s work is applied to the theoretically subtle and complicated issue of free will, things can quickly get out of hand” (40). However, he also argues that Libet does in fact not show that a decision to flex is made or an intention to flex acquired at -550 milliseconds (Mele 2006, 41). Libet et al. write “the brain […] ‘decides’ to initiate or […] prepare to initiate the act […] before there is any reportable subjective awareness that such a decision has taken place” (640). Mele argues that since Libet himself describes the relevant occurrence as the onset of an urge, which means that “rather than acquiring an intention or making a decision of which he is not conscious, the agent instead acquires an urge or desire of which he is not conscious” (Mele 2006, 33). Mele adds to this by stating that “it is also left open that what emerges around -550 milliseconds is a pretty reliable causal contributor to an urge” (Mele 2006, 33), which shows that neither a choice is made at that time, nor is it even clear that it causally contributes to an urge. Therefore, this is not an argument against free will, as it is in fact not the case, that a decision is made unconsciously.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: This chapter outlines the long-standing debate between free will and determinism and sets the stage for arguing in favor of free will while criticizing deterministic positions.
2. Free Will: This chapter examines the intuition behind free will as a constitutive element of human dignity and provides a defense against neuroscience-based objections such as the Libet experiment.
3. Determinism – A weak position: This chapter investigates different forms of determinism, specifically macro-level and neural determinism, arguing that they lack empirical support and are conceptually flawed.
4. Are Free Will and Determinism compatible?: This chapter analyzes the logical compatibility of the two concepts and argues, through the lens of causal powers and the consequence argument, that they remain mutually exclusive.
5. Conclusion: This chapter synthesizes the previous findings to argue that determinism is untenable and that libertarianism is the more appropriate framework for understanding human agency.
Keywords
Free Will, Determinism, Compatibilism, Libet experiment, Consciousness, Agency, Causal powers, Neuroscience, Moral responsibility, Human dignity, Libertarianism, Consequence argument, Rational belief, Neural determinism.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this paper?
The paper fundamentally addresses the philosophical debate between free will and determinism, exploring whether they can coexist or if they are mutually exclusive.
What are the primary themes discussed?
Central themes include the defense of free will, the critique of deterministic arguments, the interpretation of neuroscientific experiments in the context of philosophy, and the compatibility of causal determinism with human agency.
What is the main research question or goal?
The primary goal is to argue for the existence of free will by disproving common arguments against it and showing that determinism—and by extension compatibilism—cannot be logically sustained.
Which scientific or philosophical methods are employed?
The author employs conceptual analysis and analytical philosophy, specifically engaging with arguments from established philosophers like Clarke, Mele, Balaguer, and van Inwagen to evaluate premises and logical consistency.
What topics are covered in the main body of the text?
The body covers the definition and defense of free will, a critical examination of various deterministic models (macro-level and neural), and an analysis of compatibility arguments using causal power theory and the consequence argument.
What are the key terms that define this work?
The work is characterized by terms such as Free Will, Determinism, Compatibilism, Agency, and Libertarianism.
How does the author address the Libet experiment?
The author cites Alfred Mele to argue that the Libet experiment does not demonstrate an unconscious decision-making process, as it only shows the onset of an urge rather than a conscious choice.
What is the conclusion regarding compatibilism?
The author concludes that compatibilism is not a defensible position because free will and determinism cancel each other out, favoring the position of libertarianism instead.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Sarah Sailer (Autor:in), 2021, Free Will and Determinism. Are both just an illusion or do they hold some truth?, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1176122
