While talking to someone, both may be speaking of the same thing, without realizing that they are doing so. When I am talking about the Morning Star, and someone else is talking about the Evening Star, are we both talking about the same thing? Or are we talking about two different things, as we are using different names for the thing we are talking about? To start an analysis on this topic, this paper will elaborate Frege’s Puzzle’s, which he introduces at the beginning of "On sense and reference".
He talks about two puzzles, one concerning identity statements, and the other, concerning propositional attitude reports. As he himself elaborates those puzzles, he will also try to find the solution to those puzzles. To understand his solution to the Puzzles, I will elaborate his solutions, giving various definitions, which are necessary to have a great understanding of what is being argued for. While his first puzzle is especially based on proper names, his second puzzle, will concern entire declarative sentences and forms of argumentation.
After having a clear understanding of what the problem with identity is, and how Frege claims to have solved it, we will see how one could oppose to Frege’s resolution to the puzzle. Analyzing multiple reproaches, would go beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, we will only focus on a claim stated by Glezako Stravoula, saying that Frege started his argumentation wrong, by supposing that a=a can be known a priori.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Frege’s Puzzles
i. First puzzle: Identity Statements
ii. Second puzzle: Propositional Attitude Reports
3. Is Frege’s solution to the puzzle of identity satisfactory?
i. Epistemic difference
ii. Defense
4. Conclusion
Objectives and Research Themes
This paper examines Gottlob Frege’s influential work "On sense and reference," specifically focusing on the two central puzzles he introduces regarding identity statements and propositional attitude reports. The primary objective is to evaluate whether Frege’s proposed solutions—distinguishing between sense and reference—successfully address the problems of cognitive value and the failure of substitution in intensional contexts, while also critically engaging with counterarguments regarding the a priori nature of identity.
- The distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung).
- Cognitive significance of identity statements (a=a vs. a=b).
- The behavior of language within intensional contexts (propositional attitudes).
- Critique of the a priori status of identity claims.
- The pursuit of a perfect, scientifically demonstrative language.
Excerpt from the Book
i. First Puzzle: Identity Statements
The problems elaborated by a puzzle, are problems that involve claims that seem to be intuitively true, meaning that no experience is needed, to know the truth of a claims. Frege introduces his first puzzle then by saying that “Equality gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. […] Is it a relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects? […] a=a and a=b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value; a=a holds a priori and, according to Kant is to be labelled analytic, while statements of the form a=b often contain very valuable extensions of our knowledge and cannot always be established a priori. […] Now if we were to regard equality as a relation between that which the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate, it would seem that a=b could not differ from a=a (i.e., provided that a=b is true). A relation would thereby be expressed of a thing to itself, and indeed one in which each thing stands to itself and to no other thing.”
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: This chapter introduces the core subject of Frege’s puzzles, establishing the problem of identity and the author's intention to analyze these puzzles and their critiques.
2. Frege’s Puzzles: This section details the two main puzzles: the cognitive difference in identity statements and the failure of substitution in propositional attitude reports.
3. Is Frege’s solution to the puzzle of identity satisfactory?: This chapter critically assesses Frege's logic, specifically addressing the objection that identity claims like a=a cannot be definitively categorized as a priori knowledge.
4. Conclusion: The concluding chapter synthesizes the arguments, reaffirming the validity of Frege's framework when applied to a perfect, logical language.
Keywords
Frege, Sense, Reference, Identity Statements, Propositional Attitude Reports, Cognitive Value, Intensional Contexts, A Priori, Analytic, Philosophy of Language, Logic, Substitution, Semantics, Thought, Truth Value.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this paper?
The paper provides an analysis of Gottlob Frege’s philosophical work "On sense and reference," focusing on how he addresses puzzles related to identity and language.
What are the primary themes discussed?
The central themes include the distinction between sense and reference, the cognitive value of identity statements, and the analysis of intensional contexts.
What is the main research question?
The research seeks to determine whether Frege’s proposed solutions to his self-created puzzles are satisfactory, particularly in light of objections regarding the a priori nature of identity.
Which methodology is employed?
The author uses a philosophical, analytical approach, examining Frege's original text and comparing it against specific counter-criticisms.
What topics are covered in the main body?
The main body covers the first puzzle (identity statements), the second puzzle (propositional attitude reports), and a critical examination of the epistemic differences in identity claims.
Which keywords best characterize this work?
Key terms include Sense, Reference, Identity, Propositional Attitudes, Cognitive Value, and Frege.
How does Frege resolve the problem of substituting names in identity statements?
Frege resolves this by arguing that names can refer to the same object while possessing different "senses," which explains why different identity statements have different cognitive values.
How does the paper address the "Lady Gaga" example?
The author uses the "Lady Gaga" example to illustrate how intensional contexts affect propositional attitudes, explaining why substituting names can change the truth value of a reported belief.
What is the author's stance on the criticism regarding a=a?
The author concludes that the criticism that a=a cannot be known a priori is largely irrelevant, as Frege’s aim is to establish a perfect, logical language rather than describe empirical discourse.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Sabrina Fiel Abade (Autor:in), 2022, Frege's "On Sense and Reference". Elaborating Gottlob Frege’s Puzzles, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1183093
