Rawls’s claim that the primary subject of justice should be the basic structure of a society – I shall call this his basic structure claim - has been a central point of discussion for a variety of debates within political theory. Not only has it been attacked from both libertarians and socialists alike, but it has also played a crucial role in feminist critiques of Rawls. Above all, its importance can hardly be overstated with regard to questions about transnational justice: The cosmopolitanism-vs.-statism debate can to a large part be traced back to different conceptions of the basic structure, respectively resulting in different views about the scope of principles of justice.
In contrast to the pivotal significance of this claim, however, Rawls seems to assume rather than really justify it, which is part of why many have found it dubious at least, if not straightforward wrong. After shortly outlining the core aspects of that discussion in section 2, my aim in this paper will therefore be to develop a more profound account of the basic structure, based on a particular interpretation of Kant’s Doctrine of Right. In doing so, I seek to answer two questions. The first is: In which sense are institutions “different” subjects of justice after all? This question will be addressed in section 3 and 4. The second is: How do normative principles apply differently to institutions than they do to individual conduct? This will be the topic of section 5 and 6.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Cohen and Murphy vs. Rawls
3. Rawls’s circle
4. Kant’s Account of Institutions: Political not Metaphysical
5. “Taking People as They are”
6. Kant’s Moral Dualism
7. Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
This paper examines the normative status of the "basic structure" of society, specifically questioning why institutions serve as unique subjects of justice and how normative principles apply to them differently than to individual conduct. By engaging with critiques from G.A. Cohen and Liam Murphy against John Rawls, the author develops a Kantian account that justifies the special role of institutions through the lens of legitimate coercion and reasonable pluralism.
- The justification of the basic structure as the primary subject of justice.
- Critique of the monist vs. dualist debate regarding normative principles.
- Kant’s political philosophy as a framework for non-instrumental institutions.
- The role of determinacy and transparency in the exercise of coercive authority.
- Reconciling institutional requirements with the status of free and equal persons.
Excerpt from the Book
4. Kant’s Account of Institutions: Political not Metaphysical
This might seem irritating at first glance: The textbook-image of Kant is that of a moral monist par excellence. For most readers – and Rawls is no exception here (cf. Pogge 2002) - his political philosophy is to be seen as a mere derivation of his “comprehensive” moral philosophy or, more precisely, as an application of the supreme principle of morality (the categorical imperative) to the “case” of coercive institutions, and this widespread interpretation has been challenged only recently. I will try to avoid the details of that - primarily exegetical - discussion here, and will limit my focus to arguing that Kant provides us with an account of institutions that is both non-instrumental (as a mere means for achieving what morality demands) as well as political in the Rawlsian sense. For Rawls, any political conception must be faithful to two things: First, it needs to take persons as free and equal (1.), and second, it has to take seriously the issue of reasonable disagreement (2.). I will now argue that Kant’s account of institutions not only allows for both aspects, but in fact follows from them.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: Presents the basic structure claim and identifies the research gap regarding the justification of institutions as the primary subject of justice.
2. Cohen and Murphy vs. Rawls: Outlines the critique of the Rawlsian project, specifically focusing on the tension between incentive payments and the difference principle.
3. Rawls’s circle: Discusses the instrumental view of institutions and argues that Rawls faces a dilemma in defining the distinctiveness of the basic structure.
4. Kant’s Account of Institutions: Political not Metaphysical: Reinterprets Kant to show that his political philosophy provides a non-instrumental and political account of institutions.
5. “Taking People as They are”: Examines the necessity of institutions to solve the problem of reasonable pluralism by avoiding assumptions about human nature.
6. Kant’s Moral Dualism: Explains how principles of justice differ between institutions and individuals based on the requirements of determinacy and transparency.
7. Conclusion: Summarizes the findings and addresses potential objections, including the application of these insights to transnational justice.
Keywords
Basic structure, John Rawls, Immanuel Kant, Coercion, Political philosophy, Moral dualism, Institutions, Reasonable pluralism, Justice, Normative principles, Determinacy, Transparency, Doctrine of Right, Liam Murphy, G.A. Cohen
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core argument of this work regarding the basic structure of society?
The work argues that the basic structure is not merely an instrument for achieving an external ideal of justice, but a unique entity justified by the necessity of managing coercion in contexts of reasonable disagreement.
What are the primary themes explored in the paper?
The central themes are the limits of normative principles, the distinction between individual conduct and institutional design, and the use of Kantian philosophy to provide a robust foundation for political institutions.
What is the primary research goal of the author?
The goal is to develop a coherent, non-instrumental account of the basic structure that is "political" in the Rawlsian sense, drawing primarily on a specific interpretation of Kant’s Doctrine of Right.
Which scientific methods are utilized by the author?
The author employs a normative-analytical method, engaging in a critical review of contemporary political philosophy (Rawls, Cohen, Murphy) and providing a text-based re-interpretation of Kantian political theory.
What does the main body of the work cover?
It traverses the critique of Rawlsian "monism," investigates the "circle-dilemma" in defining institutional significance, and argues for a dualistic moral view where institutions are held to higher standards of transparency and determinacy than individuals.
How can the work be characterized by its keywords?
It is characterized by a focus on the structural requirements of justice, the reconciliation of freedom with coercion, and the methodological shift toward a dualistic understanding of normative responsibility.
What does the author mean by "reasonable pluralism" in the context of institutions?
It refers to the persistent condition in which free and equal individuals hold incompatible but reasonable moral views, necessitating institutions that can determine and enforce rights without relying on a single, comprehensive moral doctrine.
Why does the author argue that institutions must be "transparent"?
Transparency is required because institutions exert coercive power; to remain legitimate and "unite our wills," their goal of promoting justice must be discernible, whereas human individual motivations are necessarily opaque.
- Quote paper
- Maximilian Strietholt (Author), 2021, Kant and the Basic Structure, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1187510
