The Capability Approach – An application to the topic of "Self-determined living of people with disabilities"

Table of contents

Introduction

I. Basics of Aristotelian theory in relation to the Capability Approach

II. Three Dimensions of Meaning of Justice

III. Ethics of standards
a. Utilitarianism
b. Contract theories
c. Theories of justice
d. John Rawls Theory of Justice

IV. The Capability Approach
a. Capability Approach according to Amartya Sen
b. Capabilities Approach according to Martha Nussbaum

V. Criticism of the Capability Approach

VI. Social work and empowerment justice

VII. Digression: Self-determined living of people with disabilities in the context of capabilities
a. Disability/ Impairment
b. Self-determination in case of impairment
c. Living with disabilities

VIII. Conclusion

IX. Bibliography

Introduction

For the greater part of the German population, self-determination has been a matter of course since childhood. This circumstance is probably due in particular to stable democracy. Adult people are relatively free to decide on work, leisure, housing, life, partnership and finances. Of course, there are limits to every person's freedom of choice insofar as they reach the limits of other people, or even the financial or cognitive limits of their own person. In comparison, people with disabilities are increasingly confronted with boundaries and external regulations. The majority of those affected are not free to choose their job, but have to come to terms with what is on offer. Many do not have the opportunity to freely decide where and with whom they want to live. They must also experience that partnerships and sexuality are prevented. The free time, the day, the meals are planned and the "pocket money" is allocated. In addition, there are the personal cognitive, mental or physical impairments that must be compensated. As a rule, the housing wishes of people with disabilities can only be implemented insofar as there are free places in the dormitory and in the residential group, for example, or the need for support is rather low, so that outpatient residential care is possible, or the relatives have enough resources to maintain the care. Most forms of housing involve a relatively large dependence of those affected on other people. But to be dependent is to be determined by others. In trade journals, innovative model projects for self-determined living are increasingly being presented. Can people with disabilities live independently?

The Capability Approach is about establishing justice through empowerment to a self-determined life. Is this theory suitable to enable people with disabilities to freely choose their housing options?

This work is intended to investigate this.

It seemed important to clarify which theories of the norm ethics of the Capability Approach are based on and from which it distinguishes itself.

I. Basics of Aristotelian theory in relation to the Capability Approach

The capabilities approach is in the tradition of Aristotelian practical philosophy, which is equally related to economics, ethics and the art of state and life (cf. Oelkers et.al. 2008, p. 85).

According to Aristotle, man strives for the perfectly good as the ultimate goal of all action, for in this he sees anchored the happiness, which man wants to achieve for his own sake. Happiness alone makes life so desirable that man no longer needs to have other needs. Aristotle combines happiness with reason, because reason is the most perfect ability or virtue of man. He distinguishes two alternative possibilities of happiness as two perfect objects of reason. The happiness of theoretical life is the truth grasped in pure theory, in which the wise man satisfies himself. The happiness of practical life is the good life and action in society and polis (politics). According to Aristotle, this happiness is founded by rational activities in the house (work, cp note), in friendship, neighborhood and politics. Reason-determined activities determine for him the attainment of happiness. He excludes pleasure-determined activities for the achievement of happiness. However, in rational practice he also sees a gain from pleasure and joy as correct (cf. Anzenbacher 2012, pp.151-152). Aristotle points out that the success of happiness depends in many ways on external living conditions, such as health, prosperity, friends and family. People have only limited influence on these factors. However Aristotle leaves the conditions of the circumstances of life to biographical coincidence and assigns an achievement of happiness only to the virtuous, i.e. rational (cf. ibid., p.155).

Aristotle also distinguishes between two types of self-love, which differ in their goals in practical life. First of all, it is about the naturalistic self-love of the egoist. The egoist strives for a maximum of limited available goods and also gains his advantage to the detriment of others. The second form of self-love is motivated by reason of itself. We are talking here about goods which, in themselves, are available without limit. The appropriation of these goods does not affect the rights of other people, but promotes charity and justice. The appropriation of these goods out of self-love leads to one's own perfection and to the well-being of fellow human beings in the sense of humanity. According to Aristotle, only the second form of self-love can lead to happiness and meaning (cf. ibid., p.161-162).

II. Three Dimensions of Meaning of Justice

"Rules of justice concern reciprocal claims, binding rights and obligations. They articulate what people owe each other. What enriches social relationships as a voluntary gift remains distinguished from it." (Maaser 2010, p. 57)

The most important justice-theoretical distinction between justice also comes from Aristotle. In the 5th book of Nicomachean ethics, he introduced a far-reaching differentiation: the distinction between distributive justice (iustitia distributiva) and barter justice (iustitia commutativa). By distributive justice Aristotle understood a gift of goods from one person to another, which proves to be worthy of the gift. He did not consider social equality. Dignity he equated with status or merit. Equality and justice applied only to free male citizens. For him, exchange justice was the exchange of equivalent goods or services as a two-way just relationship (cf. Maaser 2010, pp. 58-59).

The Aristotelian understanding of justice is the basis of the three basic dimensions of a modern concept of justice.

1. In the justice of the law, all people are regarded as equal before the law and are therefore endowed with equal rights and obligations.
2. In the fair exchange or performance equality, an equality of performance and consideration is named.
3. The concern of the distributing justice is to provide each human being with what is due and necessary for the sake of his dignity.

It is worth noting for social work that the dimensions of justice have only evolved throughout history through human experiences of oppression and disregard. Before the beginning of modern times, the present social order formed the basis for justice. The differences in status were considered natural and unchangeable. To each his own meant, to each what he was entitled to according to his social status. At the beginning of modern times, this social formation dissolved under political and economic pressure. In the following dynamic-liberal social orders, it was primarily about performance justice. But the inferiority of the performance of labor to the property led to widespread impending of the affected population groups. This social problem gave space to the understanding of distributive justice. Distributive justice means justice of needs and opportunities. Justice of needs aims at the equal satisfaction of elementary basic needs. Equal opportunities mean equal access to socio-cultural competences and socio-economic resources of a society (cf. Lob-Hüdepohl/ Lesch 2007, pp. 130-131).

III. Ethics of standards

Großmaß and Perko (2011, pp. 23-24) describe a division of philosophical ethics into an applied ethics and a pure basic ethics. Normative ethics is a form of basic ethics. It discusses which values, norms and moral principles should be regarded as a benchmark for human action. The should is viewed critically in the context of social discourses, images of human beings or even legal foundations. The ethical theories underlying the Capabilities approach are, like the approach itself, forms of normative ethics.

a. Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is a consequentialist moral theory. This means that the moral quality of actions and norms is judged empirically and rationally according to their consequences. The focus is on the interests of the community and not on the individual interests of the human being. The founder of utilitarianism is Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). The most famous representative was John Stuart Mill with his work "Utilitarianism" in 1863. Today, utilitarianism is based on four principles for the moral evaluation of actions and norms. In the principle of consistency, the assessment is made exclusively on the basis of the effects of the action. The action itself is never right or wrong in itself, only the effect of the action can be morally evaluated. The utility principle evaluates the criteria by which the effects of an action are assessed. The consequences of the action are to serve the realization of the "good in itself". In the principle of hedonism, the "good in itself" is defined. It is human happiness that determines each person for himself. Human happiness involves satisfying human needs and interests. From a hedonistic point of view, however, the decisive factor is the quantity of happiness and not the quality of happiness. Thus, an action is already considered morally correct if it has good consequences and not only if it has the best consequences. The social principle rejects selfish hedonism. The action cannot be assessed as morally good if it results only in the happiness of the person involved, but as far as possible in the happiness of all those affected. Bentham calls the principle of the greatest possible happiness the greatest possible number. It is therefore about the greatest possible average benefit of actions and norms for a society (cf. Anzenbacher 2012, pp. 31-34).

From a utilitarian point of view, therefore, even actions that we intuitively regard as immoral can be considered justified as long as they serve the common good. The killing of a human being may be acceptable if this act can save the lives of several people. And social injustice within the three dimensions of justice could also be considered morally acceptable from this perspective. For example, it might not be a problem to let a minority work for an extremely low wage if it brings a correspondingly great benefit to society. Typical examples of the argumentation are the calculation of the gross national product or the per capita income of a country. It is assumed that the higher these values are, the better off a society is, but these values do not show a fair distribution (see ibid., p. 34 and Stettner 2007, p. 13).

b. Contract theories

Well-known representatives of the contractualist paradigm are Kant, Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau. They have set out the fundamental arguments that still apply to modern contract theories such as those of James Buchanan or John Rawls.

The basic idea of the contractualist paradigm is the assumption that all people have a fundamental interest in certain rules being followed. Therefore, they show a willingness to accept a hypothetical contract that obliges to comply with the rules (cf. Stettner 2007, 26).

This basic idea can be explained as follows: As long as there is no law, no morality and no regulating authority in a group of people, every individual lives very dangerously. Everyone has to fear for his or her life and the material possessions are insecure. All have to make a great effort for their safety. In these circumstances, social progress is not possible. It is very likely that everyone will come to the realization that it is better within a "contract" to refrain from killing or robbing each other. Even if there is no fair distribution of goods, the poorest also benefit from their rights. But only if everyone agrees to the agreed contract can the rules apply in the long term. In order to protect the agreed rights, sanctions for infringements are named and a body is created that has the legitimacy to enforce the rights (cf. Lob-Hüdepohl/Lesch 2007, pp. 72-73).

"It is only from the well-known long-term self-interest of all individuals that most of the basic rules of morality, certain rights of the individual and the institutions of the democratic state can be justified." (Lob-Hüdepohl/Lesch 2007, p. 73)

c. Theories of justice

In contrast to the teleology (Gr. Telos = purpose, goal) of utilitarianism, forms of argumentation of justice theory follow the deontological moral principle as a principle of justice. Deontological positions regard an action as moral or immoral, regardless of the consequences (cf. Anzenbacher 2012, pp. 32 and 128). Actions must therefore comply with certain rules or principles that are based on what may be done to others. The right takes precedence over the good. Orientation is given by kant's categorical imperative, which is expressed in the so-called "Golden Rule": "What you don't want people to do to you, don't do to anyone else!" According to this principle, humans act as autonomous beings of reason not as drive-driven nature beings (cf. Stettner 2007, p. 25). The principle of justice expresses equal freedom and unavailability for all persons. This means that standards must in principle be capable of consensus. In principle, therefore, all persons concerned must be able to agree to this standard and thus regard it as fair. According to this understanding, standards are only valid if they are fair to all. The consideration of killing one person in order to save the life of several people would not be a morally acceptable act within the deontological view, especially since it could be morally permissible not to prevent the death of a human being (cf. ibid., p. 25 and Anzenbacher 2012, p. 128).

d. John Rawls Theory of Justice

"...distinguish the skill approach from current versions of contractualism, in particular from the variant advocated by Rawls. Basically, however, these approaches are close relatives of the skill approach. The latter was originally developed primarily as an alternative to economic-utilitarian theories,..." (Nussbaum 1999, pp. 105-106)

Lob-Hüdepohl and Lesch describe Rawl's theory of justice as a "contract-theoretical reformulation of Kant's categorical imperative". (2007, p. 75) Thus, his approach can be seen as a hybrid of the theories of contract and justice, which clearly distinguishes itself from utilitarianism with its good as the greatest possible benefit for society. For Rawls, the just takes precedence over the utilitarian good. For him, the deontological principles of justice have the highest normative quality. He describes this justice as fairness (Anzenbacher 2012, p. 256).

Rawls also imagines a group of people who want to conclude a social contract. But for him, the motives of those affected are not purely economic. It is starting from a so-called primordial state, from which people determine their coexistence. For this primordial state, he defines two idealized assumptions. On the one hand, it presupposes that all contractual partners are equally involved and that decisions are only taken by consensus. And on the other hand, he describes the so-called "veil of ignorance", which makes it impossible for those involved to see the future. They do not know who they will be in the future that will be decided. Neither the gender, nor the age nor the social status is known. These special conditions lead to the establishment of maximum fundamental freedoms for everyone, because every conceivable inequality would be rejected in its original state. The situation is different with the distribution of social and economic goods. Here, equality for all could lead to a disadvantage for the poorest, which is why the group decides on an unequal distribution in favour of better productivity, from which the disadvantaged may benefit more than if they were equal. So we will try to achieve the best result for the poorest. This results in Rawl's "difference principle":

"Social and economic inequalities must be as follows: (a) they must [...] bring the greatest possible benefit to the least beneficiaries and (b) they must be associated with offices and positions open to all in accordance with fair equal opportunities." (Rawls 1993, p. 336)

Accordingly, people in their original state only get involved in a capitalist economy if they at least receive a humane minimum of benefits in the event that they themselves should not have capital and labour power.

Unfortunately, Rawls is unable to adequately justify the veil of ignorance. Therefore, its construction is ultimately based on moral intuitions (cf. Lob-Hüdepohl/ Lesch 2007, pp. 76-77).

Rawls builds his theory of good on these principles of justice. The weak theory of good is about the well-being of man within a successful life plan. And the complete theory of good is about the morally valuable person who possesses the moral personality that all participants in the original state want from the other participants. Here Rawls takes over ethical themes of the good life according to Aristotle (cf. Anzenbacher 2012, pp. 256-257). Particularly problematic in Rawl's approach and other contract theories is the fact that only people capable of rationality belong to the moral community. For example, people with intellectual disabilities, small children or people with dementia are not involved in decisions. They receive their consideration within society only on the basis of the interests of rational persons (Stettner 2007, p. 27).

IV. The Capability Approach

"[The] capabilities approach is a [...] justice-theoretical approach that focuses on the question of a good life or a successful practical way of life" (Otto, Ziegler 2010, p. 9). The theory originally goes back to two authors who, independently of each other and in different traditions, began to deal with the construct of justice through empowerment. In the following, the explanations of the economist Amartya Sen will be presented, and then the theory of the philosopher Martha Nussbaum will be dealt with.

a. Capability Approach according to Amartya Sen

Sen began his work on the Capability Approach in the "search for a perspective that captures individual benefits better than Rawls' focus on basic goods" (Sen 2013, p. 259). He was dissatisfied with purely economically and monetarily concentrated approaches to measuring social inequality, such as the comparison of gross domestic product (cf. ibid., p. 253f.). According to Sen, these say too little about individual possibilities. Much more, economic financial aspects should be considered in relation to actual chances of realization of individuals and groups within a nation. Sen implemented this idea, among other things, in his contribution to the development of the Human Development Index, which is regularly published by the UN (cf. ibid., p. 253f.).

Sen also expanded his ideas on a theoretical level in the form of the capability approach.

Sen describes capabilities as opportunities for realization (cf. ibid., p. 259). It is about the question of the extent to which a person or group within a society is able to implement what it "values highly with good reason" (Sen 2013, p. 259). In contrast to Rawls' basic goods, a very personal perspective is at the heart of the capability approach. Sen does not define justice as "everyone gets the same thing," as is the case with Rawl's basic goods, but as "everyone gets the chance to get what they value highly." Not the objective equality, but much more the individual perception of quality of life thus becomes the measure of justice.

Another term in Sen's vocabulary is that of functionings (cf. ibid., p. 259f.). These are translated as functionalities. These are actually implemented states (beings) and activities (doings). Thus, while functionings represent concrete states and behaviors, the term capabilities refers to the opportunities or possibilities to achieve or implement certain functionings that we consider to be right or good. These scopes for action, i.e. the possibility of implementing certain functionings and not others, are decisive (cf., ibid., p. 260f.). They are indicative of our freedom to make decisions.

Freedom is an important construct in Sen's remarks on the Capabilitay approach. He defines them in two ways. on the one hand, freedom means being able to achieve the goals that a person sets himself. On the other hand, however, the path to this goal is also relevant in the sense of freedom. It is free to decide who makes the decision to implement certain functionings and not others. According to Sen, anyone who is forced by external circumstances to implement certain functionings is not free, because he/she does not decide for himself/herself. This also applies if said functionings basically correspond to one's own ideas of "good" or "right". If the decision is not made in person, the person is not free (cf. ibid., p. 259ff.). In this context, the Capability Approach aims to enable people to make free decisions.

b. Capabilities Approach according to Martha Nussbaum

Compared to Amartya Sen, who developed the Capability Approach from an economic perspective, Martha Nussbaum stands in a philosophical tradition (cf. Nussbaum 2010, p. 104). Its concern is the elaboration of a fundamental comprehensive theory of justice (cf. ibid., p. 104).

Central to Nussbaum's remarks is her "strong vague theory of good". It is a list of basic human abilities that every human being should possess in order to be able to lead a life worthy of him (cf. ibid., p. 105).

Her reflections go back to Aristotelian essentialism (cf. Galamaga 2014, p. 45). Aristotle assumed that certain qualities, abilities, etc. are constitutive of being human (cf. ibid., p. 50). Nussbaum also makes this claim to her list of basic abilities. They are the minimum that must be given in order to be able to lead a decent life; this is referred to the strong part of the theory (cf. ibid., p. 45).

It is also vague because Nussbaum does not consider her list to be complete and immutable, but expressly emphasizes that it can be changed and supplemented (cf. ibid., p. 45).

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