Working Papers: 1. The Rise of China - 2. Is Protectionism still alive in a globalized world? - 3. US under Bush II - Empire or Hegemon?

Content

1. Introduction

2. The Rise of China: China approaching the US

3. Australia between China and the US
3.1 Australia and the US: “Most faithful allies”
3.2 Australia and China: “Facing the Dragon”

4. The Rise of China and Implications for Australia

5. Conclusion

6. List of References

1. Introduction

This essay will analyse the implications of the rise of China for Australia, especially in relation to the United States of America (US) as the current major international power. Australia’s special relationship with the United States on the one hand and the increasing economic relations with China on the other pose the question of how Australia will deal with two superior powers having interests in the Pacific and Southeast Asia?^[1]

While Australia accepted the US as a guarantor of security and peace in the region after the Second World War, it installed stable economic ties with China even before the international isolation of the People’s Republic has been abandoned. Today, “[as] China has emerged as a major power, the possibility of conflict between Australia’s relations with the US and those with China has emerged as an issue at times.”^[2] Crucial topics dividing the two powers are the ongoing US support for Taiwan, George Bush’s North-Korea policies and the US perception of China’s global engagement being a threat.^[3] In this context, Stuart Harris posed in 1998 the question: “Will China divide Australia and the US?”^[4]

In order to discuss such and other possible outcomes in the Australia-US-China relations triangle, this essay will first examine the rise of China in regard to the US. Therefore, two main analytical dimensions of economic and security policies were chosen to draw a comprehensible picture of Chinese developments and US responses. This will cover regional and global aspects for each of the examined countries in a historical approach, if applicable.

In the next chapter, Australia and its relations to both powers will be discussed concerning the same dimensions. The findings of this chapter provide the informational basis for the following argument on China’s impact on Australia and its special relation to the US. Finally, in the conclusion the results will be presented and summarised to explain, which influence the rise of China could generate on Australia and its policies.

2. The Rise of China: China approaching the US

In this chapter, the rise of China will be discussed concerning economic and security dimensions. While this description of the Chinese development can present the success story, the comparison to the US performance and Chinese-US relations may put the story in the right context.

Firstly, the economic rise of China will provide an understanding of the remarkable success, although social issues and poverty are still a major problem in this country. However, different indicators of economic growth, as gross-domestic product (GDP) and the import-export performance confirm a rising China every year.

During the 1990s, China reached a permanent GDP growth-rate above seven percent and peaks of 13 - 14 % 1994 respectively 1993. The imports decreased during 1998, but probably due to the financial crisis in Asia. Furthermore, the exports of China rose from 1997 with a value of 182 billion US Dollar to 249 billion US Dollar in 2000. In general, the trade balance has been positive since 1994 with an all time high of 101 billion US Dollar in 2005. All these indicators can be interpreted in favour of an increasing production, wealth and performance of the Chinese economy, while the foreign direct investment (FDI) in this time has been rather stable above 40 billion US Dollar.^[5]

Following current data of the World Bank, this trend of the Chinese economy seems to be unbreakable. While GDP growth rates in the United States of America (US) were decreasing from 3,7 in 2000 to 3,2 in 2005, China performed quite well with 8,4% in 2000 to 10% in 2005.^[6] Reasons for this success, as the availability of cheap labour, will not be discussed here, as there is a vast literature on these issues. Nevertheless, two comments should be made facing the previous data. First, the absolute GDP of the US is much higher than the GDP of China and second, data concerning China are not very reliable due to Chinese data research methods and limited external research access.^[7]

Leaving these aspects aside, China remains apparently a driving force of the world economy, when the World Bank states that it made up to one third of the world’s economy in 2004. In regard to the US, this meant a comfortable trade surplus, its membership in the World Trade Organisation and different trade agreements with the developed world. Furthermore, it changed trade relations and preferences in Asia, as Korea in 2004 exported about 50 billion US Dollar to China, but only 46 to the US. Similar trends can be seen in Chinese trade relations with Japan or Taiwan.^[8]

Secondly, a brief overview on Chinese security policy and military development should provide another perspective on the rise of this country, especially in regard to the earlier mentioned changing trade patterns of major US allies in the region. The defence spending of the People’s Republic of China as an increasingly successful player in the Asian region is only one possible indicator. The expenditure certainly does not explain if China’s military has obtained similar technological levels as the US. Nevertheless, there are several differences in the statistics of Chinese expenditures. In 2007, the National People’s Congress announced another increase of more than 17 % in the defence budget, which will rise to almost 44 to 45 billion US dollar. The US State Department estimated a defence budget of 88,9 billion US dollar in 1999, while the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated only 51 billion US dollar in 2002, which would mean that since 1999 the budget decreased. Furthermore, the BBC reported a double-digit increase of the Chinese defence spending since the early 1990s. This confusion is mainly caused by different research methods, while China is accused of manipulating its statistics. Moreover, the official defence data from China proved a certain rise of military spending,^[9] although even with 88,9 billion in 1999, China did not even reach half of the US expenditure. Accepting this rise without exact data, what does it imply for China’s security policy?

According to one senior official, “China's security policy is designed first and foremost to safeguard its sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.”^[10] In this context, Taiwan becomes an important issue and point of discontent with the US. Nevertheless, many scholars perceive China as a more benign power, which is strongly engaging with multilateral institutions and even continuously proclaiming its peaceful development. Furthermore, border conflicts have been resolved and security relations with most neighbours are improving.^[11] This draws a picture of harmony and peace, but how does it fit the often claimed challenge of US interests and security policy in Asia or the military build-up?^[12]

Joshua Kurlantzick, visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Joseph Nye assume that China applies soft power rather than military means to persuade its neighbours.^[13] Formerly more defensive in its foreign policy, Kurlantzick identifies China’s first appearance on the international stage in 1997, when it “stand up for Asia”^[14] in his words by not devaluing its currency during the Asian Financial Crisis. Kurlantzick suggests that this opened a window for further action and indeed, Chinese foreign policy became more active. Nowadays, Chinese officials continuously visit Asian countries, promote the Chinese language and culture and keep in touch with Chinese diasporas all other the world.^[15] In this context, Joseph Nye emphasises that this rise of Chinese soft power should not be ignored, but be perceived in the light of a power gap between the US and China.^[16] In addition, a more current tool of Chinese soft power has been approved to be rather powerful, as Chinese aid programs became relevant and important for the country’s international image. Furthermore, the provided support exceeds US aid often by three or four times, as in Laos or on the Solomon Islands.^[17] China is certainly not contend with the US military presence, but declared to rise peacefully. It denied a competition for the leadership in Asia, but was able to influence its neighbours by using soft power tools. This implies an increasing acceptance of a Chinese leadership in Asia, which would certainly oppose US interests in the region.^[18] On the other hand, most US officials perceive the US-China relations as “good”^[19], although it is arguable if the avoided competition for power has not already started. Rosemary Foot’s analysis provides an explanation for these Chinese policies. According to her, China applies two strategies of soft-balancing the US by improving its relations with neighbouring countries in Asia and increasing foreign aid, but also bandwagoning with the US, as it supports multilateral institutions and the US war on terror.^[20] This ambivalent picture does fit the more peaceful attempts and declarations of Chinese diplomats. Furthermore, the Chinese military, as mentioned earlier, has currently not the technology to challenge US hegemony in this field. Modernization and high-technology commitments might lead in the future to a power-shift, but do not indicate a certain danger for the US today according to Joseph Nye.^[21]

3. Australia between China and the US

3.1 Australia and the US: “Most faithful allies”

The headline of this chapter quotes the words of Michael Richardson’s Article in the International Herald Tribune. He describes the relation between Australia and the United States as rather outstanding and the expectations of Washington for Australia’s role in the Pacific and Asia quite high.^[22][23] Why and what is this special relation between Australia and the US?

To answer this question und understand the long-lasting US-Australian alliance, it is not reasonable to start with economic interactions, as these relations were born out of World War II and the incapability of the former Australian protector, the United Kingdom. This implies the historical defeat of Royal Navy vessels close to Singapore and finally, the Japanese invasion of the city. During the 19th and early 20th century, Australia perceived its European mother country as the sole and only protection from greater powers in the West and East. In the context of the fall of British Singapore, the protector lost its main bases in this area and with the defeat of the Royal Navy even its credibility of fighting back any attack on Australia." In her hour of greatest peril Australia turned to the United States. On December 27, 1941, Mr. John Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister, made a dramatic appeal for American help ‘without any inhibitions of any kind. . . . and free of any pangs as to our traditional links of kinship with the United Kingdom’."^[24] This was the birth of a strong connection in security policies and fostered further treaties in economic and other fields.

After the Second World War, the next main step in US-Australian relations was taken through the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS) in 1951. Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty confirms that ”[E]ach Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”^[25] In this time of the Cold War, Australia was often the first country to join US military operations and supported American troops in Korea as well as in Vietnam. Furthermore, it participated in the foundation of the unsuccessful pendant of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Asia, the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (SEATO).^[26] All this different Australian security measures were focused on this previous perception of insecurity. Australia was not able to defend its enormous ocean borderline on its own. The ANZUS Treaty and other supportive commitments, as the military intervention in Vietnam, should simply keep the US in the region and assure US support in a military emergency situation.^[27]

Turning to the current policies of Australia’s government, there seems to be a slight difference in this perception of the “most faithful ally”^[28], although John Howard sent troops to Afghanistan and Iraq to support the war on terror party in disregard of the United Nations (UN).^[29] Furthermore, Howard supported the US earlier during the incidents in the Taiwan Straits in 1996, when a US-Chinese war seemed to be close.^[30] Additionally, Australia hosts US intelligence facilities at Pine Gap, is a large importer of US military equipment and holds joint military exercises with the US.^[31] Howard was said to reinvent the old Australian tradition to have a protector, when he strongly linked Australia to the US in the first years of his government. This Australian attitude of foreign policy was mainly connected to the cultural understanding of Australia being “an isolated outpost and bastion of western civilisation”^[32] and therefore searching allies in the western world instead of Asia.^[33]

Nevertheless, Roger Bell pointed out that the Australian support in Iraq and Afghanistan did not match the US requests and Howard’s rhetoric. Furthermore, Howard rejected additional troops for the Iraq mission and even a long-term deployment.^[34] Following Malcolm Fraser in this context, the US-Australian relations might have suffered to some extent even earlier, when the States supported Indonesia’s claims on Papua and left the hard work in East-Timor to Australia.^[35] Recognising today’s developments, there are slight changes in the formerly so gracious Australian-US security relations, but did this affect the economic relations?

Firstly, the Australian Government was able to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States in 2004, which came into effect in 2005. This agreement has been appreciated by Australian Foreign Minister Downer, as well as Minister for Trade Mark Vaile.^[36] Certainly, such an agreement could help Australia, as the US-Australian trade in goods increased since 1985, with a negative trade balance for Australia every year.^[37] Furthermore, the Australian Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade states that “[t]he United States is Australia's single most important economic partner”,^[38] while Australia for the US is mainly a sales market for their exports.^[39]

It is questionable, if this relation can change due to the agreement. Critics, as Linda Weis and Kenneth Davidson, explained that not all barriers have been removed and especially the exclusion of agricultural production led to disadvantages for Australia. US protectionist measures for sugar, as well as tariffs on beef and dairy, which will remain for another 18 years, are threatening the Australian economy. Furthermore, a part of this agreement seemed to “undermine Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and quarantine regulations.”^[40] While these aspects certainly support some doubts of how reasonable the decision for this agreement has been, Tor Krever of the Monash University even stated “that it might not be in the national interest to do so”.^[41] Following his arguments, the agricultural goods appeared to be the most important aspect of the negotiation. It is surprising, that even the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade stressed the importance of these production areas, but finally, they were mainly excluded from the FTA.^[42]

In regard to the current development of US-Australian trade, both governments try to praise the agreement as a big step forward and foster the perception that Australia has been rewarded for its support of US military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.^[43] Nevertheless, the previously mentioned restraints in the agreement provide enough reason to doubt the benefits for Australia’s economy.

3.2 Australia and China: “Facing the Dragon”

This chapter will discuss the relations of Australia and China concerning economic and security interaction. While the relations of the US and Australia were best understood from the security perspective, the Australian-Chinese relations started from an economic point of view. Therefore, it will be most helpful to begin with these relations in a historical approach.

Firstly, relations with China were established even before the opening and normalisation of US-Chinese relations during the 1970s. Australia exported wheat and other raw materials to the isolated and communist China.^[44] However, it was in 1973, when the first Australian Prime Minister, Whitlam, visited China following the earlier visit of US president Nixon. These economic ties between both states began to develop and dominated the political life in Australia in the 1980s. The Hawk and Keating governments were able to understand and interpret the Asian miracle and shifted their economic focus to the Pacific and the industrialising countries in Asia.^[45] In this context, Australia increased its trade with Asia in general and China in particular, as Keating promoted a rational “businesslike and unsentimental relationship with China.”^[46] Although the market share diminished due to North American and European influence, Australia’s economy still benefited and trade “boomed”^[47] according to Kaushik Kapisthalam.^[48] Furthermore, these economic relations did not suffer under incidents as the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. Moreover, in 2003 China became the third largest trading partner of Australia and both sides negotiating a FTA. In this context, Hugh White even expects that China will be the major trading partner of Australia in the near future.^[49]

The economic preference in political Australia and the rise of China in general had already first implications in regard to the US-Australian relation. In order to discuss these aspects, the security policy and relations will play a certain role.

The Australian Prime Ministers Whitlam and Fraser had different objections during their terms to engage with China, while the first tried to present a decreasing dependence on the US, the latter opposed mainly the Soviet-Union (SU) by appeasing China.^[50] Furthermore, when in 2003 Hu Jintao and George Bush visited Australia, the protocol and treatment almost perfectly matched. Moreover, Hu has been the first leader of a country addressing the Australian parliament besides the American president.^[51]

Australia’s current Prime Minister John Howard has not always been that conscious about the Australian-Chinese relations, as mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, as the European Union discussed the lifting of its arms embargo on China, Australia did not join the US efforts to influence the EU keeping it up. Furthermore, the military build-up of China did not lead to an outcry and severe criticism in Australia, while the US complained strongly. Finally, Australia’s position on a military intervention against China because of Taiwan has changed. Howard and Downer denied Australian military support for such an US operation.^[52] These events mainly reflect a passive security policy towards China, but put some doubts on the perception of Australia being a blindly follower of the US.

Perhaps not well known, but remarkable active steps were taken in the Australian-Chinese security relations, which should not be ignored. In 1998, the Chinese Minister of Defence, Chi Hoatian, visited Australia to introduce a defence dialogue concerning Asia and the Pacific. Collin Mackerras of the Griffith University stressed the importance of this meeting, as further visits of Australian and Chinese Defence Ministers in China and Australia followed. Furthermore, for the first time three Chinese warships visited a foreign harbour in 1998, when they stopped in Sydney.^[53] Today, Downer emphasizes the Chinese-Australian dialogue on arms control and non-proliferation issues, as well as regional security contributions.^[54] Nevertheless, these relations certainly do not mark the end of the Australian-US alliance or the ANZUS Treaty, but even in this rather sensitive field of defence and security, China and Australia began to cooperate.

4. The Rise of China and Implications for Australia

Australia has been described as the closest ally of the United States, following and fighting side by side during the last 50 years in most of the US military operations.^[55] On the other hand, chapter two presented a rising China in respect to economic and security terms; although Nye pointed out that the current development did not pose any threat for the US.^[56] Nevertheless, China became an important trading partner of Australia and the US, while it seems to soft-balance the US hegemony, borrowing the expression of Foot, in security terms and influence in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.^[57] In this context, Richardson suggested that Australia is stuck between the two big powers.^[58] Perhaps this is even better expressed in the “balancing act”^[59] Harris put forward. This presented Australian policies concerned with preferences and demands of its ally on the one hand and its trading partner China on the other.

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^[1] Rosemary Foot, ’Chinese Strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: accommodating and hedging’, in International Affairs 82, 1 (2006), pp. 77-94.

^[2] Stuart Harris, ‘China-US Relations: A Difficult Balancing Act for Australia?’, in Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Oct. 2005), p. 227.

^[3] Ibid. p. 235.

^[4] Stuart Harris, ‘Will China Divide Australia and the US?’ Sydney: Australian Centre for American Studies, 1998.

^[5] Sebastian, Heilmann (2002): Das politische System der Volksrepublik China, Wiesbaden, p 166 and Nicholas D. Kristof, ’The Rise of China’, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5, 1993.

^[6] Anonymous, ‘China Data Profile’, World Bank, April 2007, under: http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=CHN&CCODE=CHN&CNAM E=China&PTYPE=CP[10/06/2007] and Anonymous, ’ US Data Profile, World Bank, April 2007, under: http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=USA[10/06/2007].

^[7] David Pan, ‘Damn lies and Chinese statistics’, in Asia Time Online, 19 August 2006, under: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HH19Ad01.html[11/06/2007].

^[8] Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett Avery, ‘The Rise of China and Its Effect on Taiwan, Japan and South Korea: US Policy Choices’, CRS Report for US Congress, 16 January 2006, p 3-4, under: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32882.pdf [09/06/2007] and Paul Blustein, ‘China passes US in Trade with Japan’, in Washington Post.com, 27 January 2005, under: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40192-2005Jan26.html[10/06/2007].

^[9] Anonymous, ‘China’s Defense Expenditure’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 21 May 2007, under: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/kjlc/zgjf/t141336.htm [09/06/2007] and Jeffrey Chamberlin,’Comparison of US and Foreign Military Spending: Data from Selected Public Sources’, CRS Report for US Congress, 28 January 2004, p 5, under:http://www.fas.org/ man/crs/RL32209.pdf [10/06/2007].

^[10] Anonymous, Chinese security policy safeguards sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity: official, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, 02 May 2006, under:http://www.china- embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t233830.htm[10/06/2007]

^[11] Anonymous, ‘China’s security policy seeks assurance, cooperation: say scholars’, in People’s Daily Online, 07 April 2007, under: http://english.people.com.cn/200504/07/eng20050407_179812.html[10/06/2007].

^[12] Stuart Harris, ‘China-US Relations: A Difficult Balancing Act for Australia?’, in Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Oct. 2005), p 229.

^[13] Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘ China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power’, in Policy Brief 47 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2006, under: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ PB_47_FINAL.pdf[10/06/2007], Joseph S. Jr. Nye, ’The Rise of China’s Soft Power’, in The Wall Street Journal Asia, 29 December 2005, under: http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?c type=article&item_id=1350 [10/06/2007] and for further reading: Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘ Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics’, New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

^[14] Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘ China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power’, in Policy Brief 47 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2006, under: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ PB_47_FINAL.pdf[10/06/2007], p 3.

^[15] Ibd. and Zhao Litao and Tan Soon Heng, ‘China’s Cultural Rise: Visions and Challenges’, in China: An International Journal 5, 1 March 2007, p 102.

^[16] Joseph S. Jr. Nye, ’The Rise of China’s Soft Power’, in The Wall Street Journal Asia, 29 December 2005, under: http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?c type=article&item_id=1350 [10/06/2007].

^[17] Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘ China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power’, in Policy Brief 47 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2006, under: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ PB_47_FINAL.pdf[10/06/2007].pp 3-4.

^[18] Edward Cody, ‘China Taiwan and US Display Military Might’, in Washingtonpost.com, 27 July 2004, under: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16425-2004Jul26.html[10/06/2007] and Anonymous,’China expresses ”strong dissatisfaction” with US military report’, in People’s Daily Online, 28 May 2007, under: http://english.people.com.cn/200705/28/ eng20070528_378591.html[10/06/2007] Stuart Harris, ‘China-US Relations: A Difficult Balancing Act for Australia?’, in Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Oct. 2005), p. 230/235.

^[19] Anonymous, ‘ US-China relations good, headed in a positive direction: Kissinger, in People’s Daily Online, 01 February 2007, under: http://english.people.com.cn/200702/01/eng20070201_346656.html[10/06/2007] and Anonymous, ‘Powell Expects Good US-China Relations’, in People’s Daily, 15 July 2001, under: http://english.people.com.cn/english/200107/15/eng20010715_75031.html[10/06/2007].

^[20] Rosemary Foot, ‘ Chinese Strategies in a US hegemonic global order: accommodating and hedging, in International Affairs 82, I (2006), pp 84-90 and Joseph S. Jr. Nye, ’The Rise of China’s Soft Power’, in The Wall Street Journal Asia, 29 December 2005, under: http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm? ctype=article&item_id=1350 [10/06/2007].

^[21] Joseph S. Jr. Nye, ’The Rise of China’s Soft Power’, in The Wall Street Journal Asia, 29 December 2005, under: http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?ctype=article&item_id=1350 [10/06/2007].

^[22] Michael Richardson, ‘China’s Increasing Anger Puts a Longtime US Ally in a Difficult Position: Australia Caught Between 2 Big Powers, in International Herald Tribune, 2 May 2001, under: http://www.iht.com/articles/2001/05/02/a7_1.php[09/06/2007].

^[23] Ibid.

^[24] Thomas B. Millar, ‘Australia and the American Alliance’, in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 37, No 2, Summer 1964, p. 148.

^[25] Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America [ANZUS], Australian Treaties Series 1952 No 2, Department of External Affairs, under: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1952/2.html[10/06/2007].

^[26] Thomas B. Millar, ‘Australia and the American Alliance’, in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 37, No 2, Summer 1964, pp 149-151.

^[27] Malcolm Fraser, ‘An Australian Critique”, in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, 55 (2) 2001 , p. 226.

^[28] Michael Richardson, ‘China’s Increasing Anger Puts a Longtime US Ally in a Difficult Position: Australia Caught Between 2 Big Powers, in International Herald Tribune, 2 May 2001, under: http://www.iht.com/articles/2001/05/02/a7_1.php[09/06/2007].

^[29] Anonymous,’Defence and Security’, Australian Government, Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2007, under: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/us/us_brief.html[10/06/2007] and Roger Bell, ‘Extreme Allies: Australia and the USA’, pp 36-52, in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds): Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001-2005, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2007.

^[30] Robert Sutter, ‘Thirty years of Australia-China relations: an American perspective’, in Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2002, p. 352.

^[31] Malcolm Fraser, ‘An Australian Critique”, in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, 55 (2) 2001, pp 228 - 230.

^[32] Jones, David Martin and Benvenuti, Andrea, ’Tradition, myth and the dilemma of Australian foreign policy’, in Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1, March 2006, p 111.

^[33] Ibid.

^[34] Roger Bell, ‘Extreme Allies: Australia and the USA’, pp 29-41, in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds): Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001-2005, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2007.

^[35] Malcolm Fraser, ‘An Australian Critique”, in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, 55 (2) 2001, pp 229-230.

^[36] Roger Bell, ‘Extreme Allies: Australia and the USA’, p 46, in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds): Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001-2005, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2007.

^[37] Anonymous, ‘Foreign Trade Statistics, Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance) with Australia’, US Census Bureau, 2007, under: http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c6021.html#questions[10/06/2007].

^[38] Anonymous, ‘Trade and Investment’, Australian Government, Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2007, under: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/us/us_brief.html#ti[10/06/2007].

^[39] Anonymous, Foreign Trade Statistics, Top Trading Partners- Total Trade, Exports, Imports, April 2007, under: http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top0704.html [10/06/2007].

^[40] Matt McDonald, ’Perspectives on Australian foreign policy, 2004’, in Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 2, June 2005, p. 156.

^[41] Tor Krever, ‘The US-Australia Free Trade Agreement: The Interface between Partisan Politics and National Objectives’, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 1, March 2006, p. 51.

^[42] DFAT [Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade]. 2003b. ‘Submission to the Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee Inquiry into the General Agreement on Trade in Services and Australia/US Free Trade Agreement’ and Tor Krever, ‘The US-Australia Free Trade Agreement: The Interface between Partisan Politics and National Objectives’, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 1, March 2006, p. 58.

^[43] Tor Krever, ‘The US-Australia Free Trade Agreement: The Interface between Partisan Politics and National Objectives’, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 1, March 2006, pp 65-68 and Roger Bell, ‘Extreme Allies: Australia and the USA’, p 46, in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds): Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001-2005, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2007.

^[44] Stuart Harris, ‘China-US Relations: A Difficult Balancing Act for Australia?’, in Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Oct. 2005), p. 227.

^[45] Robert Sutter, ‘Thirty years of Australia-China relations: an American perspective’, in Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2002, pp. 351-353

^[46] Ibid. p. 353.

^[47] Kaushik Kapisthalam, ’Australia and Asia’s rise’, in Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 60, No. 3, September 2006, pp. 369-370.

^[48] Robert Sutter, ‘Thirty years of Australia-China relations: an American perspective’, in Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2002, pp. 350-352.

^[49] Stuart Harris, ‘China-US Relations: A Difficult Balancing Act for Australia?’, in Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Oct. 2005), p. 235, Hugh White, ‘The limits to optimism: Australia and the rise of China’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 4, December 2005, p 478 and Kaushik Kapisthalam, ’Australia and Asia’s rise’, in Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 60, No. 3, September 2006, p. 369.

^[50] Robert Sutter, ‘Thirty years of Australia-China relations: an American perspective’, in Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2002, pp. 350-351.

^[51] Hugh White, ‘The limits to optimism: Australia and the rise of China’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 4, December 2005, p. 470.

^[52] Ibid.

^[53] Collin Mackerras, ‘Australia-China Relations at the End of the Twentieth Century’, in Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2000, pp. 192-194.

^[54] Alexander Downer, ‘Australia and China’s Shared Interests – Security and Strategic Dimensions’, Speech, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia, 13 August 2004, under : http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2004/040813_aus_china_fta.html[10/06/2007].

^[55] Charles Krauthammer,’The Art of Losing Friends’, in Washington Post.com, 24 September 2004, under: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45794-2004Sep23.html[08/06/2007].

^[56] Joseph S. Jr. Nye, ’The Rise of China’s Soft Power’, in The Wall Street Journal Asia, 29 December 2005, under: http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?ctype=article&item_id=1350 [10/06/2007].

^[57] Rosemary Foot, ‘ Chinese Strategies in a US hegemonic global order: accommodating and hedging, in International Affairs 82, I (2006), pp. 84-90

^[58] Michael Richardson, ‘China’s Increasing Anger Puts a Longtime US Ally in a Difficult Position: Australia Caught Between 2 Big Powers, in International Herald Tribune, 2 May 2001, under: http://www.iht.com/articles/2001/05/02/a7_1.php[09/06/2007].

^[59] Stuart Harris, ‘China-US Relations: A Difficult Balancing Act for Australia?’, in Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Oct. 2005).