Abstract
There is no regularity in international relations that is as imperturbable as the democratic peace. From the beginning of the statistical research in 1816 until today, no clear-cut case of war between two democratic states has been recorded. The democratic peace has obstinately kept the secret of its causal mechanism. No convincing theory as to its cause has been widely accepted.
It is the aim of this dissertation to provide an alternative explanation for why
democracies do not fight each other. Empirical research can only account for
correlation but not for causal mechanisms. This dissertation thus concentrates on the theoretical explanations. Scholars developed approaches to account for the democratic peace ranging from constructivist through the sociological to game-theoretical methodology. They focus on the single democratic state, the relation between two democratic states and, recently, the international system itself. This dissertation critically examines a number of such theories which vary in methodology and focus. Especially, arguments by Russett, Doyle and Müller are given attention, but, to a greater or lesser extent, they are flawed or insufficient.
At the same time, this dissertation points out a number of special characteristics of democratic states of importance. Pulling those together, an approach is proposed based on the assumption that the international system itself bears a major responsibility for the democratic peace. Supporting an approach by Hasenclever, it is argued that international institutions set up by democratic states are especially capable of mitigating conflicts and thus prevent war. Together with the special features of their member-states, such organisations account for the peaceful behaviour of democracies.[...]
Table of Contents
Introduction
0.1 Presentation of the subject
0.2 Methodology and literature review
0.3 Definitions
Chapter I The monadic level of analysis
1.1 Empirical research on the monadic level
1.2 The three main axioms and the rationalist approach
1.3 Structural constraints
1.4 Normative constraints
1.5 Synthetic approaches
1.6 Concluding words
Chapter II The dyadic level of analysis
2.1 Empirical research on the dyadic level
2.2 The shared democratic institutions and the credibility of signals
2.3 The shared democratic culture
2.4 A peace of deterrence
2.5 Concluding words
Chapter III The systemic level of analysis
3.1 Alternative approaches to the systemic analysis
3.2 International Organisations
3.3 The international organisation of democratic states prevents war
3.4 Concluding words
Conclusion
4.1 Summary of the argument
4.2 Critical outlooks
Research Objectives and Themes
This dissertation aims to provide an alternative explanation for the democratic peace by critically examining existing theories and proposing a systemic approach. While previous research has focused on monadic and dyadic levels, the author argues that the international system, specifically the role of inter-democratic international institutions, is crucial in explaining why democracies do not fight each other.
- Critical analysis of monadic vs. dyadic theories of democratic peace.
- The role of domestic institutions and norms (monadic perspective).
- The strategic interaction and deterrence between democratic states (dyadic perspective).
- The impact of the systemic level and inter-democratic international organizations on conflict mitigation.
- Evaluation of the democratic deficit within international institutions.
Excerpt from the Book
1.3 Structural constraints
Various monadic approaches to the democratic peace focus on the structural constraints. Related to the structural approach is the idea of inherent “checks and balances” in the democratic system. These checks and balances are carried out by the population on the one hand and by the design of the democratic institutions on the other hand. Thus this approach is somewhat related to the rationalist model, assuming the validity of the three axioms and adding further emphasis on the structure itself.
Taking on this approach, Auerswald36 as well as Sheplse37 consider that domestically weak executives are relatively more reluctant to engage in international adventures than are domestically strong ones. The argument is relatively straightforward. “If we assume that chief executives want to remain in office, one important part of their calculus will be how those entities with the power to directly terminate office tenure will react to military conflict.”38 Coherent with this assumption obviously is that failure or stalemate in an international conflict will result in domestic punishment. The relative power of the executive is related to the domestic institutional structure.39 Executives depend on maintaining the support of those groups to which the leader is accountable.40 “During an election an elite’s core reelection constituency can hold him or her accountable for foreign policy behaviour, and though the public may not attend to policy details, they are certainly able to comprehend and reward international success and punish failure or stalemate.”41
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: Outlines the research subject, the history of democratic peace theory, and the dissertation’s focus on the systemic level of analysis.
Chapter I The monadic level of analysis: Evaluates theories focusing on the internal structure of single states, examining empirical research and rationalist, structural, and normative constraints.
Chapter II The dyadic level of analysis: Investigates the special relationship between two democratic states, discussing institutions, culture, and deterrence.
Chapter III The systemic level of analysis: Proposes that international organizations composed of democratic states provide the framework for preventing war, mitigating security dilemmas through transparency and cooperation.
Conclusion: Synthesizes the argument that a systemic-level approach provides the most convincing explanation for the democratic peace while noting current challenges and the democratic deficit.
Keywords
Democratic peace, international relations, monadic level, dyadic level, systemic level, war, international organizations, security dilemma, rational choice, institutions, democracy, foreign policy, conflict resolution, deterrence, democratic deficit.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this dissertation?
The dissertation investigates the long-standing international relations puzzle of why democratic states rarely fight wars against one another, seeking to move beyond traditional explanations.
What are the primary theoretical themes analyzed?
The work explores three distinct levels of analysis: the monadic level (the single state), the dyadic level (the relationship between two states), and the systemic level (the international system).
What is the central research question?
The author asks why existing empirical research remains inconclusive and aims to determine if the international system, particularly inter-democratic organizations, provides the "missing link" in explaining the democratic peace.
Which scientific methodology is applied?
The dissertation is designed as a critical literature review, utilizing comparative methods to evaluate existing academic approaches and theories regarding the democratic peace.
What is the main argument regarding the systemic level?
The author argues that international organizations created by democratic states are uniquely capable of mitigating conflicts by increasing transparency and providing frameworks for non-unilateral conflict resolution.
Which key terms define this research?
Key terms include "democratic peace theory," "monadic," "dyadic," "systemic level," "rationalist approach," "structural constraints," and "deterrence."
How does the author view the role of 'audience costs'?
The author considers the audience-cost approach as a meaningful game-theoretical mechanism that adds credibility to democratic signals of resolve in international disputes.
Does the author consider the European Union a perfect model?
While the EU is highlighted as the most developed inter-democratic organization for mitigating conflict, the author also cautions about a "democratic deficit" within its structure that could reduce public control.
- Arbeit zitieren
- BA Simon Oerding (Autor:in), 2006, Why do democratic states not fight each other? A systemic approach to the democratic peace, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/124905
