Following grand strategy, counter-conspiracy, and economical compensation rationales of Hussein, Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Mainly supported by 'United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660 and 678, the U.S., as of January 1991, led a 'Western-Arab Alliance (WAA)' to achieve the withdrawal of 'Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF)' from Kuwait under 'Operation Desert Storm'. To reach the objective of the limited war, political and military leaders displayed differing opinions about effective ways by using the 'Center of Gravity' concept. The paper suggests that politicians, without using the technical term 'CoG', tacitly showed a more accurate theoretical appreciation of the concept for guiding their planning (foresight lens), which proved more effective in terms of achieving the outcome (hindsight lens).
To reach this conclusion, 'Chapter 2' will develop a deepened interpretation of the concept based on systems theory. 'Chapters 3 and 4' then contrast and assess the views of political and military leaders by referring to the previous findings and applying the lenses mentioned above. Finally, 'Chapter 5' will conclude by answering the questions of who was correct and why as well as by outlining the further need for research.
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION
2. CENTER OF GRAVITY
3. POLITICAL VIEW
3.a) Unity and Balance of the WAA
3.b) SSRBM
3.c) Occupation of Western Iraq
4. MILITARY VIEW
4.a) Saddam Hussein
4.b) RG
4.c) CNC
5. CONCLUSION
Research Objective and Key Themes
The essay evaluates the divergent strategic interpretations of the "Center of Gravity" (CoG) concept held by U.S. political and military leaders during the 1991 Gulf War, ultimately arguing that political actors displayed a more accurate theoretical appreciation that facilitated mission success.
- Theoretical refinement of the Clausewitzian CoG concept using systems theory.
- Assessment of the "Unity and Balance of the WAA" as a strategic friendly CoG.
- Comparison of political versus military perspectives on enemy CoGs like Saddam Hussein and the Republican Guard.
- Evaluation of the effectiveness of military implementation versus political foresight during Operation Desert Storm.
Excerpt from the Book
2. CENTER OF GRAVITY
Major-General Clausewitz coined the 'CoG' concept as an analogy derived from physics. In his approach to making an accurate interpretation, Echevarria (2003) emphasizes three characteristics:
a) It is an intangible epicenter, a concentrated force field, which can be found where physical mass is most concentrated but is not equal to it. It forms a new property (unity) and exerts a higher functionality (balance) for a complex system (e.g., state, alliance) through the dynamic interconnection of functionalities of various physical and psychological force elements (e.g., leader’s decisions, army, morale, public opinion, common interests, Nikolaev & Fortin, 2020).
b) Thus, when attacking it with concentrated rapid force, the result will be loss of equilibrium and breakdown of the system, which qualifies for an outcome-oriented 'Effects-Based-Operations (EBO)' approach designed to defeat the enemy entirely (objective). Therefore, Echevarria rejects the applicability during 'ODS'.
c) It is not an output-oriented approach to describe critical military capabilities or strengths.
Summary of Chapters
1. INTRODUCTION: Outlines the historical context of the 1991 Gulf War and introduces the research thesis concerning the divergent application of the Center of Gravity concept by political and military leadership.
2. CENTER OF GRAVITY: Provides a theoretical foundation for the CoG concept by integrating systems theory and identifying limitations in contemporary military interpretations.
3. POLITICAL VIEW: Examines how political leaders managed the alliance and strategic threats, demonstrating an intuitive grasp of the CoG concept despite not using the technical terminology.
4. MILITARY VIEW: Critically analyzes military strategy in the Gulf War, focusing on how U.S. doctrine’s flawed understanding of CoG led to specific challenges in targeting and implementation.
5. CONCLUSION: Synthesizes the findings to establish that political strategic foresight proved more aligned with systems theory and mission effectiveness than the military application.
Keywords
Center of Gravity, CoG, Operation Desert Storm, Systems Theory, Clausewitz, Strategic Thought, Political Leadership, Military Strategy, Gulf War, Homeostasis, Unity and Balance, Iraq, Republican Guard, Echevarria, Strategic Planning.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the fundamental focus of this paper?
The paper examines how U.S. political and military leaders differently applied the "Center of Gravity" concept during the 1991 war against Iraq to guide their strategic planning.
What are the central thematic areas?
The core themes include Clausewitzian strategic theory, systems thinking, the management of multinational alliances, and the practical implementation of military doctrine.
What is the primary goal of the study?
The primary goal is to determine whether political or military planners held a more accurate understanding of the Center of Gravity and why this distinction mattered for the mission's outcome.
Which methodology is employed in this research?
The author uses a comparative analysis, evaluating historical events through the lens of political and military decision-making processes, supported by systems theory axioms.
What is covered in the main body?
The main body contrasts the theoretical accuracy of leadership views in Chapters 3 and 4, evaluating specific operational and strategic choices made during the conflict.
Which keywords best characterize the work?
Key terms include Center of Gravity, Systems Theory, Operation Desert Storm, Strategic Thought, and Clausewitzian Theory.
How does the author interpret the role of the "WAA" in this conflict?
The author identifies the Western-Arab Alliance (WAA) as a friendly strategic Center of Gravity, which necessitated careful political management to maintain unity and balance.
What critique does the author offer regarding military doctrine?
The author argues that U.S. military doctrine relied on an inaccurate, output-oriented interpretation of Clausewitz, which led to less effective strategic outcomes compared to the more holistic political approach.
- Citar trabajo
- Dr. phil. Mathias Jahn (Autor), 2022, During the planning of the U.S.-led coalition’s campaign against Iraq in 1991, war planners disagreed about Iraq's "center of gravity. Who was correct, who was not, and why?, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1291679
