Administrative Disregard can Affect National Examinations. An Example of the BTS Exam in Côte d’Ivoire

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

1. LITERATURE REVIEW:
1.1 Corruption and Economic Growth
1.2 Corruption and Gender
1.3 Religion and Corruption
1.4 Money as the Lifeblood of Corruption Partial Conclusion

2. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
2.1 General Objective
2.2 Specific Objectives

3. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Research Sites
3.2. Research Population
3.3. Data Collection Instruments

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1. Results
4.1.1 The Candidacy Conditions:
4.1.2 Demographic Characteristics of “miracle” BTS holders
4.1.3 How do they do it?
4.2 Discussion
4.2.1 The Breach:
4.2.2 The Legacy of the Degree:
4.2.3 The Salvation lies in Mentality Changes:
4.2.4 How to implement these Mentality Changes?

GENERAL CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Résumé:

Cette étude a servi à comprendre les problèmes de dysfonctionnement administratif lors des examens nationaux en Côte d'Ivoire. Nous avons pris le cas de l'examen du BTS. Nous avons opté pour une étude à dominante qualitative sur 19 nouveaux candidats admissibles au BTS 2018 et nos résultats ont révélé une faille dans les conditions d'admission, qui est utilisée pour valider toute candidature. Les candidats recourent à cette pratique soit pour remplir les conditions d'une promesse d'emploi, soit pour une promotion. Leur âge varie de 34 à 38 ans. Enfin, un réseau fonctionne discrètement de la phase composition à la soutenance du mémoire contre du cash avant le service. Cette pratique découle d'une attirance pour le travail salarié qui place la jeunesse dans une sorte d'attentisme, préjudiciable au développement de l'Afrique. La solution est un changement de mentalité basé sur le modèle sud-coréen.

Mots clés : négligence administratif, examen du BTS, Côte d’Ivoire.

Abstract:

This study aimed to understand the issues of administrative dysfunction on national exams in Côte d'Ivoire. We took the case of the BTS exam. We opted for a qualitative dominant research on 19 new BTS 2018 eligible candidates and our results revealed a flaw in the admission conditions, used to validate any candidacy. Candidates use this practice, either to comply with the conditions for a promise of employment or a promotion at work. Their age varies from 34 to 38. Finally, a network works discretely from the exam writing phase, to the thesis defense, against cash paid before service. This practice comes from a spirit of wage labor that puts the youth in a sort of wait-and-see attitude, detrimental to the development of Africa. The solution is a change of mentality based on the South Korean model.

Key words: administrative disregard, BTS examination, Côte d’Ivoire

INTRODUCTION

As true as no medical doctor will treat a patient with the aim to see him/her die, a teacher’s aim has always been the success of all his/her learners. Consequently, the success of his students is for him a source of joy and pride. However, no matter how it was acquired, success in an examination is perceived as a result of effort and hard work. That is why we all have this natural tendency to congratulate those who succeed.

Nevertheless, the world news tends to present an opposite understanding of success. For example, in 2011, hundreds of students from the regional BTS (Higher Technician's Certificate) boycott the reorganization of an exam because of accusations of massive fraud. As a reaction, professors in that French region refused to correct the papers, denouncing in particular a "corruption" of supervisors and identity theft.

Moreover, in June 2011, still in France, "the French Ministry of Education announced that he was investigating" suspicions cases of leaks "for a test in mathematics of the scientific baccalaureate whose content had been disclosed on the internet a day before the exam. Despite the intense controversy, the review was not canceled. Worse, the one by whom the scandal happened has been cleared by justice "lemonde.fr.

Another story was that cheating scandal at Harvard, the American respected university, where more than 100 students were accused of participating in a massive fraud during a final exam. Indeed, students were accused “to have helped each other by communicating or copying on each other”. The scale of fraud is "unprecedented" in the history of the prestigious Harvard, according to Dean Smith. (Please, read: « Cheating scandal at Harvard, an American prestigious university and the following link: (https://www.rts.ch/info/monde/4982393-tour-du-monde-de-la-triche-auxexamens-scolaires-et-universitaires.html)

In Côte d’Ivoire, while the administration demands from a great number of BTS candidates the proof that they hold the CEPE, the BEPC and the baccalaureate degrees, the same administration allows other candidates who have none of the demanded degrees to sit for the same examination. As a matter of fact, prevails an increasing number of BTS degree holders whose sole degree is the BTS, because they have never succeeded in passing none of the less important degrees that are the CEPE, the BEPC and the baccalaureate.

All these few examples introduce us to the reality of administrative dysfunction, corruption or cheating all over the world. Why has France validated the BTS results despite the controversy? Why has the exam administration of France validated the baccalaureate despite the mathematics test’s content display on the internet a day before the examination? Is it acceptable to have two types of degree holders in Côte d’Ivoire? Is it acceptable to have on the one hand, degree holders who worked hard to earn their degree, and on the other hand, those who worked hard to earn the money that paid for their degree? What are the stakes of these opposite degree holders for the administration that issues the degrees?

1. LITERATURE REVIEW:

Merriam Webster’s dictionary defines corruption as a “dishonest or illegal behavior, especially by powerful people such as government officials, or police officers”. Corruption is as well an “inducement to wrong by improper or unlawful means such as bribery”! (Jacquemet, 2006) views a complete corruption as a contract between three players: the "principal", the "agent" and the "corrupter". For this author, this implies the signature of two contracts: the power delegated between the principal (government, public administration) and the agent that generally already exists, and because this power is centered in the hands of the agent, the corrupter perceives the need to sign a corruption verbal contract with the agent, who generally has the discretionary power to act on behalf of the administration or the government.

Other authors among which Hunt (2006) state that only two agents are involved in a corruptive contract: the corrupter and the agent. However, nothing proves that the principal is not engaged one way or another in the contract through the agent who could as well represent their mutual interests according to Becker (1968). One of the reasons is that it is absolutely rare to catch and punish corrupted agents and corrupts through internal controls. This is why some researchers rely on the press freedom to fight corruption. For this reason, many research works have been initiated to analyze the correlation between the press freedom and corruption. Thus, Ahrend (2002) showed that countries where the freedom of the press is higher, experience less corruption than countries where there is no freedom of the press. The same way, the studies of Chowdhury (2004) corroborate the results of Ahrend (2002). Beside the freedom of the press, some authors questioned culture and corruption.

Questioned about the origin of culture, the literature points at the specificities of certain cultures as the causes of corruption. Such an explanation was primarily developed by (Nye, 1967). For this researcher, some particularities of African culture such as strong family links, links between ethnic groups, the duty to help each other between people of the same origin etc. lead to corruption because, such behaviors are accepted by the whole community as normal practices. This is what (Bardhan, 1997) calls the "corruption complex” that he could not define clearly and which, for this very reason poses the problem of its real existence. Other points such as the quality of the country’s jurisdictional system were questioned.

Indeed, other studies focused their interest on the quality of the country’s jurisdictional system. In other words, their studies tried to show that countries with a good justice system experience less corruption than countries with a poor court system. Among them are Herzfeld and Weiss, (2003). Another important point of scholars’ interest was the relationship between civil servants’ wages and corruption. They wanted to know whether good salaries have an impact on agents’ ability to resist corruption. Many researchers among which Treisman,( 2000), Rauch, Evans (2000), Swamy et al., (2001), (Herfeld and Weiss (2003) were unable to perceive a clear correlation between the salaries of civil servants and the level of corruption.

However, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), revealed that the impact of salary on corruption greatly rests on the government’s ability to detect corruption. In other words, salary increase alone has no impact on bribery decrease. Indeed, to be effective, salary increase has to be reinforced by an increased control of government agents in order to punish their bribery activities.

1.1 Corruption and Economic Growth

Academicians were also interested in questioning the link between corruption and economic growth. Indeed, it is true that corruption helps to slow bribery and incite deficient public institutions become faster. In so doing, for Huntington (1968), corruption promotes economic efficiency in a sense that it helps to overcome “the rigidities imposed by governments, which hinder investment and interfere with other economic decisions that support growth”. Similarly, some academicians questioned the link between gender and corruption and below are some of their results.

1.2 Corruption and Gender

As for the link between gender and corruption, Dollar, Fisman and Gatti (2001) showed that women are less corrupted than men. Indeed, they observed that “countries where women are well represented in the political life are less corrupted than countries where women are less represented. Gatti and Paternostro, (2003) also showed that women are less tolerant than men towards corruption. Their work was a reinforcement of the findings of Swamy and al, 2001). The next issue to analyze is the link between religion and corruption.

Other authors among whom Hunt (2006) state that only two agents are involved in a corruptive contract: the corrupter and the agent. However, nothing proves that the principal is not engaged one way or another in the contract through the agent who could as well represent their mutual interests according to Becker (1968). One of the reasons is that it is absolutely rare to catch and punish corrupted agents and corrupts through internal controls. This is why some researchers rely on the press freedom to fight corruption. For this reason, many research works have been initiated to analyze the correlation between the press freedom and corruption. Thus, Ahrend (2002) showed that countries where the freedom of the press is higher, experience less corruption than countries where there is no freedom of the press. The same way, the studies of Chowdhury (2004) corroborate the results of Ahrend (2002). Beside the freedom of the press, some authors questioned culture and corruption.

Questioned about the origin of culture, the literature points at the specificities of certain cultures as the causes of corruption. Such an argument was primarily developed by (Nye, 1967). For this researcher, African cultural particularities such as strong family links, links between ethnic groups, the duty to help each other between people of the same origin etc. lead to corruption because, such behaviors are accepted by the whole community as normal practices. This is what (Bardhan, 1997) calls the "corruption complex” that he could not define clearly and which, for this very reason poses the problem of its real existence. Other points such as the quality of the country’s jurisdictional system were put in question.

Indeed, other studies focused their interest on the quality of the country’s jurisdictional system. In other words, their studies tried to show that countries with a good justice system experience less corruption than countries with a poor court system. Among them are Herzfeld and Weiss, (2003). Another important point of scholars’ interest was the relationship between civil servants’ wages and corruption. They wanted to know whether good salaries have an impact on agents’ ability to resist corruption. Many researchers among which Treisman,( 2000), Rauch, Evans (2000), Swamy et al., (2001), (Herfeld and Weiss (2003) were unable to perceive a clear correlation between the salaries of civil servants and the level of corruption.

However, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), revealed that the impact of salary on corruption greatly rests on the government’s ability to detect corruption. In other words, salary increase alone has no impact on bribery decrease. Indeed, to be effective, salary increase has to be reinforced by an increased control of government agents in order to punish their bribery activities.

1.3 Religion and Corruption

Religion is presented as having a correlation with corruption. Indeed, the works of Treisman (2000) revealed that when the proportion of Protestants in a given population is higher, less corruption is observed in that population. Therefore, religion, particularly the Protestants’ presence in a country contributes to reduce corruption. Besides, as for corruption cost, according to La Porta et al (1999), it has a correlation with what he calls "hierarchical" religions (the Catholic, Orthodox or Muslim religions). The impact of those religions on the population reduces the corruption rate, and as Andvig and Moene (1990) suggest, the more corruption, the less costly it is for bribers and the officials to initiate corruption relationships. How about the place of money in the process of corruption?

1.4 Money as the Lifeblood of Corruption

Money plays the greatest role in corruption. Indeed, money is the main reason why an officer accepts to run the risk of going to jail or losing his or her job for performing a high-risk service in favor of an unknown person who needs his help. Any corruption act is made possible because the corrupted agent expects money or a given advantage convertible in money value from the briber. As for the corrupter, he expects a given service for which he is ready to pay money. As we can see, both parties expect a gain which makes it possible for a corrupted agents to create delays purposely in order to create the need for a citizen who needs his/her service to bribe him as it appears in the works of Myrdal, (1968) and Bardhan (1997).

Partial Conclusion

This short review of the literature has enabled us to learn that the world administration suffers from “dishonest or illegal behaviors, especially by powerful people such as government officials or police officers”. Bribery is also an “inducement to wrong by improper or unlawful means”. Such a bribery is possible thanks to power delegation of the public administration to individuals. We also noted that no matter his salary, an agent still remains corruptible, though women are less corruptible that men, and religion tends to reduce corruption rates. Finally, money remains the main target of those who engage in corruptive activities.

If it is true that it is every citizen’s right to use his money to buy anything he feels like buying, are we going to allow anyone to buy our BTS degree, our baccalaureate degrees, our bachelors’, masters’ and doctorate degrees?

If nothing is done to fight corruption in the exam administration, how are we going to differentiate degree holders who worked hard to earn their degrees from those who worked hard to earn the money that served to buy their degree? This question, far from being the purpose of this study, remains the main cause that underlies it. Besides, the works of (Nye, 1967) and (Bardhan, 1997) described in this review have retained our attention and will serve to defend our thesis in the present research.

2. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The present study aims at understanding the stakes of exam administration dysfunction that generates amazing success in national examinations.

2.1 General Objective

The general objective of this research is to understand how administrative dysfunction makes it possible, even for an illiterate, to be officially accepted as a candidate for the BTS exam thanks to bribery. Such a general objective engenders the following specific objectives.

2.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives deriving from the above general objective are as follows:

- decode the BTS candidacy conditions;
- detect the demographic characteristics of “miracle” BTS degree holders;
- determine the reasons why some candidates chose the easy way to succeed;
- point out the how to accede the easy way.

3. METHODOLOGY

We adopted a methodology that presents first the research site, then the population and afterwards the sampling and analysis method.

3.1. Research Sites

Our respondents in the present research were disseminated in different places in the city of Abidjan. We met some of our interviewees in restaurants, in other open, but safe places where secret matters could be discussed. One lady who knows me well accepted to talk to me in the primary school where she is a teacher.

3.2. Research Population

Our population consists of nineteen (19) successful candidates at the 2018 “BTS” examinations. In order to get our interviewees, we contacted a UNESCO club in Abobo that offers a BTS preparation program for candidates who, for one reason or another are out of the regular education system. Our choice to interview those ones is justified by the fact that their former trainers found their success, particularly amazing, due to their education level that was judged too weak to succeed normally.

3.3. Data Collection Instruments

Our option in this research was that of a qualitative data collection method. Due to the particular nature of the topic to be discussed and the secrecy that it requires, we had no other option than using individual interviews at different locations. Our strategy was that of a successful businessman who now needs the BTS to be promoted.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

We chose to present our results first, and, afterwards, we discussed them.

4.1. Results

The presentation of our results will start from the demographic characteristics of the BTS holders.

This gives a brief idea of how to recognize them and differentiate them from common BTS candidates.

4.1.1 The Candidacy Conditions:

There are officially two types of candidacies: official candidacy and free candidacy. Approved schools present to the administration their official candidates, while those whose choice is free candidacy are in charge of submitting their candidacy to the government. The following files are to be provided:

- a photocopy of the candidate’s valid national id card, or passport;
- a photocopy of the candidate’s baccalaureate or BT degree;
- for candidates who have no baccalaureate degree, show a copy of the registration authorization of the preparatory year;
- a photocopy of the candidate’s birth certificate;
- two passport color photos from the same print;
- fill the candidacy registration form online and print it. The cost is CFA 10,000;
- Please, note that the BTS preparation courses are at the candidate's expense;
- the administrative costs for the assistance amount to 25.000fr;
- TOTAL AMOUNT: 35,000 Fr CFA, that is to say USD 60. Our source: https://www.afrimalin.ci/offres/candidature-libre-bts-2018-5

4.1.2 Demographic Characteristics of “miracle” BTS holders

We managed to interview a total of 19 happy new BTS degree bearers out of a total of 30 that we contacted. 11 of them refused to talk about their success. The large majority of our interviewees (94.73 %), that is to say 18 out of 19 are 35 years old or over. We got their contacts thanks to the diligence of the staff of the institution that prepared them to the examination. Another characteristic is that each of them has a job that he/she is not satisfied with or is in business, but being not very successful, expect to join the government or a company. Their short term objective is to take part in job selection tests. This population represents (79%) of the total interviewees (15). Those who sought for the BTS for recognition or promotion (4) represent (21%). Among those who expect to join the government workers (the 79 %), 66 % of them (10 out of 15) have a promise of help to pass the selection tests. The following figures illustrate the demographic characteristics that we are trying to describe.

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Source: Assoa ETTIEN,( 2019)

Figure one presents the age range of the BTS seekers who do not hesitate to pass their examination by all means. Their age varies from 34 to 38 years old with a pick at 35 years old. We can notice a slight drop at 36 years old, and a slight increase at 37 years old. Those who seek for the BTS degree are very seldom at 38 years old.

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Source: Assoa ETTIEN, (2019)

Indeed, 79% of our respondents seek for the BTS degree in order to satisfy the conditions to take part in a job selection test. They represent the large majority of all the candidates. As for the others (21 %), their degree seeking objective is to have a better position in their present job, that is to say to get a promotion.

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Source: Assoa ETTIEN, (2019)

Our investigations revealed that two major reasons explain BTS candidates’ sudden desire to earn a degree: the desire to get a new promised job and the desire to have a promotion or a recognition in their present job. The first group, those who desire a new promised job represent 67¨% of the whole population. As for those who want a degree for recognition, they represent 33%.

4.1.3 How do they do it?

Our investigations revealed that free candidates and official candidates are generally mixed in the same exam room. Therefore, apparently, there is no special treatment for free candidates. They are submitted to the same rules as all the other candidates. They are submitted to the same fate as any candidate if they are caught cheating. If the room has any “advantage”, it applies to all candidates.

The following verbatim justifies our statement:

“Comment voulez-vous qu’à un examen national certains candidats puissent bénéficier d’une faveur quelconque ? Même si on dit. » From Rebecca 38 years old.

The English translation gives approximately the following:

“How do you expect certain candidates to benefit from any kind of favor during a national exam? Even if we say. »Our next question is: « Voulez-vous me dire que vous n’avez bénéficié d’aucune aide ? » The English translation is as follow:« Are you implying that nobody helped you?”

Her answer:

”Ce n’est pas exactement ce que je voulais dire. Ce que je dis est que même si quelqu’un veut vous aider, il ne le fera pas devant tout le monde. C’est pas en classe. On doit être présent et signer, c’est tout ! »

“This is not exactly what I mean. What I mean is, even if someone wants to help you, he would not do it before everybody. It doesn’t happen in class. We need to be present and sign, that’s all!”

Romeo, another respondent said:

“On doit être présent pour signer, mais Jo, il faut te défendre dêh! Tu as donné tout ton moro pour ça, si tu viens pas ah. »

The English version is :

« One must be present to sign, but Jo (my friend) defend yourself! You gave your moro (money) for that, if you don’t come ah”

Edith, 34 years old, was more straight forward:

“Mon tonton, si tu veux le BTS, ceux qui m’ont aidé sont chers, mais ils font tout et c’est sûr. Tu payes 500 et tu vas composer pour signer, stage, mémoire, ce n’est pas ton problème. Moi, je suis tranquille dêh, Février mon diplôme sort. En tout cas, mon réseau est choc !»

The English version gives approximately this;

"Uncle, if you want the BTS, the people who helped me are expensive, but they do everything and that's for sure. You pay 500 and you're going to sit just to sign, internship, thesis, it's not your problem. I'm quiet dêh, February my diploma comes out. Frankly, my network is sharp!” What can we memorize from this research?

4.2 Discussion

This research reveals some deficiencies in the Ivorian examination administration system that are exploited by corrupted agents to help some candidates, who generally do not have a good level, to pass the BTS examination.

Indeed, some corrupted agents use an imperfection in the BTS admission conditions to validate the candidacy of those they want to help achieve their goal of passing their exam. The second discovery is relative to the reasons for this practice.

Undeniably, the majority of our respondents need the BTS either for a promised job, or a promotion at their working place. To achieve this goal, the future candidate has to register in one of the existing, but hidden networks put in place for this purpose. It is mandatory for the candidate to be present and sign the different lists. The network has the duty to do what it has to for the candidate to pass.

All this is done very discretely, starting from the exam writing phase, to the thesis defense. The money used for bribery amounts to CFA 500,000 in one of the secret networks and is paid in advance and their age varies from 34 to 38. Why?

The reason is that there is the age limit after which normally, no one can have access to government or administrative jobs. This age limit is 40. This explains why degree seekers (buyers) are numerous from 34 to 38 years old. After several failures, there is no doubt that for them, the only way to pass this exam remains fraud!

Besides, they are conscious of the fact that in most cases the training period after their success at the selection test is three years. Therefore, they start raising money to expect buying their degree and have enough time to try the selection test at least twice. This explains why the pick of degree seekers is 35 years old. At this age, they believe that their only chance to get a job is the secure the BTS degree.

Those who fail at 35 years old need to save money before trying again one year later. This explains the drop at 36 years old. A slight increase can be seen at 37 years old, and a significant drop after 37 years old, because of the age limit. There is no interest having a degree for the sake to have it.

This clarification about the age range being made, four points deserve some clarification:

- show how a small breach opened to allow unsuccessful baccalaureate candidates to have an equivalence for a higher education is used;
- deal with the question of the validity of diplomas resulting from corruption;
- reveal the risks that the country runs by allowing corruption invade education institutions;
- work for a mentality change.

4.2.1 The Breach:

About the first point, the candidacy conditions state what to do when the candidate at the BTS examination is not a baccalaureate holder. The regulation is as follows: “for candidates who have no baccalaureate degree, show a copy of the registration authorization at the preparatory year.”

The above regulation implies in the mind of those who produced it that the candidate is a holder of the primary school leaving degree called the CEPE, the secondary school leaving degree called the BEPC, except the grammar school leaving degree called the baccalaureate. Therefore, the above regulation was a simple breach to give a chance to a non-baccalaureate holder to have a professional higher education degree. Hence, it implies that the candidate holds the CEPE and the BEPC. Not only that, but it also implies that the candidate attended “terminale”, that class after which a candidate normally sits for the baccalaureate. It is only after that that the future candidate starts the BTS classes whose duration is three years for non-baccalaureate holders. However, the way this regulation is presented includes everyone. For example, my grandmother who has never attended school is also a non-baccalaureate holder. It is clear that she has no baccalaureate degree, therefore the stated condition applies to her. Since, according to (Nye, 1967), African cultural particularities such as strong family links, links between ethnic groups, the duty to help each other between peopleof the same origin etc. and we would add the love of money prompt some agents in the administration regard this understudy “behaviors “as “normal practices” acceptable “by the whole community”, if I really want my grandmother to be a candidate, I only need to bribe a corrupted agent in one of the several preparatory schools and the requested authorization will be issued to her through me. The corrupted agent will not even know that she has never attended school, since what matters seems to be the payment before service commencing.

4.2.2 The Legacy of the Degree:

As for the legacy of this degree type, there is no problem. For example, when the government makes money by using a money machine, the banknotes produced are fully legal and nobody complains. The reason is that the government has the right to make money. However, when individuals acquire the same machine and start making money, they are sure to go to prison if they are caught. The reason is that they do not have the legal right, neither to possess such a machine, nor to make money with it.

The same way, if we fail to prevent candidates without any degree from reaching the end of the candidacy process, their candidacy becomes as official as anyone’s candidacy. In addition to this, if they find a way to be declared successful at the end of the examination, their degree is fully legal. We might complain saying, he has such a degree, but he cannot even write a letter, or make a simple addition etc. but these complaints mean nothing scientifically. Certainly, because they are neither holders of the CEPE, primary education degree, nor the BEPEC, the secondary education degree, they will demonstrate a high difference in knowledge with the normal candidates, but nobody, except the administration can deny them the validity of their degree. When a degree is conferred, it does not specify all the abilities of the degree holder. To be convinced, let us go through what universities generally attest on in what we call degrees. The terms may vary slightly, but the idea remains the same:

“To all to whom these letters shall come, greeting: the board of trustee of (University name), on the recommendation of the University faculty, have conferred on (degree holder’s name) who has satisfactorily pursued the studies and satisfied the requirements for the degree of (bachelor or master or doctor of science) in (the field) with an emphasis in ( the major) has accordingly been admitted to the degree with all the rights, privileges and honors pertaining thereto, in testimony whereof, by authority properly committed have given under the seal of the university this month of(the month), in the year of (the year). Where is it written that the degree holder should be able to make an addition, or write a simple letter? It seems to me that a degree is an order given to anyone who sees it, to give it all the rights and honors! It is normal to feel bad when we note that some people who know very little, have the same qualifications like us, but we are wrong legally and scientifically! 4.2.3 The Risks for our Society: Such an administrative dysfunction can seriously discredit the diplomas issued, although the validity of the diploma itself is not disputed. However, this is not the most serious consequence, since those who engage in this practice do so to have a job already promised, or for a promotion. However, any serious employer will recognize the true graduate of the fake one. The most serious consequence is the spirit that underpins this practice. People behave as if unemployed, we cannot live. We can also create jobs by putting our ideas into practice, and to do it nobody asks for a diploma. The courage, the passion and the determination to succeed in a business, the illiterate can have them. The evil, the cancer that is at the base of such practices, is the spirit of salaried work! Beyond these results, we realize that it is the spirit of wage labor that is at the root of corruption in order to have a degree. This practice, far from helping those who devote themselves to it, puts them in a kind of wait-and-see attitude, a sort of mental prison, a kind of limitation that makes them not perceive the numerous business opportunities that surround them. Wealth is nothing more than a well-coordinated business idea. The intelligence with which networks of cheating or corruption are put in place is enough to set up a flourishing business. In addition, the savings effort that allows modest people to pay 500,000 CFA to a network of counterfeiters can be used to finance a business that can generate good profits. Several well-coordinated and implemented business ideas contribute to the development of Côte d'Ivoire, and that Africa as a whole, through the creation of employment. This spirit of paid employment can take Africa, nowhere! If we do not want to attain a level of administrative dysfunction worse than what we are experiencing, then let us engage now in a deep process of mentality change. We raised this question to attract the attention of all those who are in education to engage a battle: fight corruption in school! Fight corruption in our exam administration! Education is the heart of a nation. Can we imagine the disaster we provoke if we allow money to buy everything, even our degrees? Can we imagine the impact of corruption, if we allow it in our education systems? Is there any hope?

4.2.3 The Salvation lies in Mentality Changes:

Where the problem lies, is the mentality behind such behaviors. Indeed, the efforts that the corruptors made to earn and save the 500,000 f that were used to bribe corrupted agents in order to pass the BTS, could be sufficient to achieve success in an area such as trade that does not require a degree. Still, why can they not see this simple solution? What are the true stakes on national examinations dysfunction? From the highest level of administration to the small clerk, citizens behave the same way: use the administrative power to get rich or richer. Each of them sees the personal benefit to draw from the administrative power. Such a behavior cannot promote wealth for the whole nation. Such a conduct cannot indorse true development. Policy makers prefer to think how to remain in power as long as possible, or plan what they are going to eat when they are no longer in power. For example, issuing a true policy for the welfare of the people they are in charge of is less important than buying ammunition to protect one’s power. Consequently, there are few true development policies.

Seeing around them very rich civil servants, the peoples wrongly believe that an employment is their solution to success, ignoring that “the job mentality is for losers,” according to KIYOSAKI (2000). This job mentality prevents candidates from seeing trade as a great opportunity for social success. Raising money to invest requires effort, however, this effort is not correctly channeled in the right direction.

For its full development, Africa does not need citizens who flee difficulties, but rather citizens ready to face difficulties in order to overcome them! We cannot build great nations with circumvention practices like the types we are denouncing here. From the bottom class to the highest, those who are in charge of our administration use the transferred power for their own sake and profits. Thus, a few years at the head of a certain administration, mere administrative wages earners become multimillionaires! According to (Bardhan, 1997) the African "corruption complex” makes everyone regard them as an excellent example of success, instead of denouncing this well-organized embezzlement of the public wealth! This mentality will take Africa nowhere! How to implement these mentality changes?

4.2.4 How to implement these Mentality Changes?

To implement successful mentality changes in Côte d’Ivoire, we need at least a model, and South Korea has a lot to teach to the citizens of Côte d’Ivoire. Indeed, from one of the world former poorest countries, South Korea is the world ninth largest economy since 1960, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 1,531 billion USD in 2017 according to a World Bank source. Such a success always bears a secret. For Patrick Hultberg, & al (2017) South Korea has first “repeatedly demonstrated that it has an identity of its own”, second, it “strategically transformed itself into one of the world’s high-technology and education superpowers” and finally a “far-sighted, deliberate and government-regulated long-term education plans and policies”. When will Africa decide to follow its own development model?

GENERAL CONCLUSION

This piece of work was an opportunity to show how a small breach opened to allow baccalaureate unsuccessful candidates to pursue further studies, was exploited to confer higher education degrees to those who do not have the level, through administrative dysfunctions, or corruption. Thus, the phenomenon of amazing success in the BTS examination of some citizens who have neither a primary school degree, nor a secondary school degree finds its explanation. Above this lies the true problem of job mentality, that leads to the degree mentality.

Indeed, in order to find a job, the applicant needs to show his degrees. Therefore, there is no hope for whoever cannot prove that he has a degree. What to do? For many people, the solution lies in doing the impossible to have one. Since with bribe the impossible always becomes possible, we are witnessing a new phenomenon of degree mentality which has a link with the job mentality. This degree mentality is surely not the ideal solution for those who engage their lives and honor in it. If we want Africa in general, and particularly Côte d’Ivoire to go forward, we need to drop this degree mentality that derives from the job mentality to engage in a true mentality change for higher goals for our continent. Maybe, we are neither as smart as Koreans, nor as courageous as them, but at least why are we not able to copy from them, or ask them to be our coach?

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