This essay looks into the EU's approach to bilateral bargaining with a case study on the agreement with Russia on transit to its enclave Kaliningrad.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. The Framework of Analysis
3. Assessing EU-Russia bargaining on Kaliningrad
3.1. Joint gains, joint losses and the costs of a non-agreement
3.2. Negotiation strategies, agenda-setting, issue linkages and side-payments
3.3. The role of individual member states
3.4. The role of Poland and Lithuania
4. Conclusion
Research Objectives and Topics
This paper examines the counterintuitive outcome of the 2002 bilateral negotiations between the European Union and Russia concerning transit to the Kaliningrad enclave. It investigates why the EU, despite its perceived economic strength, agreed to far-reaching compromises regarding the Schengen acquis, and explores how the interplay of member state interests and Russian bargaining tactics shaped this negotiation result.
- Bargaining power in asymmetric relationships
- Application of two-level game theory
- Security and geopolitical implications of EU enlargement
- Strategic issue-linkages and agenda-setting in international negotiations
- The influence of national interests of EU member states on supranational policy
Excerpt from the Book
1. Introduction
With the accession of Lithuania and Poland to the European Union envisaged for Mai 2004 the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad will be completely surrounded by EU-territory. This is going to have a number of consequences for Russian transit travelers between Kaliningrad and the Russian mainland. With the accession agreement Lithuania and Poland have agreed to the adoption of the Schengen acquis. Therefore, Russians traveling through these countries should be subjected to the Schengen regulations which would require them to obtain an international Russian passport and a transit visa from a Lithuanian or Polish consulate.
These conditions were declared unacceptable by the Putin administration which demanded free and unrestricted travel from and to Kaliningrad which so far is possible with the old Soviet internal passport and without having to obtain a visa. If this was not possible, an international transit corridor should be established declared the Russian government. The EU made clear that the Schengen acquis was non-negotiable and any infringement of the sovereignty of Poland or Lithuania unacceptable but agreed to start bilateral talks about the costs and duration of future visas for Russian travelers.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: This chapter provides the context for the transit negotiations, outlining the conflict between the upcoming expansion of the Schengen area and Russia's demand for unhindered access to Kaliningrad.
2. The Framework of Analysis: This section introduces the theoretical tools, primarily Putnam's two-level games and Keohane and Nye's interdependence concept, used to evaluate the bargaining power and win-sets of the involved parties.
3. Assessing EU-Russia bargaining on Kaliningrad: This chapter analyzes the negotiation dynamics, including cost-benefit calculations, Russian strategic issue-linkages, the influence of specific EU member states like France and Germany, and the precarious position of Lithuania and Poland.
4. Conclusion: The final chapter summarizes how institutional constraints and geopolitical security considerations weakened the Commission’s bargaining position, leading to a compromise that prioritized the enlargement process over a strict defense of the Schengen acquis.
Keywords
Kaliningrad, European Union, Russia, Schengen acquis, Bilateral bargaining, Two-level games, Interdependence, Enlargement, Transit, Sovereignty, Negotiation strategies, Issue-linkages, Foreign policy, Security, Lithuania
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this paper?
The paper focuses on the 2002 negotiations between the EU and Russia regarding travel regulations for the Kaliningrad enclave following the EU's Eastern enlargement.
What are the primary thematic areas?
The study centers on bargaining power, the role of institutional frameworks in decision-making, the impact of geopolitical security concerns, and the conflict between maintaining EU standards and facilitating external relations.
What is the central research question?
The research seeks to explain why the EU, which appeared to hold stronger bargaining power, accepted far-reaching compromises on the Schengen acquis in the negotiations with Russia.
Which scientific methods are employed?
The paper applies a qualitative analysis using Robert Putnam's "two-level games" theory and Keohane and Nye's "interdependence" concept to interpret the negotiation behavior and outcomes.
What does the main body of the work cover?
It covers the initial conflict, the strategic maneuvers used by both sides, the internal divisions within the EU concerning Russia, and the specific impact of these negotiations on candidate countries like Poland and Lithuania.
Which keywords characterize the work?
Key terms include Kaliningrad, Schengen acquis, two-level games, asymmetric interdependence, and EU-Russia relations.
How did the internal EU process influence the negotiation outcome?
The necessity for unanimity among member states and the "tied-hands" strategy, combined with the conflicting interests of countries like France, prevented the Commission from maintaining a tough, united position against Russian demands.
What role did Lithuania and Poland play in this bargaining process?
Though not formal negotiators, they were the most affected parties; they were forced to balance their sovereignty concerns and the desire for full EU/Schengen accession against the pressure to accept compromises that would not jeopardize their membership process.
- Quote paper
- Maximilian Spinner (Author), 2003, The EU in Bilateral Bargaining: The Agreement with Russia on Transit to Kaliningrad, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/13304
