Imperial Nostalgia surrounding the Brexit. How and why did it manifest itself in the Debates?

How and why did imperial nostalgia manifest itself in the debates surrounding the United Kingdom’s 2016 referendum on European Union membership?

‘[After leaving the EU, the UK] will be able to get on and do free trade deals [...] not least with the fastest growing Commonwealth economies and build truly global Britain.’¹

June 23, 2016, marks an important turning point in recent European history.² In the British referendum, the majority of the British population opted to leave the European Union (EU).³ For the first time in the history of the EU, the population of a state was given the option of whether they wanted to remain part of the European community of states or leave. The British had a choice: either remain in the status quo or return to a past from before they joined in 1973.⁴

The reasons for Brexit are very profound and can be traced back to a multitude of different factors. In research, numerous works have already dealt with the search for the reasons for the EU exit. Gabriel Rath, for example, conducts sharp and extensive research on the causes of Brexit in his book ‘Brexitannia’ in this regard. Gerald Wood deals specifically with the spatial disparities and developments in Great Britain, whereas Sara Hobolt describes insights into the internal division of Great Britain.⁵ Migration is seen as another motivator for Brexit. The slogan ‘Take Back Control’ can be described as one of the centerpieces of the Brexit campaign.⁶ For Niedermeier and Ridder, this phrase symbolises the intention of many Brexiteers to regain control over immigration to Britain, especially from EU countries. In the course of this, however, the slogan is also emblematic of a recovery of British parliamentary sovereignty.⁷ Another reason is that Brexit has been seen by many of its supporters as a tool against the elites and the establishment.⁸ Peter Cullen, however, argues that the aftermath of the Empire, British patriotism, a lack of feeling for the symbolism of European integration, and the UK’s global political horizon, among other things, led to Brexit.⁹

The country’s global orientation as ‘global Britain’, as mentioned in the opening quote, is described by Kibata as nothing more than an expression of imperial nostalgia.¹⁰ The reference to empire with its various facets emerges in the literature among many researchers as one of the motivations for Brexit.¹¹ In the following, this specific approach to the Brexit debate will be examined in more detail. In this regard, this paper will specifically discuss how and why imperial nostalgia has manifested itself in the debates surrounding the 2016 referendum on the UK’s EU membership. The main aim of this study is to show linkages of imperial ideologies in society in the context of Brexit and to list examples of the use of imperial nostalgia in the debate. In the following, the paper first looks at an attempted definition of imperial nostalgia and tries to establish connections to Brexit. Second, the paper looks at the nostalgic heirs of the empire and their origins and briefly discusses the UK’s ‘world power complex’. Third, it takes a closer look at how society deals with the imperial past. Lastly, the text looks at rhetoric and visual symbols of imperial nostalgia in the referendum debate.

To be able to examine imperial nostalgia and its role in Brexit more closely, it must first be defined. The term ‘nostalgia’ is composed of the Greek words ‘nóstos’ (homecoming) and ‘álgos’ (longing). According to various academics, nostalgia can be defined as a type of memory that depends on a heightened sensitivity to the ephemeral. This is particularly accelerated by the fast-moving pace of modernity.¹² According to Svetlana Boym, nostalgia can be divided into two theoretical types. As ‘relective’ nostalgia, she describes the pragmatic understanding of restoring the past but from the aspect that the past should not be restored.¹³ Alongside this, she argues that ‘restorative’ nostalgia strives to recreate a certain version of the past in the present. This can be found above all in social, cultural, economic, and political events.¹⁴ The latter also describes the setting in which the referendum took place.

Boym goes on to say that nostalgia does not always remain ‘restrospective’ and that it can also be ‘prospective’. ‘The fantasies of the past determined by the needs of the present have a direct impact on the realities of the future. Considering the future makes us take responsibility for our nostalgic tales.’¹⁵ Unlike melancholy, which is limited to the levels of individual consciousness, nostalgia is more about the relationship between individual biography and the biography of groups or nations. In particular, the relationship between personal and collective memory plays a role here.¹⁶

Jobson describes that nostalgia can show itself in discourses and rhetoric, visual representations and symbols, traditions and rituals, and rules and norms. It is most evident, he says, when it is used in a rhetorical or oratorical form in popular political debate. To gain the consent of collective groups to gain political legitimacy, the rhetoric must be compatible with the nostalgic identity of the group.¹⁷ Concerning the Brexit campaign, it can be said that this approach was particularly evident in the Leave movement. Nostalgia could also be used in its classic rhetorical form as an ‘us’ against ‘them’, as long as ‘“us“ is used in a historical sense to generate, nurture or manipulate a positive emotional response to the past that plays to the collective nostalgia-identity.’¹⁸ In the case of the debates around Brexit, the Brexiteers have often classified the EU as ‘them’, thus creating a kind of counterpart.

To understand the connection of the imperial past as well as the collective nostalgic identity with Brexit, a consideration of British national history is essential. As late as 1945, the territory of the British Empire covered more than a quarter of the earth's surface and counted about 700 million people among its population.¹⁹ As a result of decolonisation and the associated declarations of independence by various states, the Empire increasingly lost power. A large part of former British colonies became the Commonwealth of Nations - a loose association of states without a constitution. This stark contrast in power politics between the past and the present had a disillusioning effect and burned itself into the memory of many Britons. The dream of a new empire – of Britain becoming stronger in world politics – was therefore repeatedly taken up and fuelled in the election campaigns of the Leave movement. BeLeave, for example, advertised before the referendum with the following quote from Boris Johnson: ‘Outside the EU we will at last be able to do free trade deals with the US, with China, and the growth economies around the world. Let us lift our eyes to the horizon.’²⁰ Leave.EU appropriately adds: ‘The government would […] be free to push for new global trade deals and reinforce its links with the Commonwealth’. It becomes clear that by leaving the EU, the former idea of empire will unfold again and a focus beyond the European continent will be preserved.²¹ The Commonwealth was repeatedly presented in the campaigns as a (better) alternative to the EU and promoted as a ‘British form of internationalism‘²², whereby Britain could regain its former status as a world power and expand its international relations. The Brexiteers thus took up a narrative that had already helped the protectionist tariff reform campaign to succeed under the slogan ‘Imperial Preference’, by serving the longing for an international, but not completely open, Britain.²³

It seems that the Empire and the British identity are closely linked. This also makes it understandable that the dream of a greater role in world politics does not simply disappear.²⁴ Especially immediately after the Second World War, British confidence and self-confidence were strengthened and they were convinced of their own still great importance in world affairs.²⁵ It was realised that Britain ‘would have to act in some way as the center of a great system of influence.’²⁶ It fits into the picture that Winston Churchill in 1946 spoke of a vision of a ‘United Europe’²⁷, in which Great Britain is indeed aligned with Europe, but without being a part of it. It can be concluded from this that the country’s orientation beyond Europe should continue to be preserved.

Another reason for the European aversion of parts of Great Britain, according to Schwarz, is to ensure ‘British nationhood’.²⁸ According to this, it has always been in Britain’s interest to preserve its national consciousness and the attributes associated with it.²⁹ These values were difficult to reconcile with the supranationality of the later EU. The Empire and the associated idea of a world power – Great Britain as the motherland of parliamentary democracy and not least the monarchy with its adherence to historical symbols – are differences from continental Europe that are still reflected in the British consciousness as a nation-state today.³⁰ According to Niedermeier and Ridder, Great Britain was much more interested in permanent ‘Anglo-sovereignty’³¹. However, this ideal state was increasingly seen to disappear in the supranationality of the EU. During the Brexit campaign, these traditional reservations about continental Europe were politicised and placed in the current context emotionally and nostalgically. The protection of national interests, therefore, played a central role in the political camp of Brexit supporters. Nationalism thus became a weighty argument in the Brexit debate.

Lorcin argues that imperial nostalgia is particularly linked to the decline of Britain's international prestige.³² She sees imperial nostalgia rooted in what Boym defines as ‘reflective’ nostalgia, which is closely linked to economic and political hegemony.³³ The Brexit referendum is not about Britain and the EU, but rather about Britain and its imperial heritage. For the Leave side, turning away from Europe is a step towards saving the British Empire.³⁴ According to them, it is rather to regain the features of Britain's former hegemonic status and not to restore the empire per se.³⁵ The excesses and misdeeds against the colonised peoples are deliberately suppressed here.

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¹ Yoichi Kibata, ‘Afterimage of the British Empire? A Background of Brexit’, in 100 Years of World Wars and Post-War Regional Collaboration. How to Create ‘New World Order’?, ed. by Kumiko Haba, Alfredo Canavero, and Satoshi Mizobata (Singapore: Springer, 2022), pp. 15-22, p. 17.

² See Martin Sabrow, ‘Zäsuren in der Zeitgeschichte‘, Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, (2013) <https://docupedia.de/zg/Zaesuren> [accessed 15 February 2023]; Caesuras are usually sectoral and synonymous with sharp incisions that are usually limited in event history (Sabrow, ‘Zäsuren‘). Sabrow argues that in cultural history, but also in economic and social history, caesuras are often described by ‘softer‘ terms. For example, there is talk of epochal thresholds, saddle periods, or structural breaks (Ibid.). It often makes sense to subdivide caesuras into caesuras of experience and caesuras of interpretation, since epochal breaks are usually never all-encompassing and, especially in the course of globalisation, many events take place in parallel and traditional spatial boundaries are increasingly dissolved (Ibid.). Brexit can be interpreted as a caesura in recent European history. It constitutes a strong break with the pan-European idea that decisively shaped the 1990s.

³ See ‘EU-REFERENDUM Results‘, BBC News, (2016) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results> [14 February 2023]; see also David Bauer, ‘Alle Resultate zum EU-Referendum in der Übersicht‘, Neue Züricher Zeitung, (2016) <https://www.nzz.ch/international/brexit/brexit-ergebnisse-grafik- karte-alle-resultate-aus-grossbritannien-auf-einen-blick-ld.90610> [14 February 2023]

⁴ Elliott Green, ‘They did things differently there; How Brexiteers appealed to voters’ nostalgia’, London School of Economics, (2016) https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/07/13/they-did-things-differently-there-how-brexiteers-appealed-to-voters-nostalgia/ [accessed 13 February 2023]; The accession at that time was to the European Community (EC) - the legal predecessor of today's EU.

⁵ The inner-British divide is also addressed by Lewis and Townsend under the North-South divide: Jim Lewis, and Alan Townsend (Ed.), The North-South Divide. Regional Change in Britain in the 1980s (London: SAGE Publications, 1989).

⁶ Alexander Niedermeier, and Wolfram Ridder, Das Brexit-Referendum. Hintergründe, Streitthemen, Perspektiven (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2017), p. 27.

⁷ Niedermeier, Brexit-Referendum, S. 27; see also Robert Saunders, Yes to Europe! The 1975 Referendum and Seventies Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 380.

⁸ See Sara B. Hobolt, ‘The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent’, Journal of European Public Policy, 23:9 (2016), 1259-1277 (p. 1260); Ibid. (p. 1265).

⁹ Peter J. Cullen, ‘Die Stellung Großbritanniens in der Europäischen Union: Vortrag gehalten am 8. Mai 1996‘, in Vorträge, Reden und Berichte aus dem Europa-Institut 342, ed. by Georg Ress/Torsten Stein (Saarbrücken: Universität des Saarlandes, 1996), p. 26-27.

¹⁰ Kibata, ‘Afterimage’, p. 17.

¹¹ See a.o Jochen Buchsteiner, Die Flucht der Briten aus der europäischen Utopie (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2018); Michael Dunning, and Jason Hughes, ‘Power, Habitus, and National Character’, Historical Social Research, 45 (2020), 262-291; Steve Corbett, ‘The Social Consequences of Brexit for the UK and Europe: Euroscepticism, Populism, Nationalism, and Societal Division’, The International Journal of Social Quality, 6 (2016), 11-31; Ursula Lehmkuhl, ‘Großbritannien zwischen Empire und Europa. Geopolitische Spannungen und wirtschaftspolitische Ambivalenzen in der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, (2016) <https://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/brexit/229081/zwischen- empire-und-europa> [accessed 28 January 2023]; John Darwin, Das unvollendete Weltreich. Aufstieg und Niedergang des Britischen Empire 1600- 1997 (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2013).

¹² Richard Jobson, Nostalgia and the post-war Labour Party Book. Prisoners of the past (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018), p. 5.

¹³ Jobson, Nostalgia, p. 7.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁵ Svetlana Boym, Nostalgia (2011) < http://monumenttotransformation.org/atlas-of-transformation/html/n/nostalgia/nostalgia-svetlana-boym.html> [accessed 16 February 2023].

¹⁶ Boym, Nostalgia.

¹⁷ Jobson, Nostalgia, p. 11.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Lehmkuhl, ‘Großbritannien zwischen Empire und Europa‘; Für einen umfangreichen Überblick über die Geschichte und Entwicklung des Empire vgl. Jeremy Paxman, Empire. What Ruling the World Did to the British (London: Penguin, 2011).

²⁰ Lisa Suckert, Der Brexit und die ökonomische Identität Großbritanniens. Zwischen globalem Freihandel und ökonomischem Nationalismus (Köln: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, 2019), p. 31.

²¹ The idea of empire was also the focus of Britain's accession negotiations with the EC. France's Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle intervened in two applications for accession by Great Britain before accession was finally successful. Great Britain, as an ‘insular, maritime country with far-reaching trade and supply connections’, seemed to have too many differences with continental Europe. See Rolf Breitenstein, Wirtschaftliche Hauptprobleme eines Beitritts Großbritanniens zur EWG in historischer, ökonomischer und politischer Perspektive (Bonn: Difo-Druck, 1972), p. 51.

²² Suckert, Identität Großbritanniens, p. 31.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Darwin, Weltreich, p. 367.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 368.

²⁶ Ibid.; see also Roger Liddle, The Europe Dilemma. Britain and the Drama of EU Integration (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), p. 6.

²⁷ Gerhard Altmann, Abschied vom Empire. Die innere Dekolonisation Großbritanniens 1945-1985 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2005). p. 56.

²⁸ Klaus-Dieter Schwarz, Englands Probleme mit Europa. Ein Beitrag zur Maastricht-Debatte (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997), p. 27.

²⁹ For a comprehensive overview of the debate on British national identity, see Almuth Ebke, Britishness. Die Debatte über nationale Identität in Großbritannien, 1967 bis 2008 (= Ordnungssysteme. Studien zur Entstehung der Neuzeit 55), (Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter, 2019).

³⁰ Schwarz, Englands Probleme, p. 27.

³¹ Niedermeier, Brexit-Referendum, p. 4.

³² Patricia M. E. Lorcin, ‘The Nostalgias for Empire’, History and Theory, 57:2 (2018), 269-285 (p. 269).

³³ Lorcin, ‘Nostalgias for Empire’ (p. 272).

³⁴ Nadine El-Enany, ‘Brexit as Nostalgia for Empire’, in Critical Legal Thinking-Law and the Political, (2016) <http://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/06/19/brexit-nostalgia-empire/> [accessed 16 February 2023]

³⁵ Francesca Melhuish, ‘Euroscepticism, Anti-Nostalgic Nostalgia and the Past Perfect Post-Brexit Future’, Journal Common Market Studies, 60:6 (2022), 1-19 (p. 7).