I. SAUDI ARABIA’S WAHHABISM
I.1. Wahabism: The Core Ideology Of Saudi Arabia
I.2. The Tawhid Philosophy
I.3. The Driving Force of Radicalism
I.4. Radical Movements in Saudi Arabia
I.5. The Shia Revolts and Juhayman al- Utaybi
I.6. Regional Salafism and the Emergence of Al-Qaeda
I.7. Enhanced Islamist Activism during the Gulf War I
I.8. Opposition from the Awakening Preachers
1.9. The Rise of Young Islamist Professionals
II. DRAMATIC CHANGES IN THE ARAB WORLD
II.1. Principal Basis of Individual and Group Identity
II.2. The Vast Growth of Radical Islam
II.3. Alliances and Divisions
III. Al-Qaeda’s East Africa Networks
III.1. The Formative Years of Islamic Radicalism in Yemen
III.1.1. Terrorism and Islamic Radicalism
III.1.2. Curtailing State Capacity
III.1.3. Current Situation in Yemen
III.1.4. The U.S. Foreign Policy and Relations with Yemen
III.2. Terrorism and Radical Groups in Sudan
III.2.1. The Bin Laden –Al-Turabi Alliance
III.2.2. The Humanitarian Crisis and Genocide in Darfur
III.2.3. U.S. Policy toward Sudan
III.3. Terrorism and Radical Groups in Somalia
III.3.1. AL Qaeda and Al Itad Al Islamia Networks
III.3.2. US Foreign Policy toward Somalia
III.4. Terrorism and Radical Groups in Eritrea
III.4.1. Response by the Government
III.4.2. U.S. Policy toward Eritrea
III.5. Al-Qaeda Operations in Weak African States
III.5.1. Corruption and W eak Law Enforcement in East Africa
III.5.2. Trans-national Terrorism In Kenya
IV. Al-Qaeda North West African Axis
IV.1.The New Terrorism Axis in the Sahel Region
IV.1.1. Al Qaeda-GSPC Networks
IV.1.2. GSPC and Europeans of North African origin
IV.1.3. Fundraising and Recruitment through Crimes
IV.1.4. Iraq-North Africa Terror Axis
IV.1.5. Massive Challenges to the Regimes
V. Inter-Continental Jihadi Strategies
V.1. WMD Productions in Failed, Corrupted and Rouge States?
V.1.1. The Sout-East Asia Axis
V.1.2. Al Qaeda’s Desire to Produce WMD in Pakistan
V.1.3. Misusing Frustrated Russian Scientists and Rogue States
VI. US- Democratization Efforts – A Dream?
VI.1. The Reality and Practices
VI.2. The Strategy of Legalizing Islamic Parties
VI.3. Recent Experiences
VII. THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TERRORISM AT SEA
VII.1. The Background
VII.1.1. Somali Piracy at the Horn of Africa
VII.1.2. The Piracy Profile of Somalia
VII.1.3. Somali Pirates and their Tactics
VII.1.4. The Economy and Profitability of Piracy
VII.1.5. Financing Islamic Radicalism through a Ransom
VII.2. The Global Economic Costs of Piracy
VII.2.1. Recent Developments
VII.2.2. Global Response
VII.2.3. Global Agenda on Piracy
VII.2.4. Millions of Dollars Rain for Somali Pirates
VII.2.5. China sends Special Forces to fight Somali Piracy
VII.2.6. Pursuing Somali Pirates on Land
Glossary of Arabic Words and Terms
Leading IalamicRadical and Jihadi Groups
This book is a partial outcome of a project conducted from 2006 to the end of October 2009 and we will continue to publish some other partial results to the end of the year. The second series on the pipeline is “ Europe: The Future Battleground of Terrorism”
As the US and the Western world accused the governments of Libya, Iran, Syria, Iraq… etc as potential sponsors of terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was not mentioned, despite several of its charity organizations are supporting the radicals under the cover of humanitarian assistance. Saudi Arabian officials show down has tried to break the chains of terrorism and condemned Al-Qaeda’s actions against the United States. The alleged Al Qaeda attacks of November 9, 2001, have dramatically distorted the political environment between the Muslim and the Western world. In the Muslim world, religion, politics, and culture are intertwined in complicated ways.
The implications of jihadists’ activities in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region are much worrying. The wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan continuously inflamed violent acts that have dramatically increased in intensity and scope. Today, to access to the technologies for the production of chemical weapons is likely to become easy. The development of “micro reactors,” or machines, only a bit larger than an average desktop computer, that are designed for pharmaceutical industries will allow chemical companies to produce chemicals in smaller quantities on short order.
After the dramatic 9/11 tragedy, the Bush Administration came out along with a bundle of strategies and advocated to democratize the Arab world. The main strategy and rationale behind the US government security interest in promoting freedom and democracy is to reduce anti-American terrorism. According to their calculus, the more democracy promoted in the Middle East the less terrorist attack on the US targets take place; but it failed.
Another phenomenon we observe today is the emergence of modern terrorism at sea. Al-Qaeda affiliate pirates of Somali clan leaders have discovered the economy and profitability of hijacking commercial and private ships to finance their weapons to support the radical Islamic unions.
I. SAUDI ARABIA’S WAHHABISM
As the US and the Western world accused the governments of Libya, Iran, Syria, Iraq… etc as potential sponsors of terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was not mentioned, despite several of its charity organizations are supporting the radicals under the cover of humanitarian assistance.
Saudi Arabian officials show down has tried to break the chains of terrorism and condemned Al-Qaeda’s actions against the United States. They made a hard move towards terrorism and have captured and arrested more than 600 activists (mostly suspected foreigners), claimed to have killed several terrorists, allegedly destroyed their bases and almost all financial resources. They even went so far and forced the leading ideological master-minders from the cleric to renounce their radical views live on television. About 1,400 imams were recalled who were well known about their deviating opinions, and took a variety of measures to strengthen the security with additional spies all over the government agencies, offices, super markets residential and air port areas.
Despite such strong actions the government has still some worries. Observations suggest that conservative group of Islamists of the Kingdom have vowed to link their campaigns with, Egypt, Palestine and Iraq.1. As it is well known, Sunni Islamists, who are the strongest Iraqi insurgents, may try to retreat one day across the border for operations in Saudi Arabia or Jordan and try to destabilize the Security. This is possible, because history has recorded that insurgents organized themselves in Syria to attack targets in Saudi Arabia in 1996 was designed in the same way. The other fear is the possible creation of tribal and fundamentalist alliance that might bring a revolution in Saudi Arabia to overthrow the government.
The current terrorism threat in Saudi Arabia is more or less accompanied with other tensions, problems and sometimes with short and small appraisals. The lack of secularism in the Kingdom, and the bargain struck between the political powers and the Wahhabi ideology, are the significant problem. In its place, we might interpret that bargain as an a priori condition, and look instead to the imbalances arising since the outbreak of the Islamic Awakening in the early 1990s and the simultaneous emergence of global Islamic radicalism.
Currently the Kingdome is occupied with two key objectives. The first is to improve the strategy of counterterrorism measures, and second, to reduce tensions between with the United States. Leaders of both countries have also implied that democratization is of utmost importance in the region and recommended political reforms in the Kingdom. International observers agree and are ready to help if necessary.2
I.1. Wahabism: The Core Ideology Of Saudi Arabia
Generally Islamic principles, practice, and discourse vary from country to country. As the main ideological master-plan of Islamism in Saudi Arabia, the Hanbali school of law (madhhab) is mostly followed by the believers. The Madhhab represents the views of Muhammad ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, a religious reformist and supporter of the Saudi royal family in the 18th century and the father of the present Wahabism. Despite some oppositions existing to it, Wahabi became the established version of Islam in the Kingdom. Both the royal family and today’s salafi opposition are Wahhabis, hence Wahhabism is not necessarily a unified ideology in terms of its proposals regarding the state.
Non-Wahhabists describe the sect as highly conservative, for Abd Al-Wahhab sought to purify his belief from degrading innovations (bid`a) that had been assimilated, according to him, from non-Islamic customs or mores. These included practices precious to the hearts of many Muslims such as the adoration of the Prophet Muhammad’s grave and those of other holy individuals, including the teachings and rituals of Sufi Muslims (the mystics of Islam), and the Shi`a. The Wahhabis condemned tomb worship to be polytheistic, a form of shirk —because something other than God is sacred. They were offended by the Shia conception of the imamate (the legitimate spiritual rulers of the Muslims) and the Sufi search for union in this lifetime with God, as well as the practices of the “ecstatic” Sufi orders.
The Wahhabis also damned the Ottoman rulers of their era for their corruption, obsession to luxury, use of prayer beads imitating themselves as kings, and other for Wahabi unacceptable practices. The Saudi Shia comprises about 40 percent of the population of the eastern oil-rich province of the Kingdom, and is approximately 10 percent of the indigenous Saudi population.
Wahhabi radicals attacked the Shia in both Saudi Arabia and Iraq during the time of ibn Abd Al-Wahhab’s day. The Wahhabi claim that the Shia is apostates renders their status difficult in Saudi Arabia, and has led to discrimination against them. The Wahhabi rulers forbade various rituals, Shia mosque construction and their doubled call to prayer; and this antipathy created tensions between the Kingdom and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Driven by the ambition of expanding their philosophy, Ideology, practices and world view, Wahhabism caused Saudi Arabia to create a quasi foreign and cultural policy of dawa, or Islamic foreign mission. This spirit of proselytization and reform can be, with all of the usual indistinctness, traced to early Islam.
Critics from the side of more liberal Muslims find it antithetical to the ethos of the Muslim world in later periods, and they cite Surah Hud of the Quran, “If thy Lord had so willed, He could have made mankind one People: but they will not cease to dispute” (11:118) or Surah Al-Baqarah, “Let there be no compulsion in religion” (2:256) to explain their aversion to supporters .
Being a Guardian of the Holy Islamic Cities and as a part of its dawa policy , Saudi Arabia has created or financed in various sorts of Islamic institutions, from the Muslim World League and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which includes the International Islamic Court of Justice (ratified by only a small number of states), and a long list of affiliated groups, banks, and federations.3
Saudi Arabia supports Islamic academies and academic chairs at Harvard, University of California, Santa Barbara, University of London, and University of Moscow. On to of that there are supports for institutes, mosques, Islamic centres in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Canada, the United States, Australasia, and Europe4.
These are, on the one hand, expressions of zakat, which is not merely charity, but furtherance of Islam. On the other, these endeavours are an aspect of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, disseminating various Wahhabist principles to the point that today many Sunni Muslims see them as a norm.
Critics accuse these efforts and institutions of supporting Islamists in other Middle Eastern nations, and in Europe. Saudi Arabia’s religious officials have even been able to obstruct with secularizing reforms by directly or indirectly pressuring local religious leaders or other Saudi-influenced constituencies, as it happened in Lebanon in 1999 with the tabling of the new optional civil law of personal status. The core idea of cleansing Islam from foreign influences is not exceptional to the Wahhabis. Many other parallels exist between Wahhabism and other streams of Muslim with or without fundamentalist thought.
A range of critiques of Wahhabism exist; one characterizes the sect as an oddly conservative and puritanical trend in the otherwise tolerant and multicultural tradition of Islam. Wahhabism in such a view is a distinct sect or reactive movement and not really a part of mainstream Sunni Islam. The writings of ibn `Abd Al-Wahhab were very meagre, limited to a small booklet. He gave it the title Kitab Al-Tawhid which means the Book of oneness of God. The tawhid (oneness of God, sometimes translated as monotheism) is divided in three key principles. One should keep in mind that Christians Buddhists or any non-Muslims should understand that not only the Wahabis, but all Muslims of the world, are committed to tawhid.
I.2. The Tawhid Philosophy
The tawhid principles are the fundamental philosophy of all Muslims and are generally expressed in Islamic art, literature, devotion, indeed in every facet of what can be termed Muslim culture. Based on the general tawhid, Abd Al-Wahhab wrote about three other points. The tawhid Al-ibada (unicity of worship), tawhid Al-rububiyya (God’s unique attribute of creator of and dominion over the world), and tawhid alasma wa Al-sifat (the idea that God’s different names or attributes that may be found in the Quran, solely apply to God and should not be applied to others).5. Tawhid became so central to the followers of Abd Al-Wahhab that they called themselves muwahhidun, means, those who support monotheism. Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab’s extremism was due to his followers’ enforcement of tawhid Al-ibada which they equated with attacks on polytheism, or shirk. Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab thought that other Muslims who were insufficiently devout, or associated “others with God” by virtue of their sect or orientation, were equivalent to polytheists, and thus subject to attack by true believers. As other Muslims acknowledge tawhid, the concept itself does not distinguish Wahhabism, rather it was ibn `Abd Al-Wahhab’s idea that he could deny the Muslim identities of others and pronounce them unbelievers, if, after God’s proof was communicated to them, the other persisted in alternate forms of worship, or failed to uphold Islamic duties. This classification of abuse is called takfiri and its presence or absence is a way of determining the “extremism” of any given Islamist group. In the whole history of the Islam, the Sunni abused Shia, or vice versa as a tafkiri. (takfir in Arabic, meaning to call someone a kaffir, or unbeliever).
A recent article in a prominent academic journal tried to highlight Saudi vagueness to its Islamic threat. Focused on the value of tawhid and seeing in it an embodiment of Prince Nayif, the Interior Minister, further described as a dark force, supporting the clerics and even Al-Qaeda, while Crown Prince Abdullah is supposedly the supporter of taqarrub (accommodation), the foil to tawhid.6 Yet, Wahhabism has, in a sense, globalized other Muslims, so they can hardly perceive tawhid as being deviant.
Wahhabism served to support Saudi political rule, for Abd Al-Wahhab and his heirs, the Shaykh family, demanded obedience to the ruling Saudi family from the people.46 This produced a stillness that differs from the oppositionism called for by Ibn Taymiyya, an intellectual brainwave of Abd Al-Wahhab and the 20th century
Islamists like Sayyid Qutb and Osama Bin Laden. They, in contrast, advised believers to counter and brand wicked rulers infidels. Bin Laden’s attacks on the piety of the Saudi family aim to de-legitimize the Saudi rulers.
Critique is highly underway that mostly attacks the alliance between the Saudi family and the Wahhabis. Most critics accuse that the alliance has been and still dictate the religious affairs of the nation without fully accounting for public sensibilities or without consulting its citizens.7
A historical view of Wahhabism shows that its purist impulse and the exhortation to jihad have created problems for Saudi rulers for some time. Ibn Saud faced challenges first from the Ottoman forces, and later from the Hashemites, who remained staunch enemies as he had divested them of the Hijaz (the Western province of Saudi Arabia where the cities of Mecca and Medina are located). He drew on militant Wahhabism at times, but in 1927, the Ikhwan (Brotherhood, as the Wahhabi warriors are known) tried to force him into a more severe conflict with the Hashemites. Ibn Saud, who had already sensed a trouble with the Ikhwan,employed his political tricks until they overstepped their bounds and conducted an appraisal. Then, in 1929 he utilized other tribal forces to defeat them and destroyed certain Ikhwan militia (integrating the rest in a newly structured national guard), but did not ban the Wahhabis; they helped him to win a war with Yemen in 1934.8 The principle of tribal and dynastic leadership was useful then and later in containing the zeal for jihad, but that does not translate into a recommendation that the royal family should or could separate itself from the Wahhabi creed particular to much of the Saudi citizenry.
I.3. The Driving Force of Radicalism
The house of the rulers and the Shayik could servive by mobilizing the Wahabi philosophy as their political base to defend the state, but several critics believe that Wahhabism is innermost drive to Saudi Arabia, a part of its founding political bargain..9 one should also keep in mind that Wahhabism is getting cooler and started moving from its earlier fanaticism and ideological rigidity to a more flexible stage in which the Council of Senior Ulama began to issue a fatwa legitimating Saudi rulers’ to invite non-Muslim soldiers to defend the Kingdom, in case it be captured like Kuwait. However, a newer and more passionately salafi movement which is very active now has explicitly challenged the government. Their philosophy seem in some comparison to the traditional Wahhabi, more fundamentalist and aggressive.
The group faces a huge rejection from the government and partly from the public mainly due to its opposition to the royal family and its uncompromising anti-Western character. The government might have plans to destroy the group but eradicate, defuse, or co-opt the new radicalism in the Kingdom, might bring a problem with it. The other approach, which more liberal reformers assert, Wahhabism’s potential for revision and cooperation toward more liberalization is possible, provided that the main clerics agree. But many in the clerical establishment and outside of it do not agree, rather they identify with the salafists’ notion of the purification of Islam through ending corruption and serving society. These ideas are Wahhabist, after all. That strand is willing to overlook a certain amount of corruption by the rulers, so long as Wahhabist doctrine remains intact. If, however, there is to be true reform, it must differentiate the offensive jihad promoted by a Qutbist/Wahhabist Bin Laden in his quest to expand Islamic territory (dar Al-Islam as opposed to dar Al-harb, or the lands of the no believers) from the defensive jihad intended by Wahhabism’s founder, according to Delong-
Bas.10 In fact, it is difficult to agree with Delong-Bas in this regard, for jihad, as it has been taught in Saudi Arabia, is a true obstacle to the reformation of Wahhabism.11
Saudis admitted and explained away the new salafi s were home-grown, though influenced by regional phenomena of radical Islam. Prince Nayif ibn Abd Al-Aziz, Minister of the Interior, was criticized in the wake of 9/11 for his attribution of militancy to the influence of the Egyptian Ikhwan, and for comments he made about Zionist linkage to the attacks. The comments communicate the Prince’s understandable desire to view extremism as an “import.” Such a position was heard everywhere in the Islamic world where home-grown radicals start to become active. Tunisia and Egypt are good examples, until so much was known about the indigenous nature of movements like the Gama`at Al-Islamiyya or the Jihad that this form of rationalization alternated with claims that activists were simply lunatics or criminals. Other leaders of Muslim states have taken very similar positions in the past, in. Official concerns with the regional environment are not entirely specious, as the Islamic Revolution in Iran inspired what it could not export, and since the jihad phenomenon in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya have blurred national and even doctrinal distinctions.
Salafists were declared as extremists, criminals and astonishingly enough as Kharijites and renegades, by Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador in Washington D.C. in June 2004. A group who withdrew from the majority Muslim community to pursue their own purist doctrines (The word Kharijites was used by the Ottomans to abuse the Wahabis in the 18th and 19th centuries). Going further by locating the fundamentalist phenomenon in Muslim history, Prince Bandar warns his listeners not to blame their emergence on the government’s ties with the United States, Christians, or Jews, or on the Palestinian situation, Iraq, or Chechnya.12
I.4. Radical Movements in Saudi Arabia
From the end of the 1960s to 80s there were a lot of swelling opposition groups in the region, these were the Saudi communist Party, Popular Democratic Union in Yemen and the Bahrain National Liberation Front. Other groups that derived from the Arab Nationalist Movement (Nasserists) were somewhat more popular, influenced intellectuals, and aggrandized the Third World discourse of revolution, setting a model for guerrilla actions. These groups managed to fuel the generalized public feeling that Saudi Arabia had a responsibility for the Arab world and its unity, and to Palestine, above and beyond its historic Islamic duty of protector of the Holy Cities and hosts of the hajj. Like the Bathists of Syria and Iraq, these movements were anti-Western in orientation, equating the West with neo- imperialism.
Modern Islamic threat is quite different from this earlier legacy, though the anti-Western-vocals remained, calls for political reform, end to corruption, and rule on behalf of the people owe something to it. In search of the root causes for the emergence of salafists, Saudis refer to an Islamic Awakening (sahwa Islamiyya) that took place in Saudi Arabia and that has mushroomed in many locations of the Muslim world. In the Arab world, the Awakening developed in the 1970s and 1980s following the defeat of secular Arab nationalism after the 1967 war and in response to repressive regimes. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was a catalyst of sorts.
In connection to that, some Saudi experts do not understand why was the Islamic Awakening appealing in a country where Islam and state were traditionally linked and where the sharia (Islamic law) is the law of the Kingdom? The only answer to that might be simply to trace back to the politically oppositionist Muslim Brothers who, exiled from Egypt, brought certain trends of extremist thought to the Gulf.13 These were the radical ideas of rejecting any state authority in favour of God’s (hakmiyy a), and the notion that one should counter and punish inauthentic and un-Islamic Muslims, even rulers (takfir).
There are many indicators that establish a direct link between the Saudi salafi s and the Egyptian Ikhwan, the sense that Islamism should be fostered regionally and the Egyptian Ikhwan’s emphasis on social justice may have indirectly impacted them. However the question remains that why radicalism became the instrument to oppose.
In other related steps, Saudi Islamists began to criticize an “establishment” ulama, (religious scholars), scholars actually well supported and respected by the Kingdom due to their neutrality and were apolitical. Later on the regime began to manipulate their view, to legitimize its actions, as in the Gulf War I fatwa explained above.
I.5. The Shia Revolts and Juhayman al- Utaybi
Juhayman al-Utaybi, grandson of an Ikhwan warrior, along with his brother-in-law, Muhammad ibn Abdullah al-Qahtani14 revolted at the end of November, 1979, and took over the Grand Mosque in Mecca.
Al-Utaybi and his followers emerged from a movement called al-Jama al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba. This movement principally reject the legal schools of Islam and argues for literal readings of religious texts. Right after the gates of the mosque were closed, and the worshipers were trapped, al-Utaybi demanded in his speech for a true and uncorrupted Islamic ruler instead of the present monarchy that serves and maintains a relation with unbelievers. His fighters held over 130 hostages and remained there for 20 days. They fought against 10,000 security forces of the government until finally the French Intervention Group of the National Gendarmes removed them.57 Once defeated, they were quickly executed and beheaded58. The revolt surprised the Kingdome and confused the authorities. However, the government responded to the Islamic dimension of the challenge, at least in part, by bolstering the religious authorities and increasing the funding for religious endeavours.
At the end of the same year, another unexpected turmoil took place when the Shia who lived in the Eastern province of the country. They accused and complained of discrimination and other oppressive practices by the government. With a clear statement, they insisted on celebrating Ashura, the Shia holiday of mourning that had been banned by the Saudi. The government responded aggressively and violently, and the National Guard put down the ensuing riots. Saudi authorities accused Iran masterminding the revolt, and Shia activists fled the country indeed some of them to Tehran.
I.6. Regional Salafism and the Emergence of Al-Qaeda
In 1979 Bin Laden first went to Pakistan and took on the cause of liberating Afghanistan from pro-Soviet forces, a quest that many in the Arab world supported. But the support was not directly attached to Bin Laden himself, it was due to the Camp David treaties that had horrified many Islamists and Arab supporters of Palestine who saw these as an Egyptian abandonment of the cause.
During that time , Bin Laden joined the forces of Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian who was in charge of an aid-office to the mujahidin in Peshawar, Pakistan, and who had taught Bin Laden and served as a mentor. Bin Laden on his part bears some similarity to Utaybi on issues of purified ummah. Utaybi was a type of person that represented the aggravated ultra-Wahhabism as compared to Bin Laden’s radicalism. Al-Qaida finally emerged with its world mission just prior to Bin Laden’s disenchantment with the Saudis. He went into exile in the Sudan where the Islamist regime sheltered him, as the Saudis cancelled his citizenship. Bin Laden attacked and criticized Ibn Baz’ fatwa that licensed Arab-Israeli peace talks by attacking the Muslims who were party to the talks (neither true Muslims, nor legitimately Islamic leaders) and Bin Baz himself15.
Osama Bin Laden’s goals are worldwide jihad against the West and Muslim “pretenders,” and his greatest complaints about the Saudi regime are still corruption, anti-Islamic, and supports non-Muslim, or non-Islamist, causes (the Maronites of Lebanon, the Christians of Sudan, Yasir Arafat and others.). In an official call to the King of Fahd, Bin Laden wrote in 1995: “Your kingdom is nothing but an American protectorate, and you are under Washington’s heel”16.
Though the Saudi regime was well conscious of Bin Laden and stripped him off Saudi citizenship, they could do little to manage his activities outside of their country. Few other Afghan Arabs came under such scrutiny, and those who went on to seek jihadist experience in Bosnia or Chechnya, or who recruited in the strong Islamist bases in Europe, were even further outside the sphere of Saudi control.
The generalized public support for those who would defend Muslims who faced genocide or repression was certainly not limited to Bin Laden or other jihads in pursuit of just causes. It must also be mentioned that the Saudi public supported Palestinian resistance to Israel and also that waged by Hezbollah in Lebanon. The argument was made that Israel had unfairly and unjustly imposed collective punishments, tortured prisoners, and was clearly inhibiting Palestinian aims to sovereignty. Calls increased for Palestinian self representation within the limitations of the Authority in the post-Oslo period. Saudis, like others in the region, therefore did not believe that by supporting Palestinians, whether in Hamas or through other organizations, they were supporting terrorism.
I.7. Enhanced Islamist Activism during the Gulf War I
Due to lack of security infrastructures and the necessary know-how-the Saudi regime permitted the total US supervision and control over their troops. Paradoxically, the 1991 Gulf War actually encouraged Islamists in Saudi Arabia and throughout the region.17.Many thousands of Saudis volunteered to join the Saudi military before January 1991, including, Shia volunteers for the first time in its history. The U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War provided ammunition to various forces opposed to the royal family and also to the American presence.
At the same the situation heated the relatively dormant moderates to activists. Huge protests and demonstrations against participation in the Coalition were mounted in a number of Middle Eastern and North African states. In Egypt emergency laws were employed, prohibiting such assemblies or demonstrations. Egyptian and other North African populations were galvanized in anticipation of a U.S. military presence on both anti-imperialist and Islamic grounds. What was really being protested was the closed nature of their own political systems above and beyond their alliances with the West.
To stop or at least contain the protests in Saudi Arabia, the King had to issue an edict reining in the religious police (mutawain). A group of 45 women who staged a driving demonstration were punished, and such a step generated even more disagreement about the possibilities of change or the need to reassert custom as it stood. Islamists accused them of trying to Americanize the Kingdom, of being “infidels,” communists, and whores. The women had pointed out the hypocrisy of a rule that permits them to be alone with an unrelated man (their driver) and to drive overseas, but not in their own homeland. No actual law against women’s driving existed, but Sheikh `Abdul Aziz Ibn al-Baz issued a fatwa in response to this polarizing incident.
The mutawain, equivalent of the medieval muhtasib (an official who could implement penalties at the level of tazir) of modern day monitor the dress code that requires women to cover completely in public, break up any gatherings of women in public, and punish men who attempt to speak or try to come in touch with them, and ascertain the closure of businesses during the five daily prayers. They have detained and tortured citizens and foreigners. They blocked and beat female students fleeing a fire in a public school in Mecca, on March 11, 2002, because they were not fully veiled in the building. Fourteen students were killed18.
Prince Nayif issued a directive in 2002 that the mutawain should alter their forceful approach,19 and an Academy of Islamic Police was established at Umm Al-Qura University, but Saudis continue to complain about the mutawain who may encourage the extremists’ views. A legal scholar suggested that the Saudi government might revisit the classical Islamic texts’ interdiction on spying on and confining citizens and regulating crimes outside the sharia20
I.8. Opposition from the Awakening Preachers
The protests and demonstrations of the first Gulf war, created a suitable atmosphere for the so-called Awakening preachers. Two significant persons, namely, Salman Al-Awda and Safar Al-Hawali, strongly criticized the regime for its alliance with the West and circulated tape-recorded sermons throughout the country. Sheikh Al-Hawali argued, as had Bin Laden, against Western influence and modernization, (without attacking the royals personally as Bin Laden did). Sheikh Al-Hawali decried America’s pursuit of its interests, including access to oil in the region, to be achieved through alliances with moderate, secularist Arab regimes as well as with Israel. He also focused on American Christian fundamentalist televangelists like Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson who, to Al-Hawali’s mind, support Zionism through their anti-Arab and anti-Muslim statements21. Sheikh al-Awda preached and wrote about some of the socio-economic problems of the country and the need to rebuild the alliance between Islamic society and state, and he decries normalization with Israel22. Others like Aidh Al-Qarni had actually emerged earlier, in the late 1980s. He, along with Said Al-Ghamidi, attacked liberals and liberal ideas in Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi government has also encouraged a countermovement under Sheikh Rabi Al-Madkhali, who refuted the awakening preachers, just like them, they also utilized cassette tapes and websites as well as formal conferences to spread their Wahhabi views. The Awakening preachers were finally seized and imprisoned, but the impact of their thoughts went further.
Intellectuals and university students were attracted by the Awakening, and some professors organized discussion groups. In March 1991, several of these figures wrote the Letter of Demands which was signed by more than 400 religious figures and preachers, including those inside of the establishment ulama, and sent it to King Fahd. This Letter followed on the heels of a so-called “secular” petition (though it contained signatures of religious personages as well and argued for closer observance of Islamic mores) to King Fahd. Their proposal written in December 1990, requests the establishment of a consultative assembly; the revival of municipal councils; independence of , and equality in, the judiciary; equality of the citizenry; more freedom of the media; reformation of the principle of hisba (commanding the good and forbidding the evil); encouraging women’s participation in society; and reform of the educational system23. Next, a group of emboldened clerics in 1992 produced a document called the Memorandum of Advice that called for stricter observance of the shariah (Islamic law) in all areas of national life, an end to corruption, and cessation of relations with Western and non-Muslim entities.
The government asked the most senior clerics to condemn the Memorandum, and, the highly-respected Sheikh ibn Al-Baz did so. Seven among this highest-ranking clerical association procrastinated, not signing onto the regime’s denunciation of clerical activism. King Fahd dismissed these seven and then attacked preachers of radical discourse and other regional Islamist influences. The clerics had attempted, in a manner consistent with their social role, to consult with and advise their ruler and to substantiate their arguments with religious scripture; secularists and Islamists were attempting to exercise the same function.
1.9. The Rise of Young Islamist Professionals
The emergence of a new organization under the umbrella of young Islamist professionals surfaced in May 1993. The organization became active by issuing a communiqué who, along with others, obtained the signatures of very prominent Saudis on this first message. In addition, a cassette tape referred to as “Supergun” was circulated to explain the demands of the petitioners to the public. The CDLR broadcast its formation on the radio, and cast itself as both a human rights organization and channel for popular, legitimate opposition. The Council of the Higher Ulama denounced the group, and the government splintered down on the new Islamist trend, arresting various leaders, and the Committee to the Defence of Liberty and Rights (CDLR’s) members fled to London, where Muhammad al-Masari emerged as chief spokesperson. The group cleverly utilized faxes, e-mail, and websites to criticize the Saudi government and what it deems the establishment clerics (ulama al-sulta). Masari was nearly deported from England but managed to remain there through an appeal process and political asylum grants –without success.
From time to time most of those young professionals abandoned their programme and submitted themselves to the government. In 2009, nobody could remember in Saudi Arabia about their existence and former members even declined to give an interview to the BBC correspondent about their former activity in the organization.
II. DRAMATIC CHANGES IN THE ARAB WORLD
The alleged Al Qaeda attacks of November 9, 2001, have dramatically distorted the political environment between the Muslim and the Western world. Muslims live in a vast and diverse region that stretches from West Africa to the southern Philippines, as well as Muslim communities and Diaspora, scattered throughout the world. In the Muslim world, religion, politics, and culture are intertwined in complicated ways. This chapter is dedicated to dig-out and examine the dynamics that are driving changes in the political-religious landscape of the Muslim world, and to provide the global policymakers, the broader academic and security circle, with a general outline of events and recent trends, in the Islamic militia, that are most likely to affect U.S. interests and global security.
In thus chapter, we can have an insight which ideological zeal Muslims in the Middle East and somewhere else seem to follow. They differ significantly not only in their religious views but also in their political and social orientation, in particular, women’s rights and the content of education and their tendency for violence. Based on such political and religious analysis an exploration will be undertaken within the two main streams of Islam, first and foremost those between the Sunni and Shiia branches and between the Arab and the non-Arab Muslims straight ait down to sub-national communities, tribes, and clans
Sunni-style Muslims are the majority in this world, but a significant minority, about 15 percent of the global Muslim population, are Shiites. Iranians are Shiites, and they form a politically excluded majority in Iraq (until the fall of Saddam), Bahrain, and possibly also in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, where the dominant Wahhabi ideology stigmatizes them as “polytheists.
Over 80% of the Muslims in the world are non-Arabs, only about 20 percent of the world’s Muslims claim to be Arabs. Astonishingly enough, the so-called Arabs try to dominate and control the interpretations of Islam, its religious practices, political, cultural, social and all other issues. For reasons that have more to do with historical and cultural development than religion, the Arab world exhibits a higher incidence of economic, social, and political disorders than other regions of the so-called developing world.
By contrast, the non-Arab parts of the Muslim world are politically more comprehensive, boast the majority of the democratic (see Egypt, Kuwait, Yemen, Indonesia… etc) or partially democratic governments, and are more secular in outlook. Although the Middle East has long been regarded as the core of the Muslim world, the most innovative work in Islam is being done on the in countries such as Indonesia, Egypt and Brunei it means in Muslim communities in the West.
II.1. Principal Basis of Individual and Group Identity
As in Afghanistan, Somali, or other ethnic based countries, tribes, and clans often comprise the principal basis of individual and group identity and the primary engine of political behaviour. The failure to fully understand tribal politics was one of the underlying causes of the catastrophic U.S. involvement in the Somali conflict in the early 1990s. Ten years later, the U.S. government still knows little about tribal dynamics in areas where U.S. forces are or may be operating. As the United States pursues an activist policy in disturbed areas of the world, it will be critical to understand and to learn to manage sub national and tribal issues.
To examine the sources of Islamic radicalism it important to have an insight in the process of spreading Islamism outside the Middle East that has involved the importation of Arab-origin ideology and religious and social practices, this is wrongly referred as Arabization. This process has had a polarizing effect outside the Middle East, creating greater distance between Sufi Muslims who have chosen to adopt elements of the Arab religious culture as a way of manifesting greater piety and those Wahabist Muslims.
Family ties, tribal conservatism, clan loyalty and cultural practices which have nothing to do with a religious feature, and religious extremism can be mutually reinforcing. In the absence of a strong central authority, they ca simply produce a militant activists or terrorists. To understand and contain the dangerous development of radical networks in the growth of Islamic extremist and terrorist movements; it is vital to analyse their roots, strategies, structure and influence.
Their networks are backed by radical Islamic groups, individuals, intellectual-master-minders who share a common religious background and goal–eradicating the hated Western. They are also be foreign based Islamic charity organizations, diasporas communities or Islamic financial institutions and Hawaalas (money transfer and laundry). In Somalia for example, the radical extremists finance their terrorism with money sent from the Diasporas through the Hawala. As it is well known, especially financial support networks have been key nodes in the funding and operations of extremist and terrorist groups. Another important sector that enhanced the modern terrorism is the emergence and support of Internet and notably the satellite regional media, like the well-known Qatari-based network of Al-Jazziera, whose ownership is the Qatari Muslim Brotherhood.
II.2. The Vast Growth of Radical Islam
The vast growth, that radical political Islam has became what it is now is, processes have been functional in a number of critical events that have now altered the political view of the Muslim world in fundamental-militant ways. Those critical events include the revolution in Iranian with the foundation of the most conservative Islamic nation, the Gulf War of 1991, the war in Afghanistan, the global war on terrorism that followed the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the Iraq war in 2003. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Indo-Pakistan Kashmir conflicts are chronic conditions that have shaped the political discourse in the Middle East and South Asia for over five decades.
After the attacks of September 11 the emergence of Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States stepped up counterterrorist cooperation with regional governments, and the Muslim world sided openly with Washington. This de facto alliance with the United States removed the Taliban threat to the Central Asian nations. It is in the context of this geopolitical realignment that the war in Iraq brought U.S. power into the heart of the Middle East. After their independence and the withdrawal of France and England, America is the first Western-nation to assume power and change the government in Iraq. In due course of this action, the major threat to Iraq’s stability started to be dominated by the increasingly organized Sunni-based insurgency. Furthermore, the strengthening of Islamic fundamentalist forces, both Sunni and Shiia, and the manipulation of Shiite movements by Iran became a boiling point.
Due to the American military and foreign policy incapability and the inflamed religious and ethnic sectarianism, Iraq seems to steer toward the politics of unknown future. However, the impact of Iraq on the political evolution of the Middle East will depend on, whether the new Iraq emerges as a pluralistic and reasonably democratic and stable state, or whether it reverts to authoritarianism or more realistically, fragments into ethnic enclaves.
Moreover, if the current unfavourable religious and ethnic sectarianism which accompanied with suicide bombings continues in Iraq, it will lead toward a further destabilization of the Middle East, destroy U.S credibility and influence, discredit democracy-based policies, and open opportunities for infringement by U.S. adversaries in a strategic vital region of the world. Removal of Saddam Hussein could have been done without opening war toward the Iraqis, once it happened, the impact of the useless war in Iraq with the intention of the removal of the Saddam were more attenuated in all regions of the Muslim world, but it did not strongly resonate in Central Asia.
The huge majority part of mainstream Muslim sectors in South and Southeast Asia opposed the war in Iraq, but the war does not appear to have had lasting effects on the evolution of political Islam or on U.S. relations with South and Southeast Asian states.
However the division between different Islamic groups within the Middle East has taken a new radical dimension as it was before. From the history, the Sunni based Ideology of al Qaeda regards Shiites as heretics, hypotheists, traitors and it absolute mistrusts and that, all Shiite groups including Hezbollah. The whole situation seems funny today, as we have recently observed that It was al Qaeda who initiated and to have given the support to Sunni extremists in Iraq to destroy all Shiite civilians and specially their holy places.
But now Hezbollah has profiled itself and feels to have been recognized as a leader of the Islamic Jihadist against Israel and the Western world. Many Sunnis are therefore rallying to Hezbollah's side, including the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt and Jordan, alItad alIslamiya (AIAI) the United Islamic Courts (UIC) of Somalia and the Eritrean Islamic Jihaad (ISM).
During Hezbolla was occupied with Israel, several leaders of al Qaeda have issued official statements concerning Hezbollah's actions and telling followers how to respond to them. The generalpicture of their argument is that the Shiites are conspiring to destroy Islam and to revive Persian imperialrule over the Middle East and ultimately the world.
The statements of al Qaeda explain this effort the "Sassanian- Safavid conspiracy," in reference to the Sassanians, a pre-Islamic Iranian dynasty, and to the Safavids, a Shiite dynasty that ruled Iran and parts of Iraq from 1501 till 1736. They go further on to argue that with the help of the United States, Iraq has been handed over to the Shiites, who are now wantonly massacring the country's Sunnis. Syria is already led by a Shiite heretic, President Bashar Al-Assad, whose policies harm the country's Sunni majority.
Hezbollah, according to al Qaeda leaders, seeks to cheat ordinary Muslims into believing that the Shiites are defending Islam's holiest cause, Palestine, in order to cover for the extensive Shiite alliance with the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In due course, this naïve and baseless theory states, that the Shiites will fail in their efforts because the Israelis and Americans will destroy them once their role in the broader Zionist-Crusader conspiracy is accomplished. And then God will assure the success of the Sunni Muslims and the defeat of the Zionists and Crusaders. In the meantime, no Muslim should be fooled by Hezbollah, whose members have never fought the infidel on any of the real battlefronts, like Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya or Kashmir. The proper attitude for Muslims to adopt is to dissociate themselves completely from the infidels.
II.3. Alliances and Divisions
Apart from the bizarre analysis of al Qaeda, Hezbollah has at the first place established an effective alliance with Hamas, a Sunni and Muslim Brotherhood organization. Second, statements coming from Hezbollah focus on the politics of resistance to occupation and invoke shared Islamic principles about the right to self-defence. Hassan Nasrallah leader of Hezbollah is extremely careful to hew closely to the dictates of Islamic law in his military attacks. These include such principles as advance notice, discrimination in selecting targets and proportionality.
At the end of the day, only Hezbollah can claim to have “defeated” Israel in Lebanon first in 2000 and in 2006, has shown its strength by hitting Haifa and other places with large numbers of Russian made Catoosa rockets - an achievement that no Arab or Muslim nation or power has accomplished since the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948. The entire impact is a psychological setback for all Arab and Persian States who deeply wish one day to win a war over Israel and triumph over their victories
Perhaps Hezbollah's pre-eminence among Sunnis will open the door for Shiites and Sunnis to stop the bloodshed in Iraq - and to concentrate on their as they say it “enemies”, -the United States and Israel. Rumblings against Israeli actions in Lebanon from both Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq already suggest such an outcome. That may be good news for Iraqis, but it marks a dangerous turn for the West. And there are darker implications still. Al Qaeda, after all, is unlikely to take a loss of status lying down. Indeed, the rise of Hezbollah makes it all the more likely that Al Qaeda will soon seek to reassert itself through increased attacks on Shiites in Iraq and on Westerners all over the world - whatever it needs to do in order to regain the title of true defender of Islam. However, the fact shows that Al Qaeda has met a dominant challenge in Hezbollah and its leader, who has made a shrewd choices that appeal to Al Qaeda's Sunni followers. Al Qaeda's improbable conspiracy theory does little to counter these advantages as long as Nasrallah keeps on preaching a non-sectarian ideology and that does not highlight his group's Shiite identity
Defeating Israel is not a simple thing as Nasrallah has defined victory in his typically low-key style, which contrasts sharply with the old-style and bombastic claims of Arab leaders such as Gama Abdul-Nasser and Saddam Hussein. What Hezbollah can do is bleed Israel’s military forces, harm its economy and extract political concessions. Psychologically, what Hezbollah claimed as a victory has a great impact on the Arab world. It is this psychological aspect to the present war that has so many Arabs and Muslims rallying to Hezbollah’s side—they finally see Arabs who are putting up a realfight against a formidable adversary who had acquired supernatural power (Israel) in their collective imagination. But does Hezbollah’s resistance really count as a victory or is it merely illusory especially in the long term? Does it constitute anything more than al Qaeda’s “acts” on 11 September 2001? How will the political map of the Middle East change if Hezbollah is seen to have won this round with Israel? And finally which forces in the United States are benefiting most from this engagement? What will be the role of al Qaeda?
First, the Salafi movement have been divided and therefore weakened by Hezbollah’s war, with one group supporting the Shiite organization and another refusing it. Second, strong links Hezbollah established with, and received a good support from, the Muslim Brotherhood including leaders like Mahdi `Akif, in Egypt and Sheik Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi in Qatar. Third, the ideological and strategic confusion of al Qaeda caused to neglect Hezbollah in its project of fighting Israel. Fourth, Support from the Hamas’ leadership in Palestine and Syria has vowed unconditional support for Hezbollah.
It is evident that through its military actions against Israel as well as its non-sectarian rhetoric Hezbollah has successfully downplayed its Shiite identity. Few in the Muslim and Arab worlds seem concerned that Hezbollah is committed to Ayatollah Khomeini’s teaching on wilayat Al-faqih, according to which the supreme leader is the one who decides matters of war and peace and that he is considered the marji` who is to be obeyed completely by all the believers. The present Wali Al-Faqih is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran who incidentally is the first to have translated the works of Sayyid Qutb into the Farsi language and has strong Muslim Brotherhood affinities. Iran’s role behind Hezbollah and its increasing influence in the Middle East are carefully hidden.
There might be finally an opportunity for Iran to see the long-awaited fruits of the 1979 Islamic revolution and project its power throughout the Middle East. Until now, Hezbollah in Lebanon was its only success. But because of American incompetence and failure in Iraq, Iran might dominate this one time arch-rival, and now because of Hezbollah in Lebanon also determine the terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The political losers in this projected scenario are clearly very numerous and include the leaderships of the Arab Gulf states, Egypt, and Jordan among others. In addition, the Middle East is likely to see the marginalization of Saudi Arabia as the religious leader of the Muslim world and sectarian conflicts, between Shiites and Sunnis, are bound to increase, as witnessed sadly everyday in Iraq.
In the US Politics, especially the neo-conservatives want a war between Hezbollah and Israel so as to expand their policy of “creative destabilization” beyond the confines of Iraq to include Syria and Iran. For the neo-conservatives a “victory” through regime change in Syria and Iran justifies any amount of destruction and death in the Middle East. They simply do not care if thousands or tens of thousands of Arabs are killed and all their countries’ infrastructure is destroyed. If anything, this provides business opportunities for western companies to win reconstruction contracts the US
In the United States the neo-conservatives have started to discuss because about Hezbollah’s actions. They feel that they have a new enemy with whom to terrify and galvanize the American public for further sacrifice in blood and treasure. One can sense their influence deliberately in the White House’s refusal to accept a cease-fire in Lebanon.
1. John Walsh, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Harvard International Review, Vol. 24,
No. 4, Winter 2003
2 Gershon Baskin, “Fragmented Beyond Repair?” Jerusalem Post, July 25, 2005; Khaled Duzdar, “Moving Backwards ,” IPCRI News Servic e, July 23, 2005. Israelis carried their opposition to the Gaza withdrawal into the streets, with orange banners and clothing, while the pro-withdrawal side wore blue. The Palestinians worry that no meaningful Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will follow disengagement.
3. Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas Mass Wedding: Check the Bride at the Door,”
Jerusalem Post, July 29, 2005.
4 Scott Wilson and Molly Moore, “Egypt Inquiry Slowed by Lack of Evidence; Home-grown Cell Inspired by Al Qaeda is Suspected in Attacks on Red Sea Resorts,” Washington Post, October 23, 2004
5 New York: National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 1998, 2002, p. 199.
6 Martin Kramer, “The Mis-measure of Political Islam,” M. Kramer, ed., The Islamism Debate, Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Centre, Tel Aviv University, 1997, p. 170.
7 The Islamic Liberation Party operated in the United Kingdom and, although it was banned in 2005, ran a small hotel in the area off Edgware Road/Marble Arches which has a large Muslim population: See, for example, Denis Sullivan, “Islam and Development in Egypt: Civil Society and the State,” Mutalib and Hashmi, eds., Islam, Muslims and the Modern State, Cairo, 2005, pp. 211-231.
8 S.a.w.s. stands for salla Allahu alayhi wa sallam, or peace be upon him, and is included after the mention of the Prophet Muhammad.
9 Dilip Hiro, War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response, pp.
10 Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2004
11 Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou: Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Opposition, Washington Institute Policy Paper, 2000.
12 G. H. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in theMiddle Eas t, New York: Macmillan, 1986, pp. 163-164.
Also see Roberto Marin-Guzman, “Fanaticism: A Major Obstacle in the Muslim-Christian Dialogue. The Case of Twentieth Century Islamic Fundamentalism,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, Issue 3, summer 2003.
13 Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Many groups did not join up with al-Qaeda, and that Egyptian Islamic Jihad was damaged by doing so, see pp. 175, 176; that al-Qaeda faces war on two fronts as well, with the West and its own disputing factions; and he concludes that the group has lost the war for Muslim minds, p. 270. 69. see also
Militants Shun Abbas Unity Offer,” BBC News, July 8, 2005.
14 Al-Qahtani bore the name of the Prophet, and Juhayman al-`Utaybi claimed that he was the mahdi —the figure who will restore Islam, and who must descend from the Prophet’s house
15 Osama Bin Laden, “An Open Letter to Sheikh Bin Baz Refuting His Fatwa Concerning the Reconciliation With the Jews,” Communiqué No. 11, Advice and Reform Committee (ARC) December 29, 1994, pp. 1-4; and “al-Risal al-Thaniyah to Sheikh Abdul Aziz Bin Baz,” ARC, January 20, 1995, pp. 1-14, discussed by Mamoun Fandy , Saudi Arabia and Politics of Dissent, New York: Palgrave, 1999, pp. 187-188.
16 Osama Bin Laden, “Communiqué No. 17, August 3, 1995” in Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002, p. 174.
17 James Piscatori, ed., Islamic Fundamentalists and the Gulf Crisis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
18 “Saudi Arabia: Religious Police Role in School Fire Criticized,” Human Rights Watch, March 15, 2002, http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/03/saudischool.htm, last visited December 9, 2004.
19 Anthony Cordesman, “Saudi Arabia and the Challenge of Terrorism: Reacting to the ‘9/11 Report’,” Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 1, 2003, pp. 131-132.
20 Frank E. Vogel, “The Public and the Private in Saudi Arabia: Restrictions on the Powers of the Committees for Ordering the Good and Forbidding the Evil,” Social Research, Vol. 70, Issue 3, Fall 2003.
21 Safar Hawali, Haqa’iq hawl `Azmat al-Khalij, Cairo: Dar Makka Al-Mukarram, 1991. For English readers, a thorough explanation of Hawali’s views may be found in Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, New York: Palgrave, 1991, pp. 61-87.
22 Fandy, pp. 89-113
23 English translation of the Petition, Appendix 11, Joseph Kechichian , Succession inSaudi Arabia, pp. 196-197.