Abstract or Introduction
The debate about the capabilities and means of intelligence services prevails socially. In the wake of the NSA scandal, the media tend to express concern about the possible superiority of intelligence services. After extremist attacks or thwarted attacks such as the recent one in Castrop-Rauxel, North Rhine Westphalia, questions are raised as to why the intelligence services had no insights of any incidents or are dependent on information from abroad. But what are the political processes behind such a consideration of intelligence effectiveness, the protection of individual rights, and political oversight? It is hypothesized that this political balancing and negotiation does not arise from a pure whim, but is founded by regularities, which can be substantiated by analytical theory work.
This paper applies the bureaucratic politics approach to the Dutch and Belgian intelligence services and explores how bureaucratic bargaining shapes the security related policy outcomes. In this context, the question is followed to what extent both, the centralization of an intelligence service and its oversight, can be theoretically justified, since these considerations can be superficially assessed as being contrary to each other. Based on the theoretical foundations, the relationship between the institutional will of workability and quality of intelligence services on the one hand, and the specificity of political oversight on the other hand, is determined. The Dutch and Belgian intelligence services are of particular interest when focusing on military intelligence systems because both services operate in a centralized manner. To increase the evidence, the paper deals with both countries and their respective intelligence organizations.
- Quote paper
- Michael Wagner (Author), 2022, Balancing of Political Oversight and Intelligence Efficiency, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1391231
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