This research suggests that the Egyptian Pharaohs during the New Kingdom applied operational art. Accordingly, theoreticians and practitioners should date the origins of operational art at least as early as Ancient Egypt. The significance of this study is paramount, as it expands the boundaries of military history by showing that the origins of operational art do not lie exclusively within nineteenth century military conflicts in Europe and America. Additionally, it proves that operational art is a timeless phenomenon and will continue to evolve and withstand the changing conditions of future warfare. Instead of relating operational art to a specific country, military scholars should put the pieces of the operational paradigm together, starting from the early beginning to the modern times.
Man’s history in the lands of the Nile extends back to the dawn of humankind and is one of the possible locations where man first crossed the line from indiscriminative violence to organized warfare. However, military historians ignore ancient Egyptians’ contribution to military art and science by relating the origins of operational art to European and American practitioners of the nineteenth century.
Did the ancient Egyptian military reached a high level of sophistication, and did it practice operational art as conceived by modern military theorists during the New Kingdom of the Early Bronze Age (1550–1070 B.C.)? This work makes the case that operational art emerged during that period. This study explains how Ancient Egypt’s war machine reached a high level of sophistication through a brief examination of Ancient Egypt warfare. It then examines the Pharaohs’ campaigns in the Asiatic theatre using operational factors and elements as discussed within the current U.S. Army doctrine.
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION
Historical and Geographical Scope
LITREATURE REVIEW
On Operational Art
Ancient Egyptian Military
METHODOLOGY
THE PHARAOHS’ WARFARE
Key Campaigns of the New Kingdom
Thutmose III’s Campaigns
Sety I’s Yenoam Campaign
Ramses II’s Kadesh Campaign
Analysis of Operational Factors
The Factor of Time
The Factor of Force
Analysis of Operational Elements
Endstate and Conditions
Center of Gravity
Decisive Points
Operational Reach
Basing
Sequential and Simultaneous Operations
Phasing
Culmination
Risk
CONCLUSION
Research Objectives and Core Themes
This monograph investigates whether the ancient Egyptian military during the New Kingdom (1550–1070 B.C.) practiced operational art as defined by contemporary military doctrine, challenging the Western-centric view that limits the origins of operational art to the nineteenth century.
- Examination of the sophisticated Egyptian war machine and its tactical capabilities.
- Analysis of major New Kingdom campaigns against the criteria of operational factors (space, time, and force).
- Evaluation of Egyptian military operations through modern operational elements such as center of gravity, decisive points, and operational reach.
- Reassessment of the historical timeline for the emergence of operational art in global military history.
Excerpt from the Book
Thutmose III’s Campaigns
Although Kamose and Ahmose launched successful joint riverine-land operations to expel the Hyksos occupations, the Asiatic antagonists still represented a serious threat to Egypt. As his predecessors desired to do, Thutmose III wanted to eliminate the Mitannian threat, establish control over the Asiatic theater, and ensure the flow of Egypt’s supplies and raw strategic material—temper and tin—to Egypt. In the same way that Scipio Africanus’s victory at Zama set Rome on the path to empire, Thutmose III’s victory at Megiddo was the first step in the creation of the Egyptian empire. In 1481 B.C., a large Canaanite coalition led by the kings of Kadesh, Megiddo, and other small-scale vassal towns revolted against the Egyptians’ control. The king of Mitanni, whose strategy aimed at undermining Egypt and gaining influence in Canaan, sponsored the revolt. A slow Egyptian response allowed Mitannian power to extend from Megiddo southward to Gaza and Sharuher. The fortified city Megiddo had a political and economic value, and was the strategic key to Egyptian influence in the region. Therefore, Thutmose III had to deal with that strategic threat directed into Egypt before it could cross the Carmel Mountains—separating the Syrian coast from the interior.
Summary of Chapters
INTRODUCTION: Establishes the study's scope by postulating that the origins of operational art predate the nineteenth century and can be found in the New Kingdom of ancient Egypt.
LITREATURE REVIEW: Surveys existing academic debates on operational art from both Western and non-Western perspectives to identify a gap regarding ancient Egyptian military history.
METHODOLOGY: Outlines the conceptual construct of testing historical campaign evidence against current U.S. Army doctrinal criteria for operational art.
THE PHARAOHS’ WARFARE: Provides a detailed analysis of key historical campaigns (Thutmose III, Sety I, and Ramses II) and evaluates them against operational factors and elements.
CONCLUSION: Synthesizes the findings, arguing that the Egyptian Pharaohs utilized operational art, thereby proving its nature as a timeless intellectual process.
Keywords
Operational Art, New Kingdom, Ancient Egypt, Thutmose III, Ramses II, Military Doctrine, Strategic Theater, Combined Arms Warfare, Operational Factors, Center of Gravity, Decisive Points, Operational Reach, Campaign Planning, Military History, Bronze Age Warfare.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary objective of this research?
The research aims to prove that the ancient Egyptian Pharaohs of the New Kingdom successfully applied operational art, challenging traditional theories that associate its origins exclusively with nineteenth-century Europe or the American Civil War.
Which military campaigns were analyzed in this study?
The study primarily focuses on the campaigns of Thutmose III (such as Megiddo), Sety I’s Yenoam campaign, and the Kadesh campaign conducted by Ramses II.
How does the author define operational art in this context?
The author uses modern U.S. Army doctrine, specifically concepts like operational factors (space, time, force) and operational elements (endstate, center of gravity, etc.), to evaluate the decision-making and campaign execution of the ancient Egyptians.
What is the significance of the "Factor of Space" in Egyptian warfare?
The immense and geographically diverse Asiatic theater forced the Pharaohs to develop sophisticated logistics, basing, and maneuver strategies to overcome environmental obstacles and limited military strength.
Did the ancient Egyptians conduct simultaneous or sequential operations?
Yes, the study provides evidence that Pharaohs, particularly Thutmose III, utilized both simultaneous and sequential operations, such as amphibious landings and multi-directional attacks, to achieve strategic objectives.
Why are non-Western military styles often ignored by historians?
The author argues that Western military historians often focus on industrial-age warfare, whereas this study contends that operational art is an intellectual process that transcends specific weapon systems or technological levels.
How did intelligence failures impact the practice of operational art?
The study highlights how Ramses II's reliance on false intelligence before the battle of Kadesh nearly led to catastrophe, illustrating the inherent risks involved in even the most sophisticated operational planning.
What role did alliances play in the Egyptian operational framework?
Military alliances were considered a strategic center of gravity, providing the Egyptians with secure bases, intelligence, and logistical support essential for maintaining influence in the Levant region.
- Quote paper
- Ehab Elhadad (Author), 2023, The Pharaohs early Practitioners of operational Art, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1397463
