Turkish Identity

Table of Contents:

1.Introduction
1.1.Construction of the Work
1.2.Literature Review and Methodology

2.Europeanness
2.1.Definition of Europe and Europeanness
2.2.European Identity in Connection with European Culture and Its Problem Fields
2.3.Inclusion, Exclusion and and Multiple Identities

3.Europeanness of Turkey
3.1.Turkey as (not) a geographical part of Europe
3.2.Turkey as (not) a historical and cultural part of Europe
3.3.Westernisation/Europeanisation Process in Turkey
3.3.1.From the Era of the Ottoman Empire to the Foundation of the Turkish Republic
3.3.1.1.Reforms under the Rule of Sultan Selim III – Nizam-i Jedid (1789-1907)
3.3.1.2.Reforms under the Rule of Sultan Mahmut II (1785-1839)
3.3.1.3.Reforms in the Era of Tanzimat (1839-1871)
3.3.1.3.1.Military Reforms
3.3.1.3.2.Reforms in the Central Bureaucracy
3.3.1.3.3.Reforms the Judicial Affairs and Secular Laws
3.3.1.3.4.Secular Education in the Era of Tanzimat
3.3.1.3.5.Cultural Changes in the Era of Tanzimat
3.3.1.4.Young Turks Era: Transition from Ottoman- to Turkish Nationalism (1908-1918)
3.3.1.5. Reforms in the Turkish Republic under the Rule of Atatürk (1922-1938)
3.3.1.6.Reforms after the Helsinki Phase (1999-2009)

4.Turkey Between Orient and Occident

5.Political Culture in Turkey from Atatürk to Erdoğan

6.Intercultural Dialogue Between Turkey and Europe and the European Cultural Programmes which Turkey takes part in

7.Conclusion

8.Appendix:

Figures and Crosstabulations about Euro-Turks and Their Bridge Role Between Turkey and EU

9.Bibliography

1.Introduction

1.1.Construction of the Work

Is Turkey a European country? To answer this question, we must first understand what is meant by ‘Europeanness’: Is it a sense of belonging to jewish-greek-roman antiquity, to Christianity, to the Renaissance and the Enlightement; which is the way the substantialists define Europeanness,^[1] or rather a commitment to the universal values (liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law) upon which the European Union was founded?^[2]

The constructivists regard Europeanness as a commitment to European principles,

defining the term in a syncretic way.^[3] So far, the identity of the European Union has prevalently been defined politically. In answering the question of whether Turkey belongs to the common European cultural heritage or not, it must first be pointed out that there would not have been a European history without Turkey since Turkey is the successor to the Byzantine and Ottoman empires that have shaped Europe. Moreover, it is important to note that the origin of Turkey itself lies within the cradle of European civilisation.

As a contribution to the continuing debate on the place of Turkey within Europe the aim of this master’s thesis is to examine in detail the historical background and context of Turkey’s cultural identity. The paper is structured as follows:

In the first part of Chapter 2 discussion will be presented on how ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeanness’ are popularly defined. This will include reference to a variety of opinions on how to define Europeanness, and the role of European values will be analysed. In the second part, European identity and its relevance to the European culture will be discussed in the light of the constructivist approach, bearing in mind that the European Union is a unity in diversity. Having considered the main elements of European culture, the problem areas of European identity will be reviewed in detail. Subsequently, the dynamic dichotomizing concepts of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ will be addressed, together with the negative impact of ‘multiple identities’, in order to explain the theoretical background behind Turkey’s characteristic ‘Europeannness’.

In Chapter 3, the issue of the ‘Europeanness of Turkey’ will be examined. The question as to whether Turkey belongs geographically to Europe or not is addressed in the first part, whilst Turkey’s historical and cultural connections to Europe are discussed in the second part of the chapter.

The third part of Chapter 3 deals with the Europeanisation processs in Turkey, starting with the period of the Ottoman Empire; and specifically with the era of Sultan Selim III. Here the reform process transformed the administrative, diplomatic, economic, military and education functions, through the so-called Nizam-ı Jedid program. Subsequently, the reform process under the rule of Sultan Mahmut II will be discussed and following that, one of the most influential reform processes in the Ottoman history will be evaluated; namely the ‘Tanzimat reforms’. The Tanzimat period plays a critical role in Ottoman history, in the development of democracy and the secularisation of the state. It led to radical reform of the military, the central bureaucracy, and judiciary, and in administration, taxation, education and communication. This era of the Ottoman history is also of particular importance, as it marked the first steps towards the adoption of a european perspective amongst Turkish people, which could be regarded to some extent as a cultural revolution.

In the following part, the era of Jung Turks will be considered, comprising the most democratic period in Ottoman history and the period where Turkish nationalism developed through the intellectual thinkers of the time. The transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic occurred in this period; the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 being a turning point.

The Young Turks era is dealt with, along with the radical reforms under the rule of Atatürk, undertaken with the aim of modernising and secularising the young Turkish Republic to achieve the same level of contemporary civilisation apparent in Europe and the West. Thereafter, the ideology- and the doctrines of ‘Kemalism’ will be described, upon which the Turkish Republic was founded and on which it remains based on today.

Having described the transformation process implemented by Atatürk, I will focus on the reforms after the Helsinki-phase, where Turkey was declared as a European candidate

country by the Helsinki European Council of December 1999,^[4] on the same basis and standards as the other European candidate countries.^[5] Without any doubt, this was an important development in the history of Turkey-EU relations. It should be also noted that after Helsinki Turkey achieved various significant reforms, thus the whole europeanisation process gained speed: In the light of the Demirok-report of 2000,^[6] which included the necessary reforms on Turkey’s way to the EU, the government carried out a reform process, realising numerous constitutional amendments and nine harmonisation packages.

Subsequently, the revision of Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code (TPC) on the denigration of Turkishness will be discussed. This is because of its particular relevance to Turkish identity, as an indicator of fundamental progress in the field of freedom of expression, which could be considered as a sine qua non requirement for EU membership.^[7]

In Chapter 3, accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU will also be discussed; in the light of the official documents of the European Commission. The current situation of the progress in the 33 chapters of the acquis’^[8] will be mentioned withoung going into detail, in consideration of the sensitive state of the ongoing negotiations between the parties.

Chapter 4 will clarify the specific character of Turkey describing it as being between the Orient and the Occident. Thus, Eurocentricism and the antagonistic terms ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’ will be discussed, as well as the close relations of Turkey with the Western world, whereby Turkey is regarded being a part of the West as the only country in the muslim world which has embraced a modernisation process under its own free will.

Following that, the fundamental differences between contemporary civilisations will be discussed briefly, in particular the contrast between Greek and Dutch cultures both being part of the European civilisation. Also the significant differences between Turkish and Arabian cultures will be discussed shortly, both regarded as a part of the muslim world. Later on, the great similarity between Turkish and Greek cultures will be discussed, bearing in mind that there are no definitive borders to European civilisation.

Chapter 5 surveys political culture in Turkey, from the foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923^[9] up to the present day. However, ‘politics and political parties in Turkey’ is not the focus of this chapter. To clarify the political culture in Turkey, firstly, a general framework will be given about the phenomenon of ‘political culture’ in brief. Then the role of Islam in Turkey will be elucidated, as well as the nature of the secular state. Subsequently, Kemalism and the role of the military in Turkey will be explained, the paradigm shift in Kemalism after the transition to the multi-party system in 1946^[10] clarified, and Islamism in Turkey described, with the main focus on the era of Erbakan. Following that, the conservative democratic party AKP will be considered, this being the party implementing a reform process for the further democratisation and development of the state, as well as for Turkey’s membership to the EU, demonstrating that it should be regarded as an economically liberal party, and politically not islamist.

In Chapter 6 the intercultural dialogue between Turkey and Europe will be evaluated, with the objective of identifying methods of improving the negotiation process, currently in progress. After that, the role of religion in these discussions, particularly that of Islam and Christianity will be clarified, and also the particular need for an improved dialogue, in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001^[11] and various terrorist attacks in Europe. As a following issue, the transition role played by Euro-Turks on Turkey’s accession to the EU will be addressed. To fully explore the issue, the conclusions of the analysis of the social scientist Ayhan Kaya will also be considered. Subsequently, the importance of a real partnership, rather than the privileged partnership between Turkey and Europe, will be emphasised, as well as the necessity of strengthening intercultural dialogue between both participants. In the following part of the chapter, the ‘cultural-, social-, and humanitarian partnership’ between Turkey and the EU will be discussed, in the context of the ‘Barcelona Process’.^[12] In addition to this, the ‘MEDA programme’ and the ‘Euro-Mediterrranean Social, Cultural and Human Partnership’ will be considered. Following this, other cultural programs of the EU, which Turkey takes part in, will be described including the ‘Culture Programme (2007-2013)’, ‘Lifelong Learning- and Youth in Action Programme’ and ‘Education and Training 2010 Work Programme’. In the final part of the chapter, accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU in the cultural field will be explained and Turkey’s advancement in this area will be evaluated, in the light of the progress reports of the European Commission giving the reader a better understanding of Turkish-EU cultural relations. In the end, Turkey’s work in the field of culture will be reviewed, on the basis of Turkey’s 2008 National Program.

1.2. Literature Review and Methodology

The literature on the Europeanness of Turkey, which falls into the survey field of this paper, is quite comprehensive: Notable social scientists have attempted to analyse Turkey’s Europeannness: Whilst some like Hans Ulrich Wehler^[13] and Heinrich August Winkler^[14] are of the opinion that Turkey is not a European country, others argue that Turkey is part of Europe. Among those, the most popular analysts might be considered to be Günter Seufert,^[15] Heinz Kramer^[16] and Wolfgang Burgdorf.^[17] Furthermore, Günter Endruweit^[18] and Jan Cremer,^[19] who have also been working in this subject area, see Turkey as european.

Concerning the Europeanisation of Turkey, the term ‘Europeanisation’ refers, as defined by Johan P. Olsen, to ‘the export of particular political and governmental forms of Europe into non-EU countries’;^[20] in this case into Turkey. In this sense, Europeanisation looks at the relations of the European Union with Turkey.^[21]

When we consider the degree of Europeanisation in Turkey, we are speaking about a ‘transformation’ of the nation of the most fundamental kind.^[22] In this regard, Heinz-Jürgen Axt, Antonio Milososki and Oliver Schwarz characterise ‘transformation’ as a development, through which the nation state -in this context Turkey- replaces its traditional policies with those of the EU and makes significant changes that differ markedly from its former structure.^[23] The development of Europeanisation is described “as a process of diffusion”.^[24] According to Radaelli’s definition, Europeanisation consists, besides diffusion process, also of processes of construction and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures and policy paradigms of Europe which transforms the structure of the nation state being integrated into the EU.^[25] Furthermore, Ladrech sees Europeanisation as an “incremental process” of directing the domestic politics to the level that EU dynamics become both politically and economically parts of the national politics and the policy-making process.^[26] The radical reforms of the nine harmonisation packages^[27] on the way of the democratisation of Turkey could be seen as examples for those.

Regarding Turkey’s Europeanisation, accession conditionality^[28] is of vital importance, being the process through which the EU makes Turkey’s membership to the union contingent on conditions,^[29] categorised as the Copenhagen criteria, and declared annually in the Commission’s progress reports. Conditionality should in no way be regarded as “a mechanism of hierarchy” since it is quite possible for the canditate state itself to decline membership.^[30] In this respect, we can speak from “Beitrittseuropäisierung”;^[31] instead of a “Mitgliedseuropäisierung”;^[32] because of the fact that Turkey is a non-EU country with whom accession negotiations have been progressing.

Central to the scope of this master’s thesis, the most recent academic work seems to be in the 2008 published book “Türkei und europäische Identität”^[33] of Ellen Madeker. She sees European identity discursively constructed by clarifying the role of the concept ‘Identity’ on the debates about Turkey’s full-membership to the EU.^[34]

Within the body of this master’s thesis, the author will be responding to the following questions:

1)What is Europeannness?
2)Which role does ‘Christianity’, ‘Renaissance’, ‘Reform’, ‘Enlightenment’ and the ‘Jewish-Greek-Roman Antiquity’ play in the formation of Europeanness? And how much is Turkey connected to this processes?
3)What is the common European cultural heritage and does Turkey belong to it?
4)In what respects is Turkey different from the rest of the muslim countries?
5)How strong are the relationships Turkey has with the rest of Europe?
6)Are there any definite borders to the spread of civilisations; in particular, that of European civilisation and culture?
7)Should the European Union enhance its multicultural and multireligious structure by accepting Turkey as a EU member or transform itself into a Christian club in the future?

As far as the methodology is concerned, interdisciplinary academic texts are the basis of ‘this work’; which could be regarded to be politically and historically reflexive. Besides the interdisciplinary texts, some data and graphics will be used to examine the role of Euro-Turks in the course of Turkey’s integration to the EU.

2.Europeanness

2.1. Definition of Europe and Europeanness

By discussing Europeanness of Turkey, we should start with ‘the definition of Europe’ and ‘Europeanness.’ In this regard, Vergara’s statements are noteworthy:

“If a quantitive analysis were made of the most frequently reiterated concepts of the last 100 years, undoubtedly one of the most used would be the term Europe; a geopolitical, cultural and economic grouping of 10.5 million square km, 46 countries and over 250 regions with a long and extensive historical protagonism highly relevant in the present day. The so-called Old Continent forms an essential and inherent part of the universal history of culture and to some extent has dictated its rhythm and tempo. It has been one of its great inspirations and driving forces. Without Europe, this cultural progression would be difficult to understand….”^[35]

But… what exactly do we mean by ‘Europe’? Above all, it must be pointed out that defining Europe is a quite difficult and multi-faceted task. From a geographical point of view, Europe is not a clearly defined continent like Australia or Africa. Whilst Europe has naturally, occurring borders to the north, west and south formed by the North Sea, Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean, the situation in the east is more complex, as Europe and Asia are not separated by a natural geographic boundary.^[36] Politically, ‘Europe’ comprises the 27 member countries of the European Union, but it may also be used to refer to both EU and non-EU countries which together comprise the 47 countries of the Council of Europe. People in Ireland, United Kingdom, Scandinavia, the North Atlantic and Mediterranean islands can also see themselves as occupying parts of ‘continental’ or ‘mainland’ Europe.

As far as ‘Europeanness’ is concerned, from a historical and cultural point of view, the “Greek Paideia, the Roman Humanitas, the Christian Ideal, the Renaissance, Rationalism, the Enlightenment and Secularism, Liberalism, Modernism” etc. are and have been the main supranational cultural developments born out of the old continent. These have spread extensively, shaping a great part of the so-called “universal culture”.^[37] In this context, I want to mention the three main positions about Europeanness:

Historical substantialists^[38] define the term generally in a holistic way stating that the main developments in European history are the determinative factors of what it is to be considered European.^[39] In this sense, to be European, a country should have been participant in ‘Jewish-Greek-Roman Antiquity’, ‘the Renaissance’ and ‘Enlightenment’ processes and belong to ‘Christianity’.^[40] ‘Samuel Huntington, Hans Ulrich Wehler and Heinrich August Winkler’ support this view.^[41] No doubt, the EU-27 countries are members of the Christian culture and they took part in the processes I have already mentioned. However, to argue that a country which is not a part of the Christian culture can not be a member of the European Union would be a fallacious statement. Also to claim that the Abrahamic religions^[42] can not coexist would be scientifically not legitimate.

Secondly, constructivists define Europeanness in a syncretic way and argue that the criteria used by historical substantialists to define european identity were not strong enough and the arguments they put forward disprovable.^[43] They claim that all the characteristics that the substantialists use to define the european identity had been and were historically constructed.^[44] In addition, they think that the European identity and the criteria for the membership to the EU were contingent; one could formulate them voluntarily.^[45] One can elucidate the constructivist position through the argumentation of Wolfgang Burgdorf:^[46]

Burgdorf points out that the territorial borders of Europe were historically flexible and one could not derive any argument from the territorial borders of Europe. He emphasises that the reference to the Jewish-Greek-Roman Antiquity did not offer any plausible argument since the influence of the Antiquity extended into the mediterranean region; including some parts of non-EU countries like Turkey on the one hand, whilst excluding some EU member states on the other. In addition, Burgsdorf stresses that Christianity should not be used as a reference point to european identity because of the fact that Christianity emerged in the Near East; not in Europe. Burgdorf and other authors who support this view, draw the conclusion that a subtantial determination of European culture was not possible, accordingly it was a voluntaristic act to determine the borders of Europe. The ex-french foreign minister François-Poncet expressed the view that there are no compelling historical, geographical or cultural reasons through which the borders of the European Union can be defined clearly. Therefore, it remained a political decision for EU member states to determine the EU’s borders.^[47]

Lastly, the view of empirical substantialists differ from the constructivists view in a way that it assumes that there were substantial values that are constitutive for the European Union.^[48]

Distinct from ‘historical substantialists’, ‘empirical substantialists’ do not determine European values; rather they seek to transform the normative question into the empirical one by asking which values the EU-member states themselves consider to be relevant. In paragraph 1a of the Lisbon Treaty these values are identified as follows:

“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’.^[49]

Also in ‘Article I-1 of the failed Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’^[50] the EU was declared to be “open to all european states which respect” these “values”.^[51] Despite the failure of this Treaty, the main logic behind this article still exists within the framework of the European Union; the EU still does not define itself officially through a common religion^[52], ethnology, language or a determined territorial border. In this regard, it is a pluralistic community representing a unity of diversity in the sense of the many different traditions and languages that coexist in harmony within its boundaries. In accordance with this principle, the European Union promotes the diversity of its cultures while bringing the European common cultural heritage to the fore.^[53] Furthermore, it respects fundamental rights which were guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.^[54]

The legal status of the values, set down in the Lisbon Treaty, are enshrined in European Law which is legally binding on all EU countries. The Treaties of the EU as part of the primary law are signed by the EU-member states whose governments are elected by their European citizens. When we take this point into consideration, we can argue that the value system^[55] of the EU is democratically legitimate. No doubt, any democratic country within Europe sharing these legitimate values can potentially become an EU member dependant on a political decision of the EU.

2.2.European Identity in Connection with European Culture and Its Problem Fields

Having mentioned the definitions of Europeanness, I want to now concentrate on European identity, within the context of constructivism, arguing that European identity has been and still is a construct.

Before addressing this issue, it is important to know what it is meant by ‘European identity’. So far, the identity of the European Union has been largely defined politically but there is a continious debate about what it actually is: Is it a condition or a developing process? Karin Winkler illustrates the dilemma about defining European identity as follows:

“‘Identität’ und ‘Europas’ sind zwei Begriffe, die einzeln oder gar in Kombination schwer zu fassen sind. Verstehen manche unter “Identität” womöglich einen Zustand der gemeinsamen Gefühle verschiedener Personen, so bliebe selbst hier die Frage offen, ob diese nun bereits vorhanden oder erst geschaffen werden müssen.”^[56]

By analysing the European identity, I want now to touch upon the main difficulties we face:

First of all, it must be noted that the concept of a collective identity seems problematic.^[57] In recent times the origins of collective identities experienced a process of deconstruction.^[58] In reality, in contrast to the essentialist view of the earlier periods, it is now argued rather that their essential feautures only exist in abstract theories and that these theories themselves are compromised by self-interest, being held by some critics to be nothing more than myths.^[59]

Secondly, a single unified identity for Europe does not represent a substantial reality. On the contrary, as Mole points out in his work “Discursive Constructions of Identity in European Politics”, “the formation of different constructions, representations and images of Europe” are investigated “in particular, political, historical and cultural contexts”, thereby being seen as the primary concern.^[60] It is obvious that EU citizens recognise many different regional, local, national and European identities and these identities are continuously re-negotiated and co-constructed by different elites and social groups, based on their everyday experiences.^[61]

Surveys also show that the citizens’ attachment to the EU (48 per cent) is lower than to the village they live in (85 per cent), or the region (87 per cent) or their home country (88 per cent).^[62] This implies that there is a lack of connection with Europe among European citizens.^[63] Furthermore, the rhetoric of the institutions about the need for a European identity, has not escaped deconstruction and has been described as “a European mystique in order to galvanize popular support”^[64] or as “an attempt to create a single, binding European cultural identity from above.”^[65] This may be considered as an extreme criticism even though the institutions promoting this identity seemed to do so in order to benefit from it and even they were unable to accurately define this identity or culture. The document from the Copenhagen Summit devoted to European identity mentions the common heritage, albeit it has no reference to cultural factors.^[66]

In the context of European identity cultural factors are very important. The European Union is not a society, but a sui generis^[67] political entity, a union of different countries that consist of different societies. For that reason we can not speak of a certain culture in the strict sense. We should rather think of a cultural area, in this case Christian-occidental that can not and must not be connected to a particular social system, ie., a society.^[68]

We would also have to discover which of the apparently common roots and their continuity still exist. In this sense, it can be asked for instance whether the Nazi regime in Germany was a part or an intermission of that tradition.^[69]

In the context of Mole’s “discourse-historical approach”, “a context-dependent negotiation of identities has to be assumed, which is discursively co-constructed in interactions .”^[70] When we take this point into consideration, we must think how the shifting borders, ideologies, languages, language conflicts and actual laws determine and restrict the possibilities of participation and access of European citizens. Thus, certain values must be invented to provide the cohesion necessary to foster the legitimacy of the EU.

Furthermore, the Declaration on European Identity that was approved in Copenhagen in 1973^[71] emphasises dangers implicit in fixing the concept of European cultural identity to the idea of a united Europe and its reality. No doubt, there still exist connections between the two, however, both of these are in a relative manner independent of the other.^[72] The subject of a united Europe is valid in the political, social, economic, and cultural fields whilst identity concerns a field that is at the same time both wider and narrower.^[73] As pointed out in Pagden’s book: “Identity moves from everyday life in its material and emotional aspects to ‘high’ and ‘low’ cultural forms of the elites and the masses….”^[74]

It must also be noted that in the European Union there is “regressive nationalism and regionalism”^[75] that are anti-European in nature, as the debates over the failed European Constitution^[76] and the Maastricht Treaty illustrate. Without any doubt, we find also “the projection of all kinds of regional and national aspirations”^[77] in the EU, even “regressive Europeanism trying to protect old values from new barbarism and very active regional and parochial movements hoping, through Europe, to escape from the constraints of national cohesion into a kind of post-modern dynamism.”^[78] All of these imply that European Project can be perceived both as “a danger and as a hope”.^[79]

When we compare the afore-mentioned movements and debates on national and regional identity in several EU countries we come to the conclusion that “national identity”; the main concept of the 19th century, is again becoming an issue in the social sciences.^[80]

In his work Picht advises that “Europeans behave in a desperately similar way even in their search for particularity”.^[81] According to him, declared identities and their rituals are a “projection of conscious and unconscious psychological and social needs”.^[82] He sees them as “arguments and incantations aimed at proving something” and concealing “underlying desires and weaknesses”.^[83] He deduces that “ideological debates on identity and ostentatious idiosyncracies”^[84] were not most revealing in their declared value, on the contrary, they were most revealing as “indicators of the unexpressed, the hidden, the unconscious.”^[85] Their deeper truth would appear in their untruthfullness.^[86]

In the context of European philosophical tradition, identity is accepted as a key problem of epistemology: In Hegel’s dialectics the ‘non-identical elements’ put history on the move which even Fukuyama was not be able to stop.^[87] Also Adorno declared in his negative dialectics specifically, that the non-identical forces disturb any finality, and Edgar Morin that the dialectical complexity affects the concept of nature.^[88] Attention must also be paid to the fact that in the scientific context no simple, reliable identity exists.^[89]

As Passerini highlights, it is believed by some authors that “no sentiment of European identity is in line with the modernisation of continental affairs”^[90] - a standpoint ostensibly confirmed by the fact that European studies have only a marginal presence in school curricula.^[91] According to others, the European consciousness disproves every genuine universalism, it is seen as “a form of group partiality, a kind of nationalism on a vast scale that includes some and excludes others”.^[92] All these expressed views imply that it is impossible to develop a European identity having the same degree of emotional impact as that achieved by existing national identities.^[93]

It can also be stated that the political objectives engendered in the construction of the European Union remain an issue of continuous dispute between the EU countries; there is very little consensus about the future of Europe on an official level. So far, there is no agreed policy even on enlargement, but only on case-related accession politics. For our subject matter ‘European Identity’, it means, that the European Project is not well defined. It is, in an administrative sense, in suspense.^[94]

The European Identity is, as Heinz Kramer and Dieter Oberndörfer amongst others highlight, a mental construction like the phenomenon of national identity.^[95] Research on multiethnic nations/states shows that there can be both disparate and conflicting identities and aspirations contributing to the development of a certain accordant polity.^[96] But guidelines for a European identity construction can not be deduced from this. Specifically, there are nations, where religion, and cultural history etc. have a significant impact, or at least, have had such an impact for a period. Other constructions of nationhood get along, however, without these positive influences. In addition, according to Cremer, it is unclear whether a political union consisting of several national identities would require a pure, overarching identity.^[97]

In this regard, Banus’s analysis about the European identity and culture could be seen as a main criticism to Cremer’s view when we think about the need for a common European identity:

No doubt, “a sense of community”^[98] is necessary for integration. In his work “Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity” Enrique Banus states, in the light of the “Tindemans Report”, that a “progress in political integration” would be inconceivable without European identity. This important report confirms this by stating that “Europe can not proceed to a greater degree of political integration without the underlying structure of a

unifying European identity.”^[99] Banus uses also the ‘Commission document of 1987’^[100] to highlight the importance of cultural belonging as a prior condition for the Internal Market which is “the core of the new political entity”. Also ‘the Opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 13 March 1998’^[101] expressed that: “Only by strengthening cultural citizenship will it be possible to consolidate the Union and build external relations on a lasting basis.”^[102] This particular document was approved by the foreign ministers of the European countries after a summit meeting which considered the European identity.^[103] There is a common acceptance, of course, that ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ are interlinked terms and cultural elements are a part of identity,^[104] as confirmed by Banus in the light of these official documents. It must be also stated that an identity (European identity) is an essential part of a political entity (the European Union), and culture is a “way of expressing or acquiring this identity.”^[105]

As Endruweit states in his work :“A culture of the European Union could empirically only be defined as those elements of culture that are common to the societies of all EU member states.”^[106] However, those elements do not exist in reality when we consider that Europe consists of a variety of historical traditions, different nation states with their own histories, different languages, different political, national, regional and local interests and traditional ideologies, different interest groups and so on. Of course, there are some unifying characteristics of the European civilisation. The US-American politologist Samuel Huntington specifies these characteristics in his work ‘Clash of Civilizations’ in the chapter on ‘The West and the Modernisation’ as follows:

1)Classical heritage
2)Catholicism and Protestantism
3)European linguistical diversity
4)The separation of sacred and secular powers
5)The rule of law
6)Social Pluralism
7)The representative institutions
8)Individualism.^[107]

Huntington doubtless thinks that these characteristics are specific to European history. However, his view has been criticised by many European thinkers arguing that such characteristics are no longer typical european domains and do not form the basis of European cultural identity.^[108] As Irene Agata Szyszko quotes in her book “Europa, Identität, Kultur” from D. Pack, the power of the European culture lies on its differentation: ‘A typical European phenomena, admired and accepted throughout the world does not exist in fact. It is rather the diversity^[109] of that which Europe has created in its national and regional culture: in music, in art, in literature, in its languages. The language and culture could frequently not be ascribed to a particular group or geographical territory.’^[110] In this regard, it should be emphasised that “it is the cultural dimension that offers the most visible heterogeneity.”^[111]

It is appropriate here to quote from Jan Suc:

“Eine wesentliche kulturelle Eigentümlichkeit Europas ist doch zweifellos eine grosse kulturelle und Traditionsvielfalt. Im Zusammenhang damit ist es sehr zweifelhaft, ob Europas Integration den Weg beitritt, jene Unterschiede auszugleichen. In vielen Fällen wird sie selbstverständlich dazu beitragen, europäische Länder zu standardisieren, jedoch in vielen anderen wird sie sicherlich neue Formen der Andersartigkeit entstehen lassen.”^[112]

Also the European Commission highlights the importance of diversity within Europe stating that “Europe’s cultural richness is represented by its diversity”^[113] and the Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs referring to “a richness born of diversity”.^[114]

Lastly, the mental construction of the European identity is not a static condition; it is a dynamic process. The contents and stresses on this identity alter over time since the political union has been enlarging. In spite of these process-related characteristics, the elements of the European Identity is perceived by European citizens in several ways: Europe as a definitive geographical place on the one hand, as an eccentric, but not topographic bordered field on the other; Europe as a ‘historical memory- and destiny community’^[115] on the one hand, Europe as a shelter of democracy and human rights on the other; Europe as a place of social market economy; as well as Europe as inheritor of the antiquity and the christian occident.^[116] But none of these elements seem to belong solely to Europe. As some of these elements become of less importance, others become of greater importance in the mind of the European citizen.^[117] Thus, the European identity can be described as a permanent self-discovery process. Europe needs others; the aliens, as was the case in the 18th and 19th centuries, in order for it to be able to define itself.^[118]

Having described the problem areas of European identity in connection with European culture, I want now to touch upon the distinctive elements of European culture:

One of the most important distinctive elements of European culture is ‘religion’. Within the analysed aspect it is though an ambivalent factor. The fact that the average European is Christian, indicates that christian values forming the christian consciousness, are part of European identity.^[119] However, the fact that Europe is,-despite some broader ecumenical tendencies,- still subdivided into three separate denominations (namely into catholic, orthodox and evangelical denominations) can be regarded as a disintegrating factor.^[120] Another fact in this vein is the existence of adherents of the other religions (in particular of Judaism and Islam), different sects, cults and new religious movements, as well as of religious agnostics and irreligious people (atheists) among the residents of Europe.^[121]

The second significant element that forms European culture is the concept of ‘ethics’. Its close interrelation with ‘religion’ confirms that ‘ethics’ is constitutive for European identity, due to its close connection to Humanism and human rights.^[122] Even Humanism and Liberalism can constitute, within the scope of “human rights”,^[123] an essential cultural component of European identity (they also exist within the framework of identity sentiment of the American people).^[124] Herewith, the problem of democracy and Liberalism (as doctrines that disperse the notion of the free market economy in the economic level) coalesce, whereby the domain of economics play a significant role, as a domain which the European identity is not directly expressed in, but in which it can find its essential basis.^[125]

If we examine the domain of culture, we observe that such essential elements of the symbolic culture as ‘Science, Literature and Art’ form part of basic factors which integrate people and take their part in the formation process of the European identity among other factors.^[126]

Another essential element forming European identity is the ‘language’.^[127] In Europe there are numerous official national languages being spoken among over 500 million people.^[128] Among them “English, French and German” are categorised as “congress languages” and “Spanish and Russian” as “part-congress languages”.^[129] Although “English” dominates other languages, the conviction that all Europeans will speak one language (namely English) in the future can be regarded as utopistic. In this sense, the competition between languages (and the competititon of cultures in general) leads to a conflict of how the European identity should be: english, french, german or something else. In any event, the ‘European Tower of Babel’^[130] is an essential factor that hinders the sentiment of a common

identity for Europeans.^[131]

Though one should bear in mind that for communities throughout Europe, cultural differences and richness, are so underpinned by the difference- and richness of languages being spoken, that the renunciation of these would not seem to be an aim worth being implemented.^[132] In this sense, Jan Suc could be criticised: It is very likely, says Jan Suc, that one of the ethnic languages (for example English) would become the sole language of congress eventually and that the remaning ethnic languages would solely undertake the function of communication enabling the continued development of national cultures.^[133]

The sentiment of European identity can not be considered as a factor that divides Europe from the rest of the world. This would allow neither the economic globalisation process nor the speedily developing world system of information. Economics and Information are the factors which form the basis of the identity of the third degree; the general humane identity. In connection with this, the European integration refers to a step towards the general world integration and the European identity towards the common world identity.^[134]

2.3.Inclusion, Exclusion and Multiple Identities

The membership category of “being European” is discursively co-constructed and covers the mem-

ber states of the EU; thus spatial borders are

drawn and the meta-distinction of “inclusion/

exclusion” is operating.^[135]

The development of a character or an identity is built on a wide range of factors including ‘equality, similarity and differences’ of many kinds. Such categorisations, and thus the perceptions based on them, stem from a rich variety of influences including long standing traditional allegiances. Likewise disussions and debates within the EU are often influenced by the dichotomizing categories; between Europe on the one hand, and Japan and the USA on the other; between the candidate countries and member states; between the core and periphery; between North and South, small and big, poor and rich countries; between members and non-members of the Schengen Agreement; between Euro-countries and those countries that do not take part in the monetary union; and between NATO-members and those that are not.^[136] Today discourses about the role of Islam have become prevalent. The debates about the potential membership of Turkey to the EU show the influence of such attributes.^[137]

Notable sociologists have for some years hypothesised theoretically on the phenomenon of inclusion and exclusion. Niklas Lukman (1997)^[138] argues, for instance, that social sciences lack a differentiated discription and analysis of the processes of inclusion and exclusion.^[139] He defines inclusion and exclusion as a ‘meta-distinction’: Certain social groups live “parallel lives”; so, social exclusion is not specific to certain social groups; it transcends the differentiation of the modern community, in the same way as the traditional values of justice and democracy.^[140]

Luhman explains the dilemma of ‘inclusion and exclusion’ in his work “Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft” as follows:

“Das reichlich verfügbare Material legt den Schluss nahe, dass die Variable Inklusion/Exklusion in manchen Regionen des Erdballs drauf und dran [is]t, in die Rolle einer Metadifferenz einzurücken und die Codes der Funktionssysteme zu mediatiseren. Ob die Unterscheidung von Recht und Unrecht überhaupt zum Zuge kommt und ob sie nach rechtssysteminternen Programmen behandelt wird, hängt dann in erster Linie von einer vorgängigen Filterung durch Inklusion/Exklusion ab…”^[141]

Exclusion means, having no access to essential information needed for participation, or citizenship, education, mass media, acquisition of language, work, residence and so on.^[142]

Elite groups justify and legitimise such exclusion in different ways: In each case they refer to gender, status, ethnic affiliation, culture or education. Nationalities and passports for example are a means of relevant exclusion for Europe through which the territorial mobility is selectively permitted or prevented.^[143]

At this point it must be emphasised that ‘inclusion and exclusion’ can in no way be regarded as a static phenomenon: Who is today excluded, can be tomorrow included and vice versa. Generally, it does not depend on particular individuals to redefine their affiliations. As the debates about the absorption of EU-candidate countries into the union show, the processes and conditions are negotiated at an institutional level. Important “gate keepers” determine who (which country) to include. The application of new laws and new ideologies effectively form new borders.^[144]

Passerini applies the concepts ‘inclusion and exclusion’ to European identity in the following way:

“European identity has long included hierarchies and exclusions-a ‘Europe-Europe’ and a ‘lesser Europe’. Although in the last few decades the conviction that the center and periphery are now everywhere has become stronger, for many the sense of not forming a full part of Europe is still marked. This sensation can be linked to the difficulties of participating in the European Union, a participation that is rendered problematic by, for example, monetary unification…”^[145]

In the context of feminist tradition, Rosi Braidotti has written that European identity has always been “a notion fraught with contradictions” and has “never been One”.^[146] Surely, “its alleged unity was at best a poor fiction”.^[147] According to her, Europe positioned itself in the centre “during the course of history”; not only of the “world economy” but also of “thought, knowledge and science”.^[148] One could infer from her statement that other world orders are viewed as being peripheral and of less significance, thinking at a “symbolic and discursive level”.^[149] Braidotti defines Europeanness as being “not the triumphant assumption of a sovereign identity but rather the disenchanting experience of disidentifying” oneself “with sovereignty all together.”^[150] In her imagination, Europe, to which she belongs is, “the place of possible forms of resistance to the systematic devaluation” of the other world orders and to the destructive conflicts to which this would lead.^[151]

The concept of ‘multiple identities’ could force and transcend the dichotomisation of ‘inclusion and exclusion’: If one- possesses multiple affiliations, speaks multiple languages, belongs to many different groups, then the strict and restrictive dichotomisations lose their

influence. This means, that we all-depending on the context- can and must select from a broadly based reservoir of identities. Inherent in this process are certain loyality conflicts during priority setting; both at collective and individual levels.^[152]

Such a conception matches the hybrid and dynamic character of the EU; because of the incremental ambiguity of time-, space- and marginal concepts, the supranational new borders must be and are created and the groups’ definitions prevail. Identities are negotiated context-dependently and formed collectively in interactions (“Co-construction”); this is taken up seriously very well through the analysis of focus group-discussions.^[153] Identities are, though, also ascribed and assigned through hierarchical and institutional power. The free space of strategic and requirement-tailored options are contingent on positions and contexts. In this respect, the social affiliation is only partially eligible; borders, ideologies, languages and laws determine and restrict here the possibility of participation, as, for instance, the debates in autumn 2002 about the application of the new law on asylum in single member states of the EU and the whole EU level show plainly.^[154] Hence, the concept of multiple identities must be differentiated through a communicative context-concept which is still considered to be too vague in many fields of linguistics.^[155]

This view seems to have influenced the “White Paper on European Governance” (July 2001), in which ‘inclusive society’ is mentioned^[156]. This term is used also in another documents, for example, in the “Report on Education from the Portuguese Presidency” (2001) and in the “White Book on the Cognitive Society” (September 2001).^[157] In these documents, the ‘openness’ of the European Community is declared as one of its primary objectives.^[158]

[...]

---

^[1] This way of Europeanness is regarded as ‘the holistic definition of Europeanness’. See:

Ayhan Kaya&Ferhat Kentel, “Euro-Türkler. Türkiye ile Avrupa Birliği Arasında Köprü mü, Engel mi?”(Euro-Turks. A Bridge between Turkey and the EU or a barrier?), as supported by Heinrich Böll Foundation, İstanbul Bilgi University (ed.), İstanbul, 2005, p.107.

^[2] The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States. See: European Parliament. Treaty on European Union (consolidated version), Article 6 (1), available at:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/20000222/libe/art6/default_en.htm (last accessed on 26.01.2009).

^[3] Kaya&Kentel, ibid.:pp.107-108.

^[4] European Commission, Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, “Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?”, Brussels, September 2004, p.14, available at: http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/english.pdf (last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[5] ibid.:p.14.

^[6] See: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/064/2000/en/dom-EUR440642000en.pdf

(last accessed on 26.11.2008).

^[7] Commission Staff Working Document. Turkey 2006 Progress Report, COM/2006/0649 final, SEC (2006) 1390, Brussels, 8.11.2006, pp.14-15, available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/tr_sec_1390_en.pdf

(last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[8] See: European Commission. Enlargement, “How does a country join the EU?”, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/negotiations_croatia_turkey/index_en.htm#5 (last accessed on 25.02.2009).

Accession negotiations with Turkey has been carried out not in all 35 chapters of the acquis, but in the first 33 chapters. The 34. and 35. chapters, namely ‘Institutions’ and ‘Other Issues’ are out of the negotiation process. See: Secretariat General for EU Affairs, “Accession Negotiations”, available at:

http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=37&l=2 (last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[9] Günter Endruweit, “Turkey and the European Union: A Question of Cultural Difference?”, in: Nezihi Çakar (ed.), Perceptions. A Strategic Overview of Turkey, Journal of International Affairs, Volume III. Number 2, İstanbul, June-August 1998, p.59.

^[10] Ercan Haytoğlu, “Türkiye’de Demokratikleşme Süreci ve 1945’te Çok Partili Siyasî Hayata Geçişin Nedenleri (1908-1945)” (The Process of Democracy and the Reasons of Transition to Multi-Party System in Turkey ), PAÜ. Eğilim Fak. Derg. 1997. Sayı:3, p.46, available at: http://egitimdergi.pamukkale.edu.tr/makale/say%C4%B13/4-T%C3%9CRK%C4%B0YE.pdf (last accessed on 25.01.2009).

^[11] September 11 news.com (ed.), “The Archives of Global Change in the 21st Century”, http://www.september11news.com (last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[12] European Commission. External Relations, “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm (last accessed on 25.02.2009) See also: Official Site of the EU, Europa Glossary, “Barcelona Process”, available at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/barcelona_process_en.htm (last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[13] Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Verblendetes Harakiri: Die Türkei-Beitritt zerstört die EU”, in: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (Hrsg.), Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 33-34, Bonn, 2004, pp.6-8.

See also: Hans Ulrich Wehler, “Die türkische Frage. Europas Bürger müssen entscheiden”, in: Claus Leggewie (Hrsg.), Die Türkei und Europa, edition Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 2004, pp. 57-69.

^[14] Heinrich August Winkler, “Soll Europa künftig an den Irak grenzen?”, in: Claus Leggewie (Hrsg.), Die Türkei und Europa, edition Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 2004, pp.271-273.

^[15] Günter Seufert, “Keine Angst vor den Türken!” in: Claus Leggewie, Die Türkei und Europa, edition Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 2004, pp.70-75.

^[16] Heinz Kramer, “Die Türkei: EU-kompatibel oder nicht? Zur Debatte um die Mitgliedschaft der Türkei in der Europäischen Union”, in: Niedersächsische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung (Hrsg.), Informativ und Aktuell, Hannover, 2004, available at: http://www.nibis.de/nli1/rechtsx/nlpb/pdf/Europa/Tuerkei_09-04.pdf (last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[17] Wolfgang Burgdorf, “Die europäische Antwort. Wir sind der Türkei verpflichtet”, in: Claus Leggewie, Die Türkei und Europa, edition Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 2004, pp. 80-84.

^[18] Endruweit, 1998, pp.54-72.

^[19] Jan Cremer, “Die Türkei und die europäische Identität”, in: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (Hrsg.), Türkei und EU. Debatte 2004, 17. September 2004, available at:

http://www.bpb.de/themen/C7YEJL,0,Die%20T%FCrkei%20und%20die%20europ%E4ische%20Identit%E4t.html (last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[20] Johan P. Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanization”, ARENA Working Papers, WP 01/02, 2002, pp.2-3, available at: http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp02_2.htm (last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[21] ibid. Johan P. Olsen speaks generally from the relations of the EU with non EU-actors. Because of the survey field is about Turkey and Turkey is still not an EU member, Turkey-EU relations had been mentioned.

^[22] Heinz-Jürgen Axt&Antonio Milososki&Oliver Schwarz, “Europäisierung-ein weites Feld. Literaturbericht und Forschungsfragen”, VS Verlag, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 48. Jg., Heft 1, 2007, p. 140, available at:

http://www.springerlink.com/content/6p32939t8381572g/fulltext.pdf (last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[23] ibid.:p.140.

^[24] Olsen, ibid.:p.3.

^[25] Axt&Milososki&Schwarz, ibid.:p.138.

^[26] Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France”, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 1, 1994, p.69.

^[27] These harmonisation packages will be handled in chapter 3 under the title ‘Reforms after the Helsinki Phase (1999-2009)’.

^[28] Originally, it refers to “Beitrittskonditionalität”. See: Axt&Milososki&Schwarz, ibid.:p.142.

^[29] See: ibid.:p.142.

^[30] Tanja A. Börzel& Sonja Guttenbrunner&Simone Seper, “Conceptualizing New Modes of Governance in EU-Enlargement”, Berlin, 2004, available at:

http://www.eu-newgov.org/database/DELIV/D12D01_Conceptualizing_NMG_in_EU-Enlargement.PDF

(last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[31] See: Axt&Milososki&Schwarz, 2007, pp.142-143. According to Grabbe, those countries which are europeanized as non EU members, “are only consumers, not producers, of the outcomes of the EU’s policy making processes.” See: Heather Grabbe, “Europeanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process”, in: Kevin Heatherstone&Claudio M. Radaelli (Hrsg.), The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford, 2003, p.313.

^[32] See: Axt&Milososki&Schwarz, ibid.:pp.143-144.

^[33] Ellen Madeker, “Türkei und europäische Identität. Eine wissenssoziologische Analyse der Debatte um den EU-Beitritt”, VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2008.

^[34] ibid.:p.14.

^[35] Javier Vergara, “The History of Europe and its constituent Countries: considerations in favour of the new Europe”, Journal of Social Science Education, Volume 6, Number 1, Madrid, June 2007, p.15, available at:

http://www.jsse.org/2007-1/pdf/vergara_history.pdf (last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[36] Berit Rinke, “Gehört die Türkei zu Europa?”, University of Oldenburg. POLITIS-Working paper No.5, Oldenburg, 2006, p.9, available at: http://www.politis-europe.uni-oldenburg.de/download/WP5_Rinke_Turkey2006fin.pdf (last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[37] Vergara, 2007, p.15.

^[38] Gerhards characterises historical substantialists as follows:

“Als historische Substantialisten bezeichnen wir diejenigen Autoren, die inhaltliche Merkmale der kulturellen Besonderheit Europas meist mit Bezug auf die Geschichte definieren und begründen und entlang dieser Merkmale Mitgliedsschaftskriterien für die EU definieren.” See: Jürgen Gerhards, “Kulturelle Unterschiede in der Europäischen Union. Ein Vergleich zwischen Mitgliedsländern, Beitrittskandidaten und der Türkei”, 1. Auflage, VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2005, p.27.

^[39] ibid.:p.27.

^[40] ibid.:p.27.

^[41] ibid.:p.27.

^[42] In the study of comparative religion, an Abrahamic religion is any of those religions deriving from a common

ancient Semitic tradition and traced by their adherents to Abraham ("Father/Leader of many" Hebrew אַבְרָהָם Arabic ابراهيم), a patriarch whose life is narrated in the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament, and as a prophet in the

Qur'an. This forms a large group of related, largely monotheistic religions, generally held to include Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and the Bahá'í Faith (based upon Islam), and comprises about half of the world's religious adherents. See: Theological Dictionary word of the day, “Abrahamic religion”, March 04, 2008, available at:

http://tdwotd.blogspot.com/2008/03/abrahamic-religion.html (last accessed on 16.02.2008).

^[43] Gerhards, ibid.:p.28.

^[44] ibid.:p.28.

^[45] Gerhards, 2005, p.28.

^[46] Burgdorf, 2004, pp.80-84.

^[47] “Es gibt keine zwingenden historischen, geographischen oder kulturellen Gründe mit denen die Grenzen der Europäischen Union eindeutig bestimmt werden könnten. Die Geschichte nimmt uns die politische Entscheidung nicht ab” See: Burgdorf, ibid.;p.84.

^[48] Gerhards, ibid.;p.29.

^[49] Amendments to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Official Journal of the European Union, C 306/11, 17.12.2007, p.11, available at:

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0010:0041:EN:PDF

(last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[50] Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Part 1, Article I-1, Official Journal of the European Union, C 310/11, 16.12.2004, p.11, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:0011:0040:EN:PDF (last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[51] ibid.;p.11.

^[52] In this respect, Bassam Tibi states: “Von der Karolinger-Zeit bis zur Renaissance war das westlich-lateinische Christentum die Grundlage dieser Kultur. Aber seit der Renaissance und der Aufklärung hat sich Europa dermassen verändert, dass seine Identität, primär nicht mehr christlich-abendländisch, sondern in der Substanz westlich-sekulär geworden ist” See: Bassam Tibi, “Mit dem Kopftuch nach Europa? Die Türkei auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union”, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 2005, p.29.

^[53] Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Title XII, Culture, Article 151(1), available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/C_2002325EN.003301.html

(last accesed on 25.02.2009).

^[54] Council of Europe, “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11 with Protocol Nos. 1, 4, 6,7 and 12, Section 1-Rights and Freedoms, pp.3-9, available at:

http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-dc13-4318-b457-5c9014916d7a/0/englishanglais.pdf

(last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[55] In this context, value system means ‘die Werteordnung’.

^[56] Karin Winkler, “1. Europäische Identität: Ein Konstrukt?”, in: Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg (Hrsg.), Deutschland&Europa. Europäische Identität, Heft 52, Stuttgart, 2006, p.10, available at: www.deutschlandundeuropa.de/52_06/europäischeidentität.pdf (last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[57] Csaba Szalo, “European Identity, Nationalism and the Dynamics of Identity Construction”, in: Csaba Szalo (ed.), On European Identity, Nationalism, Culture and History, Brno: Masaryk University, 1998. Cited by: Enrique Banus, “Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity”, in: Mary Farrell&Stefano Fella&Michael Newman (eds), European Integration in the 21st century. Unity in Diversity?, SAGE Publications, London. Thousand Oaks. New Delhi, 2002, p.165.

^[58] Banus, ibid.;p.165.

^[59] ibid.:p.165.

^[60] Ruth Wodak, “‘Doing Europe’: the Discursive Construction of European Identities”, in: Richard C. M. Mole (ed.), Discursive Constructions of Identity in European Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, p.74.

^[61] ibid.:p.74.

^[62] Karlheinz Reif, “Cultural Convergence and Cultural Identity as Factors in European Identity” in: Soledad Garcia (ed.), Europan Identity and the Search for Legitimacy, Pinter Publishers, London, 1993. Cited by: Banus, 2002, pp.166-167.

^[63] Banus, ibid.;p.166.

^[64] ibid.:p.166.

^[65] Mary Fulbrook, “National Histories and European History”, UCL Press, London, 1993, p.266. Cited by: Banus, ibid.;p.166.

^[66] Banus, ibid.;p.166: The term “diversity of cultures” is here an exception and will be handled detailed on p.22.

^[67] The EU is a unique political body, as a mixture of intergovernmental and supranational elements. It is neither a federation nor a confederation and has a structure of its own kind. As a result, it is a sui generis geopolitical entity.

^[68] Endruweit, 1998, pp. 56-57.

^[69] ibid.:p.57.

^[70] Wodak, 2007, p.74.

^[71] Declaration on European Identity, in: Bulletin EC 12, 1973, pp.118-122. Cited by: Luisa Passerini, “From the Ironies of Identity to the Identities of Irony”, in: Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Idea of Europe. From Antiquity to the European Union, Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.194.

^[72] ibid.:p.195.

^[73] ibid.:p.195.

^[74] ibid.:p.195.

^[75] Robert Picht, “Disturbed Identities: Social and Cultural Mutations in Contemporary Europe” in: Soledad Garcia (ed.), European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy, the Eleni Nakou Foundation&the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London&New York, 1993, p.82.

^[76] The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), also known as the European Constitution, was signed in October 2004. Following the rejection of the European Constitution by France and the Netherlands in 2005 and a two year period of reflection, on the 23rd of June 2007 the EU leaders agreed on a detailed mandate for a new Intergovernmental Conference. The task of this Intergovernmental Conference was to draw up a Reform Treaty by the end of 2007. On the 19th of October 2007, the informal European Council in Lisbon adopted the final text of the Treaty, as drawn up by the IGC. The Heads of State and Government of the 27 Member States of the European Union signed the Treaty of Lisbon on the 13th of December 2007. See: Official Site of the EU, Institutional Reform of the European Union. “The main stages in the institutional reform of the European Union”, available at: http://europa.eu/institutional_reform/index_en.htm (last accessed on 25.02.2009). For the whole text of the failed Treaty see: Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Official Publications of the European Communities, Belgium, 2005, pp.1-485, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/09_01_05_constitution.pdf (last accessed on 25.02.2009).

^[77] Picht, ibid.:p.82.

^[78] ibid.:p.82.

^[79] ibid.:p.82.

^[80] Picht, 1993, p.82.

^[81] ibid.:p.83.

^[82] ibid.:p.83.

^[83] ibid.:p.83.

^[84] ibid.:p.83.

^[85] ibid.: p.83.

^[86] ibid.:p.83.

^[87] ibid.:p.83.

^[88] ibid.:p.83.

^[89] ibid.:p.83.

^[90] Passerini, 2002, p. 199.

^[91] Sven Papcke, “Who Needs European Identity and What Could It Be?”, in: Brian Nelson, David Roberts, and Walter Veit (eds), The Idea of Europe, Oxford University Press, Berg, 1992, pp.61-74. Cited by: Passerini, ibid.: p.199.

^[92] Passerini, ibid.:p.199.

^[93] Passerini, 2002, p.200.

^[94] Cremer, 2004, (no page number available).

^[95] ibid.

^[96] ibid.

^[97] ibid.

^[98] Reif, 1993, p.132.

^[99] Banus, 2002, p.159.

^[100] Document COM (87) 603, p.5. Cited by: Banus, ibid.:p.159.

^[101] Banus, 2002, p.159.

^[102] ibid.:p. 159.

^[103] ibid.:p.159.

^[104] ibid.:p.159.

^[105] ibid.:p.159.

^[106] Endruweit, 1998, p.57.

^[107] Samuel P. Huntington, “Der Kampf der Kulturen. Die Neugestaltung der Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert”, München, 1998, p.99.

^[108] Irene Agata Szyszko, “Europa-Identität-Kultur”, Heiner Timmermann (Hrsg.), LIT Verlag, Münster, 2005, p. 27.

^[109] Diversity is defined in a positive way, as a richness of cultures, traditions and languages, not as something negative, as it is perceived in the everyday experiences of migrants. See: Wodak, 2007, p.79.

^[110] Pack states: “Die Stärke der europäischen Kultur liegt begründet in ihrer Differenzierung: Es ist nicht das typisch Europäische, das überall in der Welt Anerkennung und Bewunderung findet, es ist die Vielfalt dessen, was Europa in seiner nationalen und regionalen Kultur hervorgebracht hat: In der Musik, in der Kunst, in der Literatur, in seinen Sprachen. Die Stärke der europäischen Kultur liegt aber auch begründet in ihrer Integrationsfähigkeit: Sprache und Kultur beschränken sich nämlich sehr häufig nicht auf eine Gruppe oder ein geographisches Gebiet.”. See: Szyszko, ibid.:p.27.

^[111] Reif, 1993, p. 132.

^[112] Jan Suc, “Aspekte der europäischen Integration und das Identitätsgefühl des Europärs” in: Janusz Wisniewski&Cezary Koscielniak (Hrsg.), Ist die Identität Europas möglich?, Logos Verlag, Berlin, 2003, p.100.

^[113] From the ‘Conditions for participating in the Platform Europe award scheme by the Commission of the European Communities’ (O J C 167 from 10.7.1990, p.2). Cited by: Banus, 2002, p.164.

^[114] Resolution of 13 June 1985 concerning the annual event ‘European City of Culture’ (O J C 153 from 22.6.1985, p.2.). Cited by: Banus, ibid.:p.164.

^[115] It means ‘historische Erinnerungs- und Schicksalgemeinschaft’ in German. See: Claus Leggewie, “Die Türkei in die Europäische Union? Zu den Positionen einer Debatte”, in: Claus Leggewie (Hrsg.), Die Türkei und Europa. Die Positionen, edition suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 2004, pp.13-14.

^[116] Leggewie, 2004, pp.13-14.

^[117] Cremer, 2004, (no page number available).

^[118] ibid.

^[119] Suc, 2003, p. 100.

^[120] ibid.:p.100.

^[121] ibid.:pp.100-101.

^[122] ibid.:p.101.

^[123] In this context the term “human rights” is regarded as a doctrine. It refers to the basic rights and freedoms to which all humans are entitled, often held to include the right to life and liberty, freedom of thought and expression, and equality before the law. For more information about “human rights” see:

Andrew Fagan, “Human Rights”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed.), 2006,

http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hum-rts.htm (last accessed on 17.02.2009).

^[124] Suc, ibid.:p.101.

^[125] Suc, 2003, p.101.

^[126] ibid.:p.101.

^[127] Article 22 of the EU’s charter of fundamental rights, adopted in 2000, requires the EU to respect linguistic diversity and Article 21 prohibits discrimination based on language. Together with respect for individuals, openness towards other cultures, tolerance for others, respect for linguistic diversity is a core EU value. This principle applies not only to the 23 official EU languages but also to the many regional and minority languages spoken by segments of its population. It is this that makes the EU what it is - not a ‘melting pot’ that reduces difference, but a place where diversity can be celebrated as an asset.

According to the Treaty of Lisbon, signed by the Heads of State or Government of all EU Member States in December 2007, the EU shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced. See: Official Site of the EU, Europa. Languages and Europe, “Linguistic Diversity”, 2008, http://europa.eu/languages/en/chapter/5 (last accessed on 17.02.2009).

^[128] Suc, ibid.:p.101.

^[129] ibid.:p.101.

^[130] The Louise Weiss Building, as one of the buildings in Strasbourg (France), includes a tower; the so-called ‘Tower of Babel’. Having inspired from the tower, European Union depicted a mission. It combines the 12 stars of the EU flag with the rebuilding of the Tower of Babel with the motto ‘Europe: Many Tongues One Voice’. See: Michael Scheifler (ed.), “Reversing An Act of God With a Modern Tower of Babel”, Bible Light Homepage, available at: http://biblelight.net/Tower-of-Babel.htm (last accessed on 17.02.2009). See also: Douglas S. Winnail (ed.), “Europe: A Modern Tower of Babel”, Tomorrow’s World, Volume 5, Issue 4, available at:

http://www.tomorrowsworld.org/cgi-bin/tw/tw-mag.cgi?category=Magazine25&item=1104178481

(last accessed on 17.02.2009).

^[131] Suc, ibid.;p.101.

^[132] Suc, 2003, p.101.

^[133] ibid.:p.101.

^[134] ibid.:p.102.

^[135] Wodak, 2007, p.79.

^[136] Remi Brague (1992,1993) analyses in a nutshell a few dichotonomies or-following Niklas Luhman-central distinctions that characterise Europe. Cited by: Ruth Wodak&Sonja Puntscher Riekmann, “‘Europe for All’-discursive Konstruktionen europäischer Identitäten” in: Monika Mokre&Gilbert Weiss&Rainer Bauböck (Hrsg.), Europas Identitäten. Mythen, Konflikte, Konstruktionen, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt&New York, 2003, p.286.

^[137] Wodak&Riekmann, ibid.:p.286.

^[138] Niklas Luhman, “Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft”, 2 Bände, Frankfurt, 1997, p.632.

^[139] ibid.:p.632.

^[140] Wodak&Riekmann, 2003, p.286.

^[141] Luhman, ibid.:p.632.

^[142] Also Anthony Giddens emphasizes the relevance of “inclusion/exclusion”(Giddens 2001, p. 323.). He prefers the concepts “social exclusion” or “social inclusion” to the other theoretical appendages and concepts in sociology, as well as to the class- or shift concepts. Giddens defines “exclusion” as “ways in which individuals may become cut off from full involvement in the wider society.”. “Exclusion can be seen”, says Giddens, “in economic, political or social terms”.(ibid.). See: Anthony Giddens (Hrsg.), “Sociology. Introductory Readings”, London, 2001. Cited by: Wodak&Riekmann, ibid.:p.287.

^[143] ibid.:p.287.

^[144] Wodak&Riekmann, 2003, p.287.

^[145] Passerini, 2002, p. 205.

^[146] Rosi Braidotti, “Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory”, Columbia University Press, New York, 1994, pp.9-10.

^[147] ibid;pp.9-10.

^[148] ibid.;p.8.

^[149] ibid.;p.8.

^[150] ibid.;p.8.

^[151] ibid.;p.8.

^[152] Wodak&Riekmann, ibid.:p.287.

^[153] De Cillia, R/Reisigl, M./Wodak, R., “The discursive construction of national identities”, in: Discourse&Society, 10(2), 1999, pp.149-174.

^[154] Demirovic, A./Bojadziejev, M. (Hrsg.), “Konjunkturen des Rassismus”, Münster, 2002.

^[155] Wodak&Riekmann, 2003, p.288.

^[156] Commission of the European Communities, “European Governance. A White Paper”, Com/2001/0428 final, Brussels, 25.7.2001, p.14, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf (last accessed on 18.02.2009).

To get information about the term ‘inclusive society’ see: Outcome 5: Inclusive Society, http://www.winchester.gov.uk/Documents/LSP/Intro_IS.pdf (last accessed on 18.02.2009).

^[157] Wodak&Riekmann, ibid.:p.288.

^[158] ibid.:p.288.